











DESPATCHES,  
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA  
OF  
FIELD MARSHAL  
ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

EDITED BY HIS SON,  
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

[IN CONTINUATION OF THE FORMER SERIES.]

VOLUME THE FIRST.

CONGRESS OF VERONA.

INSURRECTION IN SPAIN; QUESTION OF OCCUPATION OF SPAIN  
BY FOREIGN TROOPS; ARMED INTERVENTION BY FRANCE.  
PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL.  
INDEPENDENCE OF SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE AMERICA.  
THE SLAVE-TRADE.—RUSSIA AND TURKEY.  
COMMERCE OF THE BLACK SEA.  
RUSSIAN CLAIMS ON THE N.-W. COAST OF AMERICA.  
AUSTRIAN DEBT TO ENGLAND.

[JANUARY, 1819, TO DECEMBER, 1822.]



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## NOTICE.

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THE correspondence and documents contained in this volume refer to the period between the evacuation of France by the Allied armies and the termination of the Congress of Verona.

A full table of contents will be given at the commencement of each volume, and a general index at the end of the last.

*London, March, 1867.*

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DESPATCHES,  
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA,  
OF  
F.M. THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duke of York.*

[ 1.]

Office of Ordnance, London, 9th Jan., 1819.

THE Duke of Wellington has the honour of submitting to your Royal Highness, and of requesting your Royal Highness's pleasure upon the enclosed Memorandum\* of a reduction proposed in the Royal Artillery.

The Duke of Wellington begs to draw your Royal Highness's attention particularly to the plan for bringing the officers now to be put on half-pay back to full-pay; and for continuing the promotion of the officers of the Royal Artillery through the half-pay list.

The officers of the Royal Artillery put on half-pay have no line open to them excepting that in which they have served, and to which they have devoted their lives; and it would be highly injurious to his Majesty's service to deprive it of the experience acquired by these officers. The plan, therefore, provides for their gradual return to full-pay, and for the promotion of the junior rank. It likewise provides for the advancement of a certain proportion of cadets from the Royal Academy at Woolwich.

The effect of this plan in a financial view will be, first, that the decrease of expense of the half-pay list will commence with the junior rank of the Artillery, instead of being in proportion to the casualties in all ranks; and, secondly, that the promotion of cadets to half the vacancies of second lieutenants put on full-pay will keep up the number of officers of that rank on half-pay about one year longer than they would otherwise be kept up.

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\* This Memorandum has not been found in any of the public offices. It is said that probably the MS. was burnt in the fire at the Tower of London in 1841.

But it is believed that the justice done to the officers of the Artillery by the adoption of this plan, and the advantage of preserving so many valuable and experienced officers for the service, and of keeping open a stream of promotion from the Academy, will more than compensate for this expense.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Le Baron Vincent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Paris, le 4<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1819.

Un de nos courriers, porteur de différentes communications à faire à Lord Castlereagh de la part de notre Cabinet, me procure, Milord, l'occasion de me rappeler à votre souvenir, qui m'est cher et précieux. Je joins en même tems ici une lettre du Prince de Metternich pour votre Excellence.

Dès son dernier séjour ici elle aura pressentie la secousse qui vient d'arriver hier par le changement du ministère. Le Duc de Richelieu n'ayant que de la loyauté à opposer à des machinations préparées pendant son séjour à Aix-la-Chapelle, abandonné par son *soutien naturel*, ayant laissé deviner sa disposition à une marche plus conséquente, a été facilement déjoué par le parti qui voyait en lui l'obstacle à sa prépondérance. M. de Cazes, en s'emparant du parti Libéral, se croit-il assez fort pour en faire un instrument de gouvernement qu'il saura employer et conduire ? a-t-il un but de politique générale, ou se déclare-t-il pour des opinions qu'il partage ? Voilà ce que nous apprendra la marche et la conduite du nouveau ministère. Je n'en regarde pas moins la tendance révolutionnaire comme ayant étendue grandement son influence partout, par ce qui vient d'avoir lieu en France. M. de Cazes devenu de fait le chef du ministère, par la faveur permanente du Roi, par l'importance de la double attribution des départements de l'Intérieur et de la Police, par son intimité avec le Ministre de la Guerre, ayant pour lui l'opinion des Libéraux, se trouve à l'apogée de sa carrière. Le moment de ses embarras va commencer ; car ici, la mobilité nationale devient un obstacle à la marche constante du gouvernement. C'est cette considération qui fait que je ne partage pas l'opinion de ceux qui voyent dans la composition actuelle du ministère, son affranchissement de l'influence Russe. Si elle avait lieu sous le Duc de Richelieu, c'était sans qu'il le voulut, sans qu'il le sut. Son intention était d'être indépendant de toute influence étrangère. Il n'en sera pas de même actuellement. Le ministère recueillera des éléments déjà répandus, et pourra s'en servir pour déterminer son attitude politique. Les ministres Russes blâment d'avance la conduite du Duc de Richelieu, et le Général Pozzo lui attribue la catastrophe actuelle, pour avoir cédé aux insinuations qu'il a reçu à Aix-la-Chapelle, sur sa conduite ministérielle future.

C'est en considération de l'Empereur de Russie que l'on a fait choix pour le département des Affaires Étrangères du Général Dessolles, qu'il avait connu en 1814, et qui, en dernier lieu encore, a été envoyé à sa rencontre à la frontière. Hier le Comte de Nesselrode faisait l'éloge du Général Des-

solles, parlait avec avantage de M. de Cazes, et ajoutait que le Duc de Richelieu regardait le ministère actuelle comme celui qui convenait le mieux à la France. On peut conclure d'une disposition si prématurée quelle sera la conduite future du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg envers celui des Tuileries, car ce n'est malheureusement pas d'aujourd'hui que l'on trouve de l'opposition entre la marche personnelle et uniforme en principes de l'Empereur Alexandre, la marche de son cabinet, et la conduite de ses agents politiques près de la plupart des gouvernements; cependant il peut exister à l'égard des principes qui partout menacent l'ordre social, un antidote nuisant dans la personne de l'Empereur Alexandre: en occupant son esprit et en intéressant son cœur dans le sens de la Sainte Alliance, on aortit l'effet d'une politique inquiète de sa part, et on le fait contribuer au maintien des principes conservateurs de l'édifice général.

Vous n'ignorez pas, Milord, que M. de Talleyrand s'est beaucoup mêlé de la confection du nouveau ministère. J'ai lieu de croire qu'il avait le désir d'en faire partie, et peut-être une des causes principales qui l'en ont éloigné, c'est la certitude que croit avoir le Général Pozzo, que ses opinions politiques ne sont pas favorables à la Russie. On croit que c'est le motif d'une audience privée qu'il a eue du Roi la veille que la nomination du nouveau ministère a été connue. On a cru aussi qu'à cette occasion il avait tenté un nouvel effort en faveur du maintien du Duc de Richelieu.

Milord, il s'ouvre un vaste champ où votre sagesse et votre bon esprit auront occasion de s'exercer. La bonne cause, les principes conservateurs, ont en vous un fort et noble appui. Puisse notre destinée l'accomplir au milieu du calme et de la tranquillité que vous avez tant contribué de rendre à l'Europe. S'il en était autrement, vous seriez encore celui dans lequel elle placerait sa confiance.

Permettez, Monsieur le Maréchal, qu'à cette occasion, comme dans toutes celles que je pourrai saisir, je vous offre l'hommage de ma profonde vénération, de mon sincère attachement, et de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Duc,

votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

VINCENT.

*Le Prince Castelnau to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, ce 6<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1819.

Vous aurez été, Milord, bien surpris et affligé de la triste fin qu'ont en les divisions du ministère François. Peu après votre départ et celui de Milord Castlereagh ces divisions vagues ont pris une couleur, et un caractère plus déterminé, et le voile qui les environnait a commencé à se déchirer. Bref, mon cher et digne Duc, je vous écrirai comme je suis accoutumé à vous parler, clairement et sans réserve. Je pourrai me tromper sur les conjectures, et je le désire sincèrement, car elles ne sont pas couleur de rose; mais comptez sur les faits, car il n'y en a aucun d'hasardé.

Dans un conseil tenu peu après votre départ, le Duc de Richelieu développa son plan aux autres ministres. Il consistait: 1, à trouver des expédients pour remédier au mal fait par la loi des élections, soit en la changeant et modifiant, soit en rendant la Chambre des Deputés telle qu'elle est per-

manente pendant cinq ans, ou au moins trois ; 2, à suspendre l'habeas corpus ; 3, en continuant à exercer la vigilance sur les écrits publics journaliers, et à l'étendre aussi aux demi-journaux (magazines, &c.). M. de Cazes commença par déclarer qu'il ne voulait jamais de conciliation avec des Ultras, et vota contre les propositions du Duc de Richelieu. St. Cyr et Pasquier se joignèrent à lui. Molé et Laisné furent avec le Duc de Richelieu. Roi, ministre des finances, voulait bien la permanence pour trois ans de la chambre actuelle, mais en faisant cela il croyait qu'on pût se passer d'avoir recours aux autres exceptions.

Le Mardi suivant il y eut conseil présidé par le Roi. S.M. parla avec beaucoup de sagesse, et tâcha de concilier ses ministres. On croyait tout susceptible d'arrangement, puisque le Comte de Cazes parut adopter, quoique avec peine, la mesure de trois ans pour la Chambre des Députés. Tandis que le développement de tout ceci devait avoir lieu, un incident se présentait qui n'admettait pas de délai à délibérer, savoir, le choix du Président de la Chambre des Députés. Comme De Serres ne s'était pas bien conduit avec le gouvernement dans la dernière session, le Duc de Richelieu voulait qu'on ne le confirmât point, et proposait M. Ravez, honnête homme, qui réunissait toutes les qualités et les suffrages. Le Comte de Cazes pensait différemment. Le Roi balança pendant deux jours, mais enfin il sacrifia le favori et élut Ravez. Le Duc de Richelieu s'empessa d'aller lui-même le soir le dire à M. de Cazes, le Mercredi 30 Décembre. Beaucoup de monde était chez ce dernier. Ce fut une imprudence de notre bon Duc qui lui fit perdre bien des Députés, et surtout des Pairs, car on le crut réconcilié avec De Cazes, et chacun s'arrangeait comme il pût. Mais il était dit dans les pages de l'histoire de cette malheureuse monarchie, que cette lutte entre Cazes et Richelieu pour la nomination d'un Président des Députés aurait plus de conséquences qu'elle n'en méritait, et voici comment. Lorsque le nouveau président et le bureau furent présentés à S.M., le Roi reçut très froidement M. Ravez, et manqua presque d'embrasser M. de St. Aulaire, l'un des secrétaires. M. Ravez porta ses plaintes au Duc de Richelieu de cet accueil glacial, et ce dernier écrivit au Roi une lettre très forte, lui disant qu'il lui donnait irrévocablement sa démission.

Le Roi tarda à répondre, ce qui fit croire à MM. Molé et Laisné qu'il l'avait accepté, et ce qui les fit hâter de donner leurs propres démissions. En attendant, la réponse de S.M. au Duc de Richelieu arriva. Le Roi lui disait qu'il avait vu sa lettre avec la plus grande peine ; qu'il fallait y réfléchir avec calme, et qu'ils en causeraient ensemble. En effet S.M. envoya demander le Duc de Richelieu, et nul doute que si ce dernier y eut été seul, il eut tout arrangé avec le Roi en conformité de ses désirs ; mais il commit l'autre imprudence de mener chez le Roi Molé et Laisné, et S.M. ne voulut pas s'expliquer devant ses deux autres ministres ; et la conférence n'eut pas un heureux succès. Néanmoins, tout marchait, mais lentement, et pas assez promptement et au gré du Duc de Richelieu, ce qui fit prendre au dit Duc la résolution d'écrire une lettre encore au Roi, dans laquelle, fort au long et très en détail, il s'efforçait de lui prouver qu'il n'était pas capable d'être son premier ministre ; et finissait par dire qu'il fallait que M. de Cazes partit dans les vingt-quatre heures pour Pétersbourg, où il voulait sans doute l'envoyer ambassadeur. Le Roi revit le Duc de Richelieu, et lui donna l'ordre de former le nouveau ministère ; mais dans ce moment-là Laisné,

Molé, et Pasquier donnerent leurs démissions de nouveau, bien découragés; et cela dérouta le Duc de Richelieu, lequel pourtant n'ayant encore rien arrangé pour le ministère, forma une liste qui décernait la Guerre à Lanrison, l'Intérieur à Cuvier, la Justice à Simeon, et la Mariue à M. de Villèle. Les Ultras ne voulurent pas consentir, ni Monsieur, à Cuvier et à Simeon, sous le prétexte qu'ils avaient fortement soutenu la loi d'élection, qu'on voulait changer; mais si ces deux Messieurs ne pensaient plus comme jadis, cette objection n'était pas fondée. Je le remarquai à Monsieur et à Madame, et je leur fis prévoir qu'ils voulaient par là courir le risque de faire entrer dans le ministère tous les grands Jacobins. Mais toutes les remontrances furent vaines. Ils se croyaient déjà maîtres du champ de bataille. Nonobstant les difficultés sur Cuvier et Simeon, le Duc de Richelieu continua à s'occuper de la formation du ministère; et le Roi dit à son déjeuner que M. de Cazes serait parti, et allé à Livourne. Mais M. de Cazes au lieu de cela travaillait pour faire manquer au Duc de Richelieu la formation de son ministère, à quoi les Ultras contribuaient aussi. Le Conservateur avait fait une profession de principes qui avait si fort alarmé M. Roi, qu'il prit le parti de se retirer tout de suite du ministère, ce qui fit absolument perdre la tramontane à notre bon Duc, qui écrivit une troisième lettre à S. M., lui déclarant qu'il ne pouvait pas former un ministère, et lui donnant sa démission. Il s'en repentit bientôt, mais il n'était plus tems. Le Roi lui répondit d'abord qu'il acceptait sa démission, mais il lui demandait en même tems *le secret*. Le Duc de Richelieu fut donc obligé de se taire; la contrainte, le dépit, et la rage le rendirent sérieusement malade; et il ferma sa porte. Nonobstant cela, il fut assez bon pour envoyer dire à M. de Cazes, qu'il ne voulut pas voir, par M. Laisné, qu'il vit de former un ministère, et désigna même lui pour son successeur le Marquis Dessolles. La Bourse voulait le Baron Louis aux Finances, et celui-ci, en conférence et relation constante avec Lafitte, est entré sous la condition expresse que Cazes et St. Cyr resteraient.

Le Duc de Richelieu a donné trois fois sa démission sans que Pozzo en sût rien. Il avait prié celui-ci de ne pas y aller souvent, et il lui a fermé plusieurs fois la porte. Pozzo a soutenu le Duc de Richelieu de son mieux, et s'est rangé du côté de son système, et contre les Jacobins. Cazes à présent amadoue tout le monde, et tâche de faire croire qu'il suivra un système de conciliation; mais s'il ne chasse pas le Ministre de la Guerre, s'il ne change d'une manière ou de l'autre la loi des élections, l'armée sera perdue pour le Roi, et le nouveau cinquième de l'année prochaine donnera une telle majorité aux Jacobins qu'il y a tout à craindre pour cette monarchie. En attendant, Cazes tâchera de ne rien traiter d'hasardeux dans la session actuelle pour se tirer d'embaras le plus tôt possible. Mais il sera poussé par les Ultras et par les grands Jacobins. Il terrassera les premiers, et s'associera les seconds, qui le terrasseront à leur tour avec tous nous autres. C'est la marche naturelle et progressive du système adopté. Si le Duc de Richelieu avait eu la moindre prévoyance de l'homme d'état, il aurait eu son ministère tout formé lorsque le Roi l'en a chargé, et alors tout était fait. Les grands Jacobins auraient été réduits au silence, et il aurait eu une très grande majorité dans les deux chambres. La loi des élections aurait été changée, et la monarchie sauvée. Mais à la place de cela, de gaucherie en gaucherie, à force d'imprévoyance, et se sachant toujours, il a donné gain

de cause à son adversaire, qui s'est relevé de ses chutes plus puissant et plus favorisé; et c'est lui qui l'a aidé à se relever. Les Jacobins ne pardonneront pas au Roi d'avoir balancé plus d'une fois dans toutes ses divisions, et ils ne s'y fieront pas tandis qu'ils attribuent au simple favoritisme les condéscendances que S.M. a eu et aura pour eux.

Le Duc de Richelieu, dès qu'il a été en contradiction avec M. de Cazes, s'est ouvert avec Monsieur, et l'a consulté sur tout.

La sortie de Laisné et de Molé me fait aussi de la peine. Parce que je crois que de tous côtés ils voyaient la route parsemée de dangers, et ils ont voulu s'en tirer. Il n'y a que deux partis en France: ceux qui veulent détruire la Révolution et les Révolutionnaires; et les Révolutionnaires, qui veulent détruire la monarchie des Bourbons et les Royalistes. Ils sont, les uns et les autres, incapables de conciliation. Ils ont ce mot dans la bouche et la haine dans le cœur.

Je vous supplie, Milord Duc, de me continuer l'honneur de votre bon souvenir; et de garder cette lettre avec le secret que vous jugerez convenable.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec le plus respectueux et inviolable attachement, mon cher Milord,

votre très fidèle et très dévoué serviteur,

CASTELCICALA.

*Sir B. Bloomfield to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Pavilion, 10th Jan., 1819.

I have the honour, by the Prince Regent's commands, to communicate to your Grace his Royal Highness's most entire approval of the arrangement which your Grace proposes for rendering the necessary reduction of the regiment of Artillery as little severe upon the officers of that most valuable corps as possible. His Royal Highness observes with particular gratification that part of the plan by which your Grace, so judiciously and with so much justice to the regiment, combines the retention of so many meritorious and experienced officers in the senior ranks of the corps, and at the same time of keeping open a stream of promotion throughout the junior ranks, without exceeding those financial limits which the exigencies of the times render indispensable.

With great respect I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient servant,

B. BLOOMFIELD.

[ 2. ]

*To Baron Vincent.*

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

Londres, ce 12<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1819.

Je vous remercie bien sincèrement, et je vous suis bien reconnaissant pour votre lettre intéressante sur le changement du

ministère Français. C'est l'évènement le plus curieux dans tous ses détails qui est arrivé depuis longtemps, lequel je crains pourra avoir des résultats bien malheureux pour l'Europe en général.

Dès que le parti ultra-royaliste a voulu fonder leur union avec une partie du ministère du Duc de Richelieu sur des mesures quelconques, j'étais sûr que non seulement ces mesures mais que l'union même deviendrait si impopulaire que personne, pas même ceux qui en avaient formé le plan, oseraient l'approcher, et qu'une scène d'intrigues et de confusion s'en suivrait, dont le pareil n'avait jamais paru. Je l'ai bien prêché dans tous les temps à Monsieur, au Duc de Richelieu, et à tout le monde ; et j'ai bien recommandé au Duc de Richelieu le secret sur les mesures qu'il comptait adopter pour remédier au mal du jour. Mais j'ai prêché dans le désert ! Le plan de tous les côtés était déjà formé quand nous étions à Aix-la-Chapelle, et pendant que d'un côté il y avait l'honneur, l'indiscrétion, et l'irritation, il y a eu de l'autre un plan bien combiné de l'astuce, l'avantage de communications confidentielles avec le Roi, et celui de jouer en même temps le rôle de ministre populaire et celui de favori. Il n'est pas étonnant que le Duc ait succombé : un bien plus habile que lui l'aurait fait également.

Le ministère actuel va marcher, j'en suis sûr, bien franchement dans la ligne des arrangemens fixés à Aix-la-Chapelle. Il n'y a rien qui le tente de faire autrement ; et il est trop occupé de son intérieur pour pouvoir tâcher de se faire une popularité fondée sur sa conduite dans les affaires du dehors. D'ailleurs le *ministre* n'est pas chargé des relations extérieures ; et celles-ci auront moins de son attention et de celle du ministère, que les affaires de l'intérieur pour le moment.

Observez aussi que dans tout ce qu'il écrit et publie il promet toujours de marcher dans la ligne des traités et conventions ; mais il nous dit de ne pas nous mêler de son intérieur. Certes son intérieur, c'est-à-dire, ses révolutions et l'organisation de son armée, nous sont bien aussi importantes qu'à la France. Ces sujets exigent toute notre attention, et celle de tous ceux de la bonne cause qui se trouvent à Paris ; mais j'avoue qu'il ne faut pas s'en mêler.

Le ministère actuel, et surtout le *ministre*, se fonde sur la popularité vulgaire, et sur elle seule, et voilà son danger ; et c'est en la cherchant qu'il mènera le trône à sa ruine. Il n'y a



pas de meilleure manière de la trouver qu'en s'opposant aux mesures que les puissances étrangères, ou leurs agens à Paris, pourraient prendre, pour montrer un intérêt sur telle ou telle affaire qui regarde l'intérieur de la France. Il le fait déjà, et il le fera de plus en plus à chaque occasion qui s'offrira ; et soyez sûr que chaque pas que le ministère Français fait pour se séparer des puissances de l'Europe, même sur les affaires de l'intérieur de la France, il fait un pas vers les Jacobins, et les révolutions, et la confusion. Ainsi je conseille que quels que soient les sentimens que nous avons tous sur le changement récent, quelles que soient les opinions que nous pouvons tous avoir non seulement de la manière dont ce changement a été opéré, mais de son résultat et du caractère du ministère et du ministre, et de ces mesures, je conseille que nous nous n'en éloignons pas, tant que le ministère se conduit dans les affaires étrangères comme il doit, et qu'aux yeux du public au moins il ne paroisse pas de désunion entre les puissances de l'Europe et le gouvernement Français.

Cette conduite est d'autant plus sage, que la conduite contraire ne peut produire aucun résultat que celui de rendre le ministère plus populaire.

Voilà mon opinion, et mon conseil, mon cher Général, que j'ai toujours été accoutumé à vous donner franchement.

J'ai le plaisir de vous faire savoir que le Prince Régent a donné son consentement pour vous conférer la Croix de Commandant de l'Ordre du Bain. Il y a longtemps qu'il vous doit cette marque de sa reconnaissance de vos services.

Croyez moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir H. Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Fulham, Wednesday morning,  
13th Jan., 1819.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

I send for your consideration a hasty Memorandum regarding the fund you propose to establish.

Upon considering maturely who should compose the trust, I am humbly of opinion that it would not be wise to place in it either the Paymaster-General or the Secretary at War; for if they should not, sooner or later, effect an appropriation of it different from what you propose, I am quite convinced that, if under their control in any shape, it would have the effect of superseding in their consideration the necessity of making provision for objects of compassion in the *ordinary course*.

The apprehension that the knowledge of this fund may in any case supersede the provisions made for children on the Compassionate List, induces me to propose that our fund should only be applicable, in the case of children, to objects who receive a certain provision from the Secretary at War; that the favourable consideration of their cases by him should be made the basis of their claim upon our fund.

In order to preserve the independence of the fund, I propose that the trust shall be vested in the hands of the Master-General of the Ordnance and the Governor of the Bank for the time being, and the Accountant-General. Have you any objection to this?

I have mentioned what I have written in this note and memorandum to the Duke by last night's post; and I think, from what I understood from his Royal Highness on this subject formerly, that I have stated his opinion.

My dear Lord Duke, yours most sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

If you think that the Ordnance ought to have a more exclusive share of the fund—that is, by apportioning a part of the principal to that branch, in the proportion of its extent with that of the whole service—your Grace will say so.

[ENCLOSURE.]

#### MEMORANDUM.

It is proposed that the money which the Duke of Wellington intends to place at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief for the benefit of the service in relieving objects of compassion, shall be placed in the funds, under the protection of trustees; that these trustees shall give their power of attorney to Messrs. Greenwood and Cox to receive the dividend at the usual periods, who, as agents to the fund, shall pay the annuities which the Commander-in-Chief may order to the widows and orphans of officers who are in distress. The agents will render the accounts annually for the inspection of the trustees and the Commander-in-Chief, and any balance of interest unappropriated at the end of the year shall be funded with the principal.

In order to render the benefit accruing from this fund as general as possible, and at the same time to guard against the importunities of undefined claims of distress, it is proposed, for consideration, that the distribution of the interest to objects of compassion shall be regulated by rules, to be strictly adhered to.

It is proposed, viz.,—

1st. That the fund shall be applicable only to the distressed situation of widows in aid of the pensions they receive from the government, and in aid of the provision which children may receive from the Compassionate List.

2ndly. That in no case, even of the utmost distress, shall the provision to a widow exceed the amount of her regular pension; and that the proportions within that sum shall be granted at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief, according to the nature and extent of the distress and the state of the fund.

3rdly. In order to bring the claims upon this fund within a limited compass it is proposed that the claims of the children shall be considered in what may be given to the widow; and that no specific sum shall be allotted to children unless they are actual orphans; or in some peculiar cases wherein the children of an officer, a widower, shall be in distress.

4thly. The widows of artillery officers will, of course, participate in the advantages of this fund; but as their claims do not come in any shape under the cognizance of the Commander-in-Chief, the recommendation of the Master-General will be the only document required for granting them the assistance which the nature of their cases, according to his representation of them, may appear to demand.

[ 3.]

To Sir H. Torrens.

SIR,

London, 14th Jan., 1819.

Under the treaty of the 20th of November, 1815, the officers of the Army of Occupation had a right to certain rations, according to their rank respectively, as specified in the tariff annexed to the treaty; and it was agreed that these rations might be commuted for money.

In communication with the General Officers commanding the several contingents I made a Convention with the *Ministre de la Guerre* of the French government, to regulate the sum to be paid by the latter in lieu of officers' rations; in consequence of which the officers of the British Contingent received two francs and a half for every ration to which each was entitled under the treaty of the 20th November, 1815.

The sum paid by the French government in lieu of officers' rations under this Convention has exceeded the sums paid to the officers on account of their rations to the amount of 40,266*l.* 19*s.* 9*d.* There are still, however, some outstanding demands upon it; and the Treasury have decided that the expense of transmitting the money on account of officers' rations from Paris to Cambray, viz.,  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. upon the whole sum received, ought to be paid out of it, which will probably reduce it to about 35,000*l.*, to the disposal of which sum I now beg leave to draw the attention of H.R.H.

There can be no doubt but that it belongs to the officers of the Army of Occupation. It is, however, quite impracticable to divide it among them, as the officers have frequently been changed. Entire regiments which originally belonged to that army have been withdrawn from it; and officers have frequently been absent on leave, when they no longer received the allowance in lieu of rations.

It would be, therefore, impossible to make a division of the money which could be deemed a just one. If such division could be made, the sum for each officer, particularly of the junior ranks, would be so small as to be scarcely deserving

attention; and it appears to me that it would be most advisable to dispose of the money for some general Army purpose, in which all would be interested.

I would propose, then, that the whole sum should be vested in trustees, who should place it in the funds; and empower Messrs. Greenwood and Cox, or any other agent who H.R.H. should appoint, to receive the dividends at the usual periods, and to pay from their amount such sums as might be granted to the widows and orphans of the officers of the army, under warrants from H.R.H. or the Commander-in-Chief for the time being.

The agents should render accounts of the receipts and expenditure from the fund annually to the Commander-in-Chief and to the trustees; and any balance of receipt unappropriated at the end of the year should be again vested in the trustees and placed in the funds to augment the principal.

I would propose that the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General of the Army, the Adjutant-General of the Artillery, the Governor of the Bank, and the Accountant-General of the Court of Chancery, all for the time being, should be the trustees for this fund; and that H.R.H. should be pleased to consider of the following general principles to be adopted in the grants to be made from it:—

1st. That the fund shall be applied to widows of officers in distress, in aid of the pensions they may already receive from government; and in aid of the provision which the children of officers may receive from the Compassionate Fund.

2ndly. That in no case, even of the utmost distress, shall the amount of a grant to a widow exceed the amount of her pension from government; and that the proportions within that amount shall be regulated by the Commander-in-Chief, according to his sense of the nature of the claim of each party applying, and to the state of the fund.

3rdly. That nothing shall be granted from this fund to children, excepting actual orphans.

The widows and children of officers of the Artillery and Engineers shall have claims upon this fund, as well as those of the Army; and the Master-General of the Ordnance shall recommend them to the Commander-in-Chief, and be guided by the same rules, in respect to the objects, the amount of pension, &c.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

ACCOUNT RENDERED TO FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON BY COMMISSARY-GENERAL JOHN BISSET, in his capacity of Commissioner for the Compensation granted by the French Government in lieu of Rations to the Officers of the British and minor Contingents serving with the Army of Occupation in France.

London, 10th Feb., 1819.

Ch.

Dn.	£.		£.	
	£.	s.	£.	s.
Paid as Compensation by Mr. Dunmore prior to my taking charge .. .. .	51,567		Received by Mr. Dunmore prior to the 24th June, 1816 .. .. .	90,000
Ditto by me, from the 25th June, 1816, to the 24th Dec., 1816 .. .. .	104,327		Ditto by me, from the 25th June, 1816, to the 24th Dec., 1816 .. .. .	108,000
Ditto by me, from the 25th Dec., 1816, to the 24th Dec., 1817 .. .. .	158,462		Ditto by me, from the 25th Dec., 1816, to the 24th Dec., 1817 .. .. .	192,857
Ditto by me, from the 25th Dec., 1817, to the 24th Dec., 1818 .. .. .	136,260		Ditto by me, from the 25th Dec., 1817, to the 24th Dec., 1818 .. .. .	169,714
Ditto by me, from the 25th Dec., 1818, to the 24th Feb., 1819 .. .. .	117		Profit on the remittance to London of the Balance in Messrs. de Rothschild's hands, 40,000 <i>l.</i> .. .. .	560,571
Amount of General Warrants authorising me to charge against the Fund the following sums issued for Rat and Foreign Money, viz. :—		450,735		676
No. 1 .. .. .	18,942			
" 2 .. .. .	7,677			
" 3 .. .. .	12,159			
" 4 .. .. .	3,715			
" 5 .. .. .	7,413			
" 6 .. .. .	21,136			
Amount of half per cent. Commission upon the sums received by Messrs. De Rothschild Brothers on account of the Fund, viz. :—		71,085		
Amount received by Commissary-General Dunmore and myself, as stated on the other side .. .. .	560,571			
Deduct that part of the amount paid to Mr. Dunmore which did not pass through Messrs. de Rothschild's hands .. .. .	36,000			
Amount on which they are entitled to the half per cent. Commission .. .. .	524,571			
Amounting in the whole to .. .. .	2,622			
Balance to be paid over .. .. .	36,804			
	561,248			£. 561,248

*Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

29, Upper Harley-street ; 14th Jan., 1819.

I think I cannot, under the actual circumstances of the case, accede to Lord Liverpool's offer of the 35,000*l.* His Lordship reserving the right of agreeing or dissenting from the referee's decision, the same right, of course, will remain with us. I will see you to-day if I can, and probably Lord Liverpool, to learn who he names as his referee. I wish, of course, to avoid delay.

Yours most sincerely,

BERESFORD.

*Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Vienne, le 14<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1819.

J'ai l'honneur de transmettre à votre Excellence, par ordre de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, la patente de Maréchal de ses armées et de Colonel propriétaire du régiment d'infanterie de ligne No. 42, ainsi que la lettre par laquelle son Altesse Monsieur le Maréchal Prince Charles de Schwarzenberg a l'honneur d'informer officiellement votre Excellence de sa nomination à ces deux dignités militaires.

L'armée Autrichienne sera fière de pouvoir vous compter désormais parmi ses chefs les plus distingués, et je m'estime personnellement heureux d'être le premier à vous féliciter, Monsieur le Duc, d'une distinction si bien méritée, qui vous identifie à la monarchie Autrichienne.

Je saisis avec empressement cette occasion pour vous renouveler, Monsieur le Duc, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

METTERNICH.

*To Prince Castelfidardo.*

[ 4. ]

MON CHER PRINCE,

À Londres, ce 15<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1819.

Je vous remercie de votre lettre du 6<sup>me</sup>, et des détails intéressans que vous avez eu la bonté de me donner sur les événemens qui ont eu lieu après mon départ de Paris, et qui ont fini par la séparation du Duc de Richelieu du ministère. Il est certain que c'est un grand malheur, et plus grand encore par la manière dont la séparation s'est accomplie.

Nous avons souvent gémi sur la disposition du gouvernement Français, même sous la présidence du Duc, à chercher la popularité vulgaire ; ce qui a causé la loi des élections, celle de recrutement, et autres mesures toutes antimonarchiques. Nous pouvons nous assurer que ceux du ministère du Duc qui forment le nouveau ministère ont été la cause du mal ; et que ce mal

empirera sous leur influence. Il est aussi certain que leur ministère est formé sur le principe de cette malheureuse popularité ; et qu'il faut qu'ils la recherchent à toute extrémité, même si la perte de la monarchie en est la conséquence inévitable.

Je ne erois pas que le ministère actuel fera dans le moment un changement quelconque dans le système politique extérieur établi à Aix-la-Chapelle. *Le ministre* est trop occupé de l'intérieur, dont il est à la tête ; et d'ailleurs les affaires en France ne sont pas assez avancées pour qu'on puisse abandonner le système général et marcher tout seul.

Mais le corps diplomatique à Paris a un rôle assez difficile à jouer. Malgré que les choses ne sont pas dans l'état où le gouvernement pourrait prétendre marcher seul dans les affaires extérieures, il m'est très clair qu'il en ferait la tentative si il paraissait que cette marche pourrait avancer sa popularité ; et il ne faut pas croire qu'il n'y a pas beaucoup de gens auxquels une telle marche ne serait pas fort agréable, et qui ne désirent pas encore voir la France aux mains avec toute l'Europe.

Le rôle diplomatique à Paris est de tâcher de conserver les choses comme elles sont, et de maintenir la paix générale. La dignité des Souverains empêchera nécessairement que leurs ministres puissent approuver toutes les mauvaises choses qui vont s'y faire ; mais je conseillerais aux ministres étrangers qui se trouvent à Paris, en même temps qu'ils ne se mêleront guères des questions intérieures, de ne pas se séparer trop du gouvernement et du ministère. Si ils le font, ils peuvent s'assurer d'abord que le ministère se fondera sur cette conduite pour acquérir encore de la popularité à leurs dépens, et qu'ils iront enfin jusqu'aux extrémités contre les étrangers et les ministres étrangers, tant qu'ils voyent qu'il y a de la popularité à acquérir par cette conduite.

Je conseille donc que les ministres étrangers à Paris se tiennent unis comme leurs gouvernemens le sont, et qu'ils le montrent dans toutes les occasions possibles ; et puis que, quelle que soit la conduite du ministère sur les affaires intérieures, les ministres étrangers n'ayent pas l'air de la blâmer ni de s'en séparer tant que la conduite du gouvernement dans les affaires extérieures sera conforme aux arrangemens convenus à Aix-la-Chapelle.

Vous voyez, mon Prince, que je vous donne mon opinion franchement comme toujours ; et vous pouvez vous assurer que

je désire comme toujours que les affaires marchent à l'honneur de sa Majesté et au bien-être de la famille royale.

Croyez moi, mon cher Prince,

votre très affectionné, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Le Prince Régent a consenti à donner la Grande Croix de l'Ordre du Bain au Général Woronzow, ce qui fera grand plaisir à son père.

*Sir B. Bloomfield to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Pavilion, 17th Jan., 1819.

Sir B. Bloomfield is commanded by the Prince Regent to convey to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington his Royal Highness's approval of his Grace's proposed reduction in the Royal Engineers; of a part of the corps of Sappers and Miners, and of a proportion of the drivers and horses attached to the rocket troop of Artillery. His Royal Highness is further pleased to approve that the plan adopted in respect to the half-pay officers of the Royal Artillery should be extended to those, under similar circumstances, of the Royal Engineers.

*Le Baron Vincent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Paris, le 18<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1819.

J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 12<sup>me</sup> de ce mois, en réponse à la mienne du 4<sup>me</sup>. Je profite du départ pour Londres de Lord Fitzroy Somerset pour vous remercier, Milord, de la bonté que vous avez eue d'accueillir les détails que je vous ai fait sur les derniers événements qui ont eu lieu ici, et de me faire connaître votre opinion sur les suites vraisemblables qui doivent en résulter. La marche calme et sage que vous indiquez, Milord, est sans doute la seule qu'il convienne de suivre. L'observation la plus attentive de toutes les mesures du ministre et du ministère nous est impérieusement commandée, sans pour cela vouloir nous ingérer dans les affaires intérieures d'un gouvernement qui annoncerait les dispositions à remplir d'ailleurs les différents engagements convenus avec l'Europe; mais jusqu'à présent ce même ministère, qui s'est formé sous l'influence du parti Libéral, se trouve avoir passé sous son inquiète surveillance, jusqu'à ce qu'il en soit dominé; alors il sera entraîné sur un penchant trop rapide pour ne pas être précipité. C'est celui que choisira le parti pour se porter aux dernières extrémités; c'est aussi celui qu'il faut prévoir, s'il n'est pas en notre pouvoir de le conjurer, et qu'avec une extrême prudence il faut se tenir en mesure de repousser au moment même où il arborera ses couleurs.

Ce moment de l'extrême crise est plus ou moins éloigné; cependant plu-



sieurs indices viennent ajouter aux dispositions connues du parti, et font juger qu'il ne tardera pas à porter les choses à l'extrême. Des gens se montrent et agissent qu'on n'avait pas aperçus depuis la restauration, et une mesure dont il est question de faire usage, va lever tous les doutes sur l'espérance qu'on pourrait encore conserver, de voir le ministère balancer les opinions. Je veux dire celle de la nomination de trente nouveaux Pairs afin d'obtenir de cette Chambre une majorité à laquelle le ministère sait bien qu'il ne parviendra pas sans un moyen aussi hasardeux. Si le Roi—dont la santé s'altère, et qui, dit-on, a désiré que le ministère l'entretienne peu d'affaires—si le Roi donne les mains à ce moyen désespéré, la révolution se trouvera opérée, et dès lors le ministère devenu entièrement passif, ne devra encore pendant quelque temps son existence qu'à son propre asservissement au parti qui dominera.

Vous comparerez, Milord, ces notions, peut-être trop rembrunies, avec celles qui vous parviendront d'ailleurs, et vous jugerez mieux que personne si, avec le caractère inconsidéré et léger de cette nation, la moindre circonstance ne peut pas accélérer une crise, ou qu'on regarderait comme éloignée, ou qu'on conserverait l'espoir d'écarter encore ?

J'ai été bien flatté d'apprendre de vous, Milord, les dispositions bienveillantes du Prince Régent à mon égard ; c'est à vous, Monsieur le Maréchal, que je dois sans doute d'avoir fixé sur moi l'attention de S.A.R., et de me voir associé à un ordre auquel vos succès militaires ont donné tant d'éclat.

Je vous prie, Milord, d'agréer, avec votre bonté ordinaire, la nouvelle assurance de mon attachement et de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Duc,

vosre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

VINCENT.

*El Duque de Fernan Nuñez to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

EXMO. SEÑOR, QUERIDO PRIMO,

Paris, 18 de Enero, 1819.

No quiero perder la ocasión del viaje de Lord Fitzroy sin ponerte dos renglones para desearte un feliz año nuevo y recordarte mi amistad verdadera.

Aquí, como sabrás, tenemos el cuadro político enteramente mudado, y al fin se realizó lo que yo te dije varias veces. Estarás tan bien informado de todo que será excusado que yo te diga nada, pero sin embargo no puedo menos de aconsejarte no creas mucho en todas las relaciones que lleguen ahí: pues en el día el nuevo ministerio no pierde medio de grangearse la opinión de las cortes extranjeras, qui habran visto con sorpresa la salida del unico hombre que les podia inspirar confianza. En las camaras nada se ha hecho todavía, por que la votacion no está muy asegurada: esto tiene en expectativa á todos. Los militares, los prefectos realistas, todos se van mudando y son remplazados por gentes del partido ministerial: aun se habla de la reforma de la Guardia—esto es, en su formacion—y si tal sucede ¿ que seguridad tendra el Rey ? Excelmans y otros expatriados han obtenido su perdon, y en casa de los ministros, las noches de audiencia, se ven todos los sugetos que antes no se presentaban, como el General Andreossi, el Abate Prat,

y todos los militares á medio sueldo. Donnadieu ha sido rayado de la lista activa, y se produce en los terminos mas furiosos. El Duque d'Aumont ha sido destituido tambien de su mando militar; lo mismo que el Duque de Croÿ; y así podría citarte otros muchos. Con esta marcha, ¿que seguridad tendremos de la tranquilidad futura? Mientras tanto el Rey parece muy contento, pero lo demas de Palacio esta en la desolacion, temblando el porvenir.

De España ya sabrás el gran sentimiento del Rey por la muerte de la Reina, que era toda su consolacion interior. Mucho se ha sentido en el publico la perdida de esta Señora, tan recomendable por todos titulos. Y en las circunstancias de disgustos con los Portugueses es tambien sensible, pues era siempre un garante de conciliacion mutua, del que solo quedarán sensibles memorias. La Reina esposa de Carlos IV. está tambien muriéndose, de modo que la muerte anda listo con las soberanas: pues tambien la de Wirtemberg acabó bien jóven.

La Princesa de Castelfranco y la Duquesa de Híjar me encargan expresiones para ti; yo no quiero molestarte mas con mi carta, y así coneluyo renovándote mi fina amistad, y con la confianza de que me continuarás la tuya, me repite tu affectissimo primo y amigo, Q. T. M. B.,

FERNAN-NUÑEZ.

*Sir B. Bloomfield to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Pavilion, 28th Jan., 1819.

Sir B. Bloomfield is commanded by the Prince Regent to convey his Royal Highness's approval of the Memoranda of further reduction in the military branches of the Ordnance, as submitted by Field Marshal his Grace the Duke of Wellington, namely,—

- In the Staff of the corps of Drivers.
- In the establishment of Cadets.
- In the Riding-house establishment.

B. BLOOMFIELD.

*Mr. Baring\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Paris, 28th Jan., 1819.

I have great pleasure in informing your Grace that we are at last relieved from the unpleasant suspense in which we have for some time been held, by the Court of Vienna having consented to the late arrangement for the postponement of the last hundred millions of the French contributions. Baron Barbier, the Austrian Commissary, communicated to us yesterday that instructions to this effect had been received from his Court, and I have from another quarter been privately informed that the letter from Prince Metternich expressed some surprise that Baron Vincent should have thought any further authority for this purpose necessary—a circumstance which confirms the opinion I always entertained that the difficulties we encountered were more due to the Austrian Commissaries here than to the ministers at Vienna. I shall now endeavour to bring to a close my question of compensation with the government here. The ministers feel that their claim places them in an

\* Afterwards created Lord Ashburton.

awkward position, and they determined to wait for the answer from Vienna. On my part, being persuaded that the price of the stock must gradually improve, I had no objection to the delay; but in a few days I trust the question will be settled. As this is the last act of my operations with the French government, I am anxious that it should terminate so that I may leave behind me the same reputation for liberality and fair dealing which I have hitherto maintained with them; and for this purpose I would sacrifice more than they should fairly ask. But as I do not, since the late change in the ministry, quite place the same confidence in a reciprocal disposition, I am obliged to approach the discussion with more caution than I otherwise should, and as yet I have made no concession of the right to compensation, nor can I until I see more clearly in what way it is to be used. After all, however, I have little doubt but that this sparring with Baron Louis will end satisfactorily. Public credit is recovering fast, the price of the rente is about 70, and if we are disturbed by no event, I think we are now on firm ground and may hope to close all our engagements with the Allies by anticipation within the year. It is now very evident that the great depression here was owing to the operations of the Treasury to give artificial support to prices during the sitting of the Congress; the disposition of Baron Louis to undervalue his predecessor has let out some conclusive secrets on this point. In general the state of the public mind here is certainly tranquil, and I look confidently to a year of quiet, if the King's life holds. The turbulent part of the community are buying off by the places and employments of government; but whether present quiet is not purchased at the expense of the future, time only can determine. It is certain that if the present system of nominations continues, we shall soon have an entire Bonaparte government with a Bourbon head. This may move while the King recognises the policy of continuing the revolution; but if his successor hesitates an instant the conflict immediately begins and must be short, for St. Cyr will very soon not leave a regiment upon which the family can depend. All that can be said is that this is better than the Duke de Richelieu's ill-concerted plan, or rather no plan, of reaction, which it is now evident could not have been executed; but I cannot but think that there were ample materials, if well used, to have conducted the government with some regard to its permanent institutions, and without the necessity of throwing it unconditionally into the hands of the revolutionary party. I consider the ministry essentially in the hands of Louis and St. Cyr. M. de Cazes is in a state of constant compromise with them, either real or affected; but he will soon find himself in the position of M. de Richelieu—in the necessity of yielding to or retiring from those who outbid him in liberalism. The result of the next elections will give us some insight into the future. De Cazes thinks he can manage them; but it is not difficult if he contents himself with any persons professing themselves enemies of the Royalists. For my purpose, however, I have no reason to complain: we shall certainly have tranquillity for the present, whatever may become of things hereafter. M. de Talleyrand is very busy, but I believe with little chance of success. From all I hear I should think Molé the most likely successor to M. D'Osmond.

I have the honour to be, with the utmost respect,  
your Grace's most obedient servant,

A. BARING.

*To General Vincent.*

[ 5. ]

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

À Londres, ce 29<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1819.

J'ai eu le plaisir de recevoir votre lettre du 18<sup>me</sup>, et le Chevalier Stuart m'a depuis écrit ce dont vous lui aviez chargé de me dire, sur la nomination du Général Frimont.

Le fait est, que nous ne regardons pas tant le rang de celui sur lequel on veut conférer l'ordre dans ce pays-ci que le service sur lequel il est employé ; seulement il faut qu'il soit Général, selon le règlement actuel, pour avoir la Croix de Commandeur ; et il faut avoir la Croix de Commandeur, ou avoir commandé un corps en chef, pour avoir la Grande Croix. Ainsi donc le Général Frimont a la Grande Croix ; et je suis certain que si le règlement le permettait le Régent serait bien heureux de vous la donner aussi.

Je suis beaucoup de votre opinion. Les choses se trouvent dans un mauvais état à Paris, et s'empireront dans le sens révolutionnaire. Le ministère n'a pas le pouvoir de s'arrêter ; et le seul faible espoir que j'ai, est, que les Royalistes auront le bon sens de leur prêter son appui gratuite, qui leur donnera les moyens de retarder la crise. Mais nous, c'est-à-dire, le corps diplomatique, ne peut rien faire que bien observer ce qui se passe, et se tenir bien uni. Il faut que le ministère cherche la popularité, et il le fera au dépens de et malgré tout, et sacrifiera tout ce qui pourrait entraver sa marche quoique faiblement.

Je vais à Woolwich pour montrer à l'Archiduc nos établissemens d'artillerie, et il faut que je vous quitte.

Croyez moi, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Lord Hill to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Hawkstone, near Shrewsbury ;  
29th Jan., 1819.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

I could not read the promotions in the last 'Gazette' without feelings of warm gratitude towards your Grace for your obliging attention to the applications I have made in behalf of several deserving officers, whose names I had the satisfaction to see in the list of promotions. Feeling as I do, I cannot resist the grateful pleasure to offer to your Grace my most sincere thanks for your compliance with my requests on this occasion, and for your great attention towards me during the long and interesting period I have had the honour to be under your orders. My dear Sir, I feel myself *greatly*

in your debt; more perhaps than I can ever hope to repay; but be assured your Grace has obliged one who will *never* forget your kindness.

I have the honour to remain

your very faithful, sincere, and obliged servant,

H.H.L.

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*M. Neumann to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Chandos House, le 30<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1819.

Le soussigné, Chargé d'Affaires de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, a reçu de sa Cour l'ordre de remettre à son Excellence Monsieur le Duc de Wellington le paquet ci-joint, contenant la patente de Maréchal des armées et de Colonel propriétaire du régiment d'infanterie de ligne No. 42 de sa Majesté Impériale, son auguste maître, dont elle lui a conféré les dignités. Ce paquet renferme aussi deux lettres officielles de L.L.A.A. Messieurs les Princes de Schwarzenberg et de Metternich, relatives au même objet.

Le soussigné, sachant que son Excellence a l'intention de s'absenter aujourd'hui de la ville, et se trouvant, par là, privé de l'honneur de lui présenter en personne ces documens, ne veut cependant pas différer à les faire tenir à son Excellence; et en s'acquittant ainsi de sa commission, il saisit avec empressement cette occasion pour la prier d'agréer l'hommage de sa plus haute considération.

NEUMANN.

[Compliments. Le Duc lui est bien obligé, et a l'honneur d'avouer la reception de la patente de Maréchal des armées d'Autriche et de Colonel propriétaire du régiment No. 42, que S.M.I. lui a fait l'honneur de lui conférer.]

[ 6. ]

*To Lord Mulgrave.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, Feb., 1819.

I have, as you will have heard, taken possession of my office at the Ordnance; and I have certainly every reason to be satisfied with everything that I have found there, and I should wish to leave everything as it is. But when you will recollect that I have been employed in the public service in different ways for above ten years, that I have officers about me who have been with me, some of them for the whole, others for the greatest part of that time, whom I have necessarily been obliged to employ confidentially, you will see that I cannot take upon me such an office as that of Master-General of the Ordnance, and

I will not remain in it, if I cannot have about me some of those officers who have served me till now.

You have placed such good men in all the offices that it is a difficult task to fix upon the person to be moved. I had thought of Singleton; but you are aware of the relation in which he stands to Lord Cornwallis and government, and Lord Liverpool, to whom I have spoken upon the subject, is anxious that he should remain.

That which occurs to me at present is to move Admiral Moorsom, which, however, I would not do without writing to you upon the subject; and I declare to you that I would prefer a hundred times that you should come back to your office than that I should touch any of them.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duc de Richelieu.*

[ 7. ]

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

À Londres, ce 1<sup>er</sup> Février, 1819.

J'ai eu le plaisir de recevoir votre lettre du 13<sup>me</sup>; et je vous assure que quoique je regrette les circonstances fâcheuses qui sont arrivées à Paris après mon départ, je ne peux pas douter, d'après ce que j'ai su quand j'y étais, qu'elles étaient inévitables. Dans la crise où vous vous trouviez vous aviez trop de chances contre vous; et les *malheureux* avec lesquels vous aviez à coopérer pour le salut public cherchaient un triomphe sur leurs adversaires politiques, au lieu de conseiller autant de monde que possible au changement qui devait se faire.

Je souhaite que le gouvernement actuel se conduira de manière à se concilier la confiance de l'Europe, laquelle, je ne vous flatte pas en vous le disant, a reçu une secousse violente quand vous vous êtes éloigné des conseils de S.M. Quoique nous n'ayons rien à dire aux affaires intérieures de la France, nous y sommes tous intéressés terriblement; et nous les regardons avec une jalousie qui correspond à cet intérêt. Mais j'ai bien recommandé au corps diplomatique à Paris qu'il faut éviter de faire une parade de cette jalousie, et que la meilleure chose non seulement pour le Roi, mais pour leurs propres gouvernements, était de ne pas s'éloigner du gouvernement malgré qu'ils n'en

fussent pas contents ; et de se tenir bien unis entre eux, puisque leurs gouvernemens l'étaient.

Je vous assure, Monsieur le Duc, que je n'ai pas de souvenir plus agréable que de vos bontés, et de l'intimité à laquelle vous m'avez admis, pendant que j'ai eu le commandement des troupes en France ; et j'apprends avec plaisir que nous pouvons espérer de vous voir ici au printemps. Vous y trouverez beaucoup d'amis ; et tout le monde est disposé à vous recevoir comme vous le méritez.

Croyez moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Le Prince Castelfidardo to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, ce 3<sup>me</sup> Février, 1819.

J'ai reçu avec une vive reconnaissance, mon cher Milord, votre lettre du 15 du mois passé, par laquelle vous avez daigné répondre à celle que j'avais eu l'honneur de vous écrire, avec cette franchise et cette supériorité de vues qui vous caractérisent. Vous voyez clair, très clair, Milord, et rien n'échappe à votre œil d'aigle. Vous avez trouvé la véritable origine de ce que nous souffrons dans l'envie extrême qui ont les ministres ici de se rendre populaires. C'est cette popularité à laquelle ils visent qui formera notre perdition et leur condamnation, si le système ne subit pas bientôt quelque altération. Ce que vous m'avez écrit là-dessus m'a frappé d'étonnement, parce que j'ai tout de suite reconnu que c'était vrai, et pourtant cela ne nous était pas venu dans l'esprit. Mais vous m'avez ouvert les yeux, et m'avez mis en état d'observer avec plus de fruit. Un gouvernement qui prend pour base de sa conduite la popularité du moment est un gouvernement qui porte en soi-même le germe de sa propre destruction. Vous avez eu le bonheur d'avoir en Angleterre, pendant une longue suite d'années, un souverain et un premier ministre qui avaient tous les deux une espèce d'horreur pour cette popularité momentanée ; et je vous assure que j'ai entendu dire des choses à George III, et à Mr. Pitt qui marquaient le plus profond mépris pour cette espèce d'opinion.

La conduite des ministres étrangers qui résident à Paris est bien difficile. Les règles que vous nous tracez dans l'admirable lettre que vous m'avez fait la grâce de m'écrire sont pleines de sagesse. Mais nous sommes bien loin encore de notre compte là-dessus. Pozzo à la place de tout louer et soutenir, comme il faisait du tems du Duc de Richelieu, ne s'immisce pas moins dans les affaires, mais en blâmant tout, et en voyant les objets d'une couleur tout-à-fait différente qu'il ne faisait par le passé. Ses discours avec le ministère Français ne laissent pas d'avoir une certaine air de menace par les alternatives de probabilités futures qu'il présente en perspective si l'on continue dans ce système. Son antagoniste, au contraire, est très content des ministres, jouit de la chute de l'influence de Pozzo, et on lui suppose une influence, que dans le fond il n'a pas ; et je suis fâché de cette sup-

position, car cela fait croire à bien du monde que l'Angleterre foment ce état de choses. Le ministère Français cajole beaucoup l'antagoniste en question, mais il y a une très grande différence entre cajoler et donner une influence. Ils devraient s'abstenir l'un et l'autre d'en exercer. Le tems de pouvoir influer pour le bien avec succès de la part des ministres des puissances alliées est passé. Avec adresse, mettant de côté les passions, et tenant un langage constant et plein de sens, lorsque les troupes alliées occupaient encore la France, ces ministres auraient pu faire beaucoup de bien. A présent se taire et ne point se mêler des affaires du gouvernement de la France est tout ce qui peuvent faire de mieux. Vous avez parfaitement raison de croire que le ministère Français chercherait de nouveaux moyens de se rendre populaires dans sa conduite à Paris. Je vous raconterai à cet égard quelque chose qui vient à l'appui de votre opinion. Le Marquis Dessolles a eu dernièrement recours à moi dans une dispute assez vive qu'il a eu avec le Comte de Pralorme, Chargé des Affaires de Sardaigne. Celui-ci a demandé avec instance le rappel du Duc d'Alberg, et dit au Marquis Dessolles que si le Roi de France ne le rappelait pas, on obligerait la Cour de Sardaigne à changer son système d'alliance, et à se jeter entre les bras de l'Autriche. Le Marquis Dessolles a senti au vif ces expressions, qu'il a pris pour des menaces, et a souhaité que j'arrêtasse toutes autres démarches ultérieures de ce Chargé d'Affaires. En attendant on a lavé la tête au Duc d'Alberg, en lui disant que le Roi de France étant fermement déterminé à ne point souffrir que des ministres étrangers se mêlassent des affaires internes de la France, voulait par une règle de stricte réciprocité, que ses ministres au dehors ne se mêlassent en rien des affaires internes des pays où ils résident. Cela vous montre, Milord Duc, combien leur système coïncide avec vos craintes. Au reste, par ce que le Marquis Dessolles m'a dit, ils rappelleront d'Alberg, mais ils le feront sans se presser, pour ne pas paraître céder aux menaces de la Cour de Turin. Ce d'Alberg le mérite bien, car non-seulement il travaille pour donner une nouvelle constitution aux états du Roi de Sardaigne, mais ne cesse de faire entrevoir aux Génois que la France souhaite le rétablissement de la République de Gènes. C'est la seule chose que je puis vous dire après ma dernière qui puisse avoir quelque rapport aux affaires générales. Je suis de votre avis qu'à présent on ne songe pas aux affaires du dehors, et à innover sur ce que l'on a fait à Aix-la-Chapelle. Une autre chose je dois vous dire dans notre confiance intime, et c'est que la Russie et la France travaillent pour tâcher d'induire Ferdinand VII. à épouser la Princesse de Mecklenbourg-Schwerin, nièce de l'Empereur de Russie, ce qui montre l'idée toujours existante d'union étroite entre ces trois puissances.

Le Duc d'Angoulême commence à ne pas approuver les mesures du ministère actuel, et il a hasardé dans deux ou trois occasions de parler au Roi les caractérisant d'Ultra-Libérales; cela forme une petite addition de confort au pauvre Monsieur, contre le règne duquel je suis persuadé que bien de mesures tendent. La gendarmerie, qui était un excellent corps, se change presque en entier, et est remplacé par des gens absolument révolutionnaires. Dans le Conseil St. Cyr et Louis sont les plus liés, Portal et de Cazes formant de l'autre côté une union intime, et qui jette sur les autres les résolutions extrêmes. Le Garde des Sceaux Dessolles a, et soutient souvent, des principes très dangereux. Les épurations des Royalistes



sont un peu suspendues, mais elles reprendront après un court intervalle accordé seulement pour apaiser les cris.

Le projet de loi sur la responsabilité des ministres est encore une offrande sur l'autel de la popularité.

Le Comte de Cazes continue à avoir une correspondance sur les affaires avec le Duc de Richelieu.

Agréez, mon cher Milord, les assurances de mon inviolable et respectueux attachement.

Les Comtes Woronzow, père et fils, savent toutes les obligations qu'ils vous ont pour l'Ordre de Bath, que S.A.R. le Prince Régent a conféré à votre recommandation. Plait à Dieu qu'il y eût beaucoup de gens comme eux dans ce pays-ci ! Nous serions dans un état bien différent.

De votre Excellence, Milord Duc,

le très dévoué et très fidèle serviteur,

CASTELICCALA.

*Rev. Dr. Curtis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

North Cumberland Street, Dublin,  
4th Feb., 1819.

MY LORD DUKE,

I find myself called upon by every sentiment of gratitude and duty to acquaint your Grace (whose goodness and humanity will, I confide, excuse this my unavoidable intrusion) that the Roman Catholic prelates of Ireland have, some time back, applied to Rome, and made what is called a postulation, officially praying his Holiness to appoint me Roman Catholic Archbishop of Armagh, in the room of the late M. R. Dr. Richard O'Reilly, which determination of theirs I but very recently discovered, with no less pain than surprise, as it had been taken, not only without my consent or knowledge, but contrary to the absolute refusal I had previously given to such proposal when made to me, and when I excused myself, alleging my advanced age, and other disqualifications, that rendered me totally unfit for such a charge. As the prelates, however, (instead of acquiescing in my reasons, as I expected), have thought proper to overrule my repugnance, and to proceed in their design, I could not avoid submitting, without downright disobedience, arrogance, and contempt, amounting to a breach of duty.

Yet, as I doubted if said prelates had made, or, in existing circumstances, could venture to make their said postulation known to his Majesty's government, (which I could wish were always done on such occasions), I, unawed by agitators, who endeavour to inflame and mislead the public opinion, take the liberty to give this notice of it to your Grace, praying you, should it appear deserving any attention, to have it communicated to such department as you may deem expedient, (but keeping the whole reserved in every other respect), to the end that, if any doubts should be there entertained concerning my principles, connexions, or conduct, the nomination made in my favour may be set aside, which might be easily effected in the present stage of the business, and without the smallest complaint on my part, as I have no desire of any such appoint-

ment, although it has been insidiously asserted by some here, who are declared and popular candidates for the vacant prelacy; nay, and it has even appeared in our public papers that I had, in this affair, implored government patronage, and was powerfully supported by its influence at Rome, where I have never yet so much as thought of applying.

I hope your Grace will always do me the justice to live persuaded of my unalterable attachment, and of the profound respect with which

I have the honour to remain, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's ever faithful humble servant,

P. CURTIS.

*To the Duque de Fernan Nuñez.*

[ 8. ]

À Londres, ce 5<sup>me</sup> Février, 1819.

EXMO. SEÑOR MI QUERIDO PRINCE,

Je vous suis bien obligé de la lettre que vous m'avez écrit le 18<sup>me</sup> Janvier; et je regrette extrêmement, de commun avec vous, l'absence du Duc de Richelieu du ministère Français. Il possédait la confiance générale; et il avait un fonds de droiture et de probité qui influait sur tout ce qu'il faisait, et sur toutes les mesures du gouvernement. Il a fait des fautes comme d'autres; mais quand les intentions sont bonnes les conséquences des fautes ne sont jamais si graves.

J'espère que le gouvernement actuel marchera bien, et surtout qu'ils éviteront l'écueil de chercher la popularité avec trop d'avidité. J'avoue que je ne comprends pas les mesures dont vous me parlez dans le militaire. Il ne peut pas être nécessaire ou de rappeler en France ceux qui s'étaient toujours déclaré les ennemis du Roi et de la famille royale, ou d'en employer d'autres de la même espèce, ou de nommer pour commander des régimens de garde des officiers reconnus pour être les plus attachés aux fortunes et à la personne du Buouaparte. Mais malgré que nous devons tous regarder ces mesures avec amertume et même appréhension, il me paraît impossible d'en dire un mot au gouvernement du Roi; et il ne faut pas croire qu'ils ne publieront pas ce qu'on pourrait leur en dire, si cette publication pourrait leur paraître utile. Nous n'avons rien à présent pour ressource que le silence, la patience, et l'union entre nous-mêmes, et l'espérance que cette union, si elle n'empêche pas tout le mal qui pourrait résulter de ces mesures, au moins le diminuera, et empêchera qu'il puisse devenir encore une fois la désolation de l'Europe.

Je vous prie de remercier la Princesse et la Duchesse de leur agréable souvenir, et de leur dire de ma part tout ce que vous croyez pouvoir leur être agréable.

Croyez moi, &c.

WELLINGTON,  
DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO.

[ 9. ]

*To General Pozzo di Borgo.*

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

A Londres, ce 5<sup>m</sup> Février, 1819.

Depuis que je vous ai écrit la dernière fois j'ai reçu une lettre bien aimable et amicale du Duc de Richelieu, à laquelle j'ai répondu ; et j'espère qu'il la recevra. Il parle de nous faire une visite ici au printemps, ce qui nous fera à nous tous, et surtout à moi, le plus grand plaisir.

Je ne suis pas trop content de l'emploi de certains généraux dont j'ai la liste ; mais il faut gémir sur tout ceci en silence, et espérer que notre union empêchera une partie au moins du mal que pouvait en résulter, et surtout qu'il puisse encore devenir la désolation du monde.

Je connois bien les circonstances sur lesquelles vous avez touché, et les difficultés où vous vous trouvez ; et je vous assure qu'ils sont connues ici. Étant connues, vous croirez que le remède n'est pas difficile, cependant il l'est beaucoup plus que vous ne croyez.

Je vous recommande la patience dans cette affaire comme dans d'autres ; et à la fin les choses iront bien. J'ai parlé à Palmella sur son retour ; et il attend un courier du Marquis de Marialva pour s'y décider. Je le verrai encore demain à l'enterrement à la chapelle Portugaise de la Reine d'Espagne, ce qui est le deuxième enterrement de la dite Señora dans cette ville depuis huit jours.

Croyez moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Lord Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Saturday, 6th Feb., 1819.

I entirely agree with you in feeling our position with respect to these insurgent enrolments to be most embarrassing and unbecoming.

You will see by papers Planta will send you, that I have already ordered a prosecution upon the Duke of San Carlos' last complaint. I have desired all the former references to the Crown-lawyers on similar complaints, less sustained, however, by proofs, to be sent to you; also drafts of a Bill to amend the Law, which was prepared last session but not introduced, hoping that Spain would launch the mediation, and enable us to carry through the Bill without exposing our ally to all the torrent of abuse, which is to be foreseen if we have nothing to say in his support, except that we have no right to pronounce upon the policy of a foreign state.

When I return to town I should wish to talk with you upon the whole of this subject, and we may then consider the expediency of bringing it before the Cabinet.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

*W. Hamilton, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 6th Feb., 1819.

I send your Grace herewith all the Duke of San Carlos' notes, &c., on aid to the insurgents, &c., received last year. The answers were generally verbal, and to the effect of the written answer sent by Lord Bathurst in December.

I have sent the Duke's note of the 22nd ult., with its enclosures; to the Treasury, in order that there may be no delay in preparing for the prosecution, if finally determined on, and the draft of a reply to the Duke de San Carlos is sent this afternoon to Lord Castlereagh for his approbation.

Your very faithful and obedient servant,

W. HAMILTON.

P.S.—We have not in the office the Draft of a Bill, which was prepared last year, and alluded to in Lord Castlereagh's letter to your Grace, but I have written for a copy of it to the King's Advocate, and will send it to Apsley House the moment I receive it.

W. H.

*To the Rev. Dr. Curtis.*

[ 10. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 6th Feb., 1819.

I have this day received your letter of the 4th inst., and it makes me very happy to find that you are appreciated as you deserve in your own country; and that it is wished to see you appointed to so exalted and important a situation as that of Archbishop of Armagh.

I consider this appointment to be so honourable and advantageous to the country that I have requested the Secretary of

State, in making known to him what I thought of your character and conduct for many years that I have known you, to do everything in his power to forward the wishes of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. I don't know whether he can interfere, or, if he does, whether his interference will be of any use to you. But it can do no harm; and it is very satisfactory to me to have an opportunity of testifying the opinion which I entertain of you.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 11. ]

*To Lord Sidmouth.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 8th Feb., 1819.

I enclose you a letter which I have received from Dr. Curtis, who it appears has been recommended by the Catholic Church in Ireland, to be made the Catholic Archbishop of Armagh.

This Dr. Curtis was head of the Irish College at Salamanca, in Spain. I found him to be a very honest, loyal man; and he behaved remarkably well throughout the war. He has none of the modern notions of religion or philosophy, and although a zealous and probably a bigoted Roman Catholic, he is not inimical to the British Government, and in my opinion there is no person who it would be more desirable to see in the situation to which it is proposed to appoint him.

I don't know whether Government can or will interfere in this appointment, but, as Dr. Curtis has written to me, I have thought it proper to make known to you what he says, and what I think of him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 12. ]

*To Lord ———.*

MY DEAR LORD,

10th Feb., 1819.

I received, last night, your letter of the 9th. The promotions by brevet, granted to officers by my recommendation, have never been the object of private solicitation. If they were ever to become so they would lose their value, as well to the public as to the officers who are promoted.

Captain ——— served in the Battle of Waterloo alone, and he is junior to all the officers in the Artillery who have been promoted. Now, when I state to your Lordship, first, that notwithstanding that I recommended seven officers for promotion in the Artillery on the late occasion, there are still many in that corps not yet promoted who have served throughout the war in the Peninsula and in America, and at the Battle of Waterloo; and, secondly, that this promotion by brevet must necessarily be limited in numbers, or it would become of no value to any; you will be disposed to admit that, whatever may be the nature of the claim of Capt. ———, there may be others with as good, if not a better claim on my attention, and that it is not necessary for me to give any further justification of myself for not having promoted Capt. ———. The fact is, that compared with the claims of others, he has no claim at all: and if I were to recommend him for promotion by brevet, I must certainly recommend every officer his senior who served either in the Battle of Waterloo or any other battle, and probably many of his juniors. You will see that this is quite impossible.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Le Comte Pozzo di Borgo to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MILORD,

Paris, le 11<sup>me</sup> Février, 1819.

Le Comte de Woronzow veut bien se charger de vous remettre la présente en réponse à celle que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 5<sup>me</sup> de ce mois. Je vous prie, Milord, de croire à toute ma déférence pour vos conseils, et au prix infini que j'attache à la continuation de votre bonne opinion et de votre confiance. L'expérience et la raison nous démontrent que le salut de l'Europe dépend de l'union des puissances, et que s'il existe une influence capable d'arrêter les efforts des révolutionnaires en France, et de contenir les ministres actuels dans des bornes qui ne les rapprochent pas trop des ennemis de la dynastie légitime, c'est encore de cette union qu'elle peut provenir exclusivement.

Quel que soit la présomption ou les desseins des principaux acteurs ici, il n'y a nul doute que l'attitude de l'Europe ne leur en impose. Sans avoir recours à des démarches positives et formelles, il existe mille manières de se faire comprendre tout en évitant de se compromettre; et comme les chefs sont loin de vouloir s'exposer au mal qui pourrait leur en arriver, ils s'arrêteront peut-être, et transigeront plus ou moins, même avec leurs propres projets.

A mesure que la question devient sérieuse, nous avons besoin non-seule-

ment d'union, mais de gravité et de dignité. Plus les Français parviennent traiter cette affaire à la légère, plus nous devons pour ainsi dire faire lire sur nos fronts que nous la jugeons avec une sévérité réfléchie. Dans une situation où on ne peut appliquer aucun remède spécial et prompt, c'est la tenue constante et journalière qui doit faire impression. Voilà, Milord, le plan auquel je voudrais pouvoir co-opérer; vous savez mieux que personne à quoi tient l'imperfection de celui qui existe maintenant.

Quelques ministres ont le projet vague de nommer M. le Duc d'Angoulême Généralissime de l'Armée. J'attache une grande importance à cette idée; une pareille change mettrait le Prince en rapport de commandement avec les militaires; les bons seraient encouragés, et pourraient devenir meilleurs, et ceux qui ne le sont pas, moins mauvais; d'ailleurs il parviendrait à se former lui-même une opinion positive sur l'esprit et les conséquences de la formation actuelle de cette force, dont en dernière analyse va dépendre la conservation de la couronne dans sa famille.

Palmella nous a fait déclarer qu'il veut s'en tenir à l'indemnité pécuniaire, avec offre de se retirer après le payement où on se trouvait avant l'invasion. Cette proposition laisserait la question des limites dans l'abandon. Si les Espagnols étaient sages, ils transigeraient à l'instant en donnant du territoire pour de l'argent; et si les Portugais n'étaient pas si reters, ils accepteraient la ligne provisoire à condition de négocier immédiatement et sous l'influence des médiateurs pour obtenir la frontière militaire qu'ils désirent. Mais tous les deux se connaissent si bien, qu'ils se détestent, et se méfient à outrance les uns des autres. Si vous y pouvez quelque chose, ce sera un miracle de plus.

Le Duc de Richelieu est reçu partout à merveille, excepté par les Chambres représentant la Grande Nation; je suis persuadé qu'il refusera la grande récompense offerte avec la plus grande mauvaise grâce du monde.

Je n'ai aucune nouvelle de Madrid. La mort de la Reine de Wirtemberg fait différer celles de Pétersbourg.

Je vous salue, Milord, d'agréer mon respectueux attachement.

Votre très dévoué serviteur,

POZZO DI BORGO.

*Rev. Dr. Curtis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

41, North Cumberland Street, Dublin,  
13th Feb., 1819.

MY LORD DUKE,

I must once more trespass for a moment on your Grace's goodness, sincerely to assure you that no feelings of gratitude were ever before excited in my breast similar to those produced on receiving so unexpectedly the kind and consoling letter with which, on the 8th inst., your Grace condescended to honour me, notwithstanding my humble sphere in life, and the very exalted station you occupy with so much dignity in your own and every other country capable of distinguishing unrivalled merit, and amidst the cordial plaudits of an admiring world; in which you will easily believe my poor mite is never wanting, as I can better than many others relate the examples of kindness and humanity, as well as courage

and heroism, that I frequently observed to shine forth in your unparalleled person and character. So far, at least, I am sure I may venture to go, without offending your delicacy with anything in the shape of exaggeration or flattery, which your true greatness of mind must always despise.

You are pleased to say, my Lord Duke, that you meant to inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the proposal made to Rome by the Roman Catholic prelates of Ireland for having me appointed Roman Catholic Archbishop of Armagh, that government might contribute its influence to have the matter dispatched; but your Grace seems to doubt whether government could meddle, or whether its interference would be of any service, adding, however, that it could do no harm.

I beg leave, my Lord Duke, humbly to offer a few words on that head, which I hope your Grace will not consider as entirely useless, or too officious. I most solemnly and sincerely declare I neither do, nor ever did, wish for such nomination, which I only took the liberty of mentioning because I conceived it to be not only a proper mark of respect, but a downright duty I owed to government, that it might preclude me, or any other it should consider as really objectionable, for a situation where, it must be fairly owned, much good or evil might eventually be the consequence; but I by no means intended to solicit the support or influence of government; on the contrary, I stated that I had been already falsely charged with having done so, by certain agitating candidates for that prelacy, and that in the public papers, with a view to inflame incautious minds. Yet, in justice to truth and duty, I cannot help assuring your Grace that government can always, and most easily, preclude any such obnoxious appointments, and even recommend, with a total certainty of success, a good and well deserving subject, whenever it finds it expedient to do so; either by having such notice publicly or secretly given to the Roman Catholic prelates of this country, or rather, directly to the See of Rome; as, in both places, they should be supposed enemies to religion, their own interest, and common sense, as well as disrespectful to the Crown, if they persisted in appointing suspected persons, however learned and well qualified in other respects; and for this purpose government has not the least necessity for a veto being enacted, which (besides being, well or ill, hitherto an unpopular measure) does not give to ministers in such appointments half the power they can employ without it, and without alarming anybody, so that it be done with prudence and unbiassed equity. Angry times, and hostile sentiments, that but too long prevailed, are happily gone by, or retiring fast, never more, I hope, to return; in spite of the agitating demagogues that still continue to perplex us with their unavailing efforts, and who will be charged to the general account as a sample of that body, which they vainly endeavour to mislead.

I request your Grace will excuse and reserve those reflections, to which I had many others, and much more important, to add, but that I have already encroached too much on your precious time.

I have the honour to remain as always, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obliged humble servant,

P. CURTIS.



[ 13.]

*To the Rev. Dr. Curtis.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 20th Feb., 1819.

I have received your letter of the 13th, and I have now the pleasure of enclosing the copy of one from the Secretary of State, enclosing one from his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. It will be satisfactory to you to see that your character is justly appreciated.

I have, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Lord Sidmouth to his Grace the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Whitehall, 19th Feb., 1819.

I received the enclosed this morning from Lord Talbot. There can now be no impropriety in intimating to Dr. Curtis that, on account of his character, his appointment to the Roman Catholic Archbishopric of Armagh would be viewed, not only without regret, but with satisfaction, by the government here, and in Ireland.

I am ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours,

SIDMOUTH.

II.

*Lord Talbot to Viscount Sidmouth.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Phoenix Park, 16th Feb., 1819.

Since I have received the honour of your Lordship's letter of the 11th inst., with the enclosures from the Duke of Wellington, I have been employed in making inquiries respecting Dr. Curtis, the proposed Archbishop of Armagh. As your Lordship justly observes, government cannot interfere in this appointment; but I am happy to state that the elevation of Dr. Curtis to the Archbishopric is very satisfactory, as he is on all hands admitted to be a most excellent and loyal personage.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

your Lordship's most humble servant,

TALBOT.

*To Lord Norbury.*

[ 14. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 22nd Feb., 1819.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 15th. I thought I had informed you that Sir Wm. O'Callaghan intended to support the present government, and I believe you would have been satisfied with him. However, I know that he did not intend to stand if Colonel Bagwell did, and, as far as I may be permitted to form an opinion upon the subject, you acted upon this occasion as you ought.

I see that I am to present the petition from the Protestants in Ireland to the House of Lords, which I will do with pleasure. I have long been out of the way of domestic politics, and I confess that I am not one of those to whom the new lights on the subject of the Roman Catholics have been communicated.

Ever, my dear Lord, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Rev. Dr. Curtis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*41, North Cumberland Street, Dublin,  
23rd Feb., 1819.

MY LORD DUKE,

I have the honour of just now receiving your Grace's very kind and acceptable letter of the 20th inst., covering copies of his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant's, and of the Secretary of State's official notes, expressing Government's approbation of my conduct as a good and loyal subject, and its consequent acquiescence to my intended appointment to the Roman Catholic See of Armagh. This latter I am very easy about, but I set the highest value on the former, as in duty bound; and must acknowledge, as I shall ever most gratefully do, that I owe the whole to your Grace's goodness and powerful interference; not to any merit of my own, obscure and totally unknown, as I am, to the other high personages in question, whose favourable opinion, however, I hope never to forfeit.

I beg leave to transmit for your Grace's inspection (should you deem it worth notice, or the multiplicity of your important duties permit), an open letter, addressed by me to the Cardinal employed at Rome, as Papal Minister, for the dispatch of the ecclesiastical affairs of this country; to whom I make a candid statement, among other things, of the cogent reasons that impelled me to inform his Majesty's Government of the nomination made in my favour by the Irish Prelates, lest it should perhaps

be approved and carried into execution without Government's concurrence or knowledge, which I should consider as a very rash and irritating measure, besides being a breach of duty, in which I could not, in honour or conscience, take any part. I lay down this, and some other salutary maxims, that I mean to follow if appointed, that they may know them at Rome, as absolutely necessary; and if they find them not to their mind (which I can hardly suppose, from their religious integrity and knowledge of the world), they may reject me, and nominate some other more condescending man.

Should the letter meet your Grace's approbation, I beg you may vouchsafe to transmit it to Lord Castlereagh (to whom I have the honour of being slightly known), that his Lordship may have it forwarded, if not judged improper, and delivered, sealed up, to its address.

It will appear, at least, that I do not now, nor have ever heretofore, called on Rome for any appointment, but on the contrary, I prescribe the conditions on which alone I could be induced reluctantly to accept of one; and, indeed, I understand that others who have availed themselves of powerful protectors here and abroad, are more likely than I to be promoted to Armagh, notwithstanding the nomination of the Prelates, for so things are often managed.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obliged humble servant,

P. CURTIS.

*M. Maazkamp to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSEIGNEUR,

Amsterdam, ce 25<sup>me</sup> Février, 1819.

Me trouvant honoré de votre gracieuse lettre du 28<sup>me</sup> Janvier dernier, je m'empresse de satisfaire aux ordres de votre Excellence, et prends ainsi la liberté d'inclure sous ce pli le compte des tableaux pour lesquels vous avez daigné souscrire. Le souvenir restera gravé dans ma mémoire, et rien ne peut égaler la satisfaction que je ressens d'avoir attiré l'attention de votre Excellence, que fait l'admiration de l'Europe entière.

J'ose me flatter que votre Excellence me pardonnera si j'ose lui communiquer que mon panorama se trouve actuellement exposé à Bruxelles, Place St. Michel, est placé dans un bâtiment plus convenable, et y inspire le même enthousiasme qu'à Aix-la-Chapelle. J'ai formé le plan de fixer ce panorama à Waterloo même, dans un bâtiment solide bâti de pierres, comme un monument pour la postérité. Je prendrai la liberté de vous communiquer ce plan, dès que j'aurai reçu l'approbation du Ministre des Arts et des Sciences, auquel je me suis adressé. Votre Excellence daignera me pardonner cette digression, et agréer l'assurance de la plus profonde admiration avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur de me dire très respectueusement, Monseigneur,

De votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

E. MAAZKAMP.

## [ENCLOSURE.]

*M. Maazkamp to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Amsterdam, Oct., 1818.

Son Excellence le Duc de Wellington doit à E. Maazkamp.

Souscrit en 1817, à Bruxelles, pour le tableau de la bataille de Waterloo, représentant le moment de la victoire, &amp;c. :

6 tableaux de la première impression, livré à votre	
Excellence en Octobre, 1818, à Aix-la-Chapelle, à	
2 guineas .. .. .	12 gs.
2 ditto en couleurs, premières impressions, à 4	
guineas .. .. .	8 gs.
Total .. .. .	20 gs.

[Compliments: et le prie de lui faire connaître ce qu'il lui doit dans la monnaie des Pays-Bas. Il ne connaît pas la valeur d'une guinée.]

*To Lord Viscount Castlereagh, K.G.*

[ 15.]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 27th Feb., 1819.

I enclose a letter from Dr. Curtis, late Principal of the Irish College at Salamanca, to Cardinal Fontana, which he wishes your Lordship to peruse and forward.

He wrote to me some time ago to inform me that the heads of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland were desirous of having him appointed Roman Catholic Archbishop of Armagh. I sent this letter to Lord Sidmouth with a statement of what I knew of Dr. Curtis, and Lord Sidmouth, having communicated with the Lord-Lieutenant, expressed his satisfaction with this arrangement, of which I informed Dr. Curtis.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 16.

## MEMORANDUM ON THE DEFENCE OF CANADA.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 1st March, 1819.

I have perused with attention the despatches from the Duke of Richmond upon the defences of Canada, and the papers upon that subject sent to me from your office, which I now return; and having given them every consideration in my power, and endeavoured to make myself acquainted with the nature of the military operations which can be carried on in that country, I am about to communicate to your Lordship my opinion upon the plans of defence for those provinces.

I concur entirely with the Duke of Richmond, that the points of most importance in the two provinces are Quebec, Montreal, and Kingston.

In respect to Quebec itself, I would recommend the purchase of Mr. Ferguson's ground, and the adoption of every measure in the power of government to obtain the removal of the houses already close to the works.

As far as I can learn, the siege of Quebec would be impracticable in a late season of the year if those houses were removed. I would likewise recommend the construction of the citadel as proposed.

An intrenched camp would likewise be useful on the heights of Abraham, on the line now occupied by the Martello towers; but if its flanks cannot be well secured so as that the communication with the town cannot be interrupted, I would recommend that the camp should only be traced out, and that it should be executed afterwards while the enemy should be on the advance.

No work of this kind can be considered perfect in itself, nor can its defects be kept secret from the power likely to attack it; and it is as well that he should not have the advantage of framing his plan and forming his means of attack with an exact foreknowledge of the system of defence to be opposed to him, and of all its defects.

For this reason, as well as to avoid immediate expense, I would recommend the construction of the works of the intrenched camp to be delayed, although I consider an intrenched camp upon the heights of Abraham useful, and even necessary, con-

sidering the kind of troops which may be assembled for the defence of Quebec.

Connected with the defence of Quebec I shall next proceed to consider of those of the river Richelieu, which appears the only line of advance of an enemy upon Quebec; at least it is the only one contemplated by the Duke of Richmond and the officers who have written upon that subject.

I entirely concur with the Duke in thinking it desirable that the works upon the Isle aux Noix should be reformed and put in a respectable state of defence.

I particularly approve of the scheme of making the work within the island complete, and not to consider the river as the ditch.

I should prefer the work, however, if it occupied a larger proportion of the island, particularly to the northward and westward.

I should not think it necessary to give more than a demi-revêtement to the scarp.

The counterscarp should be revetted in order to admit galleries for a reverse fire for the defence of the ditch.

I would recommend that the covert-way should be palisaded with palisades, each made of an entire tree, placed about three inches asunder, so that musketry could be fired from behind them, and firmly fixed in the ground, but unconnected with each other. However dexterous the American soldiers may be in the use of an axe they could not easily cut down these palisades. This defence with a demi-revêtement, although infinitely less expensive, would thus answer in such situations all the purposes of a complete revêtement in masonry. The palisades might be kept in store, and there would be no occasion to place them till war should be expected.

I would recommend that the fort should occupy the whole, or nearly the whole extent of the Isle aux Noix; and that those works looking to the south-west should have ordnance sufficiently heavy to be able to command the entrance of the south river.

Indeed it would be advisable to occupy, as an outwork of the Isle aux Noix, a small island which is at the mouth of that river, as it appears to be navigable from a point only\*

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\* Blank in manuscript.

miles from Misiskoni bay, which communicates with lake Champlain; and if an enemy could use this communication he would turn the Isle aux Noix.

The forts of St. John and of Chambly should be kept in a state of efficient repair; and everything should be done to impede the navigation of the Richelieu river by the enemy.

This river remaining in our possession, it appears difficult, if not impossible, in the existing state of the country between the Richelieu, the St. Lawrence, and the American province of Maine, for an enemy to penetrate through it with an army of sufficient strength, its supplies, and the necessary military equipments, to be able to make an attack upon Quebec.

The next point for consideration is Montreal, and I entirely concur with the Duke of Richmond in the opinion that it would be expedient to destroy all the works, and to sell all the magazines, military buildings, &c., at that place, and place them upon the island of St. Helen's. This island should be fortified as is above recommended for the Isle aux Noix.

In reference to the defence of the island of St. Helen's, I would recommend the occupation of the small island of St. Regis, below Cornwall, at the entrance of lake St. François in the river St. Lawrence. This may be considered as an outpost of Montreal, which will besides have the effect of protecting the navigation of the lake St. François, &c.

I do not think it would be necessary to do anything upon the river Châteauguay, although the Americans used it as a line of attack upon Montreal last war. But they were easily repulsed.

Before I proceed to the consideration of Kingston and of the defences of the province of Upper Canada, it is proper that I should advert to the communications with that province.

I consider that by the St. Lawrence above St. Regis, and by the lake Ontario, the river Niagara, the lake Erie, the river Detroit, lake St. Clair, the river St. Clair, and lake Huron, to be impracticable in time of war. An enemy has only to place a few heavy batteries, closed in, at almost any points of the rivers, in order to prevent our use of the navigation. We may likewise prevent his using it. But it is absolutely necessary to us, and is not so to him.

This observation applies only to the rivers; but in respect to the lakes it must be observed that our use of each of them must

depend upon our naval superiority upon it ; and as everything which can enable us to acquire and maintain such naval superiority must come from England, and then by a difficult river navigation of nearly three hundred miles to Kingston and twelve hundred to lake Huron, whereas the enemy have all they require upon the spot, it can scarcely be believed that we shall be able to acquire and maintain that naval superiority. The pains which Sir E. Owen has taken to survey these lakes and rivers, and to point out the places at which loaded boats and vessels might take shelter and might receive protection from works and troops, show the difficulty, nay, the impossibility, of executing such a system. Works must be constructed, armed, and manned at every point of the lakes ; and, after all, the officers and men in them might and would have the mortification of seeing valuable cargoes carried off by a single gunboat, to which they should not be able to afford protection

But not only is the use of these rivers and lakes, as a communication, impracticable in time of war, but even if it were or could be made practicable I should not recommend it, as it is the longest, the most inconvenient and expensive, and the most liable to accidents and contingencies.

I would recommend then, First : That the canal from Montreal to La Chine should be completed, so as to take boats of the largest size.

Secondly : That the navigation of the river Ottawa should be made practicable and easy, to the junction of the river Rideau with the former.

Thirdly : That the navigation of the river Rideau should be made practicable and easy to the junction with the Irish Creek, and thence, if possible, through the different lakes to Kingston.

There is besides, I believe, a line which leads up the Rideau river towards the head of lake Simcoe ; and into lake Simcoe by what is called the Black river. This line ought to be examined and completed, if practicable, either by canal or railway.

All these lines of navigation ought to be rendered, if possible, so perfect as that a steam-vessel might be used to tow the loaded boats. Trackways should be made on which the troops might march.



If the navigation could not be completed between the head of the Irish Creek which runs into the Rideau river and Huntley's bridge on the waters which fall into lake Ontario, I would recommend that a good railway should be constructed, on the carriages of which loaded boats might be taken from the one to the other.

The point of the greatest importance after Montreal is certainly Kingston. It is the connecting-point between the Upper and Lower Province. It contains the dockyard on lake Ontario, and is the most populous town in the province; and at the same time so situated in relation to Sackett's harbour as to be liable at all times to be attacked.

It must, then, be secured in some degree by works; but without having more knowledge of the detail of the ground, and of the positions of the several islands, than I can acquire by the descriptions and plans transmitted, which I have perused and examined, it is impossible for me to suggest what ought to be done.

As the attack must be made, however, by a combined naval and military operation, I would recommend the occupation, with closed works sufficiently armed, of Snake island, Cedar island, and Garden island. Those on the spot would best be able to determine how far this system ought to be carried, or whether there ought to be a work on Cataraqui point and one on Simcoe island. None of these works need be very expensive, or require more than 150 men to garrison them. But they must be well provided with artillery of the largest description; and there must be a good fort on point Henry, or elsewhere on the mainland, as the keep to those outworks.

I confess that I very much doubt that we shall ever be able to maintain even an equality of naval force upon the lake Ontario; and, that being the case, I recommend that we should look for our communications forward, to the improvement of the inland navigation from Kingston by the bay of Quinté and the Rée lake to lake Simcoe, and thence to lake Huron, even if it should be found that a water communication can be established from the head of the Rideau, by the Black river, with lake Simcoe.

It is impossible to form a judgment from the very defective details which I have perused, and the confused maps and

charts which accompany them, how far such a navigation can be insured.

It is very obvious, however, that the object of a military communication can be insured by the assistance of railways for the necessary portages.

If the communication with lake Simcoe were once established, whether by the Rice lake or direct from the head of the Rideau, I would recommend to you to remove the capital of the province from York to Kingston, if that town should not be too far removed from the centre of the province; or, if it is, I would then fix the capital of the province either higher up the Trent, or between the head of the Trent and the head of Holland's river.

If it should be impossible to remove the capital, and York should still be the place, it must be fortified; otherwise, from the probable naval superiority of the enemy on lake Ontario, it will be impossible to prevent that town from falling into his hands as often as it may suit him to visit it, whether in winter or in summer. How this town is to be fortified it is impossible for me to say without knowing more of the ground than I do at present.

The next point for consideration is the Niagara frontier. It is my opinion that this frontier cannot be defended by fort George or fort Erie, or even by the possession of fort Niagara. Both fort George and fort Erie fell in the last war without one day's defence; and notwithstanding that fort Niagara was in our possession from the winter of 1813, General Brown remained on the left of the river Niagara from July to November 1814, and in possession of fort Erie.

The Niagara frontier can be maintained and defended only by a superior army, and this superior army can be maintained only by the means which can be conveyed to that distant frontier. It is obvious that we cannot rely upon the enjoyment of the navigation of lake Ontario.

In my opinion, then, we ought to look to that of La Grande Rivière, which falls into lake Erie. We ought to endeavour to connect the navigation of that river with that of Holland's river, which falls into lake Simcoe, with that of the river Thames, and with that of the river Chippeway, by good railways, if the tributary streams should not allow of doing it by water. By these means we should be able to maintain an army upon the

Niagara frontier notwithstanding that the enemy should be in possession of the navigation of lake Ontario. We should likewise be enabled to concentrate our naval means in small craft upon lake Huron, lake Erie, and lake Ontario, upon whichever of the three we might think fit, and thus be enabled to be superior to the enemy on one of the three, notwithstanding that our operations on shore and the defence of the country could be entirely independent of such superiority.

I am perfectly aware, however, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the inhabitants of the country to this system; that they will not believe they are to be defended unless they have visible means of defence on the spot; and that people of that description are not unlikely to connect themselves with an enemy, to whose mercy they might think they are abandoned; and that to prevent these inconveniences it may be necessary to maintain a fort on the Niagara frontier. If this should be the case, I would, as far as I can judge of the localities, recommend a position on the river Chippeway in preference to either fort Erie or fort George.

The next point for consideration is a station upon lake Huron; and upon the whole I prefer Pentengashene, with its communication with lake Simcoe.

The result of all these measures would be to give us a secure line of communication from Quebec to Lake Huron of less than 500 miles even passing by Kingston, but less than 400 direct by the Rideau and Black river, instead of 1200 miles, and affording better means of defending and maintaining the Niagara frontier.

The system of defence which I would recommend is as follows:—

I suppose the army disposable in the field to consist of 10,000 men, cavalry, infantry of the line, and artillery; besides 1000 troops of the line in garrison at Quebec, 500 at Montreal, 500 in the garrisons on the Richelieu, 500 in Kingston, 500 on the Niagara and in Pentengashene, besides the militia which may be destined for each post.

I take this to be about the force which was in Canada when the last war broke out.

I would divide this number into two corps, each consisting of 5000 men complete with its field artillery and equipments.

Each of these corps would of course be joined by the militia not in garrison of the districts which would be the scene of its operations.

I would place the left of these corps on the Irish creek, which falls into the Rideau river.

From thence it could reach Montreal in four days, and the frontier of the Richelieu and the Isle aux Noix in two more, or Quebec in three, supposing the communication to be made as perfect as I believe it might. On the other hand it would reach Kingston in two or three days, and lake Simcoe in ten or twelve more from Kingston, or in six or eight if the communication can be established by the Rideau and Black river.

The right corps, consisting of 5000 men with the militia of the district in which it should carry on its operations, should be posted on the communication between the head of Holland's river, which runs into lake Simcoe, and the head of the Grand river, which runs into lake Erie.

If required at York, it could arrive by the Trent in two or three days; if at Kingston, it could arrive in six or eight days; if on the Niagara frontier, it could arrive by the Grand river and the Chippeway in from five to eight days, according to the extent to which the former can be rendered navigable.

According to this system the magazines and stores of the army, and their points of retreat and safety, will be far removed from the frontier, from the line of defence, and from the scene of the operations, at the same time that every point will be in greater security than it was in the last war.

The ordinary communications will cost half the present expense, and a war in that country will, with greater success, not cost half what the last did.

As far as I can judge of the operations of any future war in these countries, from what took place in the last war, I should say that an American corps of strength and efficiency to contend with a corps consisting of 5000 regular troops and 3,000 militia and Indians, which is what I suppose these corps would consist of, would not readily be formed, and that if such a force could be collected and put in operation, its own size would distress it and oblige it to retire from the country without effecting anything.

In the late war the corps which penetrated furthest into the

country was that which defeated General Proctor, on the Thames, near the Moravian town. But this corps, which did not consist of more than 3000 men, did not quit the river Thames, and did not advance above twenty-five miles from lake St. Clair, suffered extremely from want of provisions.

None of the others on either side, excepting in small plundering parties, were ever five miles from their boats or from their respective frontier.

In considering this system I have laid aside, as impracticable, the notion of attacking the United States on their frontier. I have never yet seen any plan of attack upon that power which was at all likely to answer the purpose; but I am certain that an attack could not succeed made from this frontier, in which we are frozen up for five months of the year, and on which the enemy have, and must continue to have, the naval superiority.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Sir Alexander Dickson, R.A., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Woolwich Common, 10th March, 1819.

The question relative to the best mode of conveying small-arm ammunition being about to come under your Grace's consideration, I venture to address you some remarks explanatory of the observations I had the honour to make on the subject in conversation with your Grace some time ago.

I find that two modes are about to be submitted, one of which is a limber-waggon carrying 20,000 rounds, drawn by four horses, and the other a cart conveying 12,000 rounds, drawn by two horses. The argument in favour of a proportionately larger quantity being conveyed in the cart is, I believe, founded on the admitted principle in traffic, that two one-horse carts will move more material than one two-horse cart, and two carriages with two horses more than one with four, and so on; but though this may be very just as it regards conveying coals from a pit, or any similar operation going at a slow and regular pace on a good and well-made road, I don't think it ought to be accepted as an argument in military matters, where accelerated movement is frequently necessary, and where an equipment would be required to march on every description of road; for from past experience I know, as far as regards the present carts, which are intended to carry 12,000, that even with 10,000 cartridges, and drawn by two of the strongest description of horses, they could not exceed a walk for any distance without greatly distressing and shaking the horses, however justly the cart might be balanced; and if even a greater proportion of ammunition was conveyed in carts than in waggons, the admitted advantage would be greatly counter-

balanced by the wear and tear of all the horses working in shafts, and subject thereby to the distress occasioned by the action of a heavy two-wheeled machine in rough or even any roads. Besides, whether with the greater or lesser load of ammunition, the carts would require to have all large, or what are termed wheel-horses; whereas waggons could be supplied with a proportion of stronger and lighter horses for wheels and leading, as is practised in distributing to brigades of artillery; to which I have to add, that it appears so highly questionable the propriety of carrying more in proportion in carts than waggons, that I think on service the plan of loading only 10,000 in carts would be generally resorted to, in order to secure facility of movement, notwithstanding the machine was constructed to hold 12,000. But even if diminution in the weight of the cart and package of the ammunition will admit of the whole 12,000 being taken with propriety, surely the wagon would possess corresponding advantages; it need not, I conceive, be more than double the weight of the cart, and might therefore be contrived to carry 24,000; but in making this observation I beg to add my belief that 10,000 cartridges for the one, and 20,000 for the other, are as many as ought to be conveyed to ensure efficient movement, however the respective carriages may be lightened in their construction.

It may also be argued in favour of two-wheeled carriages, that having less friction, they move better than those with four, and would be more easy to conduct up great steepes, or to extricate from difficulties; but reverting to the experience we have had in Portugal, it may be considered as quite satisfactory that a four-wheeled carriage, like our ammunition limber-wagon, fairly horsed, can be conducted over every species of country where there is anything like a carriage-road.

Having gone into this detail merely to draw your Grace's consideration to the question how far it is right to load the cart in proportion more than the wagon, I will proceed to mention several points in which I conceive the waggons would have an advantage over carts, viz. :—

1st. There would be less wear and tear of horses, and consequently fewer spare ones wanted with the waggons, and a mixed description of horse would be available, instead of all of a large size, as carts would require.

2nd. A general ammunition-carriage for all purposes being introduced into the service would afford great convenience, as the limber-wagon, with some difference in the boxes, would be exactly the same as that used for conveying gun-ammunition with brigades.

3rd. The movement of ammunition reserves in waggons would be more compact than in carts, and form a shorter column in the line of march.

4th. Supposing a reserve of ammunition to consist of twelve waggons, or twenty-four carts, should it be required to detach ammunition with great expedition from the wagon reserve towards any given point, it might be done by taking the leading horses from half the waggons and advancing the other half rapidly with six horses, or by unlimbering and sending the limbers alone with four horses—an advantage that the cart equipment would not admit for want of leading harness; besides, in the case where half the waggons were detached with extra horses, the remaining six waggons, if necessary, could be moved on with three horses, by adding to each one of the spare horses, whereas allowing the harness would admit of detaching twelve carts with extra horses, the remaining twelve carts would

be unhorsed altogether. It is further to be observed, that in the line of march the horses with waggons would be more ready to render mutual assistance to the carriages, in case of difficulty, than those with the carts.

5th. In case of retreat and being pressed by an enemy, should the horses be hard worked and the roads very bad, considerable casualty would naturally be the consequence, which would occasion many carts being lost or destroyed; for it would be impossible for a cart to proceed with one horse, though a waggon could do so with three,—that is to say, if a reserve of twelve waggons was diminished to thirty-six draught horses, it still could continue to move without diminution of carriages, whereas a reserve of twenty-four carts, under similar circumstances, would be obliged to abandon six carts. Besides, in the line of march a horse dropping down in a waggon it could easily be extricated, and the waggon moved on, whilst the same thing occurring with a cart, if a spare horse was not at hand, the movement of the column would either be interrupted, or the cart thrown out of the road.

6th. In the event of poles being hereafter introduced into the service, they would, of course, be applicable to waggons, but not to carts.

As the bags in which it is proposed to pack the small-arm ammunition in the carriages is a new idea to be submitted to your Grace's consideration, I would not have presumed to touch upon the subject, were it not to notice that, besides appearing to me extremely commodious for the object in view, I think a portion of them would be of infinite use in our maritime expeditions, where the ammunition is so frequently carried into the field by sailors.

I have the honour to be  
your Grace's most obedient and obliged servant,  
A. DICKSON.

[ 17. ]

*To the Marquis Camden.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 13th March, 1819.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter in favour of Colonel Wulff; I believe General Trotter is dead, but I have not yet received the official reports of his death.

You may rely upon my taking Colonel Wulff's claim fairly into consideration, but the truth is that the whole corps of Artillery having passed through my hands, some of them must have better claims on the service than others, and they must know that I am aware of it, and must look to me to do justice to their claims when in my power.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Rev. Dr. Curtis.*

[ 18. ]

DEAR SIR,

London, 15th March, 1819.

Having communicated to Lord Castlereagh what had passed between Lord Sidmouth and the Lord-Lieutenant and myself respecting you, I enclose a note which I have received upon the subject from Lord Castlereagh.

Ever, dear Sir, yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.*

Cray Farm, 14th March, 1819.

Lord Castlereagh presents his compliments to the Duke of Wellington, and has the honour to inform him, that his Grace's letter, and enclosure from Dr. Curtis, have been forwarded by him to Cardinal Gonsalvi, and the Doctor's wishes recommended to his Eminence's favourable consideration.

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*Rev. Dr. Curtis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY EVER HONOURED LORD DUKE,

Dublin, 19th March, 1819.

Your most obliging and kind letter of the 15th instant, enclosing Lord Castlereagh's note to your Grace, honours me beyond measure, as well by the favour itself as by the condescension in conferring it, and baffles every effort of mine suitably to express my gratitude.

But so much goodness, together with the unchangeable and daily increasing regard I conceived many years back, on the most solid grounds, for your Grace's person, and my ardent wish to see your unrivalled merit and glory shine in their native splendour, without the slightest shade, compel me at length, though reluctantly, to take the liberty (which I should not otherwise have done) of acquainting your Grace with what I confide you will excuse, as the effect of cordial esteem and genuine sincerity.

When I returned to this country, in the course of last summer, after an absence of forty years, I was happy in finding most things exceedingly improved; but I observed, with extreme disgust and pain, that your name and high character were virulently attacked and aspersed by people of all classes, who, I naturally expected, would have endeavoured to exceed the just and loud eulogies given to you by all the world besides. They accused your Grace of denying and despising your country, and the county Meath in particular; of receiving with contempt their cordial address and offer of erecting to you a more magnificent statue than Ireland had ever before beheld; of voting by proxy, when absent, against Catholic Emancipation; and, in fine, of having latterly presented to the House of Lords a violent petition from hence to the same purpose.

I laboured hard to convince them (and I think not ineffectually) that



such charges, if literally true, were trifling, and totally inadequate to account for the tone of asperity and dire complaint assumed by them; and that they injured their own cause very much, as well by having hitherto attempted to support it by insolent and intemperate resolutions and addresses as by the hostility of their expressions against all those that differed from them in opinion; but that the said charges were, besides, absolutely unfounded, or misunderstood, and consequently unjust and contumelious; that the vote by proxy, alluded to, had been given, without your Grace's knowledge, from a blank you had left signed on quitting England—a thing customary among Peers in minor affairs (for so I had really been informed by a person that knew it well), and that your presenting the late petition proved nothing, as members generally consider that as a duty when called upon, whether they themselves mean to support or oppose such petitions; that your Grace's liberal sentiments and generous mind were too well known not to preclude the most distant possibility of your denying or despising your countrymen, or undervaluing their patriotic effusions in your favour; but that as the Irish are, but too commonly, a violent, rash, inconsiderate people, who (in their public meetings particularly, and when led on by demagogues) are apt to exceed all just bounds, they should not be surprised that every wise and good man will be very cautious in declaring himself their patrons, affording too easy access, or seeming to adopt their gigantic pretensions.

I strongly enforced all these and many other reflections by numerous examples of your Grace's admired conduct on the continent, but particularly in the Peninsula (of which I was better qualified to speak, as a near witness, than most others), where your unlimited discretionary command rendered you absolute master, to act as you thought fit and follow your own sentiments and feelings, but where your humanity, prudence, liberality, and condescension were, and ever will be, no less universally acknowledged and applauded than your splendid victories and military skill; all which happened in a country torn with intestine divisions and formidable parties, of the military, religious, and political kind, whom you found means to liberate and serve indiscriminately, without offending any or exclusively adopting their measures.

These and other like reflections made a great impression on good and generous hearts, such as the Irish generally have, who immediately preconised your Grace as the greatest hero that the present or any former age ever produced; but some few added their fears that you are about to tarnish your glory with respect to Ireland alone. For my own part, I can never entertain any such apprehension, which I consider as absurd, and could heartily wish to incline all my countrymen to agree with me in this favourite sentiment. I hope your Grace, as far as duty and honour permit, will please to pay some regard to their number, and make due allowance for weakness and prejudices.

I have the honour to remain most respectfully, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obliged faithful humble servant,

P. CURTIS.

*Rev. Dr. Curtis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY REVERED AND HONOURED LORD,

Dublin, 2nd April, 1819.

I confide your Grace knows me too thoroughly and long ever to suspect me for a moment of avarice, or self-interested views of any kind, after the many and signal proofs I have given of a contrary spirit, which often obliged me to make great exertions in favour of establishments committed to my direction and care, but never for my own emolument, which I have frequently declined accepting.

It is only on this certain basis that I beg leave to submit to your Grace's consideration that, as well in the Peninsula, as in Great Britain, and here, several officers of high rank in your army assure me I ought to have applied to Government, through your respectable channel, for an indemnity (that would not be refused me more than it had been to so many others with less authentic claims) of the severe and repeated losses and personal damages, to a considerable amount, that I sustained at Salamanca and other parts of Spain from the French army and their adherents, from the year 1808 to 1813, when that devoted nation was, in an almost miraculous manner, completely liberated by your numerous and glorious victories, which no man living applauded more sincerely than myself.

Though it be notorious, and better known still by your Grace than by many others, that I was thrice banished, after being imprisoned and plundered of all my property by the enemy, chiefly on account of my peculiar and known attachment to your Grace, and to the just and glorious cause you so triumphantly protected; still, I always refused and rejected the idea of soliciting any personal remuneration for what I had done and suffered, that fell far short of what I wished to contribute to so great and desirable an event; but helpless old age has at length overtaken me in extreme poverty, as the small pittance allowed me out of the revenue of my professorship in the University of Salamanca (the only property I had remaining) is withheld, and cannot be paid, while that country continues in its present hopeless circumstances. I am now, besides, called upon by our prelates here to prepare for and accept the first situation here in our line, which your Grace also has vouchsafed to patronise, but which requires, in the first instance, an unavoidable and very considerable expense, such as I am by no means able to bear, even in the most restricted and economical shape; nor, indeed, is the situation itself, nor can it ever be, at all productive in future, except, perhaps, in the hands of such as might descend to mean arts that I shall never adopt.

I have then resolved, though most reluctantly, to take the liberty of consulting your Grace on how I ought to act in this extremity, and I hope your goodness and condescension will excuse my boldness. Should you recommend absolute silence to me on the point in question, I shall never mention it again, whatever I may have to suffer; but if, on the contrary, your Grace thinks I should apply to Government for some sort of redress and aid (merely on the above mentioned score), I shall have the honour of transmitting to your Grace such petition as you may deem necessary for that purpose; and I shall remain content and grateful for any compensation

to which I may be found to have a just claim, should it be considered as admissible.

I again beg your Grace's indulgence for this intrusion, and have the honour to be, most respectfully,

My revered and honoured Lord,

your Grace's faithful humble servant,

P. CURTIS.

[ 19. ]

*To the Right Hon. C. Arbuthnot.*

MY DEAR ARBUTHNOT,

London, 4th April, 1819.

I return the papers regarding Sir R. Kennedy's affair, which contain nothing but the Auditor-General's charges against him (without his answers), and the opinion of the Comptrollers of Army Accounts upon those charges. I cannot but think Sir R. Kennedy has been most shamefully treated. After having served the public successfully for several years he is put upon his trial on the loosest and most futile charges, which, after all, amount to no more than want of temper in communication with an *equal*, which was provoked, to my knowledge, by the conduct and language of the Auditor-General himself; and he is condemned by the Comptrollers without being once called upon personally to explain, although always within their reach, either anything which might have appeared against him in the charges, or doubtful in his written answer. And this is what is called justice to a meritorious public servant, who has accounted for millions of public money, and against whose integrity not even the Auditor-General dares write or utter a syllable.

I should like to know where you will find a man of an independent mind, and of integrity, to serve you again if this is the manner in which he is to be treated. I disapprove as much as others of these futile disputes, and all this irritating language and conduct between the heads of two departments whose good understanding was important to the public service. But, in my opinion, the authority of the Treasury could, and ought to have stopped these evils at the time they existed; on the part of the Auditor-General as well as on the part of the Commissary-General, who had in his favour the excuse, if it may be so called, of tried service and experience; whereas the former knew nothing of the matters on which he came to inquire, and yet, to my knowledge, he threw the first stone at

the very first moment of his arrival in Portugal *five years ago*. If this irritating language and conduct was not suppressed and kept down, as it ought to have been, by authority, it is not fair now to try and condemn one party unheard and leave the other untouched, although equally, if not more guilty of the same offences; and I am certain that there is no unprejudiced person who knows what has passed, and is acquainted with the two individuals, and who reads the enclosed papers, who will not be of the same opinion with myself.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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To Lord Castlereagh.

[ 20. ]

MY LORD,

London, 4th April, 1819.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Prince Metternich, regarding the state of the fortresses on the Sardinian frontier.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Vienna, le 15<sup>me</sup> Février, 1819.

Connaissant l'intérêt éclairé que votre Excellence n'a cessé de vouer au bon emploi de la partie des contributions destinée au renforcement de la ligue défensive des pays limitrophes de la France, j'éprouve une vraie satisfaction à pouvoir vous informer, Milord, que les officiers ingénieurs Autrichiens placés sous les ordres du Lieutenant-Général Comte de Bubna, s'étant réunis le mois de Décembre dernier à Milan avec les Commissaires ingénieurs de sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne, pour reconnaître, d'après les rapports respectifs, l'état auquel avaient été portés les ouvrages de fortifications dans le passage des Alpes, et pour régler ultérieurement l'emploi des fonds, du moment que la saison permettra de les recommencer, les Commissaires Autrichiens viennent de rendre le témoignage le plus favorable de l'activité et de l'intelligence que Messieurs les officiers Piémontais ont mise à l'avancement des travaux, et de la continuation de bonne volonté qu'ils annoncent vouloir y apporter pendant cette année.

Les points auxquels les Commissaires ingénieurs se sont accordés à vouer le plus d'attention concernent le rétablissement et le perfectionnement des forts d'Exilles, de Lescillon, et de Bard, qui entrent essentiellement dans le système de défense de cette partie des Alpes.

Si votre Excellence trouve l'occasion de dire, à cet égard, quelque

chose d'agréable au ministre de sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne à Londres, je ne doute pas que le prix que le Cabinet de Turin mettra à un suffrage aussi distingué, sera un puissant encouragement à persister dans d'aussi louables efforts.

Le Protocole du 21<sup>me</sup> Novembre, 1815, ayant décerné au gouvernement Autrichien la tâche de s'entendre avec celui de sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne sur l'emploi de cette partie des fonds de la contribution Française, il m'est doublement agréable d'avoir à transmettre à votre Excellence des notions qui lui donnent la preuve du bon accord qui règne entre les vues des deux états voisins, et dont elle est d'autant plus à même d'apprécier la valeur qu'elles se lient à l'intérêt général.

Je crois ne pouvoir mieux répondre à l'attention que votre Excellence a bien voulu nous témoigner pendant nos dernières conférences, en nous instruisant de l'avancement des ouvrages aux Pays-Bas, qu'en vous donnant, Milord, des informations également satisfaisantes sur ce qui se passe aux frontières de l'Italie.

Je prie votre Excellence d'agréer l'assurance des sentimens invariables d'attachement et de haute considération avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être,

Monsieur le Maréchal,

le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

METTERNICH.

[ 21. ]

*To the Hon. James Stanhope.*

MY DEAR STANHOPE,

London, 4th April, 1819.

I return the book. The supposed communication from me to Fouché through Macirone, which is stated (page 50) to have been given by me in writing, is false.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

P.S. The cause of the *falsehood* is clear enough. The real communication which was made after the capitulation of Paris shows clearly enough upon the face of it that the King of France had nothing to say to that instrument. If it had been published it would have given the lie to all the calumny upon that subject. It was therefore right and best to falsify the communication at the same time that what is stated is given as a copy!

WELLINGTON.

*Le Comte de Cazes to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Paris, le 4<sup>me</sup> Avril, 1819.

Je ne veux pas laisser partir M. le Marquis de Latour-Maubourg sans me rappeler à votre souvenir et à votre bienveillance. J'ai bien besoin de l'indulgence de V.E. Je la lui demandais par une lettre informelle que je lui écrivais il y a un mois, et que je la prie de me permettre de joindre à celle-ci. Votre Excellence y lira quelques observations sur notre position, que le Roi expliquait, il y a quelques jours, en ce qui touche la Chambre des Pairs, en établissant que s'il ne s'était agi de la part de l'opposition que d'un *changement de Ministère*, il n'aurait pas songé à recourir à des moyens qu'il a dû prendre quand il s'agissait d'un *changement de principe et de système*. Je ne crains pas de répéter à V.E. quo parmi les élus qu'elle connaît, et sur lesquels les précédens pourraient lui avoir inspiré des impressions alarmantes, il n'y en a pas un qui ne soit aujourd'hui en guerre avec les Ultra-Libéraux, et qu'ils ne traitent fort mal. La colère et la haine de ceux-ci prouvent la manière dont ils jugent une mesure qu'ils regardent comme la plus fâcheuse qui peut être prise pour eux.

L'affaire Cantillon est renvoyée au 5 du prochain. Je fais faire un relevé de l'acte d'accusation et des interrogatoires pour l'envoyer à V.E. Je me suis assuré que les deux avocats seront dans un esprit convenable. Du moins je n'ai rien négligé pour cela. L'Avocat-Général est distingué et capable. Il sera démontré plus clair que le jour pour la conscience des hommes que le crime a été arrêté à Bruxelles, et exécuté par Cantillon à Paris. La question est de savoir si la conviction sera assez forte pour la conscience des jurés.

V.E. jugera sans doute utile d'envoyer les deux domestiques qui ont été témoins du crime. Je serais fort jaloux de savoir si Lord Kinnaird se présentera. J'ai de fortes raisons de croire que Brice est en ce moment en France, et même aux environs de Paris. Je suis sur ses traces, et je ne désespère pas de le prendre. J'ai eu aussi d'utiles notions sur la réunion de Snrènes, et j'espère en tirer quelque parti avant le 5<sup>me</sup> prochain.

Je ne me permets pas de recommander M. de Latour-Maubourg à V.E.; son noble et franc caractère le recommandent assez lui-même auprès de V.E., qui sait si bien apprécier de telles qualités. J'ose croire qu'elles sont les plus éminentes et les plus nécessaires dans un négociateur auprès d'un gouvernement ami, et surtout auprès de ministres tels que V.E. Pour nous, Monsieur le Duc, qu'il me soit permis de vous rappeler tout ce que j'ai pu avoir occasion de vous dire dans le cours des nombreuses conversations que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec V.E., et de vous dire que les sentiments, les principes, le système de gouvernement et de conduite que j'ai pu avoir occasion de lui développer, sont ceux qui nous guident aujourd'hui et qui nous dirigerons toujours; et que V.E. trouve bon que j'ajoute qu'ces sentimens, qui ne varieront jamais, n'ont jamais cessé d'être en ce qui la touche ceux de la plus vraie reconnaissance pour les services qu'elle a rendu en si grand nombre à mon Roi et à mon pays pendant le cours de cette épreuve de trois années, où tout a été de sa part loyauté, abandon, et attachement pour la cause royale, de telle manière qu'elle pouvait le disputer au meilleur serviteur du Roi. Je ne parlerai pas à V.E. de mes

sentimens de gratitude personnelle pour la malheureuse affaire de Saarebrück ; je la prie cependant d'être bien convaincue qu'ils ne s'effaceront jamais de mon cœur.

Agréez de nouveau, Monsieur le Duc, l'expression de la plus haute considération avec laquelle je suis,

Votre plus fidèle serviteur,

DE CAZES.

*Le Comte de Cazes to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Paris, le 4<sup>me</sup> Avril, 1819.

V.E. nous a quitté au moment de la crise qui a produit le changement du ministère. Elle sait que cette crise, et par suite ce changement, n'avaient et n'ont eu d'autres causes que la pensée qu'il était nécessaire de changer la loi des élections dans son principe. Je ne pouvais partager cette opinion, et j'avais raison ; il m'est d'autant plus permis de le croire que tous mes anciens collègues sont revenus à la mienne, et que presque tous ceux que poussaient alors avec tant d'insistance aux deux degrés, l'ont abandonné aujourd'hui, à l'exception des Ultras, qui ont bien voulu mettre en avant M. Barthélemy pour engager le fer, mais de qui je n'ai jamais pu obtenir de dire toute leur pensée et de mettre des limites au vague de la proposition. V.E. pourra en juger, si elle lit la fin du procès-verbal de la séance de la Chambre des Pairs, dans le 'Moniteur' d'aujourd'hui. Les modifications du développement de M. de Barthélemy sont ou inutiles ou peu importantes ; la dernière seule a quelque prix, mais présentée à un moment si peu opportun, et sous le drapeau Ultra, elle ne pouvait pas être accueillie qu'avec défiance ; surtout après le vague de la proposition qu'elle ne corrigeait pas, puisque ce vague subsistait toujours, et qu'on ne voulait pas l'abandonner. Le Duc de R., qui déplore comme moi cette funeste proposition, et qui en juge toute la maladresse par l'effet de l'opinion dans le Midi, me présageait dans sa dernière lettre, quel serait son résultat, et son bon esprit ne l'a pas trompé. Le rejet de la loi sur l'année financière, le projet arrêté de tout repousser, même le budget—projet qu'un comité se proposait de pousser jusqu'au bout, et qui était annoncé fort haut—la nécessité de donner à la Pairie des racines dans les intérêts nationaux, et de trouver eu elle un contre-poids que sa composition actuelle ne présentait pas, ont déterminé le Roi à porter la Chambre à 270 membres, qui se trouveront successivement réduits à 200 ; soixante-dix pairs anciens étant sans enfans. Il n'y a pas un nom dans les 60 nouveaux qui ne soit une garantie pour quelques intérêts, pas un dont nous ne soyons sûrs des sentimens pour le Roi et sa famille, ou d'un retour bien prononcé à ces sentimens. Le plus important de tous, le Maréchal Davoust, à qui les fons de l'ancienne armée ne pardonnent pas de n'avoir profité sous Paris des fautes de l'armée Prussienne, et d'avoir consenti à commencer le licenciement de l'armée de la Loire, est celui qui est le plus fortement prononcé. Rapp était, le 23 Mars, dans les salons des Tuileries, mandé par Buonaparte, devant qui il ne craignit pas de paraître avec la Croix de St. Louis, la plaque de Henri IV., et la cocarde blanche. Des 60, 14 appartiennent aux 22 éliminés par l'ordonnance du

24 Juillet, qui est contraire aux droits de la pairie, et qu'il est utile d'effacer insensiblement, 8 restent en arrière.

Il faut que V.E. me permette de lui adresser cette lettre, commencée il y a un mois, et que l'entraînement des affaires m'a fait suspendre. J'ose compter assez sur son indulgence pour la lui transmettre dans cet état. Elle me fournit une nouvelle occasion de renouveler à votre Excellence l'hommage de ma plus haute considération.

LE COMTE DE CAZES.

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*To Lieutenant ———.*

[ 22. ]

SIR,

London, 5th April, 1819.

I have received your letter of the 16th March and am highly flattered by your desire that I should stand godfather to your son.

You are aware, however, that a godfather has certain duties to perform which it is quite impossible for me to undertake in this instance, and it is at all events expected from one in the situation in which I am placed that he should forward the views of his godson in the world. It is much the best and shortest way to state to you the fact, that there are so many officers and soldiers who have claims upon me for services rendered to the public under my command that I cannot, with justice to them, engage myself either directly or virtually to forward the views of any others. I hope, therefore, that you will excuse my standing godfather to your son, as it is really out of my power to undertake to do anything for him at any time.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Comte de Cazes.*

[ 23. ]

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

A Londres, ce 19<sup>me</sup> Avril, 1819.

Votre Excellence voit les choses avec justesse en croyant qu'on regarde vos affaires en France avec le plus grand intérêt. La triste expérience vous a appris qu'aucune nation du monde ne peut être tranquille si la France ne l'est pas ; et malgré qu'il soit de notre devoir à tous de tenir un silence respectueux sur tout ce qui se passe chez notre voisin, il nous est impérieux de bien connaître les choses, et de les juger pour notre propre intérêt. Je vous avoue que beaucoup de ce qui s'est passé en



France depuis que j'ai eu le plaisir de vous voir nous a donné beaucoup d'inquiétude. Elle porte surtout sur les nominations militaires, et les mesures en général du Ministre de la Guerre, et sur l'augmentation de la pairie, et les choix qui en ont été faits; et il faut toute la confiance que j'ai dans la loyauté de V.E., et son attachement à S.M. et sa famille royale, et dans la sagesse du Roi lui-même, pour dissiper un peu cette inquiétude. Vous jugeriez alors quelle sera cette inquiétude dans d'autres pays, où on n'a pas une connaissance si intime du vrai état des choses, et où on aura reçu des récits de ce qui se passe plus exagérés en un certain sens que ceux que nous recevons.

En mon opinion la première affaire, la grande affaire, encore plus, la seule affaire en France, est que le Roi forme une armée qui lui soit réellement attachée, et à sa famille royale. S'il s'agissait de guerre, je dirais une bonne armée; mais où est le fou qui pense à la guerre dans les circonstances actuelles de la France et du monde? Non, l'essentiel de l'armée en France en tout temps a toujours été, et l'est, surtout dans le moment actuel, qu'elle soit attachée au Roi; et je erois, non qu'alors le danger n'existera plus, mais il existera d'autant moins qu'au moment où on voudrait éteindre le feu on ne trouvera pas qu'il a pris à l'éteignoir. Il faut envisager l'armée en France sous un point de vue tout à fait différent de celui où nous envisageons l'armée dans ce pays-ci. D'abord notre gouvernement exécutif, en affaire de législation, est plus fort que celui de France, par son antiquité, par la constitution de la Chambre de Pairs, et par l'état des propriétés dans le pays; et notre situation insulaire n'exigeant pas que nous ayons un grand état militaire dans le pays, l'armée y a peu d'influence, et les préjugés du pays y sont contre. Mais en France il vous faut nécessairement une grande armée; et elle a toujours eu, et elle aura toujours, une grande influence sur les affaires; et cette influence est nécessaire au gouvernement exécutif.

J'avoue que je ne vois pas comment le Roi peut compter, ou sur l'attachement ou sur l'aide de l'influence journalière de l'armée formée des officiers et soldats de Buonaparte, d'après les principes de la loi du recrutement.

L'explication de V.E. sur l'augmentation des Pairs et sa composition répond à mes objections; la nécessité de cette augmentation étant reconnue. Mais il faut observer que vous n'êtes

pas encore à la fin des conséquences de cette mesure, qui n'est ni plus ni moins qu'un coup d'état, tel que les gouvernemens limités peuvent rarement frapper sans de grands inconvéniens. Je vois qu'on parle déjà d'une augmentation du nombre de la Chambre des Députés; ce qui, même si les élections tournent mieux qu'elles ne l'ont fait jusqu'à présent, va augmenter l'influence et la puissance de cette assemblée au dépens du trône.

Vous voyez, M. le Comte, que je vous écris sur ces sujets avec la même franchise, avec laquelle jadis je vous parlais. Avec le plus grand attachement pour mon propre pays, je désire le bonheur et la tranquillité de la France, non seulement par attachement pour la personne de sa Majesté, et pour la famille royale, mais aussi parce que, comme je vous l'ai déjà dit, je sens bien que si vous n'êtes pas tranquille, que ce qui est établi en France ne réussit pas, il est impossible de calculer ce que deviendra le monde.

Mais malgré que je vous écris avec cette franchise, j'aurais gardé le silence le plus absolu si vous ne m'aviez pas fait l'honneur de m'entretenir sur ces sujets dans vos lettres.

Pour ce qui regarde le corps diplomatique à Paris, je vous assure que je les ai bien prié de prendre garde à leur conduite. S'il est du devoir de leurs gouvernemens respectifs de se taire, tout en observant et réfléchissant mûrement sur tout ce qui se passe en France, il l'est bien plus du leur; et ils n'ont pas le droit de prononcer une opinion sur ce qu'ils voyent, ou par leurs paroles ou par leur conduite. Je dirai plus, que si ce qui s'est passé est un mal, il faut bien peu connaître le caractère Français pour ne pas voir que ce mal devient beaucoup aggravé vis-à-vis des Puissances étrangères, par l'éloignement que pourraient y montrer les individus du corps diplomatique à Paris, ou par leur conduite, ou par leur langage.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lord Palmerston.*

[ 24. ]

MY LORD,

London, 24th April, 1819.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's note, No. 111 211, of the 5th, enclosing a letter and other papers from the Comte Garat, which I now return.

When the army under my command entered the French territory there can be no doubt that, according to the modern practice and laws of war introduced by the French themselves, and invariably adhered to during their invasion of Spain and Portugal, I might have required the invaded country to supply all the wants of the army without any payment whatever.

I thought proper to issue the enclosed proclamation to the army referring to a General Order\* likewise enclosed, in which I promised protection to the inhabitants, and pointed out the mode in which they should obtain it, provided they *should remain in their houses, and should not take any part in the operations of the war.*

Monsieur le Comte Garat had a property at Urdains, in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, at which he did not remain himself, nor did he leave any sufficient person in charge; and he was a Senator of Bonaparte's Senate, residing at Paris.

Whatever provisions and forage his house contained were taken for the use of, and consumed by, the troops; and his house, being conveniently situated for the purpose, was converted into a military post; his trees cut down to form an abatis; and there is no doubt that Comte Garat's property was very considerably damaged.

I never considered, however, that Comte Garat had any claim to remuneration, excepting on the generosity of the British nation. He had not complied with the terms of my proclamation, and had therefore no claim under that instrument; and I do not know of any other that he had.

Adverting, however, to the manner in which these transactions ended, I deemed it proper to order the Commissary-General, Sir R. Kennedy, to examine the books of the subordinate officers serving under him, and to ascertain as far as possible the value of M. Garat's property actually taken from Urdains, and received by the troops; and upon his report I directed a sum of twelve thousand francs to be paid to Comte Garat.

In respect to the damage done to his property by his house being converted into a military post, I certainly never should have thought it necessary to pay for it.

First: I have never paid for such damage in any case whatever, whether in France, in Spain, or in Portugal.

\* See page 331. vol. viii.

Secondly : The French general never paid for such damage, even though the country he was defending was his own. It would be curious, then, if I were to allow of a claim for damage in a country, which claim would not have been allowed by the French generals themselves.

Besides the claim for losses and damage done at his residence at Urdains, to which Sir Charles Colville's certificate applies, Monsieur Garat brings forward another for losses and damage at Bassusarri. This village, still nearer to Bayonne and the enemy's lines than the house at Urdains, was a frequent scene of contest between the two armies during the winter of 1813-14. The French were in it some days before our troops occupied it at all, and I am much mistaken if there was an entire house, or a single article worth having in the village when first our troops occupied it. I am certain there were no inhabitants in it, and notwithstanding that I have made every inquiry, I have not been able to find that the commissaries took anything in that village which they could issue to the troops.

I don't know how, therefore, it is possible to give Monsieur Garat anything for his supposed losses, which it is most probable were occasioned by the French troops.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Le Général Vincent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Paris, Mai, 1819.

Si je ne suivais que mon inclination et les sentimens qui m'attachent à vous, Milord, j'aurais bien plus souvent l'honneur de vous écrire, mais en respectant votre tems et vos occupations, je considère comme superflu de vous entretenir d'un état de choses que vous connaissez d'autant mieux, que vous pouvez les juger par les antécédents ; et que les hommes aujourd'hui influent plus sur les événemens, qu'un simple concours de circonstances. C'est en France qu'existe le foyer d'une secte qui veut substituer un nouvel ordre de choses à celui qui régit le monde depuis une longue suite de siècles. Les nouvelles opinions se propagent partout, et avec d'autant plus de succès qu'elles ne trouvent nulle part un système établi pour les reprimer, et que les sectateurs des nouvelles opinions espèrent tout de leur audace. Il est possible que toutes ces attaques viennent se briser contre l'union des grandes puissances, ne leur opposeraient-elles qu'une force d'inertie ; mais au moins faut-il pour en tirer parti, que cette union

fut bien aperçue, et qu'aucune nuance n'en altère l'effet. C'est sans doute, Milord, ce que vous jugerez nécessaire.

Pourquoi la France arme-t-elle ? Pourquoi, dans l'état de paix où tous les gouvernements déclarent se trouver, la France dépense-t-elle 180 millions pour le département des forces de terre seules ? C'est là peut-être le seul objet sur lequel il serait permis de demander des explications amicales.

Lorsqu'on ne croit devoir employer qu'un moyen en politique, il faut lui donner toute sa valeur ; telle semble être notre position aujourd'hui ; témoignons donc par notre attitude, notre marche, et notre langage, que nous serons fidèles au même intérêt qui nous a réunis !

Lord FitzRoy Somerset vous rendra compte, mon Prince, de certaines nuances qui seules ont besoin d'être ajoutées à ce que vous savez sur ce qui se passe ici.

Je vous prie, Milord, d'accueillir avec votre bonté accoutumée la nouvelle assurance de mon attachement et de ma haute considération.

VINCENT.

*Le Général Pozzo di Borgo to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MILORD,

Paris, le 10<sup>me</sup> Mai, 1819.

J'ai voulu laisser passer quelque intervalle avant de vous parler de nouveau des affaires de ce pays, afin de donner aux évènements le temps de se développer, et en conséquence de mieux connaître l'état des choses, s'il est possible.

Depuis l'introduction du corps auxiliaire dans la Chambre des Pairs l'esprit du gouvernement me paraît se trouver en opposition à celui dans lequel l'Europe a opéré la restauration des Bourbons. Peu importe si ceux qui ont pris la résolution d'appeler tant d'hommes suspects au pouvoir ont calculé les effets de leur démarche ; leur imprévoyance ou leur présomption seraient des choses indifférentes si elles ne concernaient que leurs personnes ; mais la tendance irrésistible du système qu'ils ont adopté menaçant de troubler le monde, c'est sous ce point de vue qu'il faut les juger.

Le discrédit que cette mesure a jeté sur la seule institution aristocratique qui, quoique nominale, prouvait du moins le besoin d'en établir une, et l'espérance de la consolider avec le temps, est irréparable. L'exemple donné qu'on peut la résister sans peur ni pour le nombre ni pour les choix, lui a ôté jusqu'à l'ombre de considération qu'on commençait à lui accorder.

Le gouvernement, dont le soin, difficile à la vérité, était de concilier les opinions et de concentrer la force dans l'autorité, organise au contraire un parti hors de lui-même qui se rendra le maître des délibérations plus tôt qu'on ne pouvait le croire, et duquel dépendra le sort de la monarchie.

Nous voyons sous nos yeux former une armée presque toute hostile aux opinions témoignées en faveur de la Restauration. Les évènements que nous avons jugés condamnables en 1815 sont aujourd'hui des titres exclusifs à la confiance, et la conduite de l'Europe, à laquelle la famille des Bourbons s'était associée, caractérisée comme une oppression étrangère.

Cette révolution dans les idées de bien et de mal ne laissera plus aux

ministres, si même ils voulaient en faire usage, aucun motif d'exception qu'ils puissent alléguer contre des individus au moment des élections; ainsi nous verrons arriver à la prochaine session une proportion considérable de députés avides de nouveautés, qui, réunis à ceux qui se trouvent déjà dans la Chambre, et aux foibles qu'ils ne manqueront pas d'intimider, prendront successivement un ascendant funeste.

Tous ces préparatifs s'appellent ici un système de précaution contre les conseils mauvais ou imprudens qui pourraient influencer l'héritier présomptif de la couronne à son avènement au trône; mais ces précautions sont des dangers sous lesquels il succombera; parce que les hommes qui les prennent aujourd'hui ne pouvant jamais acquérir le degré de confiance implicite qu'ils cherchent, voudront se donner un autre chef qui ne laisse aucune inquiétude à leur ambition ou à leurs intérêts personnels du moment qu'on les rend juges dans leur propre cause, et maîtres de la soutenir par la force que le Roi concentre entre leur mains.

Voici, Milord, les événemens principaux qui me font le plus d'impression, et que je regarde comme capables de produire des bouleversemens prochains. Je dis prochains, parce que des si grandes catastrophes comme celles que nous avons raison de craindre arrivent toujours trop tôt, et que le délai qui peut nous offrir la vie du Roi, ou la prudence du parti dominant, n'admet pas une grande latitude.

Les Ministres Français cherchent à justifier l'élévation de l'ancienne armée comme le seul moyen qui restait au Roi d'arrêter les Jacobins. En supposant que ce raisonnement soit sincère, je n'en connais pas de plus hasardé, et je dirai de plus absurde. Les Jacobins et l'ancienne armée n'aiment rien de ce qui est arrivé depuis le 31 Mars, 1814; en conséquence ils sont réunis pour se délivrer des Bourbons, qui les gênent tous deux. Cela fait, leur bonne intelligence ou leur discorde nous intéresse très peu.

Les autres détails journaliers, quoique graves, ne méritent d'être observés qu'autant qu'ils sont sans exception les conséquences du système d'où ils dérivent. Je m'abstiens de vous les mentionner, Milord, parce que leur énumération me ferait sortir des limites d'une correspondance comme celle-ci.

Je viens de recevoir des nouvelles de St. Pétersbourg. Les événemens de la France sont appréciés d'une manière unanime là, comme à Vienne, à Berlin, et je suppose à Londres. L'union est encore recommandé avec plus d'insistance que jamais, s'il était possible; et j'ai lieu de croire que l'exemple que j'en ai donné ici rencontre l'approbation, et satisfait à ce sujet l'expectation de l'Empereur.

La propagande Française compte beaucoup sur les Réformateurs Allemands, et sur une partie du moins de votre opposition. Nul doute que si le grand exemple du mal se donne ici, il ne se communique aux pays les plus lointains.

Je crains, Milord, que vous ne trouviez dans cette lettre que des répétitions et des faits qui ne sont ignorés de personne. C'est justement ce que devrait décider à les rendre plus dignes d'attention, parce que dans ce cas leur existence ne peut pas être équivoque. Après cela vient la question la plus difficile. Que faire? Je ne serai jamais assez hardi pour prendre l'initiative sur un si grand objet, mais il me paraît qu'on peut répondre sans présomption; s'en occuper entre soi, et au lieu de répugner à porter l'atten-

tion sur des évènements d'une telle magnitude, et d'une si grande probabilité, se familiariser au contraire avec eux, et avec notre situation à venir. Lorsqu'on sera persuadé que l'existence de l'ordre social va de nouveau être mise en danger si nous tombons dans le relâchement; lorsqu'on se dira qu'il est impossible de rester neutres dans la lutte entre le bien et le mal si elle va s'établir, on aura déjà fait un grand pas vers le succès, et on réunira autour de soi tous les élémens de force et d'opinion pour l'assurer définitivement.

Je suis convaincu que le seul frein des méchants est la crainte de l'intervention étrangère. Au lieu de trahir aucun symptôme de faiblesse, nous devons laisser à cette opinion toute la force qu'elle peut acquérir. Il faut s'abstenir de tout acte qui ne pourrait pas être soutenu par des moyens efficaces; mais il ne convient pas de désavouer notre propre position, et d'encourager le mal en nous ôtant tout crédit, et en la dépouillant de tout ce qu'elle a d'imposant.

Cette lettre vous arrivera au milieu de vos occupations domestiques en Parlement; elles méritent sans doute la préférence, mais elles demandent aussi de ne pas oublier les étrangères. Dans les temps où nous vivons il existe une fédération du bien contre celle du mal. Le motif du combat ne consiste pas dans des intérêts qu'on puisse définir; c'est l'existence de chacun qui en dépend. Malgré les dangers, nous avons tous les moyens de sauver l'ordre social de la dernière épreuve à laquelle il va être exposé. Les peuples sont bons et mieux administrés que jamais. Je veux comprendre dans cette catégorie même celui de la France, qui se montre plus disposé à la tranquillité que les perturbateurs ne le voudraient. Les armées sont fidèles, et les bases fondamentales de l'ordre politique dans chaque état (excepté ici) sont encore à peu près intactes. Le danger ne pourrait donc s'augmenter que par la timidité de ceux qui seraient disposés à céder d'un côté, et de l'autre par la manie d'innover dans un moment où les factieux ne se laissent apaiser par rien, et où ils veulent arracher à la faiblesse et à la condescendance des Princes des armes dont ils ont le projet de se servir pour leur ruine.

Je vous demande mille pardons, Milord, de ces observations: j'espère que vous les attribuerez à l'importance que le monde met à votre suffrage, et à l'attachement respectueux que je vous ai voué.

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Pozzo di Borgo.

[ 25. ]

To Lord ———.

MY LORD,

London, 14th May, 1819.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter, and I should be very happy if I could recommend Major Drake for promotion by brevet without injustice to the claims of others.

Major Drake is certainly a very meritorious officer, but

there are many others whose claims are at least as strong as his who have not yet been promoted. I cannot recommend one officer without recommending others; and I am sure your Lordship will see that after a war of such extent and duration as the last was, and during which so many officers distinguished themselves, it is impossible at once to promote all who have claims.

They must be selected by degrees; and I must say that the task of making the selection, and of preferring some of these brave men to others, becomes much more irksome by the obligation imposed upon him whose duty it is to make it, of discussing with their friends their several merits.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Lisbon, 17th May, 1819.

I have not wrote to you since my arrival, as indeed I had nothing very particular to say to you; for though the state of public concerns here is of an unpleasant aspect from the absolute want of means, yet that is so far from being extraordinary, that it is but the natural result of the conduct of this government since the conclusion of the war, and which has by every reasonable man been predicted, and which I have constantly informed them would be the inevitable result; but so long as by hook and by crook they could get on from day to day, they would not open their eyes to the day of reckoning; or each, as is the custom in this country, thought it might last his time. However, the crisis is now near at hand, and they having lost every the least credit, and the revenues being by their temporary expedients reduced to a nothing, they are puzzled for their daily bread, and every department or branch of the service, civil and military, is in arrear. The pay of the soldiers (except in Lisbon) is from January last in arrear, though they have not now rations, and it is six weeks since any pay has been issued; and we are unable to relieve our detachments, as the commanding officers have not means of paying the subsistence of the troops during the march. The abuses in all the departments of the civil administration have increased since the war, and there is no chance of any correction of them; but Don Miguel, whilst he is increasing the naval force, and consequently its expences, directs all his plan of economy against the army, and, as I think I told you in England, has prevailed on the government to propose the formation of an army that is not to exceed in expense, including all its departments (except the arsenal), six millions and a half of cruzadas, that is about six hundred and fifty thousand pounds. I have postponed the attempt to form such an army under



various pretexts, but since my return I am reminded of the necessity in almost every occasion ; though Forjas himself in speaking of it cannot help confessing that the thing is impossible. However, I propose postponing this question till the arrival of Palmella, and thence to the period of going to the Brazil, which will either decide on my leaving this service, or remaining in it under different circumstances and conditions. I must, however, say that during my absence the conduct of the governors in all subjects concerning me was considerate and delicate, and since my return they have been very obliging and I am on the very best terms with them, which is so far pleasant. But Forjas keeps on his opposition steadily, and by every means in his power, though he is now obliged to do it more cautiously, and does not even govern so much as he did in the Regency since the Count of Peniche has been one of it. But the truth is, that the reason of all the differences there have been between me and the governors has originated, and is continued, from the want of immediate and personal communication, and the power which Forjas thereby has of representing my letters and representations as best suits his purpose, for all my communication with the governors passes through him. This, if I remain in this service, must be mended.

I have not since I left you heard anything more respecting the Garter though I have wrote a considerable time since on the subject to Lord Castlereagh, as well as upon my having it in my power to get naturalised in this country if things should turn out so as to make it worth while or advantageous to the general objects I have in view ; and it is most necessary I should have some light on this subject as early as possible for my own governance ; on the latter there of course can be no difficulty. The rumour is here now very general that the King is thinking of returning, and of course these come from the Rio de Janeiro ; and in truth I have a letter from there from a person well informed, to whom the King complained of the climate, and showed a discontent with things there, but went no further, and it might be the effect of some momentary feeling. He was not himself well at the time, and all his family discontented with their remaining at the Rio. The Queen has ever had an aversion to it, but that can have no weight with the King, as at the least he is very indifferent as to her being satisfied. But the fits, to which, since their residence there, all the younger part of the royal family has been subject, and more particularly the Prince Royal, are increasing in their violence, and the Princess Royal has taken a most decided aversion to the place, having the same reason as all others, and the additional one that she conceives that climate the cause of the Prince Royal's ill health, and that he would be quite free was he to return to Portugal. These, with the increasing of the King's own particular illness, would be strong auxiliaries to any attempt to persuade his Majesty to return, and which at the present moment would be powerfully assisted by the state of things at Monte Video and Buenos Ayres. At the former the affairs are far from agreeable, and the expence so excessive as to have considerably cooled and tired the expectations formed on that undertaking, and I have reason to think the court of the Rio de Janeiro would be glad to get well out of that scrape. Besides these and other circumstances of minor consideration, I think it would not be impossible to decide the King to come away ; but there is perhaps no one there in a

situation to have influence who desires it, and certainly no one, if there is the inclination, who has character or firmness sufficient to carry the business through, as the whole Brazilian and anti-English party would be against it, and the King, if he wished it, must have some one to support him through. Palmella is, therefore, necessary there, and if he was there, I might, being there, be also of some assistance, and we could play into each other's hands. He I find postpones leaving England for this till towards the end of the summer, consequently will not be at the Rio till some time in the beginning of next year, and this might be very well if he does not again further postpone his departure. I must certainly go there, and all will depend on the manner I am received. If coldly (which perhaps I have no reason to expect) then I immediately resign and return to England; if I recover the favour I was once in, then most certainly I could be very useful; indeed I could then have almost done anything, and I am most willing to do my best for the great object, which I am sure is at the least as much for the interest of the King and his family as for any other State. The use the being the bearer of the Garter might be of to me I have already so much explained, that it is here unnecessary to repeat it; however, that depends not on me.

They keep hammering at the expedition from Cadiz, and pretend to be in a great hurry, but I do not see, in spite of all this noise, that it advances much. There has been lately great desertion there. I set out on the 21st to visit the troops in the north, which will occupy me till the beginning of July.

Believe me ever, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

BERESFORD.

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*To General Pozzo di Borgo.*

[ 26. ]

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

A Londres, ce 18<sup>me</sup> Mai, 1819.

J'ai reçu il y a quelques jours votre lettre du 10<sup>me</sup>, et je vous assure que j'ai bien regretté les mesures qui ont été prises par le gouvernement Français, et qui font l'objet de vos observations. L'augmentation de la Chambre des Pairs est un coup d'autorité que les gouvernemens limités ne peuvent pas adopter impunément, et dont les suites ne peuvent pas avoir été prévues et calculées. Une de celles-ci sera l'augmentation du nombre de la Chambre des Députés, ce qui va augmenter son influence aux dépens du trône même si les élections tournent mieux qu'elles n'ont fait jusqu'à présent.

Pour ce qui regarde l'armée, il me paraît que depuis le départ du Duc de Feltré, les ministres n'ont jamais considéré que ce qu'il fallait au Roi était non une bonne armée, non une armée forte et faite à la guerre, mais une armée attachée à S.M., et à la famille Royale. Une telle armée est nécessaire non seule-

ment pour donner au trône et au gouvernement l'appui physique qu'il leur faut dans toutes les transactions du pays ; mais aussi l'appui de l'influence que l'armée a, et a toujours eu, en France, dans toutes affaires qui peuvent se traiter, ou dans les Chambres ou ailleurs.

Pour moi, je n'ai jamais pu voir autre chose que désastre dans la loi de recrutement, parce que son principe est de former une armée sur une base tout à fait différent que celle de l'attachement des officiers et soldats au Roi, et à sa famille ; et dès qu'on met en exécution cette loi en plaçant dans l'armée les officiers et soldats de Buonaparte, il me paraît que la chose doit nécessairement devenir de jour en jour plus critique en France.

J'ai pris occasion de faire connaître à M. de Cazes mes opinions sur ces deux sujets, en réponse à une lettre qu'il m'avait écrit ; mais je crains que même si ce ministre voit le danger comme nous le voyons, il n'a pas le pouvoir de l'arrêter. Le grand mal en France est, qu'on croit pouvoir gouverner par la popularité, et gagner la popularité en flattant les viles passions de la classe la plus avilie et la plus corrompue de la nation ; et on est venu au point de ne pouvoir plus appeler les choses par leur nom propre ; les plus mauvaises actions deviennent des vertus, les hommes des Cent Jours des patriotes, et la rébellion du 20<sup>me</sup> Mars, cette trahison infâme du Roi et de toute l'Europe, une action vertueuse, et un acte de dévouement et de devoir. Le gouvernement perd toute sa dignité et sa force ; et un de ces beaux jours nous verrons qu'on voudra prendre la cocarde de l'insurrection ; et le même principe—l'avidité de la basse popularité—qui a porté le ministère à céder jusqu'à présent, les portera à céder alors.

Vous voyez que je ne pense pas mieux que vous des affaires en France, qui vont empirer par le résultat des élections prochaines ; et je crois qu'il n'y a pas un homme bien pensant dans ce pays-ci qui ne les voit pas de la même manière. La difficulté est de savoir ce qu'il faut faire en telles circonstances. Je ne vois rien qui puisse approcher au nom de remède, au progrès du mal actuel. On pourra en trouver pour celui de l'avenir dans l'union intime des quatre grandes Puissances, dans celle de leurs conseils, et de leurs ministres, surtout à Paris ; et dans la prévoyance et la sagesse de leurs démarches en tout ce qui concerne la France.

Vous observerez que le mal vient du gouvernement. Si la

loi de recrutement et la loi des élections sont mauvaises, c'est le gouvernement qui les a fait ; c'est lui qui met en exécution la première, et qui empêche le changement de la seconde. C'est encore le gouvernement qui a fait l'augmentation à la Chambre des Pairs ; c'est lui qui en a choisi les sujets ; et c'est lui qui forme une armée pour le Roi de France, qui ne peut pas lui être dévouée ; et c'est encore lui qui veut gouverner par les moyens de la basse popularité. Le Roi n'est pas trompé sur ces sujets. D'abord dans les temps modernes les Rois, qui lisent tout comme les autres, ne peuvent pas être trompés par leurs ministres. Mais je sais que le Roi n'est pas trompé, ni sur les mesures ni sur le sentiment qu'elles ont excité, parce que S.M. a vu la lettre que j'en ai écrit à M. de Cazes.

Que peut-on donc faire vis-à-vis d'un Roi qui trouve les mesures de ses ministres bonnes tandis que tout le reste du monde les trouvent nuisibles ? Rien que bien observer les mesures, bien caleuler leurs suites et leurs résultats, se tenir bien unis, et surtout ne pas donner cause aux malveillans de croire qu'il existe la moindre divergence d'opinion entre les Souverains sur les affaires de France, ou de se plaindre des fausses mesures qu'on pourrait prendre sur ces affaires.

Ils craignent, c'est vrai, l'intervention étrangère ; c'est-à-dire, si elle est comme elle doit l'être, unanime et simultanée de toute l'Europe, fondée sur une cause légitime de danger pour les droits acquis et reconnues par les traités. Mais les malveillans la désirent si elle n'est pas de cette nature.

C'est alors que les malveillans en France crieraient à la tyrannie d'une intervention étrangère. Ces cris résonneraient ailleurs, et paralyseraient les efforts de l'alliance ; et on trouverait trop tard peut-être que le défaut de force morale que donne la justice dans toutes les causes avait fait manquer son but à l'intervention Européenne.

Je ne vois de remède à tout ceci que d'abord l'union, et puis la patience et la sagesse.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Le Prince Castelcicalo to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*Paris, ce 20<sup>me</sup> Mai, 1819.

Je profite, Milord, du départ pour Londres de Milord FitzRoy Somerset pour vous présenter mes hommages, et me rappeler à votre précieux souvenir. Il n'y a rien dont je me suis plus honoré que de vos sentimens de bonté et d'indulgence. C'est pourquoi je vous supplie de me les conserver, nonobstant le tems et l'absence. Les affaires ici vont à peu près le même train. La séance du 17<sup>me</sup> de la Chambre des Députés, sur les trente-sept pétitions pour le rappel des bannis, offre quelques détails et un résultat favorable, mais il ne change en rien l'état de danger de la monarchie des Bourbons. Les préfets, les sous-préfets, sont mauvais, et l'armée le devient tous les jours de plus en plus. C'est un bien que les régicides restent au dehors, au moins pour le présent. Quant aux exilés, dont le retour dépend de la volonté du Roi, comptez que le parti est pris de les faire revenir petit à petit. 'Le Constitutionnel,' que je vous remet, mais que peut-être vous aurez déjà lu, celui dis-je du 18<sup>me</sup> de ce mois, renferme des détails que j'ai vérifiés être très exactes sur la vacillation du ministère préalablement à la discussion qui a eu lieu dans la Chambre sur l'affaire des bannis. Le ministère avait consenti à ce que l'on remet purement et simplement, et sans observations, les trente-sept pétitions au Président du Conseil des Ministres. Mais MM. Laisné, Pasquier, St. Cricq, et Mézy, et quelqu'un autre des principaux, ont dit qu'ils n'y consentiraient jamais; et comme le ministère a vu que c'était là l'opinion d'une très grande majorité de la Chambre, il a cédé pour ne pas le déshonorer, et a consenti à l'ordre du jour. Alors le Garde des Sceaux, avec son habileté et son adresse ordinaire, a fait un discours, dont il pourrait s'honorer, et dont on pourrait lui faire honneur, s'il ne travaillait pas par tant d'autres moyens à la désorganisation de cette monarchie. Au reste, c'est un pas vers le bien que le résultat de cette séance du 17. Elle met les ministres complètement dans leur tort pour toutes les blessures, j'oserais dire presque mortelles, qu'ils ont faites à la monarchie légitime pour complaire à la canaille, et se procurer cette fausse popularité qui les entraîne avec la monarchie. S'il faisait consister cette popularité dans les saines mesures et dans l'opinion des bons, il n'y a pas de doute qu'ils auraient dirigé l'opinion publique, ils auraient eu la majorité dans les Chambres, et auraient réduit les méchans au silence. La conduite de Monsieur et de toute la famille royale est parfaite, et on ne peut rien leur reprocher.

C'est une abomination que tout ce qui s'est passé au procès de Marinet et de Cantillon. Le Général Murray vous en aura rendu bon compte. Les honnêtes gens en ont gémi, et moi j'en ai la rage et l'indignation dans le cœur. Mais le Roi de France est sur son trône par vous, et cette vérité, qui surnagera dans l'histoire, vous vengera de toutes les sottises et de toutes les impertinences du Président de la Cour d'Assises et de l'Avocat du Roi, Colomb. Le ministère n'a pas osé parler de crainte de nuire à sa popularité.

-Le corps diplomatique est tel que vous le connaissez, *sans changement*; c'est assez dire. La Propagande est déjà *in full activity* dans les papiers publics, et dans les pamphlets, contre les puissances étrangères, et elle ne

fera que croître et embellir. La 'Bibliothèque Historique' a fait un attaque personnelle sur mon Souverain ; et j'ai porté plainte contre elle en calomnie et diffamation. N'importe que l'amende et les peines soient modiques, suivant la belle législation qu'on vient de former. S'il n'était question que de l'amende d'un sou j'aurais porté également la plainte. Chacun doit remplir son devoir. Qu'ils disent tant qu'ils veulent du mal des actes des gouvernemens étrangers, mais qu'ils respectent personnellement les Souverains. Mille pardons de ce bavardage. Que Dieu vous conserve pour le salut commun, vous bénisse, et vous prospère, sont les vœux que je forme continuellement.

Agrééz, mon cher et incomparable Milord, l'expression de mon profond respect, et de l'attachement et dévouement sans borne que je vous conserverai toute ma vie.

De Votre Excellence

le très humble, très obéissant, et très fidèle serviteur,

CASTELICALA.

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*To General Vincent.*

[ 27. ]

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

A Londres, ce 2<sup>me</sup> Juin, 1819.

Je vous suis bien reconnaissant pour votre lettre. Toutes les nouvelles de Paris sont intéressantes, surtout celles qui viennent d'une personne qui voit les choses clairement, comme vous les voyez ; car il n'y a pas un moment des vingt-quatre heures où ce qui y arrive ne revient pas à l'esprit d'une manière sérieuse. Le mal de cet hiver-ci paraît être de la même nature que celle de l'hiver passé, c'est que le gouvernement veut la basse popularité, coûte qu'il coûte, et qu'il se base sur elle. Je trace de là la loi des élections, la loi de recrutement, et toutes les mesures qui en dérivent, y inclus celles qui ont pour objet de résister la réforme de la première ; et vous pouvez être sûr que tant qu'on gouvernera sur ce principe erroné toute l'Europe aura de l'inquiétude bien fondée sur le sort de la monarchie Française, et pour la tranquillité permanente du monde.

Pour moi j'avoue que je ne vois aucun remède à cet état de choses pour le présent ; et pour les maux qui peuvent en résulter à l'avenir, il n'y a que celui de l'union étroite des quatre grandes Puissances. Il me paraît que nous ne pourrions rien faire à présent que ne ferait pas du mal, et qui n'accélérerait pas la crise que nous avons à craindre ; et si par malheur il arrivait que ce que les Puissances Alliées voulussent faire ne fût pas une mesure bien calculée, et qu'elle ne portât pas avec elle

l'assentiment général, à cause de sa justice et de sa nécessité, il se trouverait que nous manquerions de force au moment critique. Mon opinion donc est que nous devons non seulement être, mais aussi paraître unis, en tout, et partout; et surtout à Paris; et attendre avec patience les événemens qui pourront résulter de cet état de folie.

Je n'ai aucune connaissance de la grande augmentation de l'armée dont vous faites mention. J'ai vu dernièrement l'ordonnance pour la levée de la conscription de l'an 1818. On en avait déjà pris deux; ce qui fait, y inclus celle de 1818, 120,000 hommes. On n'avait pas 40,000 hommes dans l'armée de ligne avant ces levées, non compris la Garde, dont la plus part était d'une bien mauvaise description, et plusieurs avaient droit à leur retraite. Ainsi donc je doute que, même après qu'on aura incorporé les 40,000 hommes de l'an 1818, on aura 150,000 hommes sous les armes, y compris la Garde. En effet, les 180,000,000 francs ne suffiraient pas pour une armée plus forte, si on y compte les pensions de retraite de soldats et officiers, qui sont énormes en France, et les dépenses nécessaires aux places fortes.

Ce qui doit toujours donner de la jalousie à l'Europe est cette provision de la loi de recrutement qui met les vétérans à la disposition du gouvernement; surtout si le gouvernement la met en exécution avant l'expiration du terme de service de la conscription de l'année 1816, parce que alors il serait clair qu'on voulait avoir sous les armes les soldats de l'armée de la Loire. Le Ministre de la Guerre nous a trompé tous sur cette provision, au moment de la discussion de la loi, en assurant qu'il n'avait pas l'intention d'organiser les moyens que cette provision lui donnait jusqu'à "l'expiration du premier terme de six ans, excepté en cas de guerre." Cependant, je vois qu'il a organisé cette force. La question est s'il l'a mis sous les armes; et je ne le crois pas.

J'ai vu la dernière note Espagnole, qui paraît mettre toute la négociation entre les Puissances de la Péninsule encore en l'air. D'ailleurs il y paraît une manque de convenance très remarquable. Cependant il est plus que jamais clair que ce qu'il faut à l'Espagne pour pouvoir se mettre en mesure de profiter de ce qui se passe en faveur de la mère patrie dans la colonie de Buenos Ayres, est la place de Montevideo. Si elle la tenait, et qu'elle y rassemblât 10,000 hommes et une flotte,

et que le gouvernement Espagnol y envoyât des gens sages, je suis certain que la révolte de cette colonie ne durerait pas six semaines.

Toujours à vous, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Prince Custelcicala.*

[ 28. ]

MON CHER PRINCE,

A Londres, ce 3<sup>me</sup> Juin, 1819.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset m'a donné votre lettre du 20 Mai, et je vous en suis bien reconnaissant. C'est toujours le même mal qui existe en France ; le gouvernement veut la popularité, et se base sur elle, et tant que ce mal existera l'Europe ne cessera pas d'avoir de l'inquiétude pour la monarchie des Bourbons, et pour le repos du monde. Je vois qu'on s'est déjà repenti de la petite saillie de M. le Garde des Sceaux, et qu'on veut affaiblir et même retracter ce qu'il avait dit ; et il y a une autre chose digne d'attention dans cette transaction qui montre bien sur quoi on tient en France ; c'est que le Garde des Sceaux a perdu sa popularité parmi Messieurs les Libéraux, depuis qu'il a déclaré qu'il ne voulait pas marcher avec eux à toute extrémité.

Je me réjouis beaucoup sur ce que vous me dites sur Monsieur et les Princes. Le rôle de Monsieur est bien délicat et bien difficile. Le danger pour lui est pendant la vie du Roi ; et il faut qu'il prenne bien garde de ne pas faire se déclarer ouvertement ses ennemis un grand parti parmi ceux dans les mains desquels la loi d'élections va placer la puissance. Il faut qu'il se ressouvienne que même si les Princes peuvent pardonner à ceux qui se seraient déclarés contre eux, il est rare que ces derniers puissent se fier à ces pardons ; et que si un grand parti est porté à se déclarer contre lui pendant le règne du Roi son frère, même s'ils n'ont pas le pouvoir d'interrompre la succession par un coup-de-main, ils lui rendront son règne si difficile que ce sera un miracle si la dynastie en échappe. Le malheur des Princes est qu'ils ont des intérêts tout à fait différens de ceux des autres hommes, et ils sont dans la nécessité de sacrifier leurs goûts, leurs sentimens, et leurs amitiés à ceux-ci. Voilà exactement où se trouve Monsieur, et il faut qu'il agisse en conséquence s'il veut échapper au danger. Il m'a fait grand



plaisir de savoir que le Comte Woronzow était satisfait du mariage de son fils. Je les attends à Londres avec impatience.

Je suis, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*G. H. Rose, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Berlin, 12th June, 1819.

The officer at the head of the Private Chancery of War here has desired me to transmit to your Grace the inclosed commission as General Field Marshal of the Prussian armies. You have so exhausted all means of congratulation, as well as of compliment and praise, that I must content myself with expressing my anxious and heartfelt wish that God may grant to you for your own happiness and for the good of our country, a very long enjoyment of those honours, which all the nations of Europe have heaped upon you in such eager rivalry.

I entreat your Grace to believe that

I am most faithfully and truly yours,

G. H. ROSE.

[ 29. ]

*To Lord Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 25th July, 1819.

I think it would be advisable to follow the precedent of the Peninsula prize-money as exactly as possible in respect to the grant to be made to Lord William Bentinck's army.

I was certainly the Commander-in-Chief of that army. It was put under my orders and received prize-money for all their operations; and I don't conceive that the grant made to satisfy claims for certain stores and property captured precludes me from urging claims for certain other stores and property captured. But in whatever way either or both these questions may be decided, I don't propose to, and positively will not, derive any advantage from this grant, and I leave it to you to settle the matter in such manner as you please for Lord William Bentinck; taking care only that no claim is given up by me which might be urged with advantage against any future Commander-in-Chief.

July 26th.

Just as I had written the above, it occurred to me that by urging my claims too strongly I should put Lord William Bentinck in an awkward situation, and should defeat my own

object. If my claim as Commander-in-Chief were admitted, I might give it up; but then it would go to the General Fund. He could not benefit by my giving up my claim, for then he would divide only as a General Officer. The same principles and reasoning apply to the cases of Lords Beresford and Lynedoch. I was Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army and of the troops at Cadiz; and, upon the whole, I believe that whether the warrant for the Peninsula prize-money does or not satisfy all claims of those participating of that prize-money, it is best so to understand and recite it, and then to leave the division to be made by me and Lord William; he to have the share of the Commander-in-Chief, having come to the Peninsula in that character from Sicily.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord William thinks the Navy actually employed at Tarragona cannot be left out.

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*Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Cirencester, 30th July, 1819.

On my arrival here yesterday evening I found your letter of the 25th and 26th inst. You are quite correct in stating that if the prize money be made out to you, as Commander-in-Chief, it will at once alter the whole disposition of the money, so that it will not be in your power to alter it again by forbearing to take your share.

When the money was given for the Peninsular army, it was given to meet generally their claims for prize money, without deciding what were precisely the separate heads of prizes. One of our objects in giving it in this general manner, or at least one advantage which we have taken in so giving it, is that we decided no questionable claims—a decision on which, either one way or the other, might establish an inconvenient precedent. I think that we may fairly take this circumstance into consideration, as it separates this case from all others; and with this view I beg to suggest whether it would not be better for me to write to you a semi-official letter, announcing to you the intention of government to grant to Lord William's army a sum of money in consideration of what that army was entitled for prize money. You may then decline having your name inserted, although you were Commander-in-Chief; giving as the reason, that your claims, and the claims of the army under your more immediate command, were in your opinion satisfied by what you had already received and disposed of; and then adding what you have stated in your letter to me would be the effect of having the grant made out in your name. After the receipt of such a

letter, I should be justified in considering Lord William the Commander-in-Chief of that part of the army, so far as to make out the grant at once to him in that capacity.

With respect to the Navy, Lord William must recollect that we cannot apply the prize-money to that part only which happened to be with him. It will at once be considered as a conjoint expedition—half must go to the Navy, and a considerable part to the Commander-in-Chief and other Admirals; at least I am afraid this will be the case.

Goulburn will be in town on Tuesday (he is gone into the country for a few days), and will wait upon you at your office, or at Apsley House, at any time you appoint, to take your commands as to the letter which shall be written to you.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Has Lord William accepted Madras?

[ 30. ]

*To the Comte de Cazes.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

A Bruxelles, ce 8<sup>me</sup> Août, 1819.

Votre Excellence aura su que depuis l'année 1814 je me trouve chargé des ouvrages de fortification dans ce pays-ci de la part des deux gouvernemens aux frais desquels ces travaux se font; et j'arrive d'Angleterre pour en faire la tournée, et voir les progrès qui y ont été fait depuis l'année passée.

J'avais voulu prendre cette occasion de faire ma cour à sa Majesté; et comme le but de mon voyage dans ce pays-ci sera connu, et publié, comme tout l'est dans ces temps modernes, il m'avait paru que cette démarche put diminuer le sentiment qui pourrait exister en France au sujet de cette tournée. Mais ayant consulté mes collègues avant de quitter Londres, il nous a paru à tous que puisque j'avais chaque année fait cette même tournée au mois d'Août depuis l'année 1814, on pourrait croire, ou au moins dire, qu'elle avait quelque connexion avec l'Armée d'Occupation, si elle était suivi d'un voyage à Paris; et qu'il valait mieux ne pas aller à Paris, que d'en donner cette idée.

Je vous prie, M. le Comte, d'avoir la bonté de faire connaître ces circonstances à S.M., et de l'assurer combien je regrette qu'elles m'empêchent d'avoir l'honneur de lui faire ma cour à sa fête.

J'aurais bien voulu avoir cette occasion de pouvoir vous féliciter, ainsi que Madame la Comtesse, en personne, de la naissance de votre fils. J'espère que tous les deux se portent bien; et

je vous prie de présenter mes hommages à Madame la Comtesse, ainsi qu'à Madame Pinetcau, et d'agréer les sentimens, &c.

WELLINGTON.

*Lord Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Cirencester, 10th Sept., 1819.

Many thanks to you for sending me a copy of the letter which you have written to the Emperor, which is exactly in the sense I could have wished.

I send you a despatch from the Cape; the two enclosures are not worth reading. If by artillery Lord Charles means simply guns for his forts, you will not, I imagine, have any difficulty in providing him with them. Do you think you could spare any men?

With respect to the cavalry, the regiment was withdrawn in compliance with the existing clamour for reductions, and it was insisted upon that a regiment of cavalry must be quite useless at the Cape. I think it is quite clear that there must be some force of that description maintained at the Cape, and that the volunteer Burgher corps must be considered only as a temporary expedient, and a most expensive sort of establishment.

A regiment of cavalry is expected to return from India. This regiment might be ordered to stop at the Cape. But then there will appear in the estimates of next year an increase of establishment. A regiment might be ordered either from Ireland or Great Britain. But probably Lord Sidmouth cannot spare one from hence, nor will the Lord-Lieutenant spare one from Ireland. Officers and non-commissioned officers may be sent from the half-pay to form a colonial regiment. This regiment would not appear in the estimates, and I think might be raised there, with the help of some of our emigrants, who may not like the labour of settlers. The first would, I think, be the best plan (if we can depend on Lord Hastings sending back the regiment), as we might represent it only as a temporary increase, and should then have time to concert measures with the Governor for the raising the colonial corps.

Let me know your opinion on the subject.

Yours, sincerely,

BATHURST.

The position in the rear on the Keiskamma River must depend on the force necessary for its maintenance, compared with the disposable force at the Cape.

*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Cray Farm, 11th Sept., 1819.

I have desired Lord Liverpool to forward for your consideration a Project which I have prepared in reply to the Russian and Austrian memoirs upon

establishing a Conference, &c. I also send the original papers for reference ; and as you will perceive by the last despatch to Lieven the Emperor still clings to this most hazardous notion, and only reserves his decision till he receives our official answer, and Capo d'Istria shall make his report, it appears to be material to go enough into the question to make it difficult for his Imperial Majesty to press the measure further upon us. It is nothing more than a project of Pozzo's for establishing himself as a sort of *European Director* at Paris ; and it really appears to me to be an inevitable receipt for blowing up the Confederacy in the shortest time possible. I shall be obliged to you for any suggestions that occur.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Coombe Wood, 12th Sept., 1819.

I send you, by Castlereagh's desire, this box of papers.

We shall have occasion for a Cabinet this week, both on internal and on foreign affairs ; I have desired, therefore, that one may be summoned for Wednesday, at two o'clock, and think it not improbable that we may be under the necessity of meeting again on Thursday.

The state of Lancashire and its immediate neighbourhood is very alarming, and deserves serious consideration.

On the other hand, the condition of almost every other part of the country is satisfactory ; poor-rates are falling, crimes are diminishing, and the agricultural counties are in a state of progressive prosperity ; I have witnessed this partially in a short tour which I have just taken, and I hear reports to the same effect from most other quarters.

The exchanges with foreign countries are now decidedly in our favour. I fear, however, that we shall have a bad quarter of revenue on the 10th of October ; the great deficiency is in the customs, owing to the stagnation of trade.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

*Le Comte Pozzo di Borgo to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MILORD,

Paris, le 17<sup>me</sup> Sept., 1819.

Je me reprocherais de laisser partir Lord FitzRoy sans profiter d'une si bonne occasion pour vous renouveler mes très humbles respects, et sans vous parler, comme de coutume, un peu de politique ; d'autant plus que le moment des élections y invite, et que le résultat donne à penser sérieusement. Il est démontré que le ministère compte à peine parmi les élus un tiers de ceux qu'il a porté directement. A la vérité il espère d'attirer une partie des autres qui se sont fait nommer sans lui ; mais cette manière ne réussit d'ordinaire que très imparfaitement, parce que ce n'est pas une influence solide et systematique, mais une négociation passagère avec chaque indi-

vidu et pour chaque affaire en particulier. A côté des bons, ou de ceux qui peuvent le devenir, il en est de détestables qui arriveront avec des intentions sinistres, sans compter le regicide Grégoire.

Les ministres ne peuvent pas manquer d'être convaincus que les mauvais esprits ont fait plus de progrès qu'ils n'ont supposé ; s'ils veulent tenter de les arrêter, ils trouveront encore des appuis dans la Chambre prochaine, mais s'ils visent simplement à la voir finir n'importe comment, celle qui suivra ne sera probablement plus gouvernable ni par eux-mêmes ni par personne.

Le Maréchal St. Cyr est dans l'inaction depuis trois mois à cause d'une maladie que l'on dit incurable. L'esprit du ministère se montrera dans le successeur qu'il lui destine. L'armée a grand besoin de rentrer sous une bonne influence ; elle est encore, à ce qu'on dit, capable d'être bien dirigée, mais le temps presse, et les prédicateurs de troubles travaillent en attendant à la pervertir. La Garde est toujours dans d'excellentes dispositions, un chef au Département de la Guerre qui ne se faisait pas un système de la regarder de mauvais œil, comme c'est le cas maintenant, la rendrait parfaite.

La licence de la presse est à son comble, et quoiqu'on en dise, elle pervertit et exalte les partis dans tous les sens, et les jette dans les extrêmes. Il est aussi un mal qu'elle n'opère pas chez vous ; c'est de déconsidérer les agents de l'autorité : des injures non vengées passent en France pour des injures qu'on mérite. Donnadieu a publié un libelle scandaleux ; ceux qu'il attaque, au lieu de se glorifier qu'en punissant les rebelles de Grenoble ils ont sauvé leur pays et le Roi des plus grands malheurs, ont répondu que l'ordonnance du 5 Septembre n'était pas rendue alors : que dire après cela ! Les ennemis les plus acharnés n'auraient pas indiqué une plus mauvaise défaite.

J'ignore, et ne cherche nullement à savoir, ce que le ministère se propose pour la session prochaine ; s'il se prononce de manière à se tirer avec la France de la position dangereuse où il est placé, il aura pour lui les vœux de tout le monde ; si non, il faudra se taire, et attendre.

Il est à la mode ici de mal augurer de l'Allemagne. Je n'ai jamais partagé cette manière de voir, au point du moins où on paraît la porter. Les gouvernements Germaniques ont été à la vérité au moment de se désorganiser avec leurs constitutions doctrinales ; aujourd'hui ils en sont revenus, parce qu'ils en ont reconnu l'ineptie et les dangers ; et le bon sens naturel à la nation commence heureusement à prendre le dessus.

Le Comte Capo d'Istrias m'a parlé du bon accueil qu'il avait trouvé partout en Angleterre ; et particulièrement auprès de vous, Milord ; j'ai également appris avec la plus sincère satisfaction la nomination de Monsieur Bagot à l'Ambassade de St. Pétersbourg, soit par rapport à lui-même, soit parce qu'il vous appartient de si près. Le Comte de la Ferronnaye va s'y rendre incessamment, et j'espère que le Marquis de Rivière retournera à Constantinople, malgré les projets qui ont existé de le remplacer.

Si les folies politiques pouvaient être compensées par la prospérité générale qui règne en France, le pays serait bientôt guéri. Les finances se reparent avec le plus grand succès, et l'abondance de dons de la Providence se montre par tout. Ce bien-être ne tient pas lieu de raison, mais il peut encore reparer bien des fautes, malgré qu'il ne les corrige pas toutes.

Permettez-moi, Milord, de vous réitérer encore une fois l'expression de mes sentimens, et de mon respectueux attachement.

Votre très humble et très dévoué serviteur,

POZZO DI BORGO.

*Le Baron Vincent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MILORD,

Paris, le 17<sup>me</sup> Sept., 1819.

C'est encore Lord FitzRoy Somerset qui me procure, Monsieur le Maréchal, l'occasion de me rappeler à votre bienveillance, et en cela je ne fais que céder à l'impulsion des sentiments d'attachement et de vénération que je vous porte. Il serait satisfaisant sans doute de pouvoir borner ma lettre à vous transmettre cette assurance, Milord, mais nous ne sommes pas assez heureux encore, après tant de tribulations, d'avoir atteint un but si désiré.

Vous connaissez, Milord, l'homme qui ici jouit de la faveur, et vous savez à quel usage l'emploie sa présomption et sa légèreté. Aujourd'hui que les élections lui ont échappés, et ont eu lieu en général dans le sens le plus opposé à la légitimité ou à la monarchie, cet homme se replie sur lui-même, et ne cherchant de ressource que dans une certaine somnolence qui lui est habituelle, il annonce ces élections comme étant dans le sens le plus *constitutionnel*—expression à laquelle le caractère national laisse un sens vague et très indéfini ; mais ce qui restera un opprobre, c'est la nomination du prêtre régicide, Grégoire, de scandaleuse mémoire.

Le choix du Ministre de la Guerre est une chose très importante au dedans et au dehors ; nous verrons à quel parti M. de Cazes, dans cette occasion, portera son sacrifice ; tout serait si facile ici si l'on voulait, mais on a voulu se donner de l'importance, et par là on a tout gâté.

J'ai beaucoup d'espoir sur les affaires d'Allemagne. On a pris des mesures sages, et on a vu d'assez près le danger pour croire qu'on emploiera le remède avec mesure et discernement.

Que Dieu vous garde, Milord ; vous êtes l'homme de l'Europe ; elle compte sur votre sagesse dans le conseil, sur votre expérience dans l'exécution.

Recevez avec votre bonté ordinaire, Milord, l'hommage renouvelé de mon attachement et de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Maréchal,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

VINCENT.

*Le Prince Castelcicala to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*Paris, ce 17<sup>me</sup> Sept., 1819.

Je profite, Milord Duc, du retour en Angleterre de Lord Fitzroy Somerset pour me rappeler à votre souvenir, et vous remercier mille fois de la dernière lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire. J'avais dans l'intervalle peu de choses à vous dire, car depuis quelque temps les affaires de ce pays-ci avaient pris une marche constante ; le doute ne tombait que sur l'opinion qu'on devait s'en former. Chacun en avait une. Le temps seul montrera de quel côté était la raison.

J'ai trouvé si intéressant ce que vous avez daigné m'écrire dans votre dernière lettre relativement à la conduite que Monsieur devait tenir, que je lui ai lu le paragraphe qui le concernait tout entier. Il m'a dit que vous aviez bien raison, qu'il tacherait de s'y conformer, et il m'a chargé de vous en re-

mercier, me disant sur vous des choses aussi vraies qui méritées. La conduite de son Altesse Royale est à peu près nulle dans ce moment-ci, et depuis bien de tems Monsieur semble d'une grande indifférence en tout.

L'époque que les Puissances voulaient attendre, savoir, celle des élections, est arrivée. Elles sont en général mauvaises, sans compter celle de l'Abbé Grégoire, qui est un scandale à peu près comme celle qu'une femme causerait en se promenant toute nue dans les rues. Cette dernière élection a fait beaucoup d'impression sur les ministres ici, mais il y a encore parmi eux de ceux qui croient que c'est la concurrence de Fievier dans le même département qui a mis les électeurs au désespoir. C'est ainsi qu'on perdra la monarchie par une mal-entendue soif de popularité, et par les concessions que l'on a faites aux révolutionnaires, et qu'on finira par dire que ce sont les Royalistes qui l'ont perdue. Le Ministre de l'Intérieur pourtant commence à sentir le danger, et il voit et en convient avec quelques personnes intimes, que la cause des Bourbons dépérit en France, et il assure qu'il s'occupe des moyens de parvenir à des changemens dans la loi des élections; mais il s'est trop embourbé dans cette loi pour qu'il puisse s'en retirer. Après sa funeste déclaration dans la Chambre des Pairs par la proposition de M. de Barthelemy, il trouvera plus difficile qu'il ne pense tout changement à opérer dans cette loi que lui-même a déclaré l'arche sacrée de la constitution et de la monarchie constitutionnelle. Il mettra contre lui tous les doctrinaires, qui forment ici le parti le plus nombreux. Ceux-ci se joindront aux Indépendans de toutes les couleurs, et il sera réduit aux Ministériels tout purs, qui sont en petit nombre, car pour les Royalistes ils ne lui feront jamais de grâce de la même manière que lui n'en fera jamais aux Royalistes.

C'est la licence effrénée de la presse qui fait ici plus de mal que la loi des élections. C'est cette licence effrénée de tous les jours qui sappe la monarchie plus que toute autre chose, et qui fait revivre la révolution. Ceux qui en veulent une à tout prix travaillent les petits propriétaires des départemens sur l'idée que tôt ou tard ils perdront leurs propriétés sous les Bourbons, et qu'ils n'ont d'autre salut que dans un changement de dynastie et de gouvernement. C'est pourquoi ils s'empressent de porter à la Tribune Nationale des ennemis déclarés des Bourbons. Le remède à ceci n'est pas aisé à trouver; mais c'est là la racine du mal, et tant que ces petits propriétaires auront une influence prépondérante ensemble avec les Patentés dans les élections, on peut s'attendre tous, les uns après les autres, à l'élection de gens les plus révolutionnaires, et d'avoir été régicide sera une marque de confiance plutôt qu'un motif d'exclusion. Il est inutile de songer à ce qu'on aurait pu faire et qu'on n'a pas fait. Il vaudrait mieux songer à l'avenir: mais la perspective n'est pas non plus rassurante.

Les mêmes raisons qui ont déterminé la conduite des Puissances Alliées actuelle envers la France depuis la retraite du Duc de Richelieu les feront continuer dans le même système. Cet esprit uniforme qui les animait toutes, et qui a produit ces prodiges que nous avons vu de nos yeux, et qui a opéré les deux restaurations, n'existe plus. Le danger n'est plus si imminent, si grand, ni si apparent comme il était; il ne frappe pas toutes les Puissances d'une même manière, et du même effroi. Les remèdes ne sont plus sous la main, comme ils étaient. C'est pourquoi je crains que la révolution continuera à faire son chemin ici, et qu'on ne s'en mêlera que lorsque le mal aura fait un progrès étonnant et peut-être irréparable. Ceci est dans



la nature des choses, et dans les élémens si différens des gouvernemens des quatre Puissances Alliées.

Il paraît sûr que le Maréchal Gouvion St. Cyr se retire du Ministère de la Guerre. M. de Cazes s'occupe de lui donner un successeur ; mais cette retraite pourrait bien amener d'autres changemens parmi les ministres.

Depuis quelques jours une certaine rivalité diplomatique qui vous est bien connue, et qui a produit bien de scandale et fait beaucoup de mal, est de nouveau sur pied ; et il est probable qu'elle aura d'autres suites. L'influence des Puissances Alliées ici aurait été d'un grand poids si elle aurait été exercée par toutes les quatre ensemble avec modération et raison, et si elle n'avait pas été partagée par une espèce de démenée politique, et devenue une affaire personnelle de leurs représentans. Je suis accoutumé, mon cher et digne Lord, à vous parler avec franchise. Rien n'égale les sentimens de vénération et de confiance que j'ai en vous. Continuez, je vous supplie, à m'honorer de vos sentimens de bonté et d'indulgence qui me sont si précieux, et auxquels j'attache le plus grand prix.

Je suis, avec le plus respectueux et inviolable attachement, toujours, mon cher Milord,

Votre très dévoué et fidèle serviteur,

CASTELCICALA.

[ 31. ]

*To Major-General Sir J. Byng.*

MY DEAR BYNG,

London, 21st Oct., 1819.

The accounts which I saw yesterday of the proceedings of the Radicals in different parts of England tend to prove that we are not far removed from a general and simultaneous rising in different parts and at different places. It is probable they will first *meet* in this manner and try their ground, and see how the troops are disposed of, and then proceed to business, which will be neither more nor less than the Radical plunder of the rich towns and houses which will fall in their way.

With the force which we have, it is impossible to prevent the success of this object in every part, and what we must take care of is that they have no success against any body of the troops. As long as no misfortune happens to them the mischief will be confined to plunder and a little *murder*, and will not be irretrievable ; but it is impossible to foresee how far it will go if the mob should in any instance get the better of the troops. I put out of the question their corrupting the troops, unless they are remarkably changed since I knew them about a twelvemonth ago, and unless the mob should have some success against them.

I would recommend you, then, in the disposition you will

make of your troops, first to provide for the security of the King's garrisons, castles, and magazines; and secondly, so to dispose of the remainder of your troops as to provide for the general security and peace of the district, but principally to be certain that they will be able to join and support each other in case of need, and, above all, to expose no small detachments in a populous town to the danger of being disarmed, insulted, or destroyed. It is much better that a town should be plundered, and even some lives lost, than that the whole country should be exposed to the danger which would result from the success of the mob against even a small detachment of the troops. Excepting, therefore, in strongholds, I would recommend you not to detach the infantry in smaller bodies than 200 or 300 men. As for the cavalry, and particularly the Lancers, I would recommend you not to detach them at all from the infantry and excepting with the infantry.

I would also recommend you, instead of quartering your troops, to put them up in large barns or warehouses, or to construct wooden huts for them in situations removed from the temptations held out to them in the large towns. I should think you would experience no difficulty in finding situations of this kind on the commons, &c., which must abound in the district which you occupy, and the Government will have no objection to allow you every reasonable expense for this object.

In the existing state of things, I consider 200 or 300 good infantry, with a little cavalry, fully sufficient for any mob of any numbers; and, by forming your detachments in this manner, you will always have it in your power to act according to circumstances, either upon many points, to preserve, as far as may be consistent with the safety of the troops, as many towns as possible from plunder; or upon a few, or only one, by the concentration of the troops, if the mob should be more formidable in your opinion than I now believe them to be.

Observe this, that in detaching the troops in this manner in barns, warehouses, or temporary huts, you must take great care to provide for their having good fires in the buildings in which you will place them. They will otherwise be wandering about to the public-houses, &c., in the neighbourhood, and they will, moreover, become unhealthy.

I wish to call your attention to Tyncmouth Castle. I have

directed that all the forts and batteries at the mouth of the Tyne should be dismantled excepting Tynemouth Castle, and that all the guns, stores, &c., should be removed into that work. It will be necessary that you should have a small garrison in it.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Upon considering the state of the detachments which I have recommended to you to form, it occurs to me that each of them will be much strengthened by having with it a field-piece. I will therefore send down to Weedon ten 6-pounders horsed, with artillerymen attached, to be at your disposal. There will be ammunition in the limbers; but, besides that, there will be two ammunition-waggons as a reserve, which you will place as you please.

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*Sir J. Byng to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Pontefract, 23rd Oct., 1819.

I am exceedingly obliged to you for favouring me so fully with your advice and sentiments contained in yours of the 21st.

I have always fought against the dispersion of my force in trivial detachments; it is quite impossible to defeat the disaffected if they rise, and to protect at the same time every town from plunder; *that* resistance should be made by the inhabitants,—and the greater number of the plunderers will be absent, acting with the insurgents,—but I am sorry to say the general remark from the manufacturers in and near Manchester has been that government is bound to protect them and their property.

I have considered it advisable to run up to Town, to have a conference with the Commander-in-Chief (if in Town), with Lord Sidmouth, and with you. I hope I may be so fortunate as to find you in London. I expect to be there by the time you receive this; if you will favour me with a line to appoint a time for my waiting on you, I shall be but too happy to have the advantage of a personal conference with your Grace. I am to be with Lord Sidmouth at 12 on Monday.

I am, with much truth and respect,

your obliged and obedient servant,

JOHN BYNG.

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*Sir George Shee to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Lockley's, 24th Oct., 1819.

May I take the liberty of troubling your Grace with a few words on a subject which I conceive to be of very considerable importance at the present moment and in the present conjuncture of affairs—I mean on the existing laws against high treason.

As these laws now stand, it seems to be evident that it is almost impossible to find a jury that will convict any person charged with the violation of them; and a very slight retrospect to some remarkable trials in the present reign will, I think, clearly show that the failure of the prosecutions proceeded from the necessity of trying the persons arraigned for *constructive* treason.

Whatever latitude might have been given to the judges by the ancient common law of England in determining what was high treason, the offence is clearly confined, in the 25th of Edward III., to "compassing or imagining the death of the King, or levying war against him in his realm," with some other offences not in point here, and the proof of an overt act is necessary to commit under this law; a law which remains in full force at the present day, forming as it does the basis of all our laws, whether common or statute, against the crime in question.

The widely extended interpretations of this law by eminent lawyers in modern times have constituted a sort of auxiliary code to it, and hence proceeds the practice of trying for *constructive* treason; hence also have many extraordinary verdicts of acquittal (as I have said) proceeded, for it would be difficult to convince almost any common juror, particularly one with a biassed mind and a narrow understanding, that interpretations of laws, however high the authorities for them may be, are to be deemed equivalent to direct or explanatory laws passed by the legislature.

Now I would submit to your Grace's consideration whether it would not be advisable to embody what may be intitled the common law of the land against high treason; that is to say, the various approved judicial interpretations of the statute in particular to which I have adverted, as well as of some others; into one plain, intelligible statute law, by means of an explanatory Act of Parliament; juries would then of necessity do their duty in cases of high treason, and government would obtain a great accession of that in which I humbly conceive it to be at present extremely deficient—the constitutional, legal, and, above all, practical means of its own protection.

I do not mean, however, to affirm that this measure would alone be sufficient in anomalous times, when principles, if such they can be called, of a very daring nature, subversive of all order, are in dangerous activity; new crimes must be met by new laws; but there is an interval between the period at which such principles gain wide extension and the period at which the mischief they menace would seem likely (if not prevented) to arrive, evidently favourable to the improvement of existing laws as well as to the enacting of new ones for the protection of the State. After the arrival of a great crisis in the affairs of an empire, legislation for its protection would be too late.

The circumstance should not be overlooked that, at the time when

treason was defined in our statute books, the fencing round and securing the liberties of the people superseded all other considerations, the royal prerogative having been deemed a sufficient protection for the throne.

I will conclude with just observing to your Grace that, preparatory to taking the liberty of addressing you on the present subject, I consulted a friend, who happens to be an able constitutional lawyer, on the propriety of embodying the laws against treason in the manner I have described, and he was inclined to think that the measure might possibly impeach the legality of some decisions in cases of high treason, but that he saw no other objection to it.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's devoted and faithful servant,

GEORGE SHEK.

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*Sir J. Byng to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

London, 28th Oct., 1819.

As I leave Town to-morrow on my return, and have no hope of seeing you, I write to tell you that I have disposed of the ten guns you sent me as follows :—

Two to Newcastle-upon-Tyne, where the 6th Dragoon Guards and 40th are.

Two to Nottingham, where the 9th Lancers are, with four companies of the 52nd near, which will be attached to them if called on to act.

Two to be attached to the remaining six companies of the 52nd, at Lichfield.

Two with the 85th Regiment in Cheshire, and the remaining two are ordered to Manchester for the present, but are destined for Blackburn, when proper accommodation is ready for four troops of cavalry, four companies, and the artillery. The ammunition-waggons I have sent for the present to Lichfield, as a central station; and I have written to the commanding officer of the 52nd to find a proper place, and to furnish a guard. I have given strict injunctions to each commandant to take good care of the guns attached.

By the accounts received to day, the Radicals are much divided about their meetings for Monday next, but the majority are decidedly in favour of Thistlewood, who has superseded Hunt in their idolatry—a convincing proof how anxious they are for immediate revolution. I consider your letter as valuable as a reinforcement of 1000 men; if I have but good information, I am strong enough, and I have no fear of my men.

I have the honour to be, with respect,  
your Grace's obliged and very obedient servant,

JOHN BYNG.

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*To Major-General Sir John Byng.*

[ 32. ]

MY DEAR BYNG,

London, 1st Nov., 1819.

I write you one line in answer to your letter. You are the best judge what number of detachments you ought to form; I only give you my opinion of the minimum of their strength. But allow me to give you another opinion, and that is, where you have a detachment consisting of only one regiment, or less, you should not have more with it than one piece of cannon. It may be necessary to detach half of this regiment with some cavalry; and it will be much better to draw up from the rear the cannon for the new detachment than to send it from the head-quarters of the regiment. The truth is that as long as the cannon with any detachment will not be diminished, these Tyros will not think the force of the detachments diminished.

I therefore recommend to you to form all your detachments, even when consisting of a whole battalion with cavalry, by adding one piece of artillery to them, and to keep the supernumerary cannon in reserve in the rear to be moved up as fresh detachments will be formed.

Lord Sidmouth has just been talking to me of the expediency of putting into Tynemouth Castle any moveable detachment you may have on the Tyne for the security of Newcastle, North Shields, &c., in which I entirely concur. But mind that you always have some men in Tynemouth for the security of that post, if you should think proper to move away the column.

I have no objection to your moving Colonel Griffith to your head-quarters, but remember that the detachment of Artillery at Weedon must not be moved.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Major-General Byng to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Pontefract, 3rd Nov., 1819.

I thank you for yours of the 1st. I hope no consideration will induce you to withdraw your advice and opinion from me, for it cannot be given to one more thankful for, and more-disposed to attend to it. I sent two guns to Newcastle on account of its extreme distance; I attached two guns to the 52nd and to the 85th Regiments, as they are at present stationed, as

a kind of reserve, in parts of the country not disaffected, but within a short distance; and this I considered preferable to leaving them at Weedon, which is at some distance from any part where alarm prevails; and I had the advantage of the 85th and 90th, then on the march, to escort them: for I am particularly desirous, according to your former instructions, that not a man should be withdrawn from Weedon. Of the two guns sent to Nottingham, I propose one to be sent to the West Riding of Yorkshire on the arrival of the 6th Regiment from Scotland. The two remaining guns, sent for the present to Manchester, are destined, one for Blackburn, where I propose having two squadrons of cavalry and four companies of infantry to act in the north-eastern part of the manufacturing district of Lancashire, which is very populous and much disaffected; and the other one to be attached to the 90th, which I mean to have in and near Macclesfield, as equally available for the potteries in Staffordshire, about Newcastle-under-Lyme,—Lord Dartmouth, the Vice-Lieutenant of the county, having notified to me the bad spirit prevailing among the working classes there,—and are also within a short distance of Stockport, the most disaffected place in England; with the 90th there will be three troops of the 9th Lancers.

If you think these guns not sufficiently protected as I have described, I can withdraw any of them to Chester Castle, where I have five companies of the 71st; it will perhaps be advisable to send there one from the 52nd and one from the 85th Regiment.

I think it expedient to avail myself of the meetings being postponed until the 15th, and go to Newcastle, and from thence visit Tynemouth, and see what number of men I can put in there; it will be an excellent station, far better than Sunderland.

The disaffected leaders in Lancashire are quarrelling among themselves.

I have the honour to be, with respect,

your Grace's obliged and very obedient humble servant,

J. BYNO.

Since I returned from Town on Sunday I have not been out of my house, I had such an accumulation of correspondence to attend to.

[ 33. ]

*To General Pozzo de Borgo.*

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

A Londres, ce 25<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1819.

Il y a longtemps que j'aurais dû accuser la réception de votre obligeante lettre par Lord FitzRoy Somerset; mais j'ai presque toujours été à la campagne; et les affaires sur lesquelles il vous aurait été intéressant que je vous écrive étaient toujours dans un état d'incertitude. Enfin, il paraît que le Ministère Français est changé, et que le principe du changement est à l'inverse du changement qui a eu lieu vers ce temps-ci de l'année passée, et qu'on veut changer la loi des élections.

Pour moi j'ai toujours été d'opinion que la loi des élections en France, comme la réforme parlementaire ici, menait droit à une révolution, une république, et aux mêmes malheurs par où nous avons passé dans les derniers trente ans ; et je me réjouis d'un changement que j'espère sera de nature à mettre un frein à la démocratie, et à rassurer un peu les amis de l'ordre. Je voudrais bien aussi voir le rapport de cette partie de la loi du recrutement qui a relation aux avancements et aux nominations des officiers ; mais j'espère que cela arrivera ; et en attendant je suis satisfait que le nouveau Ministre de la Guerre, que j'ai assez vu ici, et qui est un bien honnête homme, administrera son département de manière à diminuer autant que possible le mal qui doit naturellement résulter de cette loi.

Vous aurez frémi en voyant tout ce qui se passait ici. Même ceux qui nous connoissent le mieux, et qui savent que ce qui détruirait les autres n'est rien pour nous, en ont eu terriblement peur. Mais, Dieu merci ! voilà la crise passée. Le discours du Régent en ouvrant le Parlement, et la tournure admirable des discussions de ces deux jours passés dans les deux Chambres, ont déjà eu un effet remarquable en détruisant la calomnie sur l'affaire de Manchester, en ouvrant les yeux du public sur les desseins des malveillans, et en ranimant la confiance des bons ; et j'espère que les mesures que le gouvernement va proposer montreront que nous sommes déterminés à empêcher le mal autant qu'il dépend de nous.

Notre exemple servira de quelque chose en France aussi bien qu'en Allemagne ; et il faut espérer que le monde évitera la révolution générale qui paraissait nous menacer tous.

Lord Harrowby, qui a beaucoup vu le Duc de Richelieu à Spa, nous fait espérer qu'il viendra ici. Je serai charmé de le voir. Pour le bien public, je regrette qu'il ne soit pas redevenu ministre au dernier changement. Mais pour lui je ne le regrette pas. Lord Harrowby m'assure, et je le crois, qu'il est beaucoup plus heureux comme il est. Je vous prie de lui dire mille choses de ma part, et de me croire toujours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.



[ 34. ]

*To M. le Comte de Cazes.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

Londres, ce 26<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1819.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de V. E. du 20 ; et je vous renvoie la seconde note de Marinet.

J'ai bien regretté le changement du ministère de l'année passée, et je regrette encore celui que vous m'annoncez, parce que tout changement a une tendance à affaiblir l'autorité. Mais il paraît par ce que V. E. m'apprend qu'il était impossible de l'éviter ; et il faut le regarder comme un malheur inévitable.

J'applaudis beaucoup au choix que S. M. a fait d'un Ministre de la Guerre. Il y a bien longtemps que je connais de réputation le Marquis de Latour Maubourg, et je n'ai jamais rien entendu de lui, même en Espagne, où les préjugés étaient tous contre sa nation, que ce qui était bon ; et depuis que j'ai eu le plaisir de le connaître de plus près ici je ne m'étonne pas que même le préjugé national n'ai pu rien trouver à dire contre lui. Je m'assure qu'il servira le Roi avec le même zèle dans son nouveau poste qu'il a porté à son service ici ; et qu'en même temps qu'il conciliera tous les intérêts, il acquerra la confiance générale.

Je vous souhaite tous les succès que vous pouvez désirer dans votre nouveau poste, et surtout dans les changemens que vous proposez faire à la loi des élections, dont Mr. Canning m'a appris les détails ; et je vous prie de me commander si je peux être de quelque utilité au service de S. M. dans ce pays-ci.

Vous aurez été satisfait de l'ouverture de la session. Le discours du Régent, et les discussions qui ont eu lieu dans les deux Chambres, qui ont été d'un esprit excellent, ont eu un grand effet sur l'opinion publique. L'affaire de Manchester, que les gazettes avaient obscurci à force de discussion mensongère, selon leur habitude ordinaire, est tout à fait éclaircie ; et personne n'en pense plus excepté pour adopter des mesures pour empêcher les assemblées dangereuses du peuple, qui ont déjà donné lieu à tant d'inconvéniens.

J'espère que ce qui s'est passé ici à l'ouverture du Parlement vous sera de quelque utilité en France, aussi bien qu'aux gouvernemens Allemands.

Je vous prie de présenter mes hommages très respectueux à sa Majesté, et de me croire, M. le Comte, avec la considération la plus distinguée,

de V. E., &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

[ 35. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

Stratfieldsaye, 11th Dec., 1819.

From the account you give of the Treaty I entertain no doubt that your construction of the fourth Article is correct, and I have no objection to the paragraph which you have inserted in your letter respecting my opinion.

Ever, my dear Lord, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

I enclose a letter for Capo d'Istrias, merely acknowledging the receipt of his, and telling him that I will pay attention to the subject.

*To Lord Sidmouth.*

[ 36. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

Stratfieldsaye, 11th Dec., 1819.

I had not an opportunity of speaking to you last night on the subject of your operations at Carlisle and Newcastle.

I strongly recommend to you to order the magistrates at those places to carry into execution without loss of time the law against training, and to furnish them with the means of doing so. Don't let us be reproached again with having omitted to carry into execution the laws.

Byng ought to have carried into execution the distribution of his force which I recommended to him; and by sending to each of those towns about 700 or 800 men, cavalry and infantry, and two pieces of cannon, or, in other words, two of his moveable columns to each, the force would be more than sufficient to do all that can be required.

Rely upon it that, in the circumstances in which we are placed, impression on either side is everything. If upon the passing of the Training law you prevent training, either by the use of force or by the appearance of force in the two places above mentioned, you will put a stop at once to all the proceedings of the insurgents. They are like conquerors; they must go forward; the moment they are stopped they are lost. Their adherents will lose all confidence, and by degrees every individual will relapse into his old habits of loyalty or indifference.

On the other hand, the moment the loyal will see that there is a law which can prevent these practices, and means and inclination and determination to carry it into execution, they will regain courage, and will do everything that you can desire.

In my opinion, if you send the troops and order that the law shall be carried into execution, you will not be under the necessity of using them, and the good effects of this step will be felt not only in those towns and their neighbourhood, but all over England.

Observe, also, that if training is continued after the passing of the law, which it will be unless you send a force to prevent it, the insurgents will gain a very important victory.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Lisbon, 14th Dec., 1819.

The ordinary times of peace give here, as in all other places, so few subjects that can interest, that it has not been worth occupying your time with any details from here; and we have heard nothing ourselves of our neighbours of late but the details of the progress or diminution of the yellow fever, which, fortunately, is everywhere on the decline, and nearly extinct. Seville has been some time free from it in reality, and Cadiz is also now declared so; but this only by the will and decision of Fernando Septimo, who sent an order to Cadiz that they should sing *Te Deum* and declare the malady at an end, though on the very day of the ceremony 15 died and there were 660 returned sick of the contagion. Such is that government.

I think I mentioned to you in the last letter I wrote to you, after my return from the northern provinces, that I had communicated to the King my intention of paying his Majesty a visit at the Rio. I did not expect, and have not had, any direct answer; but since his Majesty has received my letter everything is changed, and the Ministers write to me on all other subjects in the kindest and most conciliating manner, giving explanations and excuses for this or the other of my recommendations not having been complied with, but that orders are given that everything is to be done precisely as I have recommended. In short, it is visible the King wishes to see me there, and I cannot doubt of being favourably received. But still, so far as being useful in any object that is reasonable which our ministers may have, and I mean in concert with Palmella, I feel and see the same difficulty as when in London, and the necessity of doing something to personally gratify the King. In fact, the question respecting the Garter, both as to the justness of the case itself, as in respect to the results it might

lead to, is exactly as when I left you in London; and to me, I confess, I can no way understand Lord Liverpool's scruples; but certainly the time now seems favourable, as the nation seems little inclined to regard or consider much what relates to without, and still less trifles of that nature. Perhaps by your suggesting the matter again to Lord Castlereagh, he and you might convince Lord Liverpool. I am now committed, and cannot myself get off going to the Rio; and you are aware how I was committed: but that is now of no consequence, and the only object I have is to be enabled to do something and to be of use when there. It is possible I may first go to England, as I still desire to see Palmella before I go, though I cannot now wait for him, and altogether I think my departure would be better from England; but I fear I shall not have time, as I must take advantage of the opportunity which offers from there, and I learn a vessel is going (the *Vigo*) in February, which could set me down at the Rio, and if she leaves England so soon I could not well get there to be in time, though she would take me up here in very good time. However, I write on this subject.

I find the ultimatum from the Rio has been rejected by Spain, and that she persists still in the determination to send her expedition against Monte Video. Under such circumstances how is it possible to avoid hostilities between the two,—and if they once begin in the other hemisphere, can they be well prevented in this? We go on here as usual, taking no measures for the improvement of the revenue, and of course are accumulating our distresses. The army is only paid to April last, and indeed all and everything is in equal arrear, and we do not on an average pay 30 days in 40; so you will see what a state we must get to. The government here, not being willing to reform any of the abuses, at length decided to sell some of the crown lands, so much as would have paid off the army, but there have arisen very serious difficulties, not in truth made by the government, but arising from the nature of the case, and there is little prospect of carrying the business into execution; and it must at all events go to the Rio and pass there through certain forms before any one will be induced to make the purchase. In the mean time Don Miguel continues working in every way against the army, and diminishing it in every way and by every means in his power. What we have are really in as fine order as troops can be in, but the whole are not now 25,000 including all arms. The militia, indeed, would be a great resource, as they are generally in pretty good order. They have required from us a few troops for the Rio, but it is a trifle; only 300 men to complete the battalions we sent from here about two years since.

I send you my proxy, which my brother sent me from England by this last packet.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

BERESFORD.

[ 37. ]

*To the Emperor of Russia.*

SIRE,

A Londres, ce 5<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1820.

Le Comte de Lieven m'a remis la lettre très gracieuse de votre Majesté Impériale et le bâton de Maréchal de l'armée de votre Majesté, qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur de m'envoyer.

Les paroles ne me suffisent pas pour exprimer à V.M. toute ma reconnaissance pour les bontés dont elle se plaît à m'honorer tous les jours ; mais je peux assurer V.M. que je ferai tous mes efforts pour les mériter.

Je suis, Sire, de V. M. Impériale le très reconnaissant et très dévoué serviteur,

WELLINGTON.

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*Le Comte Pozzo di Borgo to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

Paris, 28<sup>me</sup> Jan., 1820.

Je profite de l'occasion de Lord Fitzroy pour avoir l'honneur de vous remercier de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'écrire en réponse à la mienne d'assez longue date. Comme vous, Milord, je me suis félicité de voir interrompre la continuation d'un système qui paraissait devoir conduire la France à une ruine certaine. Cette opinion m'a semblée évidente depuis le changement du ministère immédiatement après l'évacuation du territoire. Celui qui lui succéda il y a un an n'avait certainement nulle intention de faire le mal ; mais il s'était formé sur des principes faux pour empêcher le bien qui était aisément praticable alors, et sans prévoir à quel point il serait entraîné dans le chemin dangereux où il s'était placé. La Session fut en conséquence consacrée à faire des concessions à la démocratie, et cela ne pouvait être autrement, parce que tel était l'esprit dans lequel le changement avait eu lieu. C'est à ce prix et non autrement qu'on obtint l'apparence du calme qui régnait il y a six mois, et qui a séduit un bon nombre d'observateurs. Enfin les élections menaçantes d'un côté, la défection des prétendus amis réconciliés de l'autre, et la conduite avouée de ceux qui aspirèrent à écarter la dynastie des Bourbons, décidèrent l'éloignement des trois ministres qui ne paraissaient pas également convaincus des périls de la monarchie. Cette résolution, toute nécessaire qu'elle était, privait cependant ceux qui restaient de l'appui dangereux qu'ils avaient voulu se donner l'année précédente, et les mettait dans l'obligation de s'entendre avec tous ceux qui ne voudraient pas désertir du côté gauche. Il y a eu, selon moi, une hésitation nuisible à cet égard, et je crains que les Doctrinaires même, réduits comme ils sont à des débris presque imperceptibles, n'aient différé cette détermination. Enfin, on semble persuadé maintenant qu'il est impossible de faire triompher le nouveau système en dépit de tout le monde ; et les moyens de rapprochement avec le côté droit, quoique bien faibles encore, acquièrent quelque probabilité. M. de Serre s'est éloigné par cause de santé, et ce sera M. de Cazes qui présentera immédiatement, dit-on, la réforme de la loi des élections, et celle de quelques articles de la charte. Nous désirons tous

que cette mesure soit assez bonne pour appeler la raison des gens impartiaux à son secours, et pour désarmer le ressentiment et les soupçons des personnes prévenues défavorablement. En attendant, le Jacobinisme et le Bonapartisme marchent de concert, le front levé, non-seulement avec audace mais avec fureur. L'impunité est assurée à la sédition et à la calomnie par l'insuffisance des lois, et par les abus de la funeste institution du jury appliqué à contre temps aux délits de la presse. La justice politique est nulle, et le gouvernement dans une impuissance forcée qui le décrédite d'une manière accablante. C'est à sortir de l'abîme où il s'est laissé descendre qu'il travaille maintenant, et à quoi il convient de l'aider. Les pas rétrogrades sont souvent plus difficiles à mesure qu'ils sont nécessaires. Le Ministre de la Guerre répond à l'opinion que vous vous en étiez formée ; son influence se fait sentir sur l'armée d'une manière rassurante, autant que la brièveté du temps et les circonstances peuvent le permettre. De l'autre côté, les révolutionnaires la travaillent sans cesse, et malheureusement ils trouvent dans sa composition actuelle à qui s'adresser. En conclusion, la France va subir une nouvelle épreuve. Dieu veuille qu'elle soit heureuse ! Nous ne pouvons pas nous empêcher d'en attendre le résultat avec quelque sollicitude.

Permettez-moi de vous féliciter du courage et de la sagesse déployés contre les perturbateurs chez vous. Mes sentimens ont guidé ma raison durant cette lutte. Je n'ai cessé d'entretenir les plus grandes espérances ; elles se sont réalisées de la manière la plus satisfaisante.

Que dites vous de l'Espagne, que vous avez tant contribué à sauver ? sa situation est en tout un très grand malheur, et pour les Bourbons de France une véritable calamité.

Je vous supplie, Milord, de me conserver dans votre souvenir, et j'oserais dire dans votre amitié, la place à laquelle vos bontés m'ont permis d'aspirer ; et veuillez bien agréer l'attachement respectueux avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être, Milord,

de Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Pozzo DI Borgo.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 38. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 3rd Feb., 1820.

I have perused the papers which you gave me yesterday, and which I now return. I don't think Lord Moira's minute is likely to be of much use to Sir Thomas Heslop, and I don't recommend to you to publish it before you will receive some further statement by Sir Thomas himself.

I believe it has always been understood that the defenders of a fortress stormed have no claim to quarter ; and the practice which prevailed during the last century of surrendering a fortress when a breach was opened in the body of the place, and the counterscarp had been blown in, was founded upon this under-

standing. Of late years, however, the French have availed themselves of the humanity of modern warfare, and have made a new regulation requiring that a breach should stand one assault at least; the consequence of this regulation was to me the loss of the flower of the army in the assaults of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Badajoz. I certainly should have thought myself justified in putting both garrisons to the sword; and if I had done so to the first, it is probable that I should have saved 5000 men in the assault of the second. I mention this in order to show you that the practice of refusing quarter to a garrison which stands an assault is not an useless effusion of blood.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 39. ]

*To Lord Sidmouth.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 10th Feb., 1820.

The Board of Ordnance have referred for my consideration the letter from Mr. Hobhouse, of the 3rd February, desiring the repayment to the Mayor of Newcastle of 3*l.* 5*s.*, being the expenses of spiking certain cannon.

If your Lordship will desire us to pay the expense it will of course be paid; but I beg to recall to your recollection that we desired the Mayor to send the guns, &c., with the stores, into Tynemouth, which he declined to do, and did not do; and in point of fact, the powder was removed from the magazine in Newcastle to that in Tynemouth by my orders without his consent.

I doubt, therefore, whether we ought to pay him a charge incurred by his disobedience to the orders of Government.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 40. ]

*To Sir H. Calvert.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 11th Feb., 1820.

Upon the receipt of your letter of the 27th December, I wrote to Sir R. Hill regarding the uniform of the Blues, and

I enclose you his answer, which has been mislaid by accident ever since I received it.

For my part, I am anxious to keep any uniform in which I have any concern as unchanged as possible, and strictly in conformity to written regulations.

I don't know that we have any order for either the dress or the undress of the Blues. I have heard that the dress ought to be in blue what the 1st Foot Guards have in red; and if that is the case, or if there is any order upon the subject, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know it, and I will take care that what is ordered is adhered to, and that no alteration whatever shall be made excepting in consequence of an order *in writing*.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To General Vincent.*

[ 41. ]

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

A Londres, ce 12<sup>me</sup> Février, 1820.

M. Neuman m'a donné le livre que vous avez eu la bonté de m'envoyer, et votre lettre du 16 Janvier; et je vous en rends mille remerciemens. Le livre est très intéressant. Je n'ai pas la moindre doute qu'il vient de Bonaparte. Je ne veux pas dire qu'il l'a écrit, parce que c'est mieux écrit qu'il ne peut écrire; mais il en a fourni les faits, et en a donné les idées; et je crois qu'il en a écrit une partie, surtout ce chapitre en observations. Je crois que c'est le huitième chapitre.

Il me paraît que les choses vont aller mieux en France. Monsieur de Cazes, qui me fait l'honneur de m'écrire quelquefois, me dit qu'il va proposer sa loi d'élections avec plus d'assurance de succès qu'il n'en avait même au commencement de la session; et il espère pouvoir faire même encore quelque chose pour rassurer l'ordre établi en France. Dieu le veuille; car vraiment la tranquillité du monde, et la sûreté, et la stabilité de l'ordre social en Europe dépend sur ce qui se passe en France beaucoup plus qu'on ne le pense dans les salons de Paris.

Je suis bien heureux de voir les progrès que fait le Prince de Metternich à Vienne. Il me paraît que le Prince de Metternich a arrangé son affaire; et malgré que ce ne soit pas tout à fait au niveau du cadre de Carlsbad, c'est en mon opinion mieux



arrangé, parce que tout le monde y voit à présent ses intérêts dans la conservation de la Confédération Allemande. Soyez sûr qu'en politique il n'y a rien de stable que ce qui convient aux intérêts de tout le monde ; et qu'il faut regarder un peu plus loin que soi-même.

Monsieur de Cazes me dit que les nouvelles d'Espagne sont bonnes. Je n'en ai pas encore vu les détails ; mais j'avoue que je n'ai jamais considéré ce qui s'est passé dernièrement que comme une révolte de troupes, qui devenait importante seulement à cause des relations où l'Espagne se trouvait vis-à-vis de ses colonies. Si l'Espagne avait le bon esprit, ou de s'entendre avec le Portugal, ou encore mieux, de céder quelques points pour elle insignifiants à ses colonies, la révolte ne serait rien. Mais elle est surtout importante en prouvant au monde combien peu le peuple Espagnol se soucie des principes soi-disants libéraux.

Si jamais il y a eu une occasion où un peuple ait pu se soulever avec impunité, c'est celle-ci ; mais vous voyez que non seulement le peuple Espagnol ne s'est pas mêlé de la dispute entre le Roi et son armée, mais que la dernière, connaissant l'opinion du peuple, n'a pas même osé se plaindre de son apathie.

Comme je vous l'ai déjà dit, je n'ai pas encore vu les nouvelles, mais je parierais que les soldats révoltés désertent leurs chefs, et que ceux-ci seront pendus.

Croyez moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 42. ]

*To Lord Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

London, 12th Feb., 1820.

Much time has elapsed since I have written to you, for which omission I have no excuse whatever. I received lately two letters from you, one of the 14th December, with your proxy, which I now return, as upon the accession of his present Majesty it is necessary that you should take the oath of allegiance to him ; and till that ceremony will be performed you cannot give a proxy. The other, of the 28th January, giving me the last accounts of the meeting of the troops in Andalusia. I think you have decided quite correctly in determining not to quit Portugal as long as that insurrection continues. Nay, I am not certain that you ought not to delay your departure

a little longer, and to wait till you see what shape things will take between the two governments of the Peninsula after this mutiny will be got the better of.

I think the mode in which it will be got the better of will be by the desertion of the mutineer soldiers and by the hanging up of the officers. But still the Spanish government will have received a severe lesson, and a check which they will not easily forget. One would suppose that the reconquest of their colonies by force of arms would be out of the question even to them; but the government and their army will have lost their reputation to such a degree throughout Europe that we can scarcely believe they will not endeavour to regain it by every means in their power, and none appears so feasible as an attack upon Portugal.

You will probably have heard that the government of Rio Janeiro have lately been flirting a little with Buenos Ayres; and it is said that an arrangement has been concluded with that government, under which it has been agreed that Monte Video should be evacuated by Portugal and given over to the natives whenever intelligence should be received of the sailing of the Spanish expedition, if before that event some arrangement should not have been made between Portugal and Spain.

I certainly think that Portugal would be justified in evacuating Monte Video. The Spaniards have refused to agree to every plan of arrangement, whether suggested by Portugal, by the Allies, or even by herself, and she cannot blame Portugal if the latter retires, or fights, or does anything else for her own defence. Neither can the Allies reasonably find fault with Portugal, as they were deaf to all her remonstrances upon the sailing of the expedition before the agreement between the two Powers regarding Monte Video should be concluded. The only point which I think against Portugal in this concern is that the evacuation is to take place in consequence of an agreement with Buenos Ayres, the enemy of Spain, who will profit by the evacuation, Portugal having engaged herself to be neutral in the contest between them, and having during the negotiation recognised the sovereignty of Monte Video as belonging of right to the King of Spain.

We need not doubt of the Spaniards being excessively offended with this conduct of the Portuguese in America, nor of the desire to resent it; and I think that, considering that

their colonies must now be considered as lost, it is not improbable that they will wish to endeavour to regain for their government and army their reputation by making an attack upon Portugal. I am therefore anxious that you should not absent yourself while this question is in discussion.

I have always been of opinion that the danger for Portugal would commence when the colonies should be decidedly lost, and more particularly if they should be lost in consequence of any conduct which could be attributed to Portugal. The Powers of Europe, and particularly this country, have reason to complain of the King of Portugal's preference of the Brazils to his kingdom in Europe; and it is not impossible that they might consider the kingdom of Portugal a fair object of compensation to Spain for her losses in America, and that this country might be unable or unwilling to interfere. I have therefore always considered these questions of South American independence as involving the most serious considerations for Portugal; and I confess that I am anxious that you who have taken so much trouble with Portuguese concerns, and who have got their military into such good order notwithstanding all the difficulties opposed to you, should not go out of the way at the very moment at which you are likely to reap the harvest of all your labours.

You'll have seen that the King has been very unwell. He was very near dying one night, and although out of immediate danger, and pronounced free from complaint, he is not yet what we could wish him to be.

I believe that Parliament will be dissolved immediately, and will meet again in the beginning of May. We shall have some difficult questions regarding the Princess and the Civil List when Parliament will meet again.

I don't think there is the smallest chance of Lord Liverpool's consenting to give the Garter to the King of Portugal.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 43. ]

*To General Alava.*

MI QUERIDO ALAVA,

A Londres, ce 21<sup>me</sup> Février, 1820.

Il y a bien longtemps que j'aurais dû vous écrire; j'ai une demie douzaine de lettres de votre part qui toutes exigeaient une

réponse, mais j'ai été empêché d'abord par la paresse, et puis cette paresse a trouvé ses excuses dans la difficulté et l'incertitude de trouver une occasion sûre pour vous envoyer ma lettre. Je ne me fie à rien en Europe pour le transport des lettres qu'à la poste Anglaise, aux couriers Anglais, et aux couriers Espagnols au service de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre. Pour les autres, j'aimerais mieux publier ma lettre dans la Gazette que de la leur confier. Je vais envoyer celle-ci à Paris, avec ordre qu'elle y soit remise au courier qui y passe avec les nouvelles de la mort du Roi ; et qu'elle vous soit délivré à Victoria. S'il a passé Paris avant l'arrivée de cette lettre vous ne la recevrez pas pour quelque temps.

Je me réjouis très fort de vous savoir si heureux chez vous, et que votre santé se rétablisse. Je vous conseille d'y rester aussi longtemps que vous pourrez. Si vous quittez la ville natale retournez à votre poste, ou revenez ici ; mais surtout n'allez pas à Madrid.

Je ne sais pas si vous avez chez vous une idée de ce qui se passe dans le monde politique, ni si vous voyez les gazettes ; mais je suppose que non. Vous aurez cependant connu l'assassinat du Duc de Berri, lequel, comme de coutume, on a voulu d'abord dire être l'œuvre d'un étranger, et puis d'un seul homme, un fanatique fou, qui ne sait ni lire ni écrire, et sur lequel les gazettes n'ont pu avoir aucun effet. Mais il paraît assez certain que c'est l'affaire d'une conspiration ; et nous allons voir si on aura le courage en France de vouloir dévoiler cette conspiration. Pour moi, je n'ai pas la moindre doute qu'il y a en France 25,000 officiers de l'armée—c'est-à-dire, les plus actifs, les plus spirituels, comme corps les plus puissants de toute la population Française, ceux qui étaient les plus heureux, et les plus riches sous la dynastie Impériale, et qui sont les plus malheureux et les plus pauvres sous la dynastie Royale—qui désirent ardemment, et qui tous les jours forment des complots pour atteindre la destruction de la dernière. Je sais que tout ce qu'on a fait comme règlement dans les derniers cinq ans a eu l'effet, et paraît avoir eu pour objet, d'encourager ce corps d'officiers, au lieu de les tenir sous le joug ; et on les trouve, et on les trouvera, partout tant qu'on procédera de cette manière. Je sais bien qu'on ne peut pas les tuer, ni même les décimer ; et se trouvant là, il fallait en faire quelque chose. Mais la faute qu'on a fait était de s'y fier en aucune manière. Il fallait former

une armée, mauvaise si on le voulait, sans eux, et principalement pour les observer, et les tenir en ordre, parce que ce sont eux qui sont les seuls ennemis du trône royal en France, et de l'ordre établi en Europe par les Traités de 1814 et de 1815.

On veut remédier à présent au mal qu'on a fait, surtout avant l'année 1819. Mais des choses sont établies auxquelles on ne peut pas remédier; et surtout on ne peut pas regagner les quatre ans qui se sont passés depuis le Traité de l'année 1815 jusqu'à présent, dans le cours desquels on a voulu remettre tout le monde où il s'est trouvé avant le 20<sup>me</sup> Mars, et on est réellement venu à l'année 1792 et 1793. Dieu sait où tout cela finira; mais pour moi, je crois qu'il faut une pluie de feu pour y mettre ordre.

Pour votre affaire en Espagne, je la juge comme ni plus ni moins qu'une révolte de troupes très conséquente pour l'Espagne, à cause de la nécessité où elle se trouve de se servir de ces mêmes troupes. La question est de quelle manière cette révolte va terminer; et j'ai d'abord cru que les soldats ou déserteraient ou prendraient leurs officiers et que ceux-ci seraient pendus. Mais je vois que la chose traîne en longueur, et il paraît que la désertion n'est pas très considérable; et j'attribue la lenteur de Freyre à ce qu'il ne peut pas se fier *aux troupes* proprement dites de son armée, et que la milice qui en forment le gros n'est pas aguerrie; et qu'il n'ose pas risquer une affaire avec les troupes révoltées. Il a raison, et grandement raison; et avec de la patience, il n'y a pas de doute que la fin de la révolte serait toujours la même. En attendant cependant je vois que la Cour s'impatiente. Le Roi ne souffre pas avec calme la perte de réputation que cette révolte lui cause, outre les autres conséquences, en relation à ses domaines en Amérique; et il paraît qu'il a pris des démarches dernièrement qui avaient l'air de rétrocéder sur le système sur lequel il avait marché. Je n'approuve pas ce système plus que les autres; mais il faut en le détruisant prendre garde à celui qui serait établi à la suite d'une convention avec les troupes révoltées! Tenez, mon cher! j'ai lu de beaucoup de malheurs arrivés à des pays; et j'en ai vu beaucoup dans ce genre dans ma vie; mais personne n'a jamais connu l'égal à ce qui existerait en Espagne, si le Roi avait le malheur de capituler, ou même de s'entendre, avec les troupes révoltées. Comiac vous le savez, je n'aime pas beau-

coup les républiques, et surtout pas *la Constitución Española*; mais je préférerois mille fois la réussite de la révolte et l'établissement de *la Constitución*, à la capitulation du Roi!

En tout cas, que la révolte finisse comme elle voudra, je crois que ses colonies, avec exception du Mexique, auquel il faut prendre garde, sont perdues.

Vous aurez vu avec plaisir comme nous avons bien arrangé nos affaires ici. On veut notre constitution en Europe; mais ce qu'on ne veut pas c'est la sûreté, la conservation des propriétés, que chez nous en fait la base et la force. Observez aussi que c'est cette conservation que nous faisons marcher de front avec nos libertés, et qui en est le garant qui nous rend ennemie toute la classe soi-disant Libérale en France, dans les Pays-Bas, et en Allemagne. Pourquoi? Parce qu'ils ne veulent que voler, ils ne parlent de liberté qu'avec l'objet d'empocher le bien d'autrui; et ils ne peuvent pas souffrir un pays où la liberté est établie et fondée sur l'ordre, et sur la sécurité des propriétés.

Les affaires vont aussi fort bien en Allemagne. Les deux grandes Puissances se sont entendues à merveille, et se sont montrées très modérées dans les conférences de Vienne; où elles ont arrangé tout à l'aimable avec leurs co-états; et j'espère qu'il y a moyen de contenir les constitutions à la Libérale déjà établies dans quelques pays, ou de les renverser si le cas l'exige.

Je ne peux pas dire autant pour les Pays-Bas. D'abord, la Hollande a manqué d'être submergée. Puis vous aurez su, que le Roi avait perdu la question de son budget pour dix ans; pour laquelle personne n'a voté!

Adios, querido Alava. Mil cosas de mi parte à la Señora, y cree me siempre, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Adjutant-General.*

[ 44. ]

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE CARBINES AND PISTOLS  
IN USE.

1st March, 1820.

The fault which has been found with the arms provided for the Heavy Dragoons, as well as with those provided for the Light Dragoons and Hussars, points out the necessity of providing a new arm for the whole of the cavalry; and I am anxious that his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief

should take the whole subject into his consideration, and should decide upon certain general principles before a decision is come to what shall be the firearm of the British Cavalry.

When I commanded the army abroad, great inconvenience was experienced not only by the Artillery, but by the cavalry themselves, from the variety of calibres of firearms, as well carbines as pistols, in use with the different regiments, as it was impossible to apply the supply with one regiment which might have made but little use of their arms to the wants of another which might have made much use of them, as the calibres of nearly all were different.

The first question then is, whether upon principle the calibres of all the carbines and pistols of the cavalry ought not to be the same: and, secondly, whether that calibre ought not to be the same as that of the musket of the Infantry.

This may be effected leaving the weight of every description of firearms for the cavalry to be whatever may be thought proper.

But I conceive the length and weight of every description of firearm to be very important considerations in respect to its capacity of throwing a projectile; and I know that this principle is highly important in the consideration of what shall be the firearm of the British Cavalry.

In the late war the vedettes of both heavy and light British Cavalry were frequently driven off the field, indeed always when opposed to the French Dragoons, because their arms were not calculated to carry so far as those of the French Cavalry; and the latter could wound or kill horses and men when the former could not reach their adversaries with their fire.

I have likewise frequently had occasion to lament the impossibility of dismounting part of the cavalry to act as infantry on account of the comparative deficiency of their firearms, and the consequent necessity of halting the whole cavalry till a body of infantry could come up, and the loss of some important advantage.

The length and weight of the arms for all the descriptions of British Cavalry in reference to their capacity of carrying a projectile, and this in reference to the service which all the descriptions of the British Cavalry are at all times liable to perform, are therefore principles of the utmost importance which his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief is requested

to consider before the description of arm for each description of cavalry is decided upon.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duke of York.*

[ 45. ]

SIR,

London, 2nd March, 1820.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of the 1st instant, in which your Royal Highness informs me that his Majesty has been pleased to grant to the Royal Horse Guards, Blue, the same honours and privileges in every respect as are possessed by the two regiments of Life Guards; and that it is his Majesty's intention that I should roll with, and take my share of the duty as Gold Stick with the Colonels of those two regiments, and that the field officers of the Horse Guards, Blue, should take their share of the duty of the Silver Stick; and I request your Royal Highness will make my most grateful acknowledgments to his Majesty on my own part, as well as on that of the regiment, for this most gracious mark of his Majesty's favour.

There is, however, one part of the arrangement, the effect of which I should wish to have considered before it is finally carried into execution. The officers of the Horse Guards have hitherto been recommended to his Majesty's notice, as well for their promotion as for their original commissions in the service, by the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces; and it is not unfair to attribute a part of the reputation which that regiment has acquired, and which has now obtained this distinguished mark of his Majesty's approbation, to the selection of officers made for it by the Commander-in-Chief. With every inclination to perform this duty to the best of my judgment, I doubt my having the means to perform it which the Commander-in-Chief has. At all events it will be admitted that I must feel a strong conviction of the benefit which has resulted from the selection of the officers of the Royal Horse Guards by the Commander-in-Chief, when I express a wish that that system should be continued, rather than that the privilege of recommending the officers to his Majesty by the Gold Stick should be extended to that regiment.

I have not yet made any communication to the regiment on



the subject of your Royal Highness's letter ; but I understand that this arrangement having been in contemplation upon a former occasion, the officers of the regiment were anxious that their merits and services, and their claims to promotion, should still be under the cognizance of, and should be recommended by, the Commander-in-Chief to his Majesty, which is an additional motive with me for recommending that the privilege of the two regiments of Life Guards, regarding the promotions and appointments of officers, may not be extended to the Royal Horse Guards, Blue.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 46. ]

*To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Stratfieldsaye, ce 13<sup>me</sup> Mars, 1820.

Vous pouvez vous assurer que j'ai beaucoup regretté votre départ du ministère l'année passée, et que je me réjouis très fort que vous y êtes retourné ; c'est un grand sacrifice de votre part, mais le temps l'exige. Les circonstances ne permettent pas à un homme comme vous de se tenir étranger aux affaires publiques ; et je me réjouis surtout de votre détermination de vous maintenir où vous êtes. Avec cette volonté ferme, et celle de faire tout le bien que vous pourrez, il est vrai que vous ne passerez pas un temps bien heureux ; mais vous aurez fait votre devoir dans les circonstances critiques où le monde se trouve ; et je m'assure que vous réussirez beaucoup mieux que vous ne le croyez vous-même.

Vous pouvez compter sur moi si je peux vous être utile à quelque chose. Non-seulement je suis attaché sincèrement au Roi et à la famille Royale, et je désire très fort que vous puissiez réussir dans tout ce que vous entreprendrez pour les bien établir en France, mais je ne prévois que le chaos pour le monde si ce qui est établi à présent ne puisse pas se consolider. Je vous le dis avec la franchise qui a toujours réglée mes communications avec vous, que je ne sais pas comment vous pourrez gouverner comme Président du Conseil des Ministres, sans département. Ici nous ne le pouvons pas. Il faut que celui qui joue le rôle de Premier Ministre soit à la tête d'un département important ; et le fameux Lord Chatham a échoué dans son dernier

ministère, parce qu'il a voulu gouverner en même temps qu'il était à la tête d'un des départemens inférieurs.

L'état des affaires en Espagne nous donne une complication à ajouter à toutes celles qui existaient déjà. J'ai eu les nouvelles hier au soir de la révolte des troupes à la Corogne, lesquelles il paraît avaient pris possession du Ferrol et de Betanzos ; et on avait déjà des nouvelles à Madrid de l'arrivée de Mina en Espagne. Mais jusqu'à présent il n'y a que révolte militaire. Le peuple n'y est pour rien, ni d'un côté ni de l'autre ; et je me trompe très fort s'il se mêlera de l'affaire, ou pour la *Constitution de la Monarchia*, ou pour le système du Roi, à moins que les Puissances Etrangères ne s'en mêlent. Alors le peuple prendra part contre celui qui appellera les étrangers. On parle du mauvais esprit en Biscaye ; mais il faut observer que les quatre provinces de la Biscaye ont toujours eu des privilèges très importants, que las Cortes leur ont ôtés en leur faisant avaler la *Constitution*, et que le Roi ne leur a pas rendu en entier comme elles en ont joui sous le règne de ses ancêtres. Quoique peu contentes du Roi, elles en sont plus qu'elles ne l'étaient de las Cortes ; et, en mon opinion, si le Roi renforcerait et conformerait les anciens privilèges de la Biscaye, de la Navarre, et de la Catalogne, et se les attachait fermement, il se donnerait une base populaire à contre-sens de la *Constitution*, qui pourrait lui sauver la monarchie.

Ce qui rend la révolte des troupes inquiétante est qu'en Espagne le gouvernement n'a rien de commun avec le pays, ni aucune autorité sur le pays, si ce n'est par le moyen des troupes. Les provinces sont gouvernées par les Capitaines-Généraux, et les villes, et les districts qui en dépendent, par les Cabildos ; et le peuple qui est le plus heureux, et le moins vexé, et le plus indépendant du monde, ne connaît le gouvernement que par les Cabildos ou le militaire. Les grands propriétaires tous demeurent à Madrid, et les petits dans les villes de Province ; ainsi donc il n'y a de propriétaire sur le sol que les curés de village et les grandes abbayes. L'évêque demeure toujours dans son diocèse, y dépense noblement ses grands revenus ; et vous pouvez vous imaginer l'espèce d'influence que doit avoir l'Eglise sur les délibérations du Cabildo, et surtout ce qui se passe dans l'intérieur du pays. Je resume donc que l'armée étant en révolte, le Roi n'a plus de contacte avec le pays. Il faut donc qu'il se donne une base populaire quelconque, en

contre-sens à la Constitution de las Cortes ; et c'est ce qu'il peut faire en mettant en jeu les privilèges des provinces privilégiées ; et il faut qu'il mette en jeu l'Eglise partout.

En mon opinion, les Puissances de l'Europe ne peuvent que rester neutres dans cette affaire. D'abord le peuple Espagnol se tournera contre celui qui appellera les étrangers ; et puis la voix populaire est partout si forte contre le Roi Ferdinand, surtout en France et en Angleterre, que les efforts que les gouvernemens pourraient faire en sa faveur deviendraient à peu près nuls. Si le Roi peut se faire un parti dans le pays, afin de pouvoir contenir l'armée en révolte, les circonstances changeraient ; mais jusqu'alors il me paraît qu'on doit se borner à empêcher qu'on donne aide aux troupes révoltées ; et que les Puissances Américaines ne se prévalent pas de l'état des affaires en Europe, pour s'emparer des territoires Espagnols en Amérique. Il y a une observation à faire sur l'armée Espagnole. La Révolution, comme elle s'appelle en Espagne, l'a établi sur une base révolutionnaire ; c'est-à-dire, que les gentilshommes du pays n'en sont plus exclusivement les officiers ; mais sans la discipline ni la réputation militaire de l'armée Française, elle a toute son ambition, et pour le gouvernement peut-être plus que son danger si les officiers peuvent se faire suivre par les soldats. Si l'exemple actuel n'eut pas arrivé, j'aurais cru que ce n'était pas possible ; et ce qui est arrivé montre combien le Roi s'est vraiment dépopularisé dans le pays ; car quoique la cause de la révolte des troupes en Andalousie ait été le désir de ne pas s'embarquer pour l'Amérique, la dernière en Galice montre que le gouvernement est vraiment ébranlé. Ainsi donc sans rien concéder à cette armée révolutionnaire, il faut que le Roi se donne une base populaire, et qu'il mette en jeu la seule puissance qui ait de l'influence dans le pays.

Vous avez vu que nous allons faire le procès à nos assassins ici ; et Dieu veuille que nous puissions réussir à les pendre. Jusqu'à présent le peuple ici s'est contenté de se casser la tête, et de temps en temps les vitres des ministres. Mais nous voyons à présent qu'on ne peut pas impunément approuver l'assassinat chez les autres même en silence ! Je ne sais pas si nous pouvons jamais publier tout ce que nous connaissons sur cette affaire ; mais je suis sûr que même les Septembriseurs n'ont pas délibéré avec autant d'indifférence et de sang froid, et n'ont pas discuté sur l'effusion du sang avec autant de plaisir que l'ont fait

nos assassins pendant les derniers quatre mois qu'ils ont eu cette affaire en considération.

Croyez moi, &c.

WELLINGTON.

*To the Duc de Richelieu.*

[ 47. ]

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Londres, ce 24<sup>me</sup> Mars, 1820.

J'étais à la campagne quand je vous ai écrit dernièrement, et j'ai envoyé ma lettre à Lord FitzRoy Somerset à Londres, pour qu'il la fasse passer en France, pour plus de sûreté. Malheureusement j'ai su depuis qu'il était dans ce temps précisément à son élection en Cornwall; et vous n'aurez reçu ma lettre que très tard.

Depuis que je vous ai écrit je vois que le Roi d'Espagne a tout cédé; et à ce que je peux voir, sa concession a été faite à ses généraux perfides, et à son armée révoltée; car il ne paraît pas que le peuple, même le parti libéral, qui existe sans doute en Espagne, s'est mis en avant. Tout a été fait partout par les officiers et les soldats de l'armée; et voilà une révolution effectuée contre le vœu bien prononcé, si je ne me trompe pas, non seulement du Roi mais d'une majorité de la nation si grande, qu'il peut être appelé unanime.

Je ne veux pas dire que le Roi n'ait pas fatigué la nation, et dégoûté tous les gens de bien par son administration; mais ce qui est sûr est, que personne, pas même les Libéraux, désire *la Constitution*; surtout pas par l'entremise de la révolte de l'armée.

Dieu sait où tout ceci terminera même en Espagne. C'est un exemple terrible pour ces états en Allemagne qui ont des armées composées de la même manière. Je doute même que, si la discipline y soit meilleure et mieux établie, elle soit assez forte pour empêcher le mal. En tout cas, ce qui est arrivé en Espagne est un triomphe pour le parti du désordre, tel qu'ils n'en ont pas eu depuis le mois de Mars, 1815. Même celui-ci est plus important. Alors, l'armée révoltée avait l'excuse de leur attachement à leur ancien chef; et ce chef était Bonaparte, qui savait les contenir et modérer leurs excès, et les conséquences d'une révolution produite par une révolte militaire;

mais en Espagne nous avons le mal tout pur, et l'exemple est terrible.

Il ne me paraît pas qu'on puisse y rien faire ; mais il faut observer le progrès du mal.

Nos élections ici ont été assez bien. Nous avons perdu quelques unes, et gagné d'autres ; et en tout il paraît que le Parlement sera de la même disposition que celui qui vient d'être dissous. Je me réjouis de voir que vous avez pu réussir à passer les lois que M. de Cazes avait proposées aux Chambres.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 48. ]

*To Lord Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

London, 28th March, 1820.

I have just received from you your letter of the 10th instant, and although it is possible that this letter may be too late to reach you before you will sail for the Brazils, I send it, as it will be sent after you, and will probably tend to hasten your return.

We have accounts here, which you must equally have at Lisbon, of the King having submitted to the revolt of the troops, which had by degrees spread all over Spain, having been attended everywhere by Proclamations of the Constitution of the Cortes which the King had sworn to maintain ; and he had appointed a Junta through whose hands all the acts of his government are to pass, who are, in fact, a sort of provisional government.

I really believe that the people of Spain are, and have had reason to be, dissatisfied with the government of the King. But it will require a good deal of evidence to make me believe that any number of the people desire the *Constitucion de la Monarchia*. They are very much altered if they do ; and I am therefore inclined to the opinion that the revolt of the troops, and that alone, has occasioned what has occurred. At all events it has been the most efficient cause ; and we must not suppose that such men as Riego, Quiroga, and Abisbal, as well as others, will not require rewards which it will not be very easy to grant or very safe to refuse. It is quite certain that the great object of the Spanish Government now, whether in the hands of the King or of the leaders of the Cortes, must

be to satisfy and keep in order the army. This is a *sine qua non*; and they must make every sacrifice, and do anything, to accomplish it.

If this be true, is it not probable that they will look to war with Portugal as one of the modes of effecting their object? A government and people in a state of revolution, as those of Spain are likely to be for some time to come, don't look much either to the justice or consequences of the acts which they choose to adopt, much less of those forced upon them by necessity. They will see in this measure the probability of a deliverance from a present great and pressing evil, and they will adopt it *coûte qui coûte*.

Then look to the consequences of the example of Spain in the army and among the people of Portugal. It must not be supposed that you and your system have not enemies in the Portuguese army. Even the government have encouraged them; and how much more bold and enterprising will they become in your absence, having before their eyes the example of the Spanish army. There are also some Liberals among the nobility and people of Portugal, and you may rely upon it that they are not unacquainted with the existence of this temper in the army, nor unlikely to take advantage of your absence to cultivate it to forward their own schemes. In short, in whatever light I view your absence at the present moment I see fresh cause to regret it, and I am quite certain that every day that it lasts will increase the evil, and that your presence in the Brazils can produce no benefit which can compensate for this evil.

Palmella, who has spoken to me on this subject, is entirely of the same opinion, and I hope, if you receive this letter before you sail, that you will consider the subject over again and stay in Portugal, and that, if it should not reach you till you arrive in the Brazils, you will return as soon as you can.

There is nothing new in this country.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 49. ]

*To General Alava.*

MI QUERIDO ALAVA,

Stratfieldsaye, le 30<sup>me</sup> Mars, 1820.

Depuis que je vous ai écrit le 21<sup>me</sup> Février j'ai reçu votre lettre du 9<sup>me</sup> Mars ; laquelle il paraît que vous avez écrit avant d'avoir reçue la mienne. Il s'est passé bien des choses en Espagne depuis que je vous ai écrit, sur lesquelles je pourrais remplir un volume si j'écrivais tout ce que j'en pense. Vous avez vu que je soupçonnais qu'une partie du malheur qui vous est survenu allait vous arriver ; mais j'avoue que je n'avais pas une idée de son étendue.

Je vois que tout est tranquille à Madrid depuis que le Roi a juré la Constitution, et a établi un espèce de gouvernement provisoire, et a adopté d'autres mesures qui y sont conformes. Je désire que ce soit le calme qui succède à l'orage, plutôt que celui qui le précède ; mais je crains beaucoup que ce soit le contraire. Il paraît que la révolte des troupes en Andalousie a été l'effet d'un complot général de l'armée ; mais quoique d'autres s'en sont mêlés outre les militaires en Galice et à Madrid, et même en Arragon, je doute que les principaux libéraux aient été de la partie. D'abord les malheureux : ils étaient dispersés, ou en exil, ou en prison ; et je vois qu'on envoya chercher Agar de la ville en Galice où il demeurerait, pour le faire Président de la Junte ; charge qu'on l'a forcé d'accepter. Ainsi donc, lui au moins n'en savait rien ; et le même est à présumer des autres. Même, s'ils n'eussent pas été en prison ou exilés, je les crois trop sages et trop forts dans leurs principes, et trop attachés aux bons principes, pour qu'il leur fut jamais entré dans l'imagination de fonder l'établissement de la "Constitution," ou d'un gouvernement quelconque, sur la révolte de l'armée.

Où trouvera-t-on les moyens de mettre fin à cette révolte, et de satisfaire aux officiers et soldats de l'armée ? Quel sera le gouvernement qui saura contenir et qui contiendra cette armée dorénavant qui vient de renverser le gouvernement du Roi ? Qui assurera qu'elle ne renversera pas la "Constitution," ou tout ce qui ne sera pas elle-même, aussi facilement qu'elle a renversé le gouvernement du Roi ? Si le gouvernement de l'Espagne doit être dans l'armée, dans les mains de quel général ou de quels généraux, tombera-t-il ? Qui sera le Bonaparte ?

Toutes ces questions sont importantes à résoudre ; et du fond de mon âme je plains ceux dont le sort dépend de leur solution.

Vous savez bien que je n'ai pas grande confiance dans les lunettes qui ont la prétention de vous faire voir à cent lieux de distance ; et j'avoue qu'il m'est impossible de juger ce qui va arriver au Roi. Il me paraît qu'il est dans la situation la plus difficile et malheureuse où jamais roi s'est trouvé. Il est de son devoir de faire un effort pour se relever, ainsi que sa monarchie, de l'effet de cette malheureuse *Constitution* ; surtout, sachant que même ceux qui l'ont fait avouent qu'elle est impraticable comme système et règle de gouvernement, en même temps que pour faire les changemens qui y sont nécessaires il faut employer et se fier à ceux qui, quelques honnêtes qu'ils peuvent être, se méfieront toujours du Roi, et seront toujours un objet de méfiance pour lui. À cette difficulté ajoutez celle de l'armée, dont j'ai parlé ci-dessus, et vraiment, si j'étais sur les lieux je ne saurais ce qu'il faudrait conseiller au Roi. A tout voir, cependant, je crois que ce qui lui conviendrait le mieux serait de se mettre dans les mains de ceux qui guideront *las Cortes*, en tâchant de les persuader de faire les changemens dans la *Constitution*, qui sont nécessaires pour que le gouvernement puisse marcher, et que *la Constitution* elle-même soit conservatrice au lieu de révolutionnaire.

Que le Roi réussisse ou non dans cet objet, je lui conseille de marcher franchement avec ceux qui mèneront *las Cortes* ; et surtout qu'il évite le malheur d'avoir des conseillers secrets et irresponsables.

Pour ce qui regarde *mes cousins*, les Grands d'Espagne, je leur conseille à présent de ne se mêler de rien. Ils n'ont pas de caractère politique ; et s'ils remuent ils n'en auront jamais. D'ailleurs, que peuvent-ils faire contre l'armée en révolte ? S'ils remuent, cette même armée aura leurs propriétés comme récompense.

Adios, &c.

WELLINGTON.



*Le Duc de Richelieu to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Paris, le 30<sup>me</sup> Mars, 1820.

J'ai reçu avec bien de la reconnaissance les deux lettres que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire, et qui me sont parvenues à peu de distance l'une de l'autre. Je suis bien sensible à la confiance que vous me marquez; elle me sera précieuse, et je ferai tous mes efforts pour la conserver. Rien assurément n'est plus effrayant, et d'un exemple plus dangereux, que ce qui vient de se passer en Espagne. Ainsi que vous le remarquez, Monsieur le Duc, une soldatesque conduite par des officiers révoltés faisant sans obstacle une révolution complète dans un grand royaume; le monarque obligé de céder à ces factieux, et ne trouvant aucun appui chez une nation dont l'immense majorité lui était dévouée: voilà un sujet propre à amener de sérieuses méditations sur les dangers qui menacent l'ordre social. Nous avons ressenti vivement le contre-coup de ces événements, et les révolutionnaires, tant à la Chambre qu'en dehors, en ont poussé des cris de joie. Nous prenons toutes les mesures pour être en mesure de repousser toutes les tentatives qui pourraient être faites à l'imitation de l'Espagne, mais il n'est pas douteux que les difficultés et les obstacles que nous rencontrons sur nos pas en sont fort augmentés. A cette occasion, Monsieur le Duc, il m'est impossible de ne pas vous parler avec toute la confiance que votre bonté m'inspire de la conduite que tient Sir Charles Stuart, et qui me met dans un grand embarras. J'espère quo vous me rendez la justice de croire que l'aversion qu'il a pour moi, non plus que les propos désobligeans qu'il a tenu sur mon compte, tant quand je suis sorti du ministère que lorsque j'y suis rentré dernièrement, n'influent en rien sur mon opinion à son égard; mais tout ce quo nous avons entendu sortir de sa bouche au sujet de ces affaires d'Espagne, tout ce qui nous est revenu de ses discours nous a jeté dans un très grand étonnement. Il m'a, par exemple, fait confidence le jour même où nous avons reçu la nouvelle de la révolution de Madrid, qu'il savait que la maison de Bourbon d'Espagne serait détrônée, et qu'on appellerait l'Archiduc Charles au trône. Avant le dîner il nous avait annoncé que probablement Cobbett allait être élu à Coventry. Sur ce que nous avions eu le projet d'envoyer quelqu'un à Madrid avec une lettre du Roi pour le Roi d'Espagne, Sir Charles a sonné l'alarme dans tout Paris, et a fait partir sur l'heure même son secrétaire particulier pour Madrid, avant de savoir si l'idée que nous avions serait ou non réalisée. Toutes ces circonstances et bien d'autres que je néglige de rapporter, ont établi dans nos communications une gêne préjudiciable à bien des affaires, dans un moment surtout où la plus grande confiance serait si nécessaire. J'avais besoin, Monsieur le Duc, de vous dire toutes ces choses, que peut-être vous jugerez utile de communiquer à Milord Castlereagh, à son retour d'Irlande. Je n'ai point à me reprocher d'avoir provoqué en aucune manière l'éloignement de Sir Charles pour moi; mais il existe, et c'est déjà un grand inconvénient. Il me serait bien doux de retrouver dans l'Ambassadeur la bienveillance dont j'ai eu tant à me louer de votre part et de celle du ministère de S.M.B.

Le Prince de Castelcicala, qui va en Angleterre, veut bien se charger de cette lettre, et pourra vous donner des détails sur la situation de notre pays. Le Roi a été un peu incommodé, mais est très bien aujourd'hui. Comme

je lui ai dit que j'avais l'honneur de vous écrire, il m'a chargé de vous faire mille complimens.

Agréez, Monsieur le Duc, l'hommage du sincère attachement et de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

RICHELIEU.

To ———, Esq.

[ 50. ]

DEAR SIR,

Stratfieldsaye, 4th April, 1820.

I have received your two letters of the 1st instant, and I am really much concerned that, consistently with what I conceive my duty to the public, I cannot forward the object you have in view in any manner. The public have given to the army a sum of money in satisfaction of their claims of prize, and as your claim for the capture of the ———, which I will discuss presently, must be as an individual of the army, I cannot urge it after having, as Commander-in-Chief of that Army, consented to receive a sum of money in satisfaction of its claims of prize. I might here close this answer, but as this is the last time I shall write a line upon the subject, I here deny that you have any claim for the capture of the ——— more than any officer of your rank in the army. In the first place, if there had not been 12,000 men at Bourdeaux belonging to the army, I believe even *you* will admit that you could not have captured the ———; in the next place, admitting that you and your men, who I conclude belonged to the army in some way or other (though it is not material to the question), did take the ——— without other assistance, it was no more than your duty, and I believe a part of the operation in which you were employed at the moment, viz., the taking possession of all the ships at that time at Bourdeaux. But you state that I was in the habit of giving to individuals that which they themselves took from the enemy. You are here mistaken. I never did give to an individual that which he took from the enemy. The orders of the army will show directly the contrary, viz., that I invariably took from an individual that which he had taken, in order to distribute its value among the detachment, or corps, to which he belonged, excluding the said individual; and I did it purposely to prevent individual officers and soldiers turning their attention to the security of plunder instead of the performance of their

more important duty and the use of their arms. Then you suppose that I admitted your exclusive claim to the ——— because I did not give up that ship when I arrived at Bourdeaux, as I did the others. It is not necessary that I should inform you what the motives were which induced me to give up the ships belonging to several French subjects when I arrived at Bourdeaux. The government, my superiors, approved of that act, and there is an end of it as far as regards me ; but I should think that you might discover a difference between the ———, an American privateer, with which nation we were then at war, and the French merchant vessels laying in Bourdeaux, besides this, viz., that the former was captured by Mr. ———, and the latter by the army under my command. Then another reason why you suppose that I admitted your exclusive claim to the ——— is that somebody told you I had said something at head-quarters at Toulouse. I cannot answer for all the folly and nonsense that was always talked of at head-quarters. If you had been told that I had a great respect and regard for you, that I approved of the manner in which you performed your duties at Bourdeaux, and that I had intended to place you in a situation in which you would have reaped an ample reward for any service you might have performed if you had not been unfortunately so situated as that I was prevented from doing so, you would have heard the truth ; but I never could have talked in any other way but in ridicule of the exclusive claim of any man to the merit of capturing an armed ship ! I can't conceive that the Government are bound to give you a sum of money because you were so situated that I could not employ you as I wished ; nor do I consider that you have been under-paid by Government for the service you rendered them at Bourdeaux in realizing the property belonging to them which the army had captured. Upon the whole it is impossible for me to do anything in this business.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Major-Gen. Sir Thomas Bradford.*

[ 51. ]

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 10th April, 1820.

The Board of Ordnance have brought under my consideration two letters from the Office of the Clerk of the Ordnance on the subject of the orders given by you for the issue of arms and stores, as well to the regular troops as to the yeomanry, from the stores at Edinburgh, contrary to the rules and regulations of the service, and to the orders given to the storekeeper, at Edinburgh, for the conduct of his department.

I am perfectly aware that the state of affairs in Scotland may require a departure from the usual mode of doing business in some instances, but I am convinced, by long experience, that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the public service is forwarded and accelerated, instead of being impeded, by an adherence to the rules laid down by authority for the conduct of the several departments; and, at all events, whenever these rules are departed from, the public department concerned ought to be informed of the fact as well as of the reason for the departure from rule; otherwise it is impossible for them to provide and be responsible for the provision for the exigencies of the service.

Whenever the formation of a corps of yeomanry is authorised by his Majesty, the Secretary of State signifies the same to the department of the Ordnance, and the establishment of the corps, and the Ordnance make provision accordingly for the several corps according to the regulations of the service. The corps is then responsible to the Ordnance for the arms and other equipments issued to it. Upon this statement you will see the inconvenience which will result if you or the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, under your authority, order to any corps more arms, &c., than his Majesty has authorised the Ordnance to issue to it, or equipments of a description not allowed to corps of yeomanry under the regulations of the service.

The arms to the regular army and militia are issued upon application from the Commander-in-Chief, in conformity with the regulations of the service. But we never heard of a regulation giving pistols and sabres to infantry. It may be very necessary for what I know; and, if you authorised it, I dare say it was; but how can the Ordnance be responsible for the number of pistols and sabres necessary for the service being

in Scotland, if the Commander of the Forces in Scotland orders an issue to a corps to which these arms are not allowed by the regulations of the service, and the departments are to know nothing of the matter for four months after the issue had been made?

I enclose you the copy of the Memorandum which has been brought before me on this subject. I am convinced that you will agree with me in the necessity of this matter being regulated. Indeed, unless it is regulated in some manner which shall conciliate the convenience of the service in Scotland with the regulations for the conduct of the department of the Ordnance, I must give orders to the storekeeper to perform his duty by obeying the orders of his immediate superiors in the Ordnance Department.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 52.] MEMORANDUM TO VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH REGARDING THE  
PROPRIETY OF INTERFERING IN SPANISH AFFAIRS.

London, 16th April, 1820.

It appears that the circumstances supposed to exist in Spain when the despatch of the Comte de Lieven was written at St. Petersburg, in which it is proposed that the Allied Cabinets should deliberate on the affairs of Spain, did not exist.

The King of Spain has accepted and sworn to the Constitution. He has not called for the interference or assistance of any Power in Europe against his revolted troops.

Nobody can entertain a doubt that the revolt of the troops, which was becoming general, was the cause of the step taken by the King of Spain; but I think it doubtful whether he had or not the means in his power of further resistance; and if this doubt be solved in the affirmative, it follows that the act must be reasoned upon as voluntary on the part of the King of Spain.

It is quite clear, however, that the revolt of the troops, and that alone, occasioned it. There is certainly a *Liberal* party in Spain. But the names of none of them appear in any of the reports of the transactions upon this subject; not even in the confession of General O'Donnell, who, although interested

in representing that he was confided in by persons of note of the Liberal party, does not state that he communicated with any person not military excepting two of the lowest class, notwithstanding that Cadiz and its neighbourhood was for a time the scene of his machinations; and I observe that Agar, who was Regent in the year 1814, upon the King's return to Spain, and was residing at Betanzos at the moment the troops in Galicia revolted, was unacquainted with their measures, objected to become President of the Junta in Galicia, and was absolutely forced to take upon himself that office.

On the other hand it must be observed that nobody moved in favour of the King's authority; Riego marched with a small force, from town to town in Andalusia, without being molested by the people, who submitted to his force while he was present, and to the King's authority as soon as Riego had departed; and, excepting the massacre at Cadiz, which appears to have been accidental, there is no instance of any great effort made any where on behalf of the King's authority.

From all that has hitherto appeared, I should conclude that the people of Spain, who certainly previous to the year 1814 were but little attached to the *Constitucion*, are now as little so to the King's authority; and that the only real authority in Spain, at present, is that of the army.

The question is, whether it is possible for the Powers of Europe to interfere in these affairs at the present moment? These Powers must be called upon by some authority in the State, to effect some object upon some defined principle. But I don't believe that up to this moment any foreign Minister in Spain knows more than the passing events, or has any communication with anybody who could inform him of what is intended, or that there is any authority existing which could afford him such information.

It appears, then, that even if interference on the part of the Powers of Europe were desirable it is at present impossible; but I will go further and endeavour to establish as a principle that no foreign Power ought to interfere in this case.

There is no country in Europe in the affairs of which foreigners can interfere with so little advantage as in those of Spain. There is no country in which foreigners are so much disliked and even despised, and whose manners and habits are so little congenial with those of the other nations

of Europe. The pride and prejudices of the Spaniards, their virtues as well as their faults, are brought into action at every moment and in every transaction, and all tend to give them an exaggerated notion of their own powers and to depreciate foreigners.

There are hundreds of instances in the late war of the operation of these feelings, but I will just advert to a few which prove them in a remarkable manner. When I went to Corunna in the year 1808, General Blake, at the head of the army of Gallieia, and General Cuesta, at the head of that of Castille, had just been defeated and dispersed in a great action fought at the Rio by a very inferior force under Mareschal Bessières. The kingdom of Gallieia was open to the enemy, who was expected to arrive at every moment. I offered the Junta to land and to march to the frontier for their protection. But they refused my assistance, desiring me to land only the money and arms which were in the fleet for their use.

It will be recollected that afterwards this same body refused to admit General Rand's Corps to land at Corunna, till ordered to do so by the Central Junta sitting at Madrid, notwithstanding that they knew their assistance, and the assistance of every man that could be procured, was necessary against the formidable army which had just entered Spain under Bonaparte.

At a subsequent period of the war, in 1809, an offer was made to make Cadiz the basis of the operations of the British Army, provided that army should occupy Cadiz with a joint garrison; but this was refused notwithstanding that the Spaniards lost their last army in the battle of Otaña, and the Central Junta, situated at Seville, was exposed at every moment, and was in fact driven from that town into Cadiz because it would not adopt the proposed arrangement. The measure of garrisoning Cadiz was permitted afterwards as a last resource; but it was too late to save the Junta from the necessity of abandoning Seville, and the British Army had then decided upon making Lisbon, instead of Cadiz, its point of support, and Portugal, instead of Andalusia, its basis. But this transaction shows how injurious to their own interests and views were the unnatural prejudices and jealousies of the Spaniards.

I believe it will be admitted that no nation was ever under such obligations to another as Spain was to Great Britain during the late war. She was supplied with money, arms,

provisions, and everything to enable her to carry on the war for her independence. Her battles were fought for her, her strong places were taken from the enemy and restored to her, and everything was done to conciliate the good will and confidence of the people of Spain. Great Britain had also been long in the enjoyment of a Constitution the practical blessings of which it was the professed object of the Spanish patriots to obtain; and there were not wanting persons to give their counsel in the framing of that *Constitucion*, which was actually framed under the protection of the British Army, and of a British garrison in Cadiz! Yet did the influence of the example of the British Constitution, or the advice of British individuals however distinguished (for I believe the Government very wisely refrained from giving any advice), produce any effect in the formation of any one Article in this Act? On the contrary, the framers of it took for their model, though not avowed, the Proceedings of the National Assembly in France, because they would not be supposed to be influenced by that foreign nation upon which they were obliged to rely for their defence, and for their means of salvation from the enemy, and for their future independence.

Here, then, are a few only of the instances of the conduct of the Spanish nation, in relation to foreigners, which will tend to show what is to be expected from any interference, however friendly, in their affairs. History will show what is the consequence of a hostile one. I entertain no doubt that, from first to last, Bonaparte sent 600,000 men into Spain, and I know that not more than 100,000 went out in the shape of an army, and with the exception of Suchet's Corps, these were without cannon or baggage, or anything to enable them to act as an army.

It is true that this result of the war may in part be attributed to the operations of the Allied Armies in the Peninsula; but those would form a very erroneous notion of the fact who should not attribute a fair proportion of it to the effects of the enmity of the people of Spain.

I have known of not less than 380,000 men of the French Army in operation in Spain at one moment; but their officers and the servants of the French Government had no authority excepting on the spot on which their troops stood, and their time passed and their force was exhausted by the mere effort of



obtaining subsistence from the country. Such was the effect of the want of resources in the country, which I will discuss farther presently ; of the hatred of the Spaniards to the French, principally because they were foreigners and interfered forcibly in their affairs, and of the passive resistance of the people to the French force !

Then I would ask, with these examples before us, with what force, of what nation, and from what quarter would we carry on our operations, supposing such interference to be determined upon ?

I would not recommend the French Government to interfere at all. The circumstances of the late war are still too fresh in the memory of every man in Spain, and there is not an arm in that country which would not be raised against a French Army.

There might be doubts of employing French troops in this concern on other grounds referable to the nature of the contest in Spain, and to its probable unpopularity in France. But the objection first mentioned is sufficient ; and I am certain that there is no person acquainted with Spain who will not concur in the opinion that of all foreigners the French are the most odious to that country.

If the armies of other nations are to interfere it must be through France, from Portugal, or from the sea-coast of the Mediterranean. I don't believe the French Government would now permit a large German or Russian Army to pass through France to undertake operations on the frontiers of Spain by the Pyrenees. The interference must be, then, from Portugal, or from the sea-coast of the Mediterranean ; and it must be by means of a commanding force, whether with a view to receive the support of the party in the country, whose interests it is intended to maintain, or to put down the adversary. I would then observe that there is no part of Spain that is not thinly peopled in proportion to its extent. The difficulty of maintaining on the resources of the country a large body of troops collected together becomes next to an impossibility. Then there are no navigable rivers or other means of communication by water, and but few roads in the country practicable for military operations, and those constructed only for the communications from one village to the other. In short, Spain is a country in which military operations must be carried on by a large force,

if it is intended they should be successful; and yet the country is so thinly peopled in proportion to its extent, and it contains so few large towns, that it is scarcely possible, and absolutely impossible without incurring an enormous expense, to keep such a force assembled; an expense infinitely larger than that to be incurred in any other country for a force of the same strength and description.

Then it must be recollected that an army landing upon the coast of the Mediterranean, or in Portugal, is absolutely incapable of moving till its means of equipment are collected, and the more incapable in proportion to its size and numbers, particularly in cavalry. These means cannot be brought with it without an expense in transports quite beyond all calculation, and they must be collected in Spain even for the army, whose basis will be Portugal, and time will be required to collect them.

I have thought it proper to mention these details, that they may be fairly taken into consideration upon the discussion in future of any forcible interference in the affairs of Spain.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Lord Chancellor (Eldon).*

[ 53. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

Stratfieldsaye, 23rd April, 1820.

I enclose a letter which I have received from a gentleman who was at school with me, and likewise another from his brother. I know nothing of him since the period above mentioned, nor do I think that his having been at school with me gives him any claim upon my exertions in his favour, more particularly as there are many hundreds of meritorious individuals, some in the same profession, who have served the public under my directions, for whom I can obtain nothing. But I send your Lordship these letters as they have been written to me, and to give Mr. Haslewood a chance of success if you should think proper to inquire respecting him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 54. ]

*To Sir William Taunton.*

SIR,

London, 2nd May, 1820.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 1st instant, and I have to apologise for having omitted so long to return an answer to that which you had already written me.

I had promised my friend, Mr. Bathurst,\* that I would pay him a visit at Oxford, about the 12th or 13th of June, and the Vice-Chancellor, having heard of this intended visit, has since done me the honour to invite me to dine with him. The Corporation have likewise, through you, done me the same honour, and thus what was intended as a visit to a private friend has become a public matter, and I am liable to the accusation of making an ostentatious visit to the University, and of seeking the honour which the Vice-Chancellor and the Corporation have been pleased to confer upon me.

It is very difficult for me to promise to leave town at the period stated, in the midst of the business of Parliament, and so I have stated to Mr. Bathurst and the Vice-Chancellor; and it is quite certain that I cannot be absent from London at that period for many days. I am therefore under the necessity of declining the honour of dining with the Corporation, which I regret very much.

I hope that you will make my excuses to them, and assure them that I will take some other opportunity of paying them my respects.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 55. ]

*To the Right Hon. G. Canning.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 3rd May, 1820.

I have perused the papers in this box, which I consider so conclusive upon Sir T. Hislop's conduct that I recommend to you

\* William Bathurst, late Clerk of the Council, then Fellow of All Souls, Oxford.

to let them go before the public in their present shape. It would have been a difficult matter for Lord Moira to have brought Sir Thomas Hislop to a military inquiry for his conduct at Salneir. Sir Thomas is Commander-in-Chief of a separate Company's Army. Supposing that Lord Moira, by his general authority, could have ordered this separate Commander-in-Chief to submit to an inquiry, would it have been proper to order officers under his own command to form the court? Could he have formed the court of officers of another army, the Bengal or Bombay Armies, to which the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Fort St. George does not belong? Could he have brought Sir Thomas Hislop to trial or inquiry, as an officer of the King's troops, before a court of officers of the King's troops only? There would have been difficulties in, and objections to, all these modes of proceeding, besides the great objection of all, in my opinion, to such a proceeding, viz., the weakening and bringing into contempt the authority and character of a person in such a situation. It appears to me that the inquiry by the proceeding of Sir Thomas himself is as full and as fair, and the result as satisfactory, as if the proceedings had been conducted by any court, however constituted. It will not be so to the factious, and those who stirred the question with a view to mischief and to injure the character of a meritorious officer. But it will be so to those who seek the truth; and this result, which it is fair to suppose that Lord Hastings anticipated, affords a good reason for his conduct in making the inquiry ordered in such a manner as to occasion as little public inconvenience and mischief as possible.

It is quite clear to me that the Killedar had incurred all the penalties of the laws of war, and that an example in his person was necessary at the moment in Candeish, that an inquiry was made by the Commander-in-Chief before he ordered that he should be put to death, and that the Killedar acknowledged his guilt. The two officers present at the inquiry, one of them independent of the Commander-in-Chief, the agent of the Governor-General, concurred in the opinion of his guilt and in the expediency of punishing him. I must say, however, that I object to this inquiry so far as that it was made in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief. It is true that if he had been absent the officers employed upon it would have probably

declined to do more than report facts, upon which the Commander-in-Chief would at last have been obliged to order the execution of the Killedar.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 56. ]

*To Sir H. Clinton.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 27th May, 1820.

I have received your letter of the 25th May, regarding Captain Dawkins, who, it appears by what you state, was not promoted at the period of the Battle of Waterloo because he had not served the time required by the Regulations. This, I should think, would acquit me sufficiently of neglecting any person recommended by you, and as I certainly shall not be allowed to recommend him now I might here close this letter ; but I wish to recall to your recollection that for a very obvious reason I have at all times objected to the recommendation by General Officers of the Aides-de-Camp for promotion by Brevet. It is true that they have at times all recommended their Aides-de-Camp and Staff notwithstanding my objections, but the rule has been otherwise, and the promotion of the Staff of the General Officers an exception founded upon special circumstances. Now, I am certain that when you are reminded of this fact, in addition to that mentioned in your own letter, that Captain Dawkins had not served long enough at the period of the Battle of Waterloo to be promoted, you will acquit me of any intentional inattention to you or to those attached to you.

Believe me ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P. S.—I hope you are better.

*To Lord Sidmouth.*

[ 57. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 30th May, 1820.

I return General Byng's letter, and the memorandum you gave me lately upon the distribution of the forces under his command and in Scotland.

I am quite certain that this distribution is erroneous, and I had thought of writing you a memorandum upon the subject, only that, upon referring to my former letter to you upon this subject, I find it contains all I need say. I could not do more without making out a detailed distribution, which it would be unbecoming in me to offer.

In my opinion the government, or the General Officer on the spot acting for the government, ought to distribute the troops with a view to general, and not local objects; and for that reason the public, and not the towns, ought to pay the expense of the temporary barraeks.

It is very true that a company of infantry, or a troop of dragoons, well applied, might at times keep the peace of a whole country, and I don't object to such detachments. But let them be the exception to the practice, and not the rule; and in every instance in which such a detachment is made upon the call of the magistrates or people, let the General insist upon the men and horses being quartered in one or in contiguous buildings, and then let the towns pay the expense.

Rely upon it that, till you have the troops distributed as I before suggested to you, you will be liable to the effects of the intrigues of the disaffected against them, and sooner or later some misfortune will happen. No serious misfortune can happen if this distribution is made. It has, besides, the advantage of obliging the loyal to associate for their own personal protection.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*' Colonel Gilmour to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Tuam, 31st May, 1820.

As senior Lieutenant-Colonel of the Rifle brigade, I have the honour of forwarding to you a letter from the officers composing the two battalions of it, and in doing so I beg leave to express the high sense I entertain of

the honour which has now devolved upon me, as also to embrace this opportunity of acknowledging the many obligations personally conferred upon me by your Grace, and which I beg leave to assure you shall ever be held in my most grateful recollection.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,  
your most obedient humble servant,

D. LITTLE GILMEUR,  
Lieut.-Col. 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR GRACE,

We, the Lieutenant-Colonels commanding, Field-officers, Captains, and subalterns of the two battalions of the Rifle brigade, beg leave to represent to your Grace with what feelings of pride and satisfaction we viewed your appointment to be our Colonel in Chief.

Assuredly so high a distinction could not fail to make a deep impression on the minds of any corps in his Majesty's service; but we cannot conceal from ourselves that, in the breasts of the majority of us, every sentiment of joy and exultation was in no slight degree augmented when memory recalled the days of active service under your Grace's command, as well in that series of brilliant campaigns which terminated in the emancipation of the Peninsula, as during the last grand struggle, which, sealing the destruction of the common enemy, purchased for Europe tranquillity and for your Grace the title of its deliverer.

Whatever henceforth may be the destinies of this corps—whether its exertions shall be for some time confined to the humbler, less inspiring, but not less imperative duty of protecting our fellow-citizens against the criminal attempts of flagitious and designing men in our native country, or whether our better fortune shall again direct us to the more enviable and spirit-stirring occupations of foreign war—we entreat your Grace to believe, that the lustre of your high example will ever be present before our eyes, animating us all, each in his degree, and within the sphere of his activity, to renewed exertions; imparting to our humble efforts a character of a loftier emulation, and teaching us unceasingly to aim at results not unworthy to be associated with a name which history will indissolubly blend with the fairest and most enduring triumphs of a free and independent people.

We have the honour to be,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servants,  
1st and 2nd Battalions Rifle brigade.

A. NORCOTT, Col. and Lt.-Col. Comd.  
D. LITTLE GILMEUR, Lt.-Col.  
J. ROSS, Major and Lt.-Col.  
S. MITCHELL, Major and Lt.-Col.  
J. LEACH, Major and Lt.-Col.  
GEO. MILLEN, Major and Lt.-Col.  
W. GRAY, Captain and Major.  
MORGAN BRENT, Major.

MEMORANDUM TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL RESPECTING THE [ 58. ]  
STATE OF THE GUARDS.

June, 1820.

I feel the greatest anxiety respecting the state of the military in London, and I think it best to adopt this mode of making known to you my opinion upon it, leaving it to you to draw the attention of our colleagues to it or not as you may think proper.

Very recently strong symptoms of discontent appeared in one of the battalions of the Guards, of which the most remarkable circumstance was that neither Government nor the Commander-in-Chief had any knowledge of the existence of discontent till some hours after it had appeared in acts of mutiny and disorder. This battalion was moved from London, and it has been reported, whether with foundation or without is not known, that the men on their march had joined in, and made use of, the cry of disaffection of the day.

The Secretary of State has informed the Cabinet that the Commander-in-Chief has felt great uneasiness respecting the Coldstream Guards; while the Commander-in-Chief, in a General Order, assures the army and the public that the symptoms of discontent have been confined only to one battalion of the 3rd Guards, and even to a few individuals in that battalion. In the mean time there are, as usual, reports without number in circulation respecting all the Guards, both cavalry and infantry, the greater number false, no doubt, but whether true or false no man can tell; and I am sure that none of us could say he was surprised if, at the next Drawing-room, he should hear as we did at the last, that there was a mutiny in more of these corps; and thus, in one of the most critical moments that ever occurred in this country, we and the public have reason to doubt in the fidelity of the troops, the only security we have, not only against revolution but for the property and life of every individual in the country who has anything to lose.

I certainly have had every reason to be satisfied with the army, and I should say generally that they are to be relied upon in all cases. But I thought that we ought not to rely solely upon the army when we were discussing the expediency of calling out the Militia in this year; and I am sure that if the



principle on which we decided to call out the Militia was sound, it applies ten times more strongly to the adoption of some measure of the same description in London, where we have already been *surprised* by a mutiny in one corps, where we know not, and cannot know under existing circumstances, whether seeds of discontent are laid or not in other corps, and where the Government depend for their protection against insurrection and revolution, and individuals for their personal safety and property, upon the fidelity of 3000 Guards, all of the class of the people, and even of the lowest of that class.

In my opinion the Government ought, without the loss of a moment's time, to adopt measures to form either a police in London or military corps, which should be of a different description from the regular military force, or both. The consequence would be that the mutiny of the regular force, if it should ever occur, would be of little or no importance. But it is probable that the feeling of emulation which would be excited by seeing these other corps formed, and particularly that of the nondependence of the Government upon these Guards alone for their security, would prevent the breaking out of these mutinies, even if the danger of them should be greater than any of us think they are.

Then there are other measures of a military nature which I think might be adopted with advantage, and would at least prevent our being *surprised* by a mutiny. I put out of the question all the causes or pretences stated for mutiny, as I know well that if the temper for mutiny does not already exist none of these causes ever excite it. The men may grumble at the frequency and unpleasant nature of their duty, but they never mutiny on this account, although such grievances sound well in their mouths, or those of their abettors, when mutiny has occurred. I would, however, recommend some new arrangement for the duties; particularly if we are to pass many more such months as this last, during which I have had a knowledge of them. Besides the King, who sends his own commands through Bloomfield, there are the following officers who send orders to these unfortunate troops:—The Secretary of State; Commander-in-Chief; Field Officer in Waiting; Gold Stick, Silver Stick, to the two regiments of Horse Guards only. The consequence is that when there is a disturbance in the town which lasts for a week or ten days nobody knows who is on or

who off duty, all the troops are harassed, and the duty is ill done after all.

Only last night, after I had received Lord Sidmouth's directions for the duties of the night, at eight o'clock in the night I found that somebody had altered what was ordered, and that the guard at the Horse Guards was doubled, whether for any or what necessity I cannot judge.

It is quite impossible to conduct the duties of the Guards in London as those of the line are in quarters or barracks in the country. But the more nearly these duties are assimilated the better. The sergeants and corporals of the Guards are certainly excellent soldiers, and their conduct is exemplary upon all occasions. But it must be observed that they are taken from the ranks, and of the class of the people, and liable to be influenced by the views and sentiments of the people. If the officers of the Guards could perform the duties required from the officers of the Line there is no doubt that the sergeants and corporals of the Guards would perform their duty better even than they do now; and it is almost certain that such an event as occurred lately in the 3rd Guards would not occur without the previous knowledge of the officers. I think, therefore, that it might be desirable that the duty of the officers of the Guards should, as far as possible, be assimilated to that of officers in the Line.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Sir Henry Wellesley.*

[ 59. ]

MY DEAR HENRY,

London, 1st June, 1820.

From all that I have heard and read of the state of the temper in Spain, I think it not improbable that at the meeting of the Cortes there will be some inquiry regarding the causes of the King's conduct upon his arrival in 1814, and as the papers here have more than once attacked me upon my having received from the King a confirmation of the grants and honours conferred upon me by the Cortes, I think it as well that you should have in your possession authentic information upon that point, of which you will make the use you please if it should appear to you to be necessary.

There was nothing of which the French Government were so anxious as to prevent me from having any communication with

the King, and they with that view sent him into Spain by Perpignan, instead of by the great road of Bayonne, &c., and the King passed through Toulouse some days before I approached that place, and I had no communication with him or from him till I received the letter of which I enclose the copy. From the date it would appear that the writing this letter was almost his first act, and I could have had no communication with him either to request him or to induce him to write it. To this letter I returned the answer, of which I enclose the copy.\*

These circumstances and these letters will speak for themselves, and will certainly remove from me the suspicion that I had anything to say to the King's subsequent conduct.

Afterwards, when I was going to Madrid, in the month of May, to pay my respects to the King, I had determined to review General Freyre's Army, which was at Tarbes, on my passage through that place. On my road there from Toulouse I heard of the events at Madrid, and of the King's proclamation † which had been addressed to me; and at the same time I was informed of the doubts entertained by General Freyre whether he would or not acknowledge the King's authority under the then existing circumstances. I considered that whether the King was right or wrong, was a question with which the army had nothing to do, particularly that part of it which was within the French frontier, or immediately on the frontiers of Spain. We knew that the King had been received with enthusiasm, and acknowledged at Madrid and throughout Spain by both civil and military authorities and by the people, and that *de facto* he had the Government in his hands; and I could no more permit the armies to deliberate whether what he had done was right or wrong, or to question his acts, than I could before have permitted the same bodies to call in question the acts of the Cortes. I therefore did advise both General Freyre and the Prince of Anglona to submit themselves and their armies to the King's authority; and by pointing out to them the consequences which must result to Spain of their opposition to his Majesty's acts, I believe I did at the time prevent a civil war, and all the evils which would have followed.

\* See Wellington Despatches, 1st Edition, vol. xi., pp. 632 and 640. Letters dated 12th and 13th April, 1814.

† See Wellington Despatches, large 8vo., 2nd Edition, vol. vii., p. 728.

This is the whole of what I had to say to the change effected by the King on his arrival. You have, I believe, copies of the Memorandum\* and letters which I wrote to him or the Duc de San Carlos afterwards, in which I recommended to him a line of conduct which, I believe, if he had followed, both his Majesty and Spain would have been saved from all the evils which both have since suffered. I, besides, verbally entreated his Majesty and his ministers almost to importunity to release all the persons confined on his arrival for political offences, as the first step towards the adoption of a system of government which would have given satisfaction to his people.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I enclose two letters which I wrote to the Duc de San Carlos on my way to Madrid after I had reviewed the 3rd and 4th Armies.†

MEMORANDUM OF PATROL DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED [ 60.]  
JUNE 9TH.

*To the Commanding Officer of the Life Guards.*

From King-street Barracks, a patrol of six men to set out at half-past nine, and to proceed by Gloucester-place, Portman-square, Manchester-square, Cavendish-square, Portland-place, Weymouth-street, Manchester-square, Portman-square, and King-street Barracks.

A patrol of six men to set out at half-past nine, and proceed by Weymouth-street, Cavendish-square, Holles-street, Oxford-street, Cumberland-street, Portman-square, and King-street Barracks.

Twelve men to proceed from King-street Barracks, at half-past nine, along Wigmore-street to Cavendish-square, to wait there till relieved, and the last relief to return with the last patrols to King-street Barracks.

Similar patrols to be sent out from King-street Barracks as soon as those above-mentioned will have returned, and the same to be repeated till half-past one in the morning.

\* See Wellington Despatches, 1st Edition, 8vo., vol. xii., p. 40.

† See Wellington Despatches, 1st Edition, 8vo., vol. xii., pp. 25 and 26.

A patrol of six men to be sent, at half-past nine o'clock, from the barracks at Knightsbridge, along Piccadilly, Park-lane, Upper Grosvenor-street, Grosvenor-square, Hanover-square, George-street, Conduit-street, Berkeley-square, Charles-street, Curzon-street, South Audley-street, Stanhope-street, Piccadilly, and the barracks.

A patrol of six men to be sent from the barracks at Knightsbridge, by Piccadilly, Bond-street, Clifford-street, Saville-street, New Burlington-street, Swallow-street, Princes-street, Hanover-square, Lower Brook-street, Grosvenor-square, Upper Brook-street, Park-lane, barracks at Knightsbridge.

A party of twelve men will proceed from Knightsbridge Barracks at the same hour with the patrols above mentioned, and will proceed by Piccadilly, Dover-street, Hertford-street, Curzon-street, Charles-street, Berkeley-square, and there remain till relieved. The last relief to return with the last patrols (and will keep a vedette in Brook-street to communicate with that patrol) by the same route to Knightsbridge Barracks. The said patrols to be repeated from Knightsbridge Barracks when the above-mentioned will return, and to be repeated again till half-past one in the morning, or even later if there should be any riot or disturbance.

A patrol of six men to be sent from the Horse Guards at half-past nine, and proceed along Pall Mall, St. James's-street, Piccadilly, Haymarket, Horse Guards.

A similar patrol, at the same time and from the same place, and proceed by St. Alban's-street, Charles-street, St. James's-square, York-street, Jermyn-street, Duke-street, St. James's-square, George-street, Pall Mall, Horse Guards.

Similar patrols to be sent out when these will return, and they are to be repeated till half-past one in the morning, or later if necessary.

In case any disturbance or breaking of windows should be heard of in any streets in the neighbourhood of the lines of these patrols, the patrols are to be taken to those streets, and communication to be made to the support stationed in Berkeley-square and Cavendish-square respectively.

A patrol from the Horse Guards is likewise to be sent up the Strand at the same hour and in the same manner.

WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Herbert Taylor.*

[ 61. ]

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 14th June, 1820.

After receiving several anonymous letters to the same purport as the enclosed, I received the latter this morning.

I am quite certain that it is impossible to do anything for the subalterns of the army, and I have no objection to stand forward and tell those gentlemen my opinion, and that I can't interfere in their favour. But, before I do so, I wish to be quite certain that I am right, and to have your sanction for telling them that it is impossible to give them the brevet of captain.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lieuts. Newport, Smyth, Hunt and M<sup>r</sup> Arthur, 39th Regt.*

[ 62. ]

GENTLEMEN,

London, 20th June, 1820.

I have received your letter of the 10th June, in which you desire that I should recommend that brevet rank should be conferred upon subaltern officers of a certain standing in the army.

This subject is not new to me, my attention having been frequently drawn to it in different ways by anonymous letters and otherwise; but I confess that I never have been able to discover the mode in which this scheme could be carried into execution, with any advantage to the individuals promoted, which could at all compensate for the inconvenience and injury which must result from it to the public service. It is unnecessary that I should go further into the subject than to point out to you that the public would not pay as Captains those subalterns thus promoted by brevet; they would continue to do the duty of subalterns, as the rosters of subalterns are generally kept regimentally, excepting possibly upon General or Garrison Courts Martial, and they would not be more certain of succeeding to vacancies of companies than they are at present. I confess that, before I press the Commander-in-Chief upon a point which I know must occasion inconvenience, I must be certain of obtaining something more solid for persons so deserving of attention and favour than the extension of brevet rank to subaltern officers would be to any of them.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 63. ]

*To Sir Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY,

London, 20th June, 1820.

I enclose a letter from Dr. Curtis, now titular Archbishop of Armagh, who was very useful to the cause of Spain in every way during the war. He has nothing, I believe, from his Dignity but the Title, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will endeavour to obtain for him the continuance of his salary at Salamanca.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 64. ]

*To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Londres, ce 22<sup>me</sup> Juin, 1820.

Il y a une société en Angleterre de personnes qui s'amuse à naviguer le canal entre la France et l'Angleterre pendant l'été, dans les vaisseaux à eux appartenans, dont le Quartier-Général, si je peux m'exprimer ainsi, est établi à l'Isle de Wight, à Cowes. Ces Messieurs désirent pouvoir visiter de temps en temps les ports de France ; mais ils ne peuvent pas y entrer, à cause des dépenses énormes des droits de port, lesquels je crois sont un des résultats de la longue guerre de la Révolution. De cette manière ils sont privés du plaisir et des convéniens qui pourraient résulter de relâcher dans les ports de France ; en même temps que ceux-ci sont privés de l'avantage qui leur reviendraient de ces visites de la part de ces Messieurs.

Il paraît que feu M. le Duc de Berri avait procuré à cette société la permission de visiter les ports de France en payant seulement les mêmes droits de port que payent les vaisseaux Français ; mais qu'elle en a été privée non à cause d'abus de la part de ces Messieurs, mais parce que d'autres se disant de cette société, mais étant véritablement vaisseaux de commerce ou employés de porter des passagers, s'étaient passés comme vaisseaux de la société. Si cette représentation est vrai, et que le gouvernement Français est disposé à accorder à ces Messieurs la permission qu'il leur avait autrefois accordé à la demande de M. le Duc de Berri, il me paraît qu'on pourrait trouver les moyens de l'accorder sans grand danger d'abus. Par exemple, la société pourrait remettre à l'ambassade de France au 1<sup>er</sup>

Mars de chaque année la liste et la description des vaisseaux, avec les noms des propriétaires; et sur cette liste le gouvernement Français pourrait accorder une permission d'entrée pour chaque vaisseau. Cet arrangement empêcherait le renouvellement de l'abus déjà arrivé.

Ces permissions pourraient durer pour un an, ou autre temps limité; et on pouvait y nommer les ports, et de cette manière faire l'exception de ceux dont on ne voudrait pas que ces Messieurs fassent la visite.

Ces Messieurs sont prêts à s'engager de ne vendre rien, ni de porter personne qui payerait son passage; et il me paraît que si par hasard quelqu'un abusait de ce privilège, il serait facile, par l'arrangement ci-dessus proposé, de l'en priver entièrement. Je vous prie, M. le Duc, de prendre ce sujet en considération, et d'avoir la bonté de me faire savoir s'il serait possible d'accorder la demande de ces Messieurs.

Je vous envoie le papier qu'ils m'ont remis.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Lord Boreford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Rio de Janeiro, 30th July, 1820.

Though it is probable I may be in Portugal before you receive this, yet I will not omit to inform you of what has here occurred since my last letter to you. I have since then received yours of the 28th March, which had gone to Lisbon, and as there was nothing in it which might not be shown to the King, I presented it to him, and indeed I thought you might have wrote it a good deal for that purpose. He desired me to read it to him in Portuguese, which I did, and as at the same time orders had come for the *Vengeur* to return home and to offer me a passage, I made the proposal to the King, backed so strongly by your sentiments. He reluctantly consented and has ever since remained in pretty bad humour on the subject, and has by indirect means and pretty strong insinuations, or rather declarations of his wishes, endeavoured to induce me to postpone my departure. However, though I am sometimes awkwardly enough placed on those occasions, still I get over them as well as I can, and my departure remains fixed for the 10th of next month. The King is perfectly aware of the advantage, and indeed necessity, for my return, and his good sense, though it cannot absolutely conquer certain feelings, yet keeps a middling balance, and upon the whole he is less displeased than I thought he would have been, and uses every effort to appear less so than he is, and is personally very kind to me; yet I trust I shall be able to get away, though until out of the port I shall



never be sure. The minister, Thomas Antonio Villa Nova Portugal, gives me every possible assistance, and indeed carries the thing through. The Count dos Arcos (the other minister) opposes in everything he can, and I know not for what. The arrangement which has been made respecting me is this: I have been appointed Marshal-General Junto a Real Pessoa; as such I communicate immediately in all things military to the King, and my authority in Portugal is entirely independent of the government. This part is entirely the King's doing, as I had not the least idea of being Junto a Real Pessoa, nor, as I understand, did the minister know it till a few hours before it was declared. Having this dignity, which is esteemed so high in Portugal, I am in consequence to have a vote in the Regency on all matters whenever I choose to go there, and this saves the necessity of formally declaring me one of the Governors, which certainly is in my mind a better mode of arrangement. The Count dos Arcos is, I know, doing all in his power to prevent this, and as, though determined, it is not yet despatched or signed, there may be change, though I can scarcely think there will be, as the King has already told me of it. His Majesty, by the instigations of the Count dos Arcos, has shown a great reluctance to remove Forjas from the Secretaryship of the War department, though his now remaining there is an incoherency if not absurdity, and I thought it right to yield to those feelings of the King, but with the understanding that Don Miguel was not, as such, to have a vote in the Regency. I doubt, however, that this last part, though promised, will be carried into execution, and it is of no material consequence if I have a vote myself, because, if present, I am sure the Governors will not go against me. Up to this time, such is the state of the question respecting me, I will not say that no change will take place in the next ten or twelve days.

In respect to the faint hopes I held out to you in the postscript of my last letter respecting the Prince's going to Portugal, that has vanished: there was not the least sincerity in the insinuation of his Majesty on that subject. In fact, I see little hopes of getting him from here; for though he continues to declare his intentions of going to Portugal, it will, I fear, end in declaration, and at all events, from everything that is doing here, it is most obvious that at present he has not the slightest intention of such an undertaking. When I saw the inutility of pressing for the immediate return of either his Majesty or the Prince Royal, I pressed for a fixed time, and said that even if his Majesty would name the next year, or even the year after, it would be of most material consequence; but, alas! I could not even bring him to that. The truth is, as I ever foresaw and said, the danger is too far off to make them feel it properly, so as to induce them here to take the proper and efficacious measures of prevention, and the danger is perhaps just apparent enough to discourage the King from going there. He will not, certainly, be moved to any change of intention by argument; it must be, if it ever takes place, by some event that will work stronger on his feelings than the considerations which detain him here. The King's general health is by no means bad, though his legs are continually ailing and prevent him taking exercise; but he may so go on for many years, at the same time from his gross habit of body and much relaxed system, a serious illness would be to him very dangerous; and I fear his medical men would not make the matter much better. Things at Buenos Ayres continue in the same dis-

turbed and confused state, and his Majesty is decided not to take any part beyond the Uruguay, that is, to remain as he is, though of course his expectations are that in the end he will furnish a King to Buenos Ayres by general consent.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

BERESFORD.

*Sir A. Dickson to Lord FitzRoy.*

MY DEAR LORD FITZROY,

Woolwich, 26th July, 1820.

I have attentively considered the papers relative to the cadets, on which I beg leave to make the following hasty observations:—

In the first place I must state that the principle laid down in the commencement as being a calculation of General Mudge is incorrect, for it takes a period of 8 years—from 1st Jan., 1802, to 1st Jan., 1810, and having found that 148 vacancies occurred in that period, it draws a proportion between 509 officers that existed in 1802, and 891 officers in Jan. 1st, 1810, without taking into calculation the progressive increase during the period from the smaller number to the larger; 148 vacancies in 8 years is 18½ a year, and the proportion as stated is, as 509 is to 18½, so is 891 to 32. But to draw a just proportion, the number of officers in the 8 years ought to be added together, and the number in 1810 multiplied by 8, which would give the following: as supposed—5200 is to 148, so is 7128 to 203, or about 26 a year; and though I have no means at hand for ascertaining the real number, I am convinced I am not under the mark in assuming 5200, for there was a battalion formed in 1803, another in 1806, and a third in 1808, which together with progressive augmentation of horse artillery and engineers, could not fail to make at least the number I have assumed.

I beg to add I would not have taken up your time to go into this criticism were it not to express my fear that the calculation which follows is overrated, and that the vacancies will not average hereafter 16 a year: but, however, I will take the principle as Colonel F. lays it down, in my statements, as follows, the first of which is with regard to the extinction of the half-pay lieutenants.

PROBABLE Progress of Extinction of the SECOND LIEUTENANTS on Half Pay.

1820. From July to Dec.	{ Brought on full pay by vacancies .. }		1820. July	On Half Pay.	
	{ 8 }			Royal Artillery .. ..	12
				Royal Engineers, in- cluding Mr. Radcliff ..	6
				Commissions supposed to be given at Christmas	4
					22
					8
					14

## 138 DIMINUTION OF CADET ESTABLISHMENTS JULY, 1820.

PROBABLE Progress of Extinction of the SECOND LIEUTENANTS ON  
Half Pay—continued.

1821. 30 June	{ Brought on full pay to this date .. .. }	8	1821.	Remaining .. .. .	14
31 Dec.	{ Ditto ditto .. .. }	8		Commissions at Midsummer	4
				Ditto Christmas	4
					22
					16
					6
1822.	{ Brought on full pay during the year .. }	16	1822.	Remaining .. .. .	6
				Commissions at Mid- summer and Christmas	8
					16
					14
					2

By this calculation the whole of the Second Lieutenants on half pay will be absorbed by the end of 1822, but only 20 commissions will be given away in that time.

PROBABLE Progress of Diminution of the CADET ESTABLISHMENT, supposing  
the MASTER-GENERAL only nominates one Cadet for two that leave the  
Academy.

1820.	{ Commissions supposed will be given at Christmas .. .. }	4	1820.	Existing strength .. ..	150
	{ Cadets leaving the Academy from other causes .. .. . }	4	July	Cadets nominated at Christmas .. .. . }	4
					154
					8
					146
1821.	{ Commissions 8 or half presumed vacancies Cadets leaving the Aca- demy from other causes .. .. . }	8	1821.	Remaining .. .. .	146
		8		Nominations .. .. .	8
					154
					16
					138
1822.	{ Commissions .. .. Leaving Academy from other causes .. .. }	8	1822.	Remaining .. .. .	138
		8		Nominations .. .. .	8
					146
					16
					130

PROBABLE Progress of Diminution of the CADET ESTABLISHMENT—*continued.*

1823.	Commissions, second Lieutenants being absorbed .. .. .	16	1823.	Remaining on establishment .. .. .	130
	Leaving Academy ditto	7		Nominations .. .. .	11
					141
					23
					118
1824.	Commissions .. ..	16	1824.	Remaining on establishment .. .. .	118
	Leaving Academy ..	6		Nominations .. .. .	11
					129
					22
					107
1825.	Commissions at Midsummer .. .. .	8	1825.	Remaining on establishment .. .. .	107
	Leaving Academy ditto	3		Nominations, 30 June ..	6
					113
					11
				Remaining ..	102

Being a period of five years to reduce the institution to 102 cadets, of which setting aside changes in the relative position of individuals from exertion in study,

54 will be of the cadets now in the institution,

48 will be nominated in the five years,—

102

Provided the average of 16 vacancies a year does not fail, and supposing 6 cadets to leave the institution annually from other causes, a cadet at the expiration of the above period ought to acquire his commission in something less than five years. As the progress of the foregoing operation, however, would cause cadets to remain at the Academy infinitely longer than their studies would require, or than would be admissible on account of age, a certain number deemed qualified might be examined as for commissions, and in the event of passing they should form an additional class to be instructed in the repository exercise and laboratory duties, of making up arms, and preparing the construction of guns and carriages of every description, the mode of working the brass foundry, the different operations of proving, also to attend some practice, and all experiments of an interesting nature. This, if properly attended to, might be gone through in from eight to twelve months, and as soon as it is ascertained by proper certificate that the course of instruction has been fulfilled, they might be dismissed to

their families till circumstances permitted their nomination to commissions in the artillery and engineers; but I think in the mean time it would be necessary, as a retaining fee, to continue them their pay as cadets; and in the event of their abstracting themselves from the artillery service without the Master-General's sanction, the parents might be obliged to give security for a certain remuneration, as is practised by the East India Company at Addiscombe.

By this arrangement a number of the senior cadets would be gradually removed from the institution which would hasten the diminution of the resident establishment; but I think it would be a great object, both on score of expense and discipline, if the proposed additional class, as well as all the others, could in the mean time be quartered in the upper Academy; and I cannot help thinking when his Grace inspects the extent of its buildings that he will find it can be done without much difficulty, for the Academy is arranged for 128, and there are, therefore, only 22 to provide for, which will gradually diminish.

Pray excuse this hurried commentary, and

Believe me, yours most truly,

A. DICKSON.

I return all the papers (three sheets).

*Memorandum.*

In collecting the numbers of artillery officers and engineers exactly from the annual Army Lists, they appear to be each year as follows:—1802, 508; 1803, 492; 1804, 535; 1805, 579; 1806, 630; 1807, 682; 1808, 717; 1809, 781: total, 4924; amongst whom 148 vacancies occurred in the 8 years. 1810, 806; and not 891 as General Mudge's statement makes out.

The proportion ought, therefore, to be thus:—

$$\begin{array}{r} 4924 : 148 :: 6448 : 193\frac{1}{2} \text{ vacancies in 8 years.} \\ 8)193\frac{1}{2} \\ \hline 24\frac{1}{8} \text{ vacancies in each year.} \end{array}$$

Or even allowing there were 891 officers in 1810, as General Mudge states, the proportion would be thus:—

$$\begin{array}{r} 4924 : 148 :: 7128 : 216 \text{ vacancies in 8 years.} \\ 8)216 \\ \hline 27 \text{ vacancies in a year.} \end{array}$$

It is evident, therefore, that the calculation as it stood did not authorise so great an expectation as 32 vacancies a year.

General Mudge supposes the vacancies in war compared to those in peace would be as 3 to 2, which would bring down his calculation annually to 21, and as the two corps as they now stand have also been reduced nearly one-fourth, the number of 21 should be diminished in proportion, leaving about 16 or 17.

But according to the foregoing correction, the calculation of from 27 to  $24\frac{1}{8}$  of war vacancies would by the peace comparison be diminished to 18 or 16, and allowing for the diminution of the two corps, the annual vacancies would be from  $13\frac{1}{4}$  to 12.

I admit the difficulty of going into any calculation that depends so much on the relative ages of the officers, and the nature of services they are engaged in, and it appears from events that the absolute casualty has exceeded even General Mudge's calculation; but as the papers were put into my hands to look over, I could not return them without noticing so manifest an inconsistency, to which I beg to add my doubts whether the annual vacancies will exceed 12 or 13 a year. I have, however, accepted the calculation as it originally stood as the basis of my statement for the progressive reduction of the cadets.

A. D.

To the above is to be added that there are now much fewer officers on foreign service in proportion than formerly.

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*Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Coombe Wood, 31st July, 1820.

I am sorry to find that the Light Horse Volunteers made so indifferent a muster, and still more, that they have not succeeded in completing their numbers. I will endeavour to ascertain the cause.

I am fully impressed with the difficulties to which we may be exposed on the 17th, and I had a communication last week with the High Bailiff of Westminster and several other persons acquainted with the metropolis. They were all of opinion that armed associations would not succeed at this moment, that the absence of so large a proportion of the gentry from town (who ought to take the lead in them) would throw them into improper hands, and that any failure in the attempt might be productive of serious consequences, and would at all events render a recurrence to the measure, under other circumstances, more difficult. They recommended, therefore, calling upon all the vestries of the western parishes of London and Westminster to take charge of the peace of their respective parishes, and to swear in a large number of special constables to aid the police of Westminster and to protect the two Houses of Parliament. This measure will be adopted, and a letter has been written to the Lord Lieutenants of the home counties to have the yeomanry corps in readiness to march up to London, if required.

I shall be in town to-morrow and Wednesday, and if anything should occur to you, I wish you would look in upon me. Lord Sidmouth is in Devonshire.

I am glad to hear so good an account of the regular troops. It is upon them I have every reason to believe that the Queen and her advisers have principally relied. It was a great point to get the King to the review with his arm in a sling.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

*The Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone to Field Marshal the  
Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

Bombay, 3rd August, 1820.

I have had the honour to receive your Grace's letter by Dr. Baird, and shall not fail to attend to his interests. He is a gentleman with whose management of his hospital I remember your being much pleased at Elich-poor. I am most grateful for the interest you take in my success in this service. No part of it has been near so flattering to me as its all having originated in your patronage, and there is no portion of my life which I remember with half so much pride and pleasure as that when I had the honour to be attached to you. India is completely changed since then. All the Peishwa's territories and the northern half of the Raja of Berar's are our own, as is Asseerghur. The Berar government is administered by our officers; the Nizam's is still threatening to fall to pieces, as it was in 1803, and has been ever since. Ajmeer is ours, and is a great military station connected with Gnzerat by another station in the Oudepoor country. Malcolm is at Mow, near Indore, centre of Malwa. Holcar is in abject dependence on us, as Sindia probably will soon be either with or without a war. We are threatened with a war with Sinde, but hope to avert it by assembling an army of 12,000 men in Cutch. Anything that carried us to the Indus would be a real misfortune. I have perhaps said too much of the alteration that has taken place in India in a period during which you have changed the face of Europe; I shall therefore take up no more of your time but to assure you of the sincere respect and gratitude with which I am

your Grace's most obliged and faithful servant,

MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE.

*Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Foreign Office, Monday.

As Lord Liverpool leaves the neighbourhood of London for some days on Wednesday, I have been obliged to summon a Cabinet for to-morrow, at three. My immediate object in calling the Cabinet was to look at the Neapolitan question; but the enclosed papers will show you that we have another military revolution to deplore.

Could news of a more recent date than the 29th from Lisbon find its way through the Madrid Gazette to Paris so as to be known in the latter capital on the 8th?

Yours, my dear Lord, ever very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

P. S.—I send this by a messenger.

## [ENCLOSURES.]

## I.

Londres, ce 10<sup>me</sup> Sept., 1820.

Le Duc de Cazes a l'honneur de faire ses complimens à Lord Castlereagh, et de lui transmettre copie d'une dépêche qu'il vient de recevoir par la voie de télégraphe, et une lettre du Consul-Général de France à Lisbonne sur le même sujet. Les faits de la dépêche télégraphique paraissent postérieurs à ceux de la lettre du Consul-Général.

Le Duc de Cazes demande à Lord Castlereagh la permission de le voir à son retour à Londres, et le prie de lui faire connaître le moment où S.E. pourra le recevoir.

## II.

DÉPÊCHE TÉLÉGRAPHIQUE de Paris, du 9<sup>me</sup> Septembre, 1820, à deux heures du soir.

"Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à M. le Général Proteau, Lieut. du Roi à Paris :—

"Je vous prie, Monsieur le Général, d'envoyer sur-le-champ, par un courier extraordinaire, la dépêche suivante à M. le Duc de Cazes, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté à Londres.

"Un courier du commerce arrivé hier au soir à Paris a apporté un Supplément de la Gazette Universelle de Madrid, qui annonce qu'une révolution a été faite en Portugal par les troupes ; que la Constitution des Cortes a été proclamée, toujours sous le Roi Jean.

"Tous les Anglais sont remplacés par des Portugais dans les places qu'ils occupaient.

"Il y a eu un peu de sang répandu à Lisbonne."

## III.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Lisbonne, le 29<sup>me</sup> Août, 1820.

En priant Votre Excellence de vouloir bien faire expédier le plus promptement possible, pour Paris, la dépêche ci-jointe, je m'empresse de l'informer des évènements qui viennent d'avoir lieu à Porto.

Le 24<sup>me</sup> de ce mois les chefs des deux régimens d'infanterie et du détachement d'artillerie qui formaient la garnison de cette ville, ont fait prendre les armes à leurs soldats, avant le jour, et ont fait connaître par deux proclamations leur volonté, tendante à ce que des Cortes soient convoquées pour faire une constitution nationale. Ils ont ensuite occupé l'Hôtel de Ville, et convoqué le corps municipal, auquel ils ont proposé l'établissement d'une commission de gouvernement provisoire, dont ils avaient déjà choisi les membres. Cette proposition ayant été acceptée, on a fait appeler les personnes désignées, qui se sont installées immédiatement sous le titre de *Junta Provisoire* du Royaume, en déclarant reconnaître les droits de souveraineté de la maison de Bragance. Toutes les autorités locales se sont soumises à ce nouveau gouvernement, et ont signé un acte d'adhésion à la volonté manifestée par les chefs militaires. Un rassemblement du peuple, qui s'était formé devant l'Hôtel de Ville, a joint ses acclamations à celles des soldats ; mais il n'y a eu ni effusion de sang, ni la moindre désordre ; et la plus grande tranquillité continue à régner à Porto.

Quoique ce mouvement paraisse avoir été connu par le gouvernement depuis trois jours, il paraît, cependant, qu'on cherchait à le cacher jusqu'à l'arrivée du



courier de Porto. J'ai en l'honneur de dîner avant hier chez M. le Comte de Palmella, et il n'en a été nullement question. Depuis hier les réunions de la Régence ont été fréquentes; mais personne ne sait encore les mesures qu'elle a prises dans cette circonstance critique. En attendant, la tranquillité la plus parfaite règne dans cette capitale; et tout fait présumer que, si cet exemple devient contagieux, il ne sera suivi d'aucun trouble.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec une respectueuse considération, &c.,

LESSEPS.

P.S.—J'apprends à l'instant que la Régence vient de faire publier et afficher une proclamation, dont je remets un exemplaire à votre Excellence; je regrette de n'avoir pas le temps d'y joindre la traduction.

Veuillez me permettre, M. le Duc, de vous assurer, à la hâte, que je m'estimerais très heureux si vous me mettiez à même de vous être agréable dans ces contrées. Je vous supplie en même temps de pardonner le désordre de cette lettre, et de l'attribuer au désordre général que les circonstances actuelles rendent inévitable.

L.

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*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Horse Guards, 19th Sept., 1820.

I was honoured yesterday with your Grace's letter of the 17th, but the early attendance at the House of Commons, where I was detained, prevented my immediate reply. The Duke of York being at Brighton, I have not communicated your Grace's letter to his Royal Highness, but have written to Major Gunthorpe, the Adjutant of the 3rd battalion of Grenadiers, to call his attention to the circumstance which it states, but without naming the quarter from which I derive the information; and I have added an observation (which I believe to be well grounded) that there must be a want of sufficient authority, or a neglect in the exercise of it, in the non-commissioned officers to which the irregularities of the soldiers on this and other occasions must be attributable.

This is all that can be done in this instance, and I hope that even this notice will render the recurrence of similar scenes unfrequent; but I am most willing to admit the correctness of your Grace's observation upon the mischief which does and may arise from the proceedings of soldiers who are not under the immediate care and control of their officers. Upon this point, as connected with the Foot Guards in London, Sir Henry Torrens and I have had frequent conversations, and we have not withheld our feelings from the Duke of York, nor has the subject escaped his Royal Highness's attention, as your Grace will perceive on perusal of the enclosed confidential Brigade Order, which, from every inquiry I can make, has not been disregarded. The misfortune, however, is, that the manner in which the Guards are quartered in London renders the constant presence and attention of the officers impossible. The barracks do not afford room for officers, and the quarters are of the very worst description and do not afford the same facility of visit and inspection which attaches to country quarters. In these respects the Guards are worse off than any other corps, and while this evil cannot be remedied by the government it is in vain to hope for the removal of its effects.

The conduct and proceedings of the troops, and more especially of those in and about London, are the occasion of almost daily communication between this office and that of the Secretary of State. Nothing that is reported, whether by the police, by unofficial observers, or stated in anonymous letters, is neglected or overlooked, and wherever sufficient ground is produced, the attention of the commanding officers is called to the circumstance and inquiry is made.

I have taken the liberty of entering into these particulars, that your Grace may be satisfied that the necessity of extraordinary vigilance at this period is felt, and that this feeling is acted upon. At the same time extreme caution must be used to avoid creating an impression that the fidelity of the troops is suspected, for this might produce the very evil which it is intended to avert. Nor do I believe that there is any cause to suspect their fidelity, or to apprehend that any serious effect has been or will be produced by the industrious attempts of the disaffected, or that they will not do their duty whenever they may be called upon, and under whatever circumstances, as they have always done it. No result of any inquiry made can justify that belief. Individuals in some corps, and possibly in the greater number, may be very bad subjects and ripe for any mischief, but the proportion is very small; they are formidable as individuals only, and, when in the ranks, they must yield to and co-operate with the great mass, which I am convinced is good and untainted.

There is, however, one circumstance which has occurred to me, and which may possibly have struck your Grace also, that, whether from a sense of his own increased importance which the soldier has acquired during the late war, or from being influenced to a certain extent by the latitude of opinion and observation upon public questions which has been assumed by the lower classes, grievances, whether real or supposed, are brought forward and urged in a more decided tone than heretofore, and the grievance of a few individuals is discussed and taken up by the large body, and brought forward as the common interest and object of the whole. What was formerly a representation, made respectfully with a view to obtain explanation, has in many late instances become a remonstrance or complaint of injustice done, often tumultuously urged. To what this may lead in time God knows; but if I am founded in this observation the natural inference is, that there never was any period when the utmost care and vigilance of the commanding officer was more required to guard even against the necessity of explanation.

I had forgotten to mention, in reference to the 3rd battalion Grenadiers, that I have understood, on previous inquiries, that this battalion, having been quartered at Cambray where the duty was so easy, and where its situation was in all respects so comfortable, has, since its return, submitted with less patience than the other battalions to the comparatively severe duty of London, where the numbers do not amount quite to three reliefs. On the other hand, this observation does not apply to the 2nd battalion Coldstream, which is similarly circumstanced.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

## [ ENCLOSURE. ]

*To be read by the Commanding Officers of Regiments to their Officers, and then returned to the Field Officer in Waiting.*

BRIGADE ORDER, 31ST JULY, 1820.

The Duke of York, as Senior Colonel of the Brigade of Foot Guards, feels it incumbent upon him to draw the particular attention of the officers of the brigade to the necessity of a strict attention to all the details of their duty; and he desires that the commanding officers of regiments will explain collectively and individually to the officers under their command, that his Royal Highness relies with confidence upon their honour for the punctual and exact performance of every point of duty required of them.

The Duke of York wants no further guarantee for the fulfilment of the expectations to which his anxiety for the welfare, discipline, and credit of the whole brigade gives rise, than his long and intimate knowledge of the high sense of honour and ardent zeal, which have ever animated them when upon actual service; and he, therefore, wishes strongly to impress upon their minds that the same zeal and attention are as essential to the welfare and discipline of the brigade in home quarters, as they have been conducive upon many great and important occasions abroad, to the glory of the army and to the advantage of the country.

In the battalion stationed out of London, it is incumbent upon the Captains and officers of companies to pay the most constant attention to their men, and to perform all such duties in the care and management of their companies as are enjoined by the general regulations of the army.

The Duke of York is aware that the peculiar situation of the troops stationed in London renders it impossible to carry into full effect the measure of superintendence which is usual in the Line, and which is required in the Guards when not in London. But still many opportunities are afforded to officers of seeing more of their men and being better acquainted with their habits and characters than has been of late the custom; and he therefore strongly urges a more frequent and particular inspection of the troops, particularly in barracks, by the officers of their respective companies.

The Duke of York has such full reliance on the good sense and zeal of the officers of the brigade of Guards, that he requires no other security for the exact performance of their respective duties than their assurance upon honour to that effect, as also of their determination to report any departure from the execution of the duties required of them.

FREDERICK,

Commander-in-Chief, Colonel of the 1st Grenadier Guards.

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*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Kensington, 26th Sept., 1820.

A severe indisposition has, for the last four or five days, rendered me nearly unfit for the discharge of any business and prevented my acknowledging earlier the honour of your Grace's letter of the 21st instant, anxious as I felt upon every account to pay the earliest attention to its contents. The same cause has prevented my communicating on the subject of this cor-

respondence with the Duke of York or with Sir Henry Torrens, to whose department, as embracing almost exclusively matters of discipline and interior regulation of regiments, it would belong to be referred. I should, indeed, at all events have been tempted to wait the return both of his Royal Highness and of Sir Henry Torrens, as the questions which have been started would require consideration and much cautious attention.

I am perfectly aware of the difficulty of effecting anything like alteration in the system of the Guards, and of the jealousy with which any approach to the attempt is viewed. This feeling arises partly from a knowledge of the jealousy with which they are viewed by the Line, and it has been confirmed by a sense of the approbation which, under all the *alleged* imperfections of that system, the conduct of this corps has received at home and upon service, and which has upon more than one occasion been so particularly distinguished by your Grace, in reference not only to behaviour in the field, but to strict attention to discipline and regulation. Still I am confident that the officers will be found willing and ready to undertake any duty not hitherto required of them, but of which the circumstances of the time point out the expediency, and that periodical visits of the quarters and written reports of them might be easily introduced.

The regulations respecting men who are allowed to work, which your Grace proposes, have I believe long been in force. Men of good character, those with families, &c., who are so indulged, are occasionally excused duty and pay their substitutes; but the extent of duty has of late often interfered with this indulgence, and when I mentioned that they have not three reliefs for the duties in London, I do not allude to occasions requiring double guards, pickets in Palace Yard, &c., or inlying pickets, but to the *constant* duties, although these have been of late reduced by relieving the Guards from the Deptford and Woolwich and the Dock duties. If the troops in London were reinforced, the greater evil must be incurred of placing more of them in the quarters where they are exposed to every temptation, to the most mischievous attempts by which, considering all things, they are affected to a degree so trifling as to be quite extraordinary. Upon the whole I am confident that inquiry, which should embrace every minute detail as to the mode of assigning and distributing duties, working men, &c., matters of interior economy and regulation in the Guards, would be most satisfactory in its results, and would show that, in these respects, the system admits of little improvement, and that it is admirably calculated for a body of men thus circumstanced. I have no doubt, indeed, that a regiment of the Line, fresh imported into London, and in the highest state of discipline, would, if placed in quarters (Holborn and Westminster), suffer more and occasion more unreasoning in one fortnight than a battalion of Guards in six months. I take the liberty of making this observation in reference to an idea which was suggested, when the 1st battalion 3rd Guards showed symptoms of insubordination, that the regiments of the Line should take their turn of duty in London, and which I am certain could not be carried into effect without material prejudice to the army in general. The great evil in the Guards, more particularly as it affects the portion stationed in London, is the want of intercourse between the officer and the soldier, and the consequent want of knowledge on the part of the former of the soldier's character and habits.

I am not surprised that your Grace should have been so much struck by my notice of the manner in which it has appeared to me that soldiers discuss individual grievances and make them the objects of combination, as it had not before occurred to you, or been mentioned; and I should be almost tempted to think, from this circumstance, that I have considered in too serious a light what may have struck others as comparatively trivial. But, if there is the *smallest* foundation for the impression which I have received, I shall rejoice in having given vent to the observation, as it may be of so growing a nature and the consequences may prove so serious, that it must be important to attend to it in its infancy. I question, however, that anything has occurred sufficiently marked to form the basis of a General Order, such as your Grace proposes. The occurrence in the 90th was not of a description to which such order would apply. A soldier of that corps had taken it into his head that he might volunteer for general service: he attempted to influence others, was detected, and, when called to account for his conduct, conducted himself with great insolence. He was tried and sentenced to a heavy punishment. It was discovered that a large proportion of the six companies at Manchester had combined to rescue him and to defeat the objects of discipline, and it was considered advisable to call in the presence of some other corps, cavalry and infantry, to carry the punishment into effect. There had been no previous complaint or remonstrance. The 90th regiment had long suffered from an erroneous system in the command and from great relaxation of discipline. The commanding officer was removed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Austin, who was appointed in his place, had been indefatigable in his endeavours to bring the regiment into better order. In many respects he succeeded; but he failed in reconciling the men to his mode of proceeding, and their ill-humour broke out upon this occasion. The regiment was marched in small detachments to Plymouth, and is under orders to embark for the Mediterranean. The question of recommending to the King that it should be broke was seriously entertained by the Duke of York; but, upon referring to the periods of enlistment, it was found that a very small proportion of the men were entitled to pensions; the disbanding, therefore, would have been an act of favour, not of punishment, as there is no power of transferring the services of men, so disbanded, to any other corps. This objection would, I fear, apply equally to most regiments stationed in the United Kingdoms, if circumstances should unfortunately occur which might raise the same question.

I have to apologise to your Grace for taking up so much of your time; but the manner in which you have entered into this subject has led me to consider it a duty not to withhold what occurred to me, more especially as the communication of the correspondence could not but facilitate any further reference to its objects when the Commander-in-Chief and the Adjutant-General return to town, and when you have an opportunity of seeing them.

I may possibly appear not to have sufficiently adverted to the issue of a General Order and its provisions; but this is a point which comes so entirely within the department of the Adjutant-General, that I should prefer to leave every observation upon it to him. Possibly it may occur that no sufficient case has been made out for such an Order, and it may be objected that the Articles of War provide specially for the manner in which soldiers should bring forward their grievances. Under any circumstances the agitation of

this question, in consequence of what I have taken the liberty of submitting, cannot but be beneficial, and I shall rejoice in its leading to your communicating with the Duke of York upon it.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,  
H. TAYLOR.

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*To the Lord Chancellor (Eldon).*

[ 65. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

Stratfieldsaye, 13th Nov., 1820.

You will recollect that I spoke to you some time ago in favour of the Rev. Mr. Briscall, who I recommended to your Lordship to be appointed to a living which was then vacant, and supposed to be in your Lordship's gift; and you were pleased to express yourself satisfied with the character which I gave you of him. The Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Liverpool were equally so; but, unfortunately, the living was in the gift of the Bishop of Bristol, with whom I was not acquainted, and poor Mr. Briscall remains still unprovided for.

This Mr. Briscall is a gentleman of education and character, who served for twelve years as Chaplain at the head-quarters of my army, and was, in truth, at the head of that important department; and when I gave up the command he was put upon chaplain's half-pay, and would have starved if I had not obtained for him from the rector the curacy of this parish. Out of his stipend he supports his mother and sisters; and I have been obliged myself to assist him with money to pay for the furniture of his house, and the little stock there is about the parsonage.

I will not detain your Lordship by enumerating his services, but I must say this for him that, by his admirable conduct and good sense, I was enabled more than once to get the better of Methodism, which had appeared among the soldiers, and once among the officers; and yet I could not at the close of his service, from the beginning of the year 1808 to the commencement of 1819, prevent this gentleman from being put on half-pay as an army-chaplain; and I have not been able to obtain anything better for him than the curacy of the parish of Stratfieldsaye, although he is the only person whom I have ventured to recommend in his line.

I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if you will take Mr. Briscall's claims into your consideration. Make any inquiries you please about him. He was educated, I believe, at Brazen Nose College, Oxford; but I really think that there is no instance of a person who has served so long in such a situation and so recommended who has not in some manner been provided for.

Ever yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

[ 66. ]

*To the King.*

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MEMORANDUM UPON THE SUPPOSED CHANGE OF HIS  
GOVERNMENT.

SIR,

Dec., 1820.

I have seldom troubled your Majesty with my opinion separate from that of my colleagues; nor should I now do so if I did not stand in a peculiar situation in reference to the questions likely to come under discussion in Parliament when it shall meet, having had nothing to say to the appointment of the Milan Commission, and having had no knowledge of its existence till long after I had come into office, and no relation with the Commission till your Majesty sent to the government its Report in the summer of 1819. I therefore venture to give your Majesty my opinion upon the steps which your Majesty is about to take, which I hope your Majesty will receive as that of a servant bound to your Majesty by every sentiment of gratitude for favours received, and attached to your Majesty's person by every motive which can attach one man to another.

I have put this opinion in the form of a Memorandum, in order to enable me to discuss with more freedom the points to which it relates; and I beg to assure your Majesty that I neither have communicated it nor will communicate it to anybody.

I take the liberty of adding that I am very far from wishing to persuade your Majesty not to change your government if your Majesty thinks that others can conduct your Majesty's affairs with more advantage. But I entreat your Majesty, for the sake of your own honour, and, I will add, your own independence in relation to their successors, not to deprive your

servants of their power till they will have concluded the business in which they are engaged.

The existing difference between your Majesty and the government has, in one point of view, scarcely a distinction. The government have advised that Parliament, on its assembling on the 23rd instant, should be prorogued to the 14th of January. Your Majesty is desirous that Parliament should immediately on its assembling proceed to discuss the provision for the Queen, and the other questions in the House of Lords collaterally depending on the recent inquiries. It is very natural that your Majesty should be desirous of putting an end to these discussions; but a very little observation will convince your Majesty that they cannot even be commenced in the House of Commons before the period proposed by the government for the assembling of Parliament after the prorogation.

It will be admitted that the House of Commons cannot proceed on the question of the provision for the Queen without a call, and yet, in consequence of the peculiar terms in which the notice of the call of the House was given, that call cannot be enforced without a farther notice, and an adjournment of the House for three weeks. This will bring us to the 14th of December, and it is well-known that at that period it is impossible to commence any business. A farther adjournment will take place to the 14th of January, and thus, in your Majesty's view of accelerating these discussions, there will be really no difference between what is advised by the ministers and what is proposed by your Majesty yourself.

But in other views the difference is very essential.

First. Till Parliament shall be prorogued the Bill of Pains and Penalties is, in fact, on the table of the House of Lords. It is not *rejected*; but the consideration of the last question, *that the Bill should pass*, has been postponed for six months.

This distinction, although certainly only technical, is very important in reference to the discussions in the House of Commons regarding the provision for the Queen, to which many will object, some with good, others with bad faith, on the ground of the continued existence of the Bill; and also regarding the discussions on all the collateral questions connected with the recent inquiries in the Lords. As long as the Bill exists it will be more difficult to prevent the Commons from entering into these subjects.



Secondly. If Parliament be not prorogued, the inquiry into the Milan Commission, and all the circumstances attending it, must go on immediately in the Lords, or after a very short delay; an inquiry in which not the Queen, but your Majesty yourself, and your English and Hanoverian servants, and the servants of the Duchy of Cornwall, and those employed by them, will be put on their trial.

Leaving out of the question all reference to the temper in which the House of Lords would probably now come to such an inquiry, after passing the summer and autumn in that just concluded, I would ask, whether it is advisable to keep up the agitation which now exists in the public by entering into this inquiry at present; and then to add fresh fuel to the flame by the discussions on the provision for the Queen, which must take place in January?

But there is another view of this question which is very important for your Majesty's consideration.

The English government, as far as I understand, had but little to say to the Milan Commission; and there is no member of the government who has such a knowledge of the proceedings of the Commission as to be able to discuss and defend them in Parliament. Time must be given to enable your Majesty's ministers to make themselves masters of the subject, so as to defend your Majesty, your Hanoverian government, all persons concerned in the Milan Commission, and themselves, from the attacks which will be made upon its transactions; and it would really be doing injustice to the cause to allow it to be brought forward before the ministers have had an opportunity of fully considering the subject.

For all these reasons, then, I presume to think that it is best that Parliament should be now prorogued.

But there is another topic connected with this discussion of a far more delicate nature than those to which I have adverted; and I venture to touch upon it only because I conceive that your Majesty's decision upon it is of vital importance to your Majesty's honour, to your interests, and those of your kingdom.

We are told that your Majesty is not pleased with your servants, that your Majesty thinks others could now serve him with more advantage, and most particularly could, if now in his service, relieve him more effectually from many of the inconveniences of his situation.

No persons could serve your Majesty, excepting those now in your service, without dissolving the Parliament; and I need not point out the consequence of coming to a discussion of all the difficult questions relating to a provision for the Queen, and to the Milan Commission, and others collateral to the recent inquiry in the House of Lords, in a Parliament elected during the existence of the present ferment in the public mind. But those to whom your Majesty would naturally look as the successors to your present servants are, and have long been, their political rivals and opposers, particularly in their recent measures regarding the Queen; and it cannot be expected that they will not take advantage of every circumstance, however trivial, and of every action of every inferior agent, however low or corrupt, of the Milan Commission, to destroy the reputation of their predecessors in office, and, through them, that of your Majesty yourself.

Is it desirable for your Majesty to throw yourself, your Hanoverian government, your English government, your servants as Duke of Cornwall, the gentlemen who served your Majesty in the Milan Commission, into the hands of the Opposition on these inquiries? Considering what the share of your Majesty's servants was, as I understand, in the formation of this Commission, that its proceedings were neither conducted nor controlled by them, and that, in point of fact, every evil which has occurred in the course of this inquiry, and particularly those under which your Majesty is now suffering, were foreseen and foretold by your Majesty's servants, it appears to me to be not only the height of impolicy, but the greatest degree of unfairness, to hand these servants over to their rivals and opponents for the trial of their conduct in these transactions.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Adjutant General.*

[ 67. ]

SIR,

London, 7th Dec., 1820.

In returning to you the letter of Colonel Norcott, commanding the 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade, which I had the honour to receive from you some time ago, I beg leave to state for his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief's information,

that, according to the rule to which I have confined myself in recommending regiments for honorary distinctions, I conceive that the Rifle Brigade may be permitted to bear on its appointments the following inscriptions, in commemoration of the distinguished services of the several battalions of that brigade on those occasions, viz.:—Rolica and Vimiera; Busaco; Barrosa; Fuentes de Honor; Ciudad Rodrigo; Badajoz; Salamanca; Vittoria; Nivelle; Nive; Orthes; Toulouse.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 68. ]

*To the Adjutant-General.*

Ordinance Office, 15th Dec., 1820.

When I recommended the 45th Regiment for certain honorary distinctions in commemoration of the services of that corps in the Peninsula and France, I omitted to include "Fuentes de Honor," which I conceive the regiment entitled to bear on its colours and appointments, the Commanding Officer having obtained a medal for the part his regiment bore in that action.

I will, therefore, thank you to lay before his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief my recommendation that "Fuentes de Honor" may be added to the other marks of distinction which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to grant to that regiment.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 69. ]

*To Mr. ———.*

London, Feb., 1821.

The Duke of Wellington recollects perfectly having met a gentleman in the crowd at the door of Drury-lane Theatre on the 6th instant, who, having recognised the Duke, mentioned his name, turned about, and walked before him through the crowd to the door of the house. This service, if it can be so called, was purely voluntary on the part of this gentleman. The Duke is as well able as any other man to make his way through a crowd even if there existed any disposition to impede his progress,

which did not appear, and therefore the assistance of this gentleman was not necessary; and, moreover, the Duke's footman attended him.

In stating this, however, the Duke does not deny that he considered this gentleman's conduct as very polite towards him; and he was much flattered by it, and returned his thanks for it.

It appears that this gentleman is Mr. ———, who states he lost his seals, not in returning through the crowd after having walked before the Duke, but in returning through the crowd some time afterwards, after having walked through it to the door of the theatre before Lord Palmerston; and he desires to have compensation from the Duke for this loss.

Upon this statement, and in order to avoid making this case a precedent for others of the same kind, the Duke, however flattered by Mr. ———'s politeness, must positively deny that he has any claim upon him for compensation for his loss. The Duke does not consider that Mr. ——— rendered him any service whatever, and on the ground of service he must refuse to give him compensation for his loss, even if it had occurred in returning from the door of the theatre after having walked to it before the Duke.

But as Mr. ——— may be a gentleman in circumstances not able to bear the expense of such a loss, and as the Duke certainly considered his conduct towards him as very polite, the Duke feels no objection to assist him to replace the loss he has sustained; at the same time taking the liberty to recommend to Mr. ——— in future to omit to render these acts of unsolicited and unnecessary politeness unless he should be in a situation to bear the probable or possible consequences.

*To Mr. Stockdale.\**

DEAR SIR,

Feb., 1821.

[ 70. ]

I have received your letter enclosing the printed paper entitled the 'Obligation of an Orangeman,' as the declaration of the object of the Society to which it is desired that I should belong.

\* This letter was not sent.

This Society has for its object fidelity and allegiance to his Majesty, the support and maintenance of the laws and constitution of the United Kingdom, and the succession to the throne in his Majesty's illustrious House; and I believe nobody will suspect me of being lukewarm in my attachment to these blessings. But I confess that I do object to belong to a Society professing attachment to the throne and constitution of these realms, from which, by the terms of the obligation of the person to be admitted to the Society, a large proportion of his Majesty's subjects must be excluded, many of them as loyal men as exist, and as much attached to the Constitution.

This objection is natural from one who was born in the country in which a large proportion of the people are Roman Catholic, and whose life has been passed in transactions with persons of that and of all other religious persuasions, and who has never found that, abstracted from other circumstance, the religious persuasion of individuals or of nations affected their feelings of loyalty to their Sovereign, or of attachment to the laws and constitution of their country.

But the principal objection which I have to belong to this Society is, that its members are bound to each other by an oath of secrecy. If such an oath be legal, which I doubt, I can't swear it consistently with my conception of the Oath of Allegiance, and the oath which I have taken as one of his Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

#### OBLIGATION OF AN ORANGEMAN.

I, A. B., do solemnly and voluntarily swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to his Majesty King George the Fourth; and that I will, to the utmost of my power, support and maintain the laws and Constitution of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland; and the succession to the Throne in his Majesty's Illustrious House, being Protestant.

And I do swear that I am not, nor ever was, a Roman Catholic or Papist. That I was not, am not, nor ever will be, a member of the Society called United Irishmen, nor any other Society or body of men, who are enemies to his Majesty or the glorious Constitution of these realms; and that I never took the Oath of Secrecy to that or any other Treasonable Society.

I swear that I will, as far as in my power lies, assist the Magistrates and Civil Authorities of these Kingdoms in the lawful execution of their official duties when called on. That I will be true and faithful to every Brother Orangeman in all just actions. That I will neither wrong, nor know him to

be wronged or injured without giving him due notice thereof, if in my power. And I solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will always conceal and never will reveal either part or parts of what is now to be privately communicated to me, unless to a Brother Orangeman, knowing him to be so by strict trial and due examination, or from the word of a Brother Orangeman; or until I shall be authorized so to do by the proper authorities of the Orange Institution.\* That I will not write it, indite it, cut, carve, stain, stamp, or engrave it, or cause it to be done, lest any part thereof might be known.

Lastly, I do swear that I have not, to my knowledge or belief, been proposed and rejected in, or expelled from, any other Orange Society. So help me, God, and keep me steadfast in this Orangeman's Obligation.

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*To the Rev. James Haviland,*

[ 71. ]

SIR,

London, 2nd Feb., 1821.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 31st January, and I am really much concerned that you should not be satisfied with the reasons which I stated to Mr. Fleming for not recommending that your name should be inserted in the commission of the peace of the county of Hants. I cannot consider this power of recommendation as a matter of patronage, or the recommendation of any gentleman as a favour done him. I conceive that it is my duty to recommend that the names of those should be inserted in the commission of the peace who are duly qualified, and whose services in that capacity are necessary in that part of the county in which they reside, without any consideration of partiality or favour. But I cannot think it proper to recommend that a gentleman's name should be inserted in the commission who resides at Bath, only because he wishes it, and is qualified in respect to property, character, and attainments.

I have, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Sir Henry Torrens.*

[ 72. ]

SIR,

Ordnance Office, 3rd Feb., 1821.

I have the honour to request that you will submit to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief my recommendation

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\* The proper authority, from which liberty to make such disclosure must be obtained, is the Grand Orange Lodge of England, signified under their Great Seal.

that the under-mentioned regiments may be permitted to bear on their colours and appointments the following distinctions, viz.:—43rd (Light Infantry) Regiment—Vimiera, Busaco, Fuentes de Honor, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Vittoria, Nive, Nivelles, Toulouse. 52nd (Light Infantry) Regiment:—Vimiera, Busaco, Fuentes de Honor, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Vittoria, Nive, Nivelles, Orthes, Toulouse. 58th Regiment:—Salamanca, Vittoria, Pyrenees, Nivelles, Orthes, in commemoration of the distinguished services of these regiments on those occasions.

• I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 73. ]

*To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 12th Feb., 1821.

I wish to draw your attention to the case of Major-General Swinton, now a Lieutenant-Colonel on half-pay of the 8th Garrison Battalion.

This officer, after having served with great distinction, to my knowledge, became Lieutenant-Colonel of the 75th Regiment, which he was proceeding to join in the year 1815, being then a Colonel by brevet in the army, and likely to be promoted to be a Major-General in the first promotion, when, on account of ill health, he was obliged to exchange to the half-pay on the 12th October, 1815. At this time the Warrant of the 12th August, 1814, granting an allowance to General Officers, was in force; and expecting to be made a Major-General on the first promotion, which subsequently happened, he did not take the difference between the price of his full pay and that of his half-pay commission.

Unfortunately, he was not made a Major-General till the Warrant appeared of the 18th February, 1818, taking away the allowance of General Officers granted by that of August, 1814; and he has been ever since a Major-General upon the half-pay of a Lieutenant-Colonel, viz., 8s. 6d. a day, without any other resource whatever.

I don't doubt the propriety of the Warrant of 1818. I am quite certain that that of 1814 was an evil, and that it had not been sufficiently considered when it was issued. But it cannot

be denied that that of 1818 took away that which the Warrant of 1814 had granted; and here is an instance in which its operation is that of a positive breach of faith. This officer went upon half-pay, not taking the difference in consequence of the existence of the Warrant of 1814.

Then comes the Warrant of 1818, which deprives him of that which he had a right to expect to enjoy, and in the hopes of the enjoyment of which he had sacrificed the difference of the price between his full pay and half-pay commission.

I have stated this case for your consideration, as it appears to me to be one of great hardship; and I would suggest that this officer should enjoy the pension allowed by the Warrant of 1814. His case, which is exactly as I have represented it, cannot form an inconvenient precedent. I do not know of, and don't believe there is, any other who, being a Colonel, exchanged to half-pay not taking the difference in the interval between the dates of the two Warrants; and, if this be true, the expense will be about 300*l.* a year. But this can easily be ascertained, and the extent of the inconvenience of the precedent known before anything is done.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lord Liverpool.*

[ 74. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 26th Feb., 1821.

I return Lord Palmerston's letter, and although I concur in all his facts I cannot in his conclusion.

It is perfectly true that if General (then Colonel) Swinton had exchanged to half-pay, taking what is called the difference, he would not, according to existing regulations, have been promoted to be a Major-General. But the money he would have received would have given him about the income, including his half-pay, which the Warrant of 1814 held out to him. He would not then have been a Major-General, but it must likewise be observed that he would not have starved; and he would have been a Colonel on the list of the army.

I likewise admit that the ten cases mentioned in the enclosed paper are upon principle the same as that of Major-General Swinton. Some of these officers, such as Colonel Harris and



Sir Neil Campbell, may have exchanged not on account of inability to perform their duty as Lieut.-Colonels of regiments, but from disinclination. But still all must have looked to the provision for Major-Generals as certain; and must have calculated upon it when they retired upon half-pay not taking the difference. The authoritative removal to half-pay of the four officers last mentioned in the enclosed list affords an example of the effect of the Warrant of 1818. These officers being the seniors of their rank in their several regiments, must, according to the usual practice of the service, have been left on full pay, and their juniors have been reduced to half-pay. But this practice was departed from; and the Warrant of 1814 alone can have justified the departure. The Warrant of 1818 has deprived these officers of the benefit of the Warrant of 1814, and they are living upon 8s. 6d. a day, their juniors being in possession of their commands and situations.

I don't mean to say that the Warrant of 1818 was not necessary, but its operation in these ten cases, which I conclude are the whole, has been very unjust, and the remedy which I have recommended in the case of General Swinton, if applied to the whole, would now cost less than 2500*l.* a year, and eventually less than 4000*l.*

You must be the best judge whether this can be done; but I am certain that there is no person who will not admit that the case of these officers is unprecedented.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 75. ]

*To Prince Esterhazy.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

Londres, ce 28<sup>me</sup> Février, 1821.

Je vous renvoie les deux pièces que vous m'aviez envoyées. Pour celle qui regarde les arrangemens à faire à Naples avant l'arrivée du Roi, je n'ai rien à dire.

Il me paraît qu'il n'y a rien de plus sage que de les faire paraître émanés de la personne de sa Majesté lui-même, et de tenir à l'écart tout-à-fait le Commandant-en-Chef de l'Armée, et autant que possible les ministres des Cours Alliées.

Pour ce qui regarde l'occupation, je l'aurais fait durer pendant sept ans. La grande faute que nous avons faite en France

est d'avoir stipulé l'occupation pour seulement cinq ans, en même temps que nous promettons de délibérer sur l'évacuation au bout de trois ans. Par l'effet de cette stipulation, et par la diminution de la force, l'occupation ne pouvait durer que trois ans. Elle aurait dû durer sept ans. Elle aurait donné le temps pour tout le monde, et surtout pour le Roi de France, de s'arranger chez lui ; et elle aurait empêché quantité du mal qui est arrivé depuis qu'elle a cessé. Ainsi je trouve que votre occupation de Naples est trop courte. Il aurait fallu qu'elle fût de sept ans. Il aurait été facile de l'arrêter au bout de trois ou de cinq ans ; mais ayant stipulé que sa durée ne serait que de trois ans, il n'est pas bien facile de la faire continuer pour cinq ou pour sept, si les circonstances le rendraient nécessaire.

Pour ce qui regarde le Commandant-en-Chef de l'Armée, il faut qu'il soit seul et exclusivement responsable pour toutes ses actions, de quelque nature qu'elles soient ; et qu'il en soit absolument le maître, responsable envers personne exceptés les Souverains dont il commandera les troupes. Pour lui faire avoir des données certaines sur lesquelles il pourra baser ses mesures, il est nécessaire qu'une conférence des ministres des Puissances dont les troupes composeront l'armée soit établie à Naples, comme elle l'était jadis à Paris, avec ordre de communiquer avec le Commandant-en-Chef sur tous les événemens qui pourraient arriver, et leurs opinions en détail sur leurs causes et conséquences probables. Il resterait au Général de prendre ses mesures d'après les informations qu'elle aurait ainsi reçues.

Pour ce qui regarde les communications avec le Roi, et le pouvoir que ce dernier doit exercer sur l'armée, je suis d'opinion que sa Majesté ne peut exercer aucune autorité sur l'Armée d'Occupation sans violer le principe de la responsabilité du Général. Il faut observer aussi que cette armée est celle des Puissances qui l'ont envoyées à Naples ; qu'elle y est pour des objets Européens, et non pour ceux de Naples, à moins que ceux-ci consistent avec les premiers. Ainsi donc en mon opinion, si le Roi désire l'assistance de l'armée il devrait en faire la demande aux ministres des Puissances qui en sont les maîtres, et ceux-ci, avec leurs observations, au Commandant-en-Chef. Il restera à ce dernier d'obtempérer à la demande, ou non, comme il le jugera à propos. J'insiste sur ce point-ci, parce que l'action de l'armée est une question militaire, sur laquelle le Commandant-en-Chef est le meilleur s'il n'est pas le seul juge ; et je ne

peux pas imaginer une hypothèse où il ne serait pas avantageux que ce soit le Commandant-en-Chef, et non le Roi, ni les ministres des Puissances, qui doit décider sur les mouvemens et opérations de l'armée. Je vous communique ces opinions en qualité d'individu très intéressé à la gloire et au bonheur des Puissances Alliées ; et je vous prie de me croire, &c.

WELLINGTON.

[ 76. ]

*To Mr. Fleming.*

DEAR SIR,

London, 1st March, 1821.

I have received your note and the enclosure from Dr. Hook, with whom I am acquainted, and for whom I entertain a great respect.

I am not at all desirous of stating any principle in respect to the nomination of gentlemen to be Justices of the Peace ; and Dr. Hook misunderstands me entirely if he supposes that I doubt the expediency of recommending clergymen to the commission on account of any disqualification in their profession.

I doubt the expediency of such recommendation, unless in instances in which it is absolutely necessary, because I think the gentlemen of that profession have duties to perform of a higher description ; and because I wish to keep them clear of the *broils* of the county, and of all participation in the execution of the criminal law, and of the unpopularity which must frequently, and generally does, attend the performance of the duty of a Justice of the Peace.

The performance of this duty is not required from the clergy as it is from the proprietors of the county, but I do not object to recommend that the name of a clergyman should be inserted in the Commission when he is a proprietor, nor to insert the name of the clergyman of a parish in which there is no resident gentleman qualified or willing to undertake the duties of the office.

I am certain that if Dr. Hook will look at the office of Justice of the Peace as I do, as an honourable burden imposed upon English gentlemen, and the character, and office, and duties of the clergy as I do, he will feel both the reason of the rule which I wish to lay down for my own guidance, and for the exception to it ; and not consider it, as he appears to do, as

a stigma upon a body for which he cannot entertain a higher respect and veneration than I do.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Lord Melville.*

[ 77. ]

MY DEAR LORD MELVILLE,

London, 2nd March, 1821.

My opinion is quite unchanged regarding Captain Sabine's promotion by brevet, which I can't recommend on any ground excepting his production of the proof that Lord Mulgrave promised him such promotion as an inducement to him to go upon the service. This he has never done, although Lord Mulgrave and Chapman are both alive, and the former on the spot; but he refers to a conversation with General Mudge, who is dead. I never recommended, nor ever will recommend, any officer for promotion by brevet excepting for repeated distinguished service before the enemy in the field. I don't wish to depreciate Captain Sabine's service, but if I were to give way upon this occasion, we should have men promoted for their services in the barrack-yard at Brighton. To this I never can be a party. I enclose you the copy of the letter I wrote to Captain Sabine upon the subject. I beg to observe that when you have thought proper to promote only the Commanding Officer of this expedition, leaving the Commanding Officer of one of the ships still a Lieutenant, it is rather too much to expect from me that I should recommend Captain Sabine for promotion by brevet unless he can prove that it was promised to him as an inducement to go upon the service.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Mr. Arbuthnot.*

[ 78. ]

MY DEAR ARBUTHNOT,

London, 26th March, 1821.

I have been solicited to write to you on the claim of Mr. Gunning to be paid as Surgeon-in-Chief during the campaign of 1815; and I beg to draw your attention to the following points:—

Mr. Gunning served during the war in the Peninsula, and was paid as Surgeon-in-Chief, and he was appointed to the same situation in the army in the Netherlands, and performed the duty of it. By some accident or mistake no order was given to that army respecting his pay, and he was not paid during the service, and he has never been able to get his pay since.

There is no doubt whatever that if this case had come regularly before me while I commanded the army, I should either have ordered the issue of his pay, or should have recommended his case to the Treasury at a period at which, probably, my recommendation would have been more readily attended to.

The distance of time cannot weaken his claim to remuneration for services seldom, if ever, equalled by any person of Mr. Gunning's profession; and supposing there is an irregularity in the period, or even in the nature of this application in his favour, I must lay claim to the merit with the Treasury of having paid into the Exchequer the sum of forty thousand pounds, of which I might have disposed as I thought proper.

I hope, therefore, that this application in Mr. Gunning's favour will be attended to.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 79. ]

*To Sir B. Bloomfield.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 28th March, 1821.

In consequence of the commands of his Majesty, communicated to me by the Earl Cathcart, I have had certain cuirasses prepared, some bright iron with brass nails, for the Life Guards, and others brazed for the Blues. The latter, though much more expensive and considerably heavier than the former, are not likely to be so durable, as, in fact, the brazing is liable to come off. Under these circumstances, and having shown the pattern to the Earl Cathcart, I beg leave humbly to recommend to his Majesty that the cuirasses for the three regiments may be bright iron with brass nails and ornaments; those for the Life Guards having blue binding, those for the Blues, red.

I beg to have his Majesty's decision upon this subject as soon as may be convenient, as there is but little time to complete the cuirasses before the coronation.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Harrington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 30th March, 1821. [ 80. ]

The king has determined that the Life Guards and Blues shall wear cuirasses ; and this department is now employed in preparing the cuirasses now in the Tower for those regiments.

Lord Cathcart has informed me that there are in the stores of the First Life Guards certain cuirasses formerly used by that regiment ; and as these may be better than some in the Ordnance stores, and, at all events, those may be deficient in number, I request your Lordship to be so kind as to let me have those which may be in the stores of the First Life Guards. If they should be better than those in the Ordnance, they shall be re-issued to that regiment when fitted up.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Duke of Clarence.*

SIR,

London, 30th March, 1821. [ 81. ]

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter by Mrs. Warner, regarding the pension to the late Lady Shipley.

According to recent regulations, this department has no authority to grant pensions without the consent of the Treasury ; and General Sir Charles Shipley having died in the general service of the country, and not in the particular employment of this department, his family could not be considered as having any claim upon this department beyond the allowance usually given to the families of officers of that rank.

In consequence, however, of the pressing applications made to

me, I did on the 18th of October, 1820, address a letter to the Lords of the Treasury, representing the distresses of General Sir C. Shipley's family. I applied again for an answer to this letter on the 8th of March, but have hitherto received none.

I would beg leave to observe to your Royal Highness, under these circumstances, that as I have unfortunately but too many families looking up to me for protection, and who have real claims upon me personally, which this family have not, nor even upon the department of which I am at the head, some of those who are interested for this family on account of their knowledge of Sir C. Shipley, or of their respect for his memory, ought to apply to Lord Liverpool in their favour.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 82. ]

*To Sir Thomas Tomlins.*

DEAR SIR,

London, 4th April, 1821.

I have received your letter of the 3rd, and I have likewise to acknowledge the receipt of others from you on the same subject, to which I have not yet returned an answer. I have not done so because, at the same time that, situated as I am, it is impossible for me to do what you desire; it is not very easy to make you understand what the circumstances are which prevent me from doing that which you consider a mere act of justice. If I had never filled any office but that of Secretary in Ireland, or had only gone through the official routine in this country, I should have no scruple about giving certificates of good conduct to all those from whom, in the performance of my official duties, I have received assistance. But having been in situations to receive assistance from thousands of persons of all ranks and professions, and each of those individuals having the same right to call upon me to grant him a certificate of his good conduct, and such certificate, if of any value at all, being always liable to be abused, I have been under the necessity of declining to give any certificate of a general nature of good conduct to any individual whatever. I cannot therefore give one to you without passing at least an implied censure on all those who have assisted me, whether in the office of Chief Secretary or

elsewhere, unless, indeed, I should now begin to grant certificates of good conduct to everybody, which I have invariably refused. I confess also that I do think the solicitation of such a certificate is a little inconsistent with your station and character. Who ever doubted, or what part of my conduct could occasion a doubt of my satisfaction with, and gratitude for, your services and assistance in the office which you filled under me as Chief Secretary in Ireland? Why am I to testify that which no man can doubt? I must beg you to excuse me for insisting upon an adherence to the rule which I have laid down for my conduct, and from which I cannot depart without the greatest inconvenience.

Ever, dear Sir, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lieut.-General Sir Herbert Taylor.*

[ 83. ]

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 11th April, 1821.

Lord FitzRoy has given me your letter to him of the 9th, regarding the appointment of Mr. Chetwood Eustace to be a cadet at Woolwich.

The fact is this. The academy was lately of the number of 150, and it is now in the course of reduction to 100 by the following operation; that is to say, as only one officer is nominated from the Academy for every two vacancies in the Artillery and Engineers, so only one cadet is named from the list of candidates for every two vacancies in the Academy; or, in other words, one candidate from the list for every four vacancies in the regiment of Artillery or corps of Engineers.

The list of candidates given to me by Lord Mulgrave was seventy, and I have endeavoured to keep it to that number by refusing many who have applied to me. Mr. Chetwood Eustace does not state the age of his son; but you will see from the circumstances which I have above stated, that I should only deceive him and his Royal Highness if I were to insert his name on the list, and hold out any hopes of success.

But I beg leave in confidence to draw the attention of the Commander-in-Chief to another objection which I have to this appointment. It appears that Mr. Chetwood Eustace has nothing to depend upon excepting the pay which he may



eventually get from his commission. I confess that I have long thought that we have too many officers in the Artillery and Engineers of this description. These are, in fact, of the description of those officers who have revolutionised other armies; that is, having no connexion with the property and rank of the country, they are the more easily disposed to destroy its institutions, of which the primary object is to maintain the rights and protect the property of the whole community. I have therefore invariably endeavoured to put in my list of candidates for admission into the Academy at Woolwich, from which all the officers are taken, only those connected in some degree with the property of the country, in order to diminish, as far as may be in my power, the chance in these corps of the evils which have occasioned so much mischief elsewhere. If, however, his Royal Highness still wishes that this gentleman should be admitted, I will of course put his name on this list.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Mr. Ward.*

[ 84. ] ROUGH MEMORANDA ON THE COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE  
ARTILLERY IN 1791-92 AND IN 1821; AND ON THE  
NUMBER OF OFFICERS OF ENGINEERS EMPLOYED THEN  
AND NOW.

	May, 1821.
Total of marching battalions in 1791, 1792 .. .. .	3763
Add in Ireland in 1791, 1792 .. .. .	602
	<hr/> 4365
Add employed abroad in 1821, in additional colonies :—	
Malta .. .. .	107
Ionian Islands .. .. .	191
Cape of Good Hope .. .. .	68
Ceylon .. .. .	150
Mauritius .. .. .	62
St. Helena .. .. .	70
Barbice, &c. .. .. .	} 100
St. Lucia .. .. .	
Tobago .. .. .	
Trinidad .. .. .	
	<hr/> 748
	<hr/> 5113
Present establishment, including everything .. .. .	5575
	<hr/> 462

Therefore there are now 462 more of marching battalions than in 1791, 1792.

But it must be observed that upon 4365 (gross numbers) men in 1791 and 1792, there were 285 officers; and there are now 442 upon 5575 (gross numbers) men: difference 157.

Then it must be observed that the reliefs extend now to ten stations more than in 1791 and 1792, and that two of these stations are beyond the Cape of Good Hope and one at the Cape.

The average number of non-commissioned officers and privates in England of foot artillery from 1789 to 1792 was 1800; in 1792 it was 1734; in 1821 it is 2430.

Difference .. .. .	630
There are less in Ireland .. .. .	116
There were in 1791, 1792, in the East Indies, and not now there .. .. .	228
	344
	296

are the overplus unaccounted for.

But the whole number of 630 are the overplus of the numbers now at home to what there were in 1792. But there are ten more stations to be relieved; some in the Adriatic, and others at the Cape, the Mauritius, or Ceylon.

1791.—Engineers employed at home .. .. .	28
"      "      abroad .. .. .	36
	64
1792.—Engineers employed at home .. .. .	29
"      "      abroad .. .. .	26
	55
1821.—Engineers employed at home .. .. .	57
"      "      abroad .. .. .	64
	121
Take the average of engineer officers employed at home and abroad in 1791, 1792, at .. .. .	60
add Sappers and Miners .. .. .	36
Survey .. .. .	8
Ceylon .. .. .	6
Cape .. .. .	5
Malta and Ionian Islands .. .. .	10
St. Helena .. .. .	2
Additional colonies in West Indies .. .. .	..
	127

Observe that the reliefs extend to beyond the Cape, as in the case of the artillery; and that the officers of engineers are employed not only in the superintendence of the Ordnance buildings, but likewise of those of the Treasury.

There are 12 officers employed in Ireland, but there was in 1791, 1792, a corps of engineers belonging to that country.

[ 85. ]

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*To Zachary Macaulay, Esq.*

DEAR SIR,

London, 8th May, 1821.

I have received the tract which you have sent me, which I will read with great satisfaction.

I have always felt the difficulty of obtaining from France a complete execution of the measures for the abolition of the Slave Trade. There exists no moral feeling in France against the traffic; and it is believed that our measures for the abolition are founded upon views of interest. That having filled our colonies with slaves, and having had reason to apprehend the consequences of increasing their numbers, we had suddenly put an end to the trade, and that we now sought to deprive other countries of its known profits and advantages which did not enjoy the same colonial prosperity and which did not entertain the same apprehensions of an increased negro population.

There is no truth in all this; but still we must not be surprised that it has its effect in a country of which the inhabitants are almost universally as ignorant as they are full of national prejudices, and avaricious of commercial profit and advantage.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

[ 86. ]

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*To Mr. Arbuthnot.*

MEMORANDUM.—OBSERVATIONS ON MR. HILL'S MEMORANDUM AND ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE DUTIES OF THE BRANCH OFFICE, OF THE TREASURY WORKS, AND OF THE COMMISSARY OF STORES.

London, 1st June, 1821.

The perusal of Mr. Hill's Memorandum would lead to the conclusion that a suggestion had been made to transfer to the

Ordnance all the duties of the Commissariat; whereas the suggestion which was made, and which gave occasion to the writing of that Memorandum, was that the duties of the Commissary of Stores should be transferred to the Ordnance.

This department have already under their superintendence the supply in all parts of the world of every article of arms and ammunition and military stores to the navy and army; and in Great Britain of accoutrements, as well as arms, &c., to the yeomanry, and of clothing and every other article of supply whatever to the artillery and engineers in all parts of the world.

The Ordnance therefore do now supply, and have in their stores, every article supplied through the agency or under the direction of the Commissary of Stores.

The Ordnance being under the necessity of supplying his Majesty's ships and troops, as well as the artillery and engineers, with those articles of store which they require in all parts of the world, have stores of those articles, and officers to take charge of them, established wherever there may be ships or troops. Without any addition to their establishments, then, it is believed that this department could supply and take charge in all parts of the world of those articles of equipment now supplied and taken charge of by the Commissariat in their capacity of Commissary of Stores. These articles are understood to be great coats and other articles of clothing, whether for troops, Negroes, or Indians; and tents and camp equipage stores, and shoes.

I think it very doubtful that, comparing the goodness of the articles supplied, the supplies by the Ordnance are more expensive than those by the Commissariat for the department of the Commissary of Stores; but this is a point which may be accurately ascertained, and the prices paid by the Ordnance must be corrected if they should be found excessive. Neither would there be any difficulty regarding the articles being procured according to fixed patterns, nor in their being packed as they are now, or as they ought to be. The business of the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance is to attend to these objects; and, as I have above stated, the Ordnance now perform many of these duties for the navy and army, and all these duties in all their details for that part of the troops under their own superintendence and management.

The only point, then, that remains to be considered is the issue of these articles.

These, it is understood, are issued to the troops at fixed periods and according to fixed regulations and allowances; and it does not appear that there would be more difficulty in managing their issue than there is in the management of the issue of the various articles which the navy and army now receive from the Ordnance in all parts of the world.

In regard to those issues of a casual nature, it would be necessary that the department of the Ordnance should receive from the Treasury or the Secretary of State the signification of the necessity of the issue, the period, &c. It appears to me quite clear that this branch of the Commissariat might be made over to the Ordnance with great advantage.

In respect to the Barrack Department, the consideration of it may be divided under two distinct heads: the building of barracks in England and abroad, and the care and supply of the barracks when built.

In respect to the building of barracks, I have to state that the Ordnance have necessarily in all parts of his Majesty's dominions officers, overseers, &c., &c., who have not so much to perform that they might not be employed in the superintendence of the construction of barracks for the troops of the line; and as these persons are already in the public service, the expense of superintendence would be saved by thus employing them. Indeed, the engineer officers are so employed already in the West Indies and elsewhere, although not under the superintendence of the Board of Ordnance.

I cannot, however, but be of opinion that great advantage would be derived to the public interests by placing, not only barracks at home and abroad, but all military works in the colonies, under the immediate superintendence and direction of the Ordnance; confining the governors abroad to a specified sum unless by the sanction of that Board, and the Ordnance to a specified sum unless by the sanction of the Treasury.

The Ordnance would have no more difficulty in sending out building materials for such buildings and works than they have in sending out the same materials for those buildings and works immediately under their own charge.

The truth is, that all these buildings and works ought to be under their superintendence and charge. The mode in which they have remained under the direction of the Treasury and

Commissariat appears to be this. The Commander-in-Chief, upon the conquest or occupation of a colony, orders certain buildings to be erected for the convenience of his army or works for their defence, and the expense is defrayed by the Commissariat and charged in the extraordinaries of the army. And when peace is made these works are continued under the same directions, and the expenses paid from the same funds, without advertng to the fact that there is a department existing which must have in the same place all the means of executing such works, and at home much better means of superintending them than the Treasury or Commissariat can have.

In respect to the care of the barracks, it is obvious that they ought to be taken care of by the same department which builds them and keeps them in repair. This will with certainty require the same number of barrack-masters as at present. It is not probable that any very great saving would be made, even though there should be officers of the Ordnance at stations at which there may now be barracks, or at which barracks may hereafter be required.

In respect to the supply of the barracks, it does not appear to me that the Ordnance would experience more difficulty in supplying those which are destined for the troops of the line than they now experience in supplying those occupied by the troops under their own care.

Those supplies consist in furniture, fuel, and straw. It might be a public convenience to take the latter article at some stations from the Commissariat, as the Commissariat are obliged to make purchases of the same article for the consumption of the horses of the cavalry. In some parts of his Majesty's dominions, such as Canada, the Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, and Ceylon, contracts for fuel might be entered into with advantage by the officers of the Commissariat rather than by those of the Ordnance; but in all such cases the two departments would understand and accommodate each other. At all events, it appears to me that by transferring the barrack department to the Ordnance there would be a saving of the whole expense of superintendence of buildings, and of all the expense of the barrack department in London, whose duties might be performed by the Board of Ordnance.

There would be no more difficulty on the part of the Ordnance

in communicating with the Quartermaster-General regarding the occupation of the barracks and the situation of those to be built than there is with the Adjutant-General regarding the arming of the troops, and with the Admiralty and Navy Office regarding the equipment of his Majesty's ships and the position of the magazines for that purpose.

WELLINGTON.

3rd June, 1821.

Your Grace's paper seems to me so concentrated as well as so cogent, that I have not an observation to make. I would merely submit whether it would not be proper to order a return, and, where it could be done without inconvenience, in some instances, to make an inspection of the capacity of the storehouses at different stations. In Dublin and the Tower I believe there is very little room. Perhaps an account of the stores actually under charge of that part of the Commissariat which has succeeded to the Store-keeper-General would help us greatly in our calculations.

The only very pressing part of Hill's reasoning seems to me to be that which relates to the confusion which might ensue from the paramount jurisdiction of the Treasury over our officers.

R. W.

[ 87. ]

*To Lieut.-General Sir Herbert Taylor,*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 6th June, 1821.

I have received a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Arch. Ross, who was desperately wounded in the battle of Vittoria, desiring that I would recommend him to his Royal Highness for one of the situations of inspector of army clothing, he expecting that both will soon be vacant.

I don't like to trouble his Royal Highness with a request, or even recommendation, in Colonel Ross's favour. But there is no doubt that he was a very meritorious officer, and is quite prevented by his wounds from undertaking any more active duty. I shall be very much obliged to you therefore if, when his Royal Highness is considering the selection of an officer to fill one or both these situations, you will draw his attention to Colonel Ross.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel G. Murray.*

[ 88. ]

SIR,

London, 22nd June, 1821.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 19th instant, enclosing an humble representation to his Majesty, which it is your wish that I should present to his Majesty, as Gold Stick in Waiting.

It appears that, holding a civil office in Scotland, you have been called upon by an order of the House of Commons to make a return of any other commissions which you may hold, and the amount of the pay, &c., of such commission. I understood, from what you stated to me in conversation some days ago, that you experienced a difficulty in making such return; but upon the perusal of the papers which you have enclosed, and particularly of your commission, I can see none, as you are thereby, in April, 1815, appointed supernumerary Lieutenant-Colonel of the 2nd Regiment of Life Guards.

It does not appear from the papers which you have enclosed whether you receive any pay, salary, allowance, or emolument on account of your holding this commission; but I conclude that you can state whether you do or not receive any and the amount of such allowance, if there should be any; and this is all that is required by the order of the House of Commons. There is no mention made in it of the duties performed or required from the persons holding the appointments or commissions referred to, nor of their ulterior rights or claims.

Under these circumstances I do not think it necessary to lay before his Majesty your humble representation, more particularly as it appears that his Majesty has before had this case under his consideration and has decided upon it; and I return your representation with all the papers accompanying it.

I have, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lord Clanwilliam.*

[ 89. ]

MY DEAR CLANWILLIAM,

London, 23rd June, 1821.

I return the letters which you sent me regarding the claim of the French government to payment of the value of certain rations received by the British troops in France during the



months of January and February, 1816; and a letter on that subject from the Commissary-General Bisset.

The letter of Monsieur Le Tonr Maubourg clearly explains the nature of this demand; and I entertain no doubt, nor does Commissary-General Bisset, but it never was paid or carried to account in any settlement with the French government. Indeed, it is quite clear that the settlement of this account had been delayed on account of the want of the necessary documents to enable the Commissaries to settle it.

This being the case, the question is, whether the final settlement of the Commission Mixte at Cambrai in the year 1818 could be considered applicable to this account, the discussion of which had before been postponed on account of a deficiency of documents. I should think not, in fairness.

The sum is scarcely worth disputing about, being about 600*l.* sterling. But you'll observe that the demand is on the part of the Department of the North, and I conclude that the French government would find it inconvenient either to pay the demand and open a fresh account on the score of the Army of Occupation, or, on the other hand, to desire the Department to charge it to the departmental funds.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

[ 90. ]

*To Lord Bathurst.*

London, 24th June, 1821.

I concur entirely in the reasoning in this letter. The refusal of the King to allow the government to be strengthened would occasion a necessity to break it up; indeed, such refusal would, in fact, break it up. But the refusal of the King to receive Mr. Canning into his confidential service at this moment does not amount to a refusal to strengthen the government, particularly as such refusal is accompanied by an offer to allow Lord Liverpool to make any other arrangement he pleases.

I confess that I think it very probable that all that is going on will eventually lead to a dissolution of the government. But before we dissolve it ourselves, we ought to take care to be in such a situation as to be obliged to do so, and that not by our own fault.

I think there is one way in which the refusal of the King to receive Mr. Canning into his service immediately might lead to a dissolution of the government. The Grenvilles must be informed of what has passed on this subject. Suppose they were to say, "You have no influence with the King, nor, without that influence, no strength of your own, and we cannot connect ourselves with a government evidently falling." We must then, I should think, bring the King to a decision either to keep us, giving us his entire confidence, and allowing us to do what is best for his service, or we must break up. But such an answer from the Grenvilles would be a new fact in the case, and would go very far to justify us. If Lord Liverpool is not in a hurry he will have the game in his own hands, and if at last obliged to dissolve his government he will be able to do so with advantage, or at all events with less disadvantage than under existing circumstances.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*To Lord Melville.*

[ 91. ]

MY DEAR LORD MELVILLE,

London, 25th June, 1821.

I have received your letter, and I have not the smallest objection to supply the Royal Society with the rockets which they require; but I believe that I must take the King's pleasure upon the issue.

I don't know in what manner the society propose to apply the rockets in relation to the attainment of the longitude. If it is to fix certain points from another fixed station, I, who have been rocketted more than once, can assure them that there is nothing so difficult to ascertain exactly as the point from which a rocket is thrown up either by day or night; and particularly the latter. If it is to ascertain distance by the time of seeing the fire, I would recommend a gun in preference to a rocket; as the fire from the former is instantaneous, and if seen at all must be seen at the instant of explosion; whereas that of the latter may not and probably would not be seen for two, three, or more seconds after the fire is applied to the rocket composition, which must lead to error.

I mention this not knowing how the Royal Society propose to apply the rockets; and I could likewise in the same state of ignorance suggest to them the use of fire rockets instead of those in common use.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 92. ] MEMORANDUM FOR THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL, RECOMMENDING CERTAIN OFFICERS TO BE MADE BARONETS.

London, 6th July, 1821.

As it is probable that some baronets will be created upon the occasion of the coronation, I wish to bring the following persons under the consideration of the Earl of Liverpool as deserving that honour:—

1st. Sir Robert Kennedy. So much has been said of this gentleman's claims for his services, and of his character, that it is not necessary to enter into those subjects. As far as depends upon him, his accounts are settled; and I imagine that the government have now acquired sufficient knowledge of Mr. Dawkins, the late Auditor-General in Portugal, to see that the disputes between Sir Robert Kennedy and that gentleman are not to be attributed solely to the former. Besides I must say that Sir Robert Kennedy laid the ground for this mark of favour from the government some years before Mr. Dawkins joined the army, and previous to any transactions or dissensions between those gentlemen. Nothing has occurred or has come out in the course of those transactions or discussions to deteriorate the services of Sir Robert Kennedy, or to alter the good opinion which I, and I believe the government, have formed of him, I therefore again beg leave to recommend him to the Earl of Liverpool.

2nd. Colonel James Carmichael Smyth of the Royal Engineers. This officer was chief engineer at the battle of Waterloo, and during the occupation of France. He is highly respectable as an officer, and has many foreign orders. He married the daughter of the late General Morse, and has a very large fortune.

3rd. Lieutenant-Colonel John Thomas Jones of the Royal Engineers. This officer served with distinction in the army in

the Peninsula, where he was desperately wounded. He wrote the best history of the war in the Peninsula. He has since been employed in framing the system of fortification in the Netherlands, and in assisting me in carrying that system into execution. He has an estate in Norfolk of considerable extent, and about eight thousand pounds a year will be settled upon the possessor of any title to be conferred upon him.

4th. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Robert John Harvey. This officer served during the war in the Peninsula on the staff of the Portuguese army, and he was in fact the principal channel of communication between me and it, and he rendered himself highly useful. He is of a respectable family at Norwich, where his father and uncle have always supported the interests of government; and he has a landed estate in Norfolk of not less than five thousand a year.

WELLINGTON.

*Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 12th July, 1821.

I have considered the several claims you have brought before me for the Baronetage. I wish it were in my power to comply with the desire you have so strongly impressed, to obtain this honour for Lieutenant-Colonel Jones and Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey. But the numerous claims brought forward upon the present occasion, and the limits we have been obliged to put to those claims in other branches of the military and public service, render it, I regret to say, impossible for me to bring their names before his Majesty upon the present occasion.

I am, with great truth, my dear Duke,  
yours very sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

*The Marquess of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Stowe, 24th July, 1821.

As I had reason to consider myself slighted, I determined not to present myself at the levée or drawing-room. I regretted not being able to see you before I left town, to tell you the increased accounts which I had received and the additional evidence with which I was furnished of *la régnante's* influence. She and her friends expect much to result from the Irish journey. They are quite aware of the plan to be adopted by you, and hope to counter-mine you and to force you to an explosion before the return from Ireland. A scene of intrigue is prepared then for him, which Lord Sidmouth will be

but little able to counteract. My own opinion now is that you will not be permitted to strengthen yourselves. Canning is beginning to mark his feelings very strongly, and a rencounter took place between him and Lord Bathurst in Westminster Hall, which would not seem to imply that the dislike to him rested with the King. The Duke of York might yet save you, if he would move. But at present depend upon it that nobody is losing ground but yourselves, and that you are doing every moment. Lord Londonderry's manners are not calculated to inspire fear into your enemies or courage amongst your friends. I saw him on Sunday, and nothing could be more repulsive or so little calculated to conciliate or secure support. Pardon the liberty which I am taking, and depend upon it the danger is more imminent than you are aware of.

Believe me always yours very sincerely,

CHANDOS-BUCKINGHAM.

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*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

93.]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 4th Sept., 1821.

I returned here yesterday, and was informed by Lord Bathurst of what had been done, and was intended to be done, in consequence of the transactions of the 14th and 26th of August; and by his desire I write to you regarding ———.

It appears to me that the proceeding in respect to him ought to be to announce to him that his Majesty had been pleased to dismiss him from his service in consequence of his conduct on the 14th instant. The government will be responsible for this act; and, when called upon, will justify themselves by the production of, or merely the statement of the facts contained, in the depositions of the officers and soldiers of the Life Guards, regarding the transactions of the 14th, and possibly that of the gardener, at Hammersmith. These depositions contain positive statements of words spoken, and of actions and conduct, which it is impossible to explain away or to justify. If the deponents are to be believed, ——— is certainly not a fit person to be an officer in his Majesty's service. If they are not to be believed, then the whole matter ought to be dropped.

If this be true, why should we call upon ——— for an explanation? He cannot explain or justify, and will naturally answer, "I deny, and desire inquiry and trial;" and you will then see that your call for explanation will force a trial of him by a General Court Martial. Upon this trial, considering who and what the man is, who the persons will be who will probably try him, what the nature of the evidence will be, and

the probable defence, I entertain no doubt that he would either be acquitted, or let off with a reprimand, or other slight censure.

It appears to me that this case, in relation to the previous demand for explanation, is quite distinct from any that we have lately had under consideration, whether relating to the conduct of ——— or that of ———. In these cases the subject of complaint was words spoken at public meetings, or a letter written of which we had no evidence excepting what appeared in the public prints. We could not proceed upon such evidence; and therefore the mode of proceeding which we had in contemplation was, in the first instance, to call upon the officer to say whether he had uttered the words or written the letter in question.

But in this case there can be no doubt of the words and conduct; and if there is any, it can be cleared up only by a trial by a Court Martial, which it is agreed cannot with propriety take place in this case, unless called for by ——— himself. Neither does it appear to me that the call upon ——— for previous explanation is called for by anything which it appears passed between him and Sir Herbert Taylor.

Lord Bathurst will send you the written document, and you will see that the conversation having been sought for by ——— himself, in consequence of reports in circulation of his conduct, he said no more than that he could justify himself.

Was any officer ever dismissed from his Majesty's service, or any individual ever dismissed from any situation, for an alleged fault, who did not expect that he could justify himself?

I am upon the whole, then, decidedly of opinion—

First. That the words spoken, and the conduct of the 14th, are sufficient to render ——— unworthy of a commission in his Majesty's service.

Secondly. That they are sufficiently proved to enable the government to act upon them by the depositions of the officers, soldiers, and others.

Thirdly. That no call for explanation is necessary; and

Fourthly. That any call for explanation will infallibly lead to a trial by a General Court Martial, and to the acquittal of ———, or some very lenient censure.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Mr. Crew.\**

[ 94. ]      MEMORANDUM FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE CORPS OF  
ARTILLERY DRIVERS.

London, 12th Sept., 1821.

The corps of Artillery Drivers is to be reduced.

The quartermaster, sergeant-major, quartermaster-sergeant, and staff-sergeant, are to be reduced.

Two inspectors to be discharged.

The adjutants and officers of corps are to be en second to the regiment of Artillery, and the promotion is to be carried on through this list, as it now is through the half-pay list.

The non-commissioned officers are to be supernumerary to the several battalions of Artillery, to succeed to vacancies in their several ranks as they will occur; and the drivers are to be attached, namely, four drivers and five horses to each company of Artillery, or thirty-two drivers and forty horses to each battalion.

The two veterinary surgeons and one trumpeter, as Trumpet-Major, are to be attached to the staff of the regiment; one farrier, one shoeing smith, one collar maker, one wheeler, and one carriage smith, are to be attached to the staff of each battalion of Artillery.

From this time forward every man enlisted for the Artillery is to be enlisted as a gunner-driver; and is to be liable to be employed either as gunner or driver as his services may be required.

The commanding officers of the several battalions will decide to what service the several men are to be trained; but it will be expected that one-half of the establishment of each company shall be trained to the care and management of horses, as well as to the service of the Artillery.

One of the drummers of each company of Artillery is to be trained as a trumpeter.

Besides this, one man of each company should be trained as a shoeing smith, one as a wheeler, one as a collar maker, and one as a carriage smith.

The mode in which the duty must now be carried on is as follows:—

The drivers belonging to the whole regiment must remain

\* Mr. Crew was Secretary to the Board of Ordnance.

at the head-quarters of their several companies, if at Woolwich or in Ireland, till a sufficient number of drivers of the companies stationed at Woolwich and in Ireland will be trained to take charge of the horses.

The drivers and horses belonging to each company and battalion in the regiment must be under charge of the officers and non-commissioned officers of such company and battalion; and when detached on any duty, must be ordered by a detail from head-quarters in the same manner as any other detachment is made.

In consequence of this draft of the Driver corps into the companies of Artillery, there are to be reduced five men each company by the discharge of that number of men.

A company of Artillery will then consist as follows:—

One captain, one 2nd captain, two 1st lieutenants, one 2nd lieutenant, three sergeants, three corporals, three bombardiers, one drummer, fifty-nine gunners and drivers, one trumpeter.

Staff of the regiment: two veterinary surgeons, one trumpet-major.

Staff of the battalion: one adjutant, one quartermaster, one sergeant-major, one quartermaster-sergeant, one farrier, one shoeing smith, one collar maker, one wheeler, one carriage smith.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lord Melville.*

[ 95. ]

MY DEAR LORD MELVILLE,      Ordnance Office, 20th Sept., 1821.

I send you the notes for the Admiralty, on the subject of *wrought-iron carriages*, and you will see that I was right.

In case you should not have them at hand, I likewise send the papers which passed heretofore on this subject.

If those carriages were certainly better than the others, which I think would be doubtful, if not certainly otherwise, if iron trucks were applied to wooden carriages, or wooden trucks to iron carriages, still as we know that we cannot make the change of the one for the other throughout the Navy, I doubt the expediency of incurring the expense of constructing forty-six of these carriages for a useless experiment, at a moment



when we are starving many a poor devil who is not necessary to us, in order to save a little money.

Pray return the enclosures.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*M. Gaillard to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Paris, le 10<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1821.

Je me dispose à publier le portefeuille du Duc d'Otrante, dont je suis seul dépositaire; tout ce qui a été imprimé jusqu'ici étant apocryphe ou plutôt mensonges.

Sa correspondance avec moi, depuis son départ pour Dresde en 1815 jusqu'à sa mort, présentera beaucoup d'intérêt. J'en ai conservé les originaux.

Beaucoup de gens seront surpris d'apprendre qu'en 1814, et jusqu'en 20 Mars, 1815, le Duc faisait passer au Roi des notes de police et des conseils, dont l'auteur était inconnu, mais dont l'effet aurait dû être de prévenir la catastrophe épouvantable du 20 Mars. J'ai toutes ces notes en minutes.

Une foule d'anecdotes de police, inconnues jusqu'ici; les diverses querelles entre le Duc et Bonaparte, et surtout les véritables causes des disgrâces du ministre.

Des ordres plus ou moins atroces donnés pendant les Cent Jours, et demeurés sans effet. Tels sont, Monsieur le Duc, les objets principaux contenus dans le portefeuille que je vais publier.

Je veux tirer parti de ce présent du Duc d'Otrante, pour réparer une partie de ma fortune, entièrement détruite par la révolution. Mais je ne veux pas que cet ouvrage soit une nouvelle occasion de scandale: je ne veux pas qu'un seul homme estimable ait à s'en plaindre.

Votre Grâce comprend qu'il est impossible que son nom ne se trouve pas répété plusieurs fois dans ce recueil.

Ses victoires en 1814; la campagne de 1815; son séjour à Paris, pendant que le Duc était ministre du Roi; la conférence qu'elle a bien voulu m'accorder, dans l'intérêt du Duc, au moment de sa proscription; la démarche qu'elle a bien voulu faire auprès du Roi, et qu'elle a daigné me raconter; la lettre même qu'elle a consenti de faire passer à Dresde: tous ces faits fournissent des pages fort intéressantes.

Retenu par une maladie, pendant le court séjour de votre Grâce à Paris, dans les derniers tems, il ne m'a pas été possible d'aller lui présenter mon hommage, et de conférer avec elle sur cet objet.

Aujourd'hui, Monsieur le Duc, je prie votre Grâce de vouloir bien me faire passer, par la voie la plus sûre, des notes, en ce qui la concerne, sur les faits que je ne puis que lui indiquer, à moins qu'elle n'aime mieux m'adresser un homme de son choix, avec qui je puisse m'entendre.

Sans doute, l'un des partis qui nous agitent tirerait un grand profit des

pièces qui sont en ma possession, personne ne pouvant donner un démenti à l'éditeur d'un pareil ouvrage. Je ne veux rien faire pour les passions.

D'un autre côté, le Due d'Otrante ayant commencé à jouer un grand rôle dès la création du Directoire, un gouvernement pourrait aussi faire insérer dans ce recueil une foule de choses qui ne s'y trouvent pas ; et personne ne serait autorisé à dire, "Le Due d'Otrante n'a point ainsi pensé, ainsi parlé, dans telle ou telle occasion." Je sais que c'est ainsi qu'on écrit l'histoire. Je ne traiterai qu'avec un imprimeur, et un imprimeur étranger, et mon nom ne paraîtra pas. C'est avec le plus grand abandon que je confie mon secret à votre Grâce.

On ne tardera pas à publier ce qu'on appellera *Les Mémoires de Buonaparte*. Mon recueil contiendra beaucoup de faits autrement présentés. Ce ne sera pas le moindre avantage que j'en attends.

Mille fois pardon, Monsieur le Duc, de la longueur de ma lettre. J'ai voulu vous soumettre deux articles que je modifierai, que je supprimerai à votre volonté. Votre Grâce m'a traité avec une grande bonté ; je serais au désespoir de faire paraître un mot qui lui fût désagréable.

Ma lettre parviendra à votre Grâce sans que personne puisse savoir que j'ai l'honneur de lui écrire.

Je suis, avec respect, Monsieur le Duc,

votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

M. A. GAILLARD,

Conseiller en Cassation, Rue du Petit Bourbon, No. 4.

P.S. Une des disgrâces du Due ayant eu pour cause des démarches d'Ouvrard auprès de M. le Marquis de Wellesley, je mettrai un grand prix à quelques notes sur le caractère et les services de ce ministre.

Ne voulant pas manquer l'occasion de faire passer ma lettre, je n'ai pas le tems de garder copie de mes deux notes, qu'il me serait difficile de rendre dans les mêmes termes. Je prie votre Grâce de me les renvoyer, si elle juge à propos de m'adresser quelqu'un. Ce serait un moyen de m'assurer que je puis donner confiance à celui qui se présenterait.

#### [ENCLOSURE.]

#### *Première Note.*

Le 21<sup>me</sup> Juin, 1815, un envoyé du Due d'Otrante, d'accord en ce point avec d'autres membres de la Commission du Gouvernement, d'accord aussi avec M. de Vitrolles, parti de Paris, avec ordre de se diriger vers la Belgique.

La marche des armées d'Angleterre et de la Prusse était si rapide, les moyens de communication si difficiles ou si négligés, que la Commission du Gouvernement ignorait absolument ce qui se passait à 50 lieues de Paris, au moins sur cette ligne.

On croyait que le Congrès de Vienne s'était transporté à Frankfort, et l'envoyé dont nous parlons ne voulant pas se charger de beaucoup d'argent, avait pris sur Frankfort une lettre de crédit, dont il ne fit aucun usage.

Un ordre du Ministre de la Guerre enjoignait aux commandans des villes ou des armées de faire conduire cet envoyé par un trompette aux avant-postes des armées étrangères.

Peu exercé au métier de la guerre, l'envoyé avait exigé qu'on lui donnât pour

compagnon, jusqu'à la frontière, un officier supérieur en uniforme. Il avait regardé ce moyen comme indispensable, pour se garantir des difficultés sans nombre qui pouvaient arrêter sa marche, de la part de quelques postes isolés, de quelques corps francs, ou de quelque commandant peu traitable.

Dès le Bourget et jusqu'à Senlis les voyageurs rencontrèrent des aides-de-camp, plus ou moins blessés, la plupart camarades de l'officier placé dans la voiture, et d'après leurs récits il fut facile de voir que la course ne se prolongerait pas jusqu'à Frankfort.

L'envoyé ne perdait pas un mot de ce que racontaient ces militaires, et il lui fut démontré que l'armée Prussienne serait à Paris sous fort peu de jours.

Peronne était l'extrême frontière de la France. Les conversations d'ailleurs si importantes de nos militaires avaient ralenti la marche de l'envoyé. On arriva fort tard à Peronne.

Le Général commandant sur ce point ne fit aucune difficulté d'obtempérer aux ordres du Ministre de la Guerre; seulement après s'être assuré que l'envoyé et son fils ne parlaient pas la langue Anglaise, il leur dit, "Je reçois à l'instant l'avis que des détachemens de cavalerie Anglaise étaient il n'y a qu'un instant près des glacis de la place. Vous allez tomber au milieu de la nuit dans un détachement; vous ne pourrez pas vous faire comprendre même par signes. Attendez quelques heures; ou baissez les ponts; et si vous rencontrez de la troupe, elle pourra du moins reconnaître le chasseur dont vous serez précédé. Ma cavalerie consiste en six chasseurs et un brigadier. Quant à une trompette, il n'y en a pas une dans la ville. Je vous conseille d'attendre."

Notre envoyé suivit ce conseil. L'officier qui l'avait accompagné regagna Paris, et le Général, d'après les ordres du Ministre de la Guerre, quitta lui-même Peronne, pour parcourir la Picardie, et faire replier sur Paris les hommes et les munitions.

La garnison de Peronne se composait d'une compagnie de vétérans, une compagnie de la levée en masse, et de six hommes de cavalerie, presque point d'artillerie, point de munitions, point de magasins.

Vers une heure du matin le commandant de la place accompagna l'envoyé jusques sur le glacis, et le jeune Brigadier de Chasseurs dirigea la marche sur Cambrai.

A l'embranchement de la route de St. Quentin on rencontra l'armée Anglaise gagnant le village de Vermand, quartier-général du Duc de Wellington. L'envoyé remit au Général l'invitation dont il était porteur, de le faire conduire au quartier-général. Au lieu de lui donner un cavalier pour le conduire, ce Général invita le voyageur à suivre l'armée. Qu'on se figure une chaise de poste, traînée péniblement à travers champs, dans des ravins, forcée de faire mille circuits pour trouver passage, ou concevra tout à la fois et l'embarras et la lenteur de la marche du voyageur, lequel, ignorant et le nom du village où se trouvait le quartier-général et la route qui pouvait l'y conduire, ne pouvait se dispenser de suivre l'armée. Il ne put arriver à Vermand que vers onze heures du matin. Wellington en était parti, et s'était avancé sur Peronne. L'envoyé passa la journée en causant avec quelques officiers restés à l'état-major, et rapprochant ce que ces officiers disaient de la marche et des opérations du Maréchal Blücher, de ce qu'il avait appris des officiers Français de Paris à Senlis, il lui fut facile de s'assurer que le Général Prussien déguisait sa marche, et voulait arriver à Paris avant l'armée Anglaise.

M. le Duc de Wellington ne reparut que vers dix heures du soir, il avait pris Peronne, et n'était pas descendu de cheval depuis neuf heures du matin. Il était pressé de se mettre à table; son état-major l'était d'avantage; il invita l'envoyé à s'y placer aussi; et ce ne fut qu'après le repas qu'il entendit le voyageur.

Dès l'abord il fut aisé de s'assurer de deux points importants : le Général Anglais mettait à l'honneur de replacer le Roi sur son trône, et de menacer la capitale.

Au moment où l'envoyé quittait Paris il ne s'y trouvait pas un régiment ; il n'avait rencontré que quelques officiers isolés. Le tems des miracles en faveur des armées Françaises avait passé. Comment deviner qu'en trois jours on aura formé une armée de quatre vingt mille hommes autour de la capitale ?

L'envoyé, convaincu de l'empressement de Blücher à gagner Paris, et de soudain de s'y trouver seul, ne tarla pas à l'être du dessein de venger sur Paris les échecs antérieurs de la Prusse. Il crut donc devoir conjurer Wellington de presser sa marche.

Ce Général croyait avoir à forcer deux camps entre Peronne et Senlis, un à Roye, l'autre à Pont St. Maxime. L'envoyé avait quitté ces deux villes deux jours avant ; il essayait de dissuader le Général Anglais sur l'existence de ces deux camps, dont la supposition lui semblait une nouvelle tromperie du Général Prussien. Lorsque vers une heure du matin arriva M. de Lariston, l'envoyé se retira, laissant à ce Général le soin de détromper le Duc de Wellington sur les camps de Pont St. Maxime et Roye.

#### *Deuxième Note.*

Le lendemain du jour où la Chambre des Députés adopta la loi qui proscriit les Conventionnels, ayant voté la mort du Roi, un ami du Duc d'Otrante fut admis à conférer avec M. le Duc de Wellington. Sa Grâce, avant de savoir l'objet de la conférence sollicitée par l'ami du proscrit, voulut lui faire connaître ce qu'elle avait fait dans l'intérêt d'un homme qui lui paraissait avoir des droits à une exception.

"J'ai vu le Roi. J'ai dit à sa Majesté ; 'Le Duc d'Otrante est proscrit, votre Majesté sait pourtant qu'elle lui doit sa couronne ; elle sait que lorsque nous nous sommes trouvés sous Paris, Blücher et moi, nous avons reconnu notre insuffisance non pas seulement pour attaquer, mais pour nous défendre ; et qu'en cas d'attaque il eût fallu nous replier. Elle sait que derrière nous venaient l'Autriche et la Russie, qui ne voulaient pas que vous remontassiez sur le trône ; elle sait que c'est le Duc d'Otrante qui a empêché qu'on ne se battît sous Paris. C'est donc à lui qu'elle doit sa couronne. Et le voilà proscrit.' "

"Quelle fut la réponse du Roi ? " demanda l'ami du proscrit.

"Le Roi," reprit M. de Wellington, "n'est point en mesure quant à présent de rendre une ordonnance d'exception. Il la rendra plus tard."

"Je ne crois pas à cette ordonnance," répliqua l'ami du Duc d'Otrante ; "et au surplus, ce n'est nullement dans cette vue que j'ai prié votre Grâce de m'entendre. Le Duc est proscrit à jamais, je n'en ai aucun doute. Je ne vois que l'Angleterre où il puisse être en sûreté ; partant ailleurs il trouvera des exilés qui vont lui attribuer leur malheur, parce qu'il a contresigné l'ordonnance portant contre eux la peine d'exil. Le désespoir ne raisonne point, et peut se porter au plus violent excès. Je voudrais savoir si le Duc serait admis à fixer son domicile en Angleterre."

"La conduite révolutionnaire du Duc d'Otrante," répond M. le Duc de Wellington, "n'est pas un titre à la recommandation en Angleterre. Toutefois le ministère sait comment il s'est conduit dans ces derniers tems. Dites lui d'écrire ; il recevra, je crois, l'autorisation."

"Je n'ai plus qu'une faveur à vous demander dans l'intérêt du Duc," répliqua son ami. "C'est que votre Grâce lui fasse passer la lettre contenant le conseil qu'elle veut bien m'autoriser à lui transmettre."

"Pourquoi ne pas écrire par la poste ?"

"M. le Duc?" répond l'ami du Duc; "assurément ma marche n'a rien de reprochable. Je ne voudrais pas pourtant qu'elle fût connue. Je ne hazarderai point une lettre, si votre Grâce ne consent point à la faire passer pour l'Angleterre dans un de ses envois."

M. de Wellington consentit à insérer la lettre en question dans une dépêche. Le Duc d'Otrante la reçut; il écrivit au gouvernement Anglais, qui ne répondit pas.

[ 96. ]      MEMORANDUM ON THE PORTEFEUILLE OF THE DUKE  
D'OTRANTE.\*

Oct., 1821.

Le Duc de Wellington ayant rempli des charges, et ayant pris part à plusieurs transactions publiques, ses actions et ses paroles sont de droit matière à l'histoire; et le Duc ne peut ni consentir ni empêcher que celui que le désire puisse publier tout ce qu'il lui semblera bon.

Le Duc est reconnaissant envers Monsieur G. de ce qu'il lui a communiqué son dessein de publier le portefeuille du Duc d'Otrante. D'après le principe ci-dessus énoncé, le Duc ne doit pas faire la tentative d'empêcher qu'il y soit question de son nom; ni d'autre part peut-il y donner son consentement. Tout ce qu'il peut désirer de la part de Monsieur G. est que dans cet ouvrage, lequel Monsieur G. doit désirer qu'il puisse captiver la confiance publique, il n'y fasse insérer rien dont il n'a pas un souvenir très exacte; rien qui ne soit pas un fait; rien qui soit matière de conjecture, où, il faut l'avouer, tout le monde peut se tromper.

En renvoyant à Monsieur G. les deux feuilles de sa note, le Duc observe déjà des erreurs marquans non seulement de conjecture mais de fait.

Monsieur G. se trompe dans sa conjecture que le Maréchal Blücher voulait entrer à Paris tout seul. La conversation des officiers de l'état-major du Duc qui aurait pu l'entraîner à cet erreur en était très capable, puisque eux ne savaient rien de ce qui se passait.

Monsieur G. se trompe de conjecture et de fait en croyant qu'après la prise de Peronne le Duc croyait l'ennemi en force ou à Roye ou à Pont St. Maxime.

Le Duc savait que les Prussiens avaient déjà passé en

\* See page 184 for letter of M. Gaillard, on which this Memorandum was written.

avant ; et il ne pouvait pas se tromper sur un point qui était militairement si évident.

De fait aussi Monsieur G. se trompe, et sa mémoire l'a trahi sur les détails de la conversation qu'il a eu avec le Duc le lendemain du jour du décret de proscription contre les votans de la mort du Roi Louis XVI. Le Duc n'a pas pu dire à Monsieur G. qu'il avait dit au Roi que S.M. savait que lorsque Blücher et le Duc se trouvaient sous Paris *ils avaient reconnus leur insuffisance, non pas seulement pour attaquer mais pour se défendre, et qu'en cas d'attaque il eût fallu se replier*, et que S.M. sentait que derrière eux venait l'Autriche et la Russie, qui ne voulaient pas que sa Majesté remontasse sur le trône ; que sa Majesté savait que c'était M. le Duc d'Otrante qui avait empêché qu'on ne se battît sous Paris. *C'est donc à lui qu'elle doit sa couronne.*

Non seulement le Duc n'a pas pu dire au Roi ce qui est dit ci-dessus ; mais il n'a pas pu le dire à Monsieur G., puisque il ne s'y trouve pas un mot de vrai.

Il n'est pas vrai que le Maréchal Blücher et le Duc ont reconnu leur insuffisance, non pas seulement pour attaquer, mais pour se défendre, et qu'en cas d'attaque il eût fallu se replier, puisque de fait le Maréchal Blücher a, le 30<sup>me</sup> Juin, emporté le village d'Aubervilliers, à la porte de Paris, que le lendemain les deux armées se sont séparées, mettant la Seine entre eux, l'armée Prussienne ayant passé la Seine à St. Germain ; et que de fait l'armée Prussienne fut attaquée le 2<sup>me</sup> à St. Cloud, et le lendemain à Issy, et a repoussé toute seule l'ennemi. L'armée Anglaise, se tenant toujours à Bourget avec leur avant-garde à \*, n'a pas été touchée.

Ces détails, qui sont historiques, montrent que le Duc n'ait pu dire au Roi, et encore moins en faire le rapport à Monsieur G., que les Armées Alliées se trouvaient dans le cas de ne pas pouvoir se défendre. Encore moins aurait-il pu dire à sa Majesté que les Empereurs d'Autriche et de Russie ne voulaient pas que S.M. remontasse sur son trône. S.M. lui en aurait rit au nez !

Le Duc a toujours reconnu les services rendus par Monsieur le Duc d'Otrante à sa Majesté Louis XVIII. Mais ces services, tant qu'ils étaient de la connaissance du Duc, prennent date de la termination des opérations militaires, et de la conclusion de l'armistice de Paris.

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Le Duc doit aussi relever l'inexactitude du fait rapporté sur l'envoi d'une lettre à Monsieur le Duc d'Otrante.

Le fait lui-même est vrai ; mais la lettre n'a pas été envoyée en Angleterre, parce que Monsieur le Duc d'Otrante ne s'y trouvait pas ; mais dans les Pays-Bas ou en Allemagne.

Tout en contestant l'exactitude des conjectures et faits ci-dessus détaillés, le Duc de Wellington désire que Monsieur G. ne croie pas qu'il veut ou consentir ou refuser son consentement qu'il puisse se servir de son nom de la manière indiquée dans les notes, ou de toute autre manière qu'il jugera à propos dans son ouvrage. Il désire seulement le mettre sur ses gardes.

[ 97. ]

*To Mr. Geils.*

DEAR SIR,

Stratfieldsaye, 12th Oct., 1821.

I have had for some time under my consideration your application to be paid as Deputy Judge-Advocate of the Army in the Peninsula, from April, 1809, to the end of the war.

It appears that you were appointed to that situation by Lieut.-General Sherbrooke ; but I beg to observe to you that Lieut.-General Sherbrooke never commanded the army, and whatever respect his appointment might have carried with it, it is obvious that he could not have appointed any officer to fill a Staff situation in the army for a longer period than for the performance of an immediate duty upon which he could not take the orders of the officer commanding the army.

I cannot find in the general order books of the army, or in any other official document, any trace of your appointment to this situation, either by General Sir J. Cradock or myself, as we both commanded the army in April, 1809.

But if such an appointment were really made or confirmed by those competent to make it, I would beg you to observe that you were taken prisoner, unfortunately for yourself and the service, in August of the same year. According to the general order of the army in the Peninsula, when a staff officer was absent for any cause more than two months he lost his situation. But this is not all. The rule of the service, since the days of Queen Anne, has been that an officer, prisoner of war, has no *right* to pay of any description. I know it is customary to grant the pay to an officer after being exchanged or released, but I

never heard of Staff-pay being either claimed or granted to an officer during the period of his being prisoner of war, and particularly not to an officer on the Staff of the army of the Peninsula.

The result then is, that if you really were appointed to be Deputy Judge-Advocate of the Army by any officer authorised to make the appointment, of which no trace can be found, you would have a claim to be paid for that office from April to August, 1809, provided those who would now have to pay you, namely, the Treasury, should not object to the payment after you had allowed seven years to elapse before you made the claim after you had been released from being a prisoner of war. Under these circumstances I certainly cannot forward the claim in any way, and I earnestly recommend to you to withdraw it, as, if referred to me by the Treasury, I must state what I have stated in this letter.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To General Lord Hill,*

[ 98. ]

MY DEAR HILL,

London, 25th Oct., 1821.

I have received your letter, and sincerely congratulate you on the success of your nephew, and this fresh instance of the deserved respect in which you and your family are held in the county of Salop.

In respect to Mr. Southey, I have heard that he was writing a History of the War in the Peninsula, but I have never received an application from him, either directly or indirectly, for information on the subject. If I had received such an application, I would have told him what I have told others, that the subject was too serious to be trifled with; for that if any real authenticated history of that war, by an author worthy of writing it, were given, it ought to convey to the public the real truth, and ought to show what nations really did when they put themselves in the situation the Spanish and Portuguese nations had placed themselves in; and that I would give information and material, to no author who would not undertake to write upon that principle. I think, however, that the period of the war is too near, and the character and reputation of nations as well as of indi-



viduals are too much involved in the discussion of these questions, for me to recommend or even encourage any author to write such a history as some, I fear, would encourage at the present moment. This is my opinion upon the subject in general, and I should have conveyed it to Mr. Southey if he or his friends had applied to me.

In respect to your reference to me, I receive it, as everything that comes from you, as a mark of your kind attention to me. Unless you approve of the principle which I have above stated there is nothing to prevent you from giving Mr. Southey any information you please; but I should wish you not to give him any original papers from me, as that would be, in fact, to involve me in his work without attaining the object I have in view, which is, *true* history.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 99. ]

*To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD LIVERPOOL,

Stratfieldsaye, 26th Oct., 1821.

I return the papers which Arbuthnot gave me for perusal, and I see that Canning, by his letter of the 22nd June, very positively releases you entirely from any obligation express or implied which you might imagine yourself to have contracted by the overtures which you had made to him. He does this on the most satisfactory of all grounds, namely, his preference to remaining out of his Majesty's service to re-entering it against his wishes; and it must be observed that these grounds, although in one view they may be considered public, are essentially personal. That release does not certainly make any alteration in the circumstances which induced you to recommend Mr. Canning to the King; and I, for one, still think it very desirable that Mr. Canning should be brought back to the Cabinet. But the question is, whether it is possible to effect that object?

I don't concur in the opinion stated in the paper dictated by you, which Arbuthnot read to me yesterday, that you ought not to propose anything to the King on this subject which you are not determined at all risks to carry through.

First. I don't believe you will find your colleagues disposed to incur all risks for this object, although I believe they are all

sincerely desirous of having Mr. Canning in the Cabinet ; some, like myself, thinking it desirable on the ground of the services he can render the government and on his own account, and others out of deference to you. But I don't think that you will find many of them disposed to resign the government from their hands if they should not attain that object.

Neither, secondly, do I believe you will find the party in general disposed to approve of your resignation on this ground.

There is no doubt that Mr. Canning is not very popular with them, and although they in general would wish for his assistance, they would be much disappointed and displeased to find the power of the country transferred to the hands of the Whigs and Radicals because we could not prevail upon the King to re-admit Mr. Canning into his Councils.

I think then, upon considering this matter and inquiring the opinion of your colleagues and friends, you will find that you cannot with justice to yourself or to the country, put the existence of your administration on the issue of this proposition to the King.

Then the question arises ; ought you to make it without being determined to carry it through ? Your continued opinion, mine, that of several other of your colleagues and of many of your friends, that it is highly desirable that Mr. Canning should be in the government, and the claim preferred in the last letter of the 29th June, to bring his name again under the King's view, show that you ought to propose him to the King not only under present circumstances, but whenever an opportunity may offer, his own conduct and opinions, in relation to those of the government, being the same as they are at present. I would recommend you to propose him to the King, then, not in the spirit of hostility, not as an alternative to be taken between Mr. Canning and us, or anything else the King can find as a government, but as you did at first, as an arrangement calculated for the strength of the government, the benefit of the country, and the honour of the King himself. It may fairly be doubted, and I doubt myself that the King would consent to the proposition made to him in any manner and under any circumstances. But of this I am very certain, that made in this form there is more chance of success ; and that at all events the question of Mr. Canning is not one on which this government can break with the King.

Under this impression I would make the proposition to the King in such a manner as that his rejection of it should not be liable to be considered as a perpetual exclusion.

In respect to Lord Conyngham your line is quite clear. You have nothing to propose; but you desire to remonstrate if the King should propose to appoint him Lord Chamberlain. This you may rely upon it he will not be allowed to do. If he does I think the appointment of Lord Conyngham, unaccompanied by a satisfactory arrangement of the question of Mr. Canning or of the government, would give you a good ground for quarrel.

But why should *we* look for quarrel? Is it not rather our duty to endeavour to settle this petty question, which after all is a mere trifle, and can affect us, and never was considered as affecting us, excepting as a point of honour. I don't mean to depreciate the importance of a point of honour to the government; but I would observe that the prevention of this particular appointment became a point of honour and important to the government after the rejection of Canning in June, the questions of the Irish Peerages, and of the Green Ribbands, and all the follies of the Coronation.

Before that period I perfectly recollect the subject being discussed, and that it was the general opinion that Lord Conyngham's appointment to be Lord Chamberlain, or to one of the other high offices in the household, could not be objected to. I certainly don't think we could now allow him to be Lord Chamberlain under any circumstances. But if we could not object at that period to his being appointed to any of the great offices of the household, why should we object at present to his being appointed to any except the Lord Chamberlain's, if we can make any arrangement of Canning's question, or any satisfactory arrangement to strengthen the government? Why should we not endeavour to settle that which is important to us and to the country by concession upon that which is immaterial to both, but which we know is particularly desired by the King?

I am aware of the difficulty of discussing this last question with him, as in the discussion we must descend in some degree from the high ground which we took respecting Lord Conyngham's appointment in August last. This difficulty will be increased tenfold, and will become an impossibility by putting questions on sharp alternatives, and by endeavouring to force

the King with the threat of the dissolution of the government, instead of to persuade him by awakening his mind to a sense of the manner in which they will affect his own honour and dignity and interest. But the most important of all these considerations is your own situation in relation to the King.

As I told you at Walmer, the King has never forgiven your opposition to his wishes in the case of Mr. Sumner. This feeling has influenced every action of his life in relation to his government from that moment; and I believe to more than one of us he avowed that his objection to Mr. Canning was that his accession to the government was peculiarly desirable to you. Nothing can be more unjust, or more unfair, than this feeling; and as there is not one of your colleagues who did not highly approve of what you did respecting Mr. Sumner, so there is not one of them who would not suffer with you all the consequences of that act.

It must not be forgotten, however, that we have a duty imposed upon us which was never thrown upon any of our predecessors.

The question for us is not, Whether we shall bear with many inconveniences and evils resulting from the King's habits and character, and which none of our predecessors ever bore, or make way for others equally capable with ourselves of carrying on the public service? but, Whether we shall bear all that we have to endure, or give up the government to the Whigs and Radicals, or, in other words, the country in all its relations to irretrievable ruin?

I believe that if it were not for this consideration there are few of us who would stay where we are. I now beg to urge it upon you, and to entreat you to bear it in mind in all that you will have to go through in the discussion and arrangement of all these questions. Let them be calmly looked at and considered, and don't allow yourself to put yourself or your government to issue upon any of them.

The result may be that we shall break down; but we shall have the satisfaction of reflecting that this misfortune is the effect of the circumstances in which we are placed, and of the character of the person with whom we have to deal, and not our own act.

I think that when you come to take into consideration how you stand yourself with the King, you will see that the line of

conduct in regard to Mr. Canning, which is advisable on other grounds, becomes absolutely necessary, and is the only one which affords a chance of success.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Mr. Crosbie to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

Paris, 8th Nov., 1821.

I have the honour to inform your Grace, that I yesterday saw Monsieur Gaillard, and read him the Memorandum which I beg to return together with his letter. He desires me to say, that in the work he proposes to publish, he will suppress the two articles he had submitted to your Grace, and which I delivered into his hands.

I have the honour to remain,  
your Grace's very faithful and obliged servant,  
M. CROSBIE.

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*To Mr. Crew.*

[ 100. ] MEMORANDUM.    TRANSFER OF THE BARRACK DEPARTMENT  
AND COMMISSARIAT OF STORES TO THE ORDNANCE.

December, 1821.

I have perused and taken into consideration the Memorandum, papers, and books transmitted to me by Mr. Arbuthnot, upon which I proceed to make some observations.

There is no doubt that the Ordnance department can take charge of the department of the Commissary of stores, and of that of Barracks. In respect to the former, the Ordnance now supply to the troops under their own superintendence, and for the service of the army and navy, nearly all, if not all, the articles of which the list is in the paper, No. 1. They have likewise establishments at nearly all the stations mentioned in No 2. The exceptions to the articles and to the places will be discussed hereafter.

The Ordnance have storehouse-room in the Tower and at Woolwich, or could obtain it at either without expense or inconvenience; and it is imagined that all the business of the store department, with the exceptions above referred to, could be transacted without any increase of establishment or of expense, excepting for labour.

Before, however, I can decidedly give an opinion upon this subject, I should wish to see an exact return of the number of officers, clerks, and labourers employed in this particular branch of the Commissariat

It would likewise be very desirable that I should be furnished with a list of prices, in order that they may be compared with those paid by the Ordnance for the same articles.

In respect to the Barrack department, I should wish to have the same information regarding persons employed in this particular branch of the service under the Treasury, including clerks of works.

All the establishments of the Ordnance having been recently reduced as low as possible, and the superintendence of the Barrack department involving very great details, it is possible that the transfer of this department to the Ordnance might require that some addition of clerks should be made to the Ordnance. But this point shall be examined very minutely, and no addition shall be made that is not absolutely necessary.

I come now to discuss the details of the Memorandum transmitted by Mr. Arbuthnot, and, for the sake of convenient reference to it, I have numbered the paragraphs.

When first this subject was discussed, I adopted the idea of the transfer of these departments to the Ordnance, because that department did, in fact, already transact much business of the same description on its own account, and because it could transact more of the same kind of business without any material increase of numbers or of expense. But if this arrangement is to occasion increase of establishments in the Ordnance, and should not diminish the public expense, I am decidedly of opinion that it ought not to be adopted; and there is no person who would undertake to carry it into execution with more unwillingness than myself.

In answer to the paragraph 2, then, I must observe that that which I had in contemplation in respect to the store department, was the transfer to the Ordnance of the supply and issue of every article of equipment to the troops, excepting what cannot properly be so called, provisions, forage, and fuel—the latter being a barrack supply, and coming under the consideration of barracks; and likewise supply and issue of all materials for building, whether at home or abroad.

It is this branch which I think could be carried into execution without any increase of expense or of establishment to the

Ordnance. But if that department are to issue tools, clothing, &c., to convicts, captured negroes, and military settlers, at what places not stated, and Indian presents, it is impossible for any man to form a judgment what establishments will be required, or what the expense to be incurred, without knowing much more of the details of those services than I do at present, or than I am likely to know.

In my view of this subject there is a clear distinction between supply and issue; and I do not think it would be difficult to make an arrangement between the two departments which should give the public the benefit of all the services of each, and of a considerable diminution of establishments and expense. Supposing, for instance, the services above referred to, that is the issue to convicts, slaves, &c., were not transferred to the Ordnance, the ordnance stores might still supply, on requisition and for payment to the commissariat, the articles for the performance of their work—as clothing, tools, arms, &c., in the same manner as the Navy Board now supply the shipping required by all the departments of the State, and as, in my opinion, the Commissariat ought to supply all the provisions, forage, fuel, and straw, required by the Ordnance and all the other departments. This measure would simplify all our operations. But what I particularly object to in what is proposed in this paragraph, is putting the officers at out-stations and abroad in relations to an extent unlimited with persons not military, unaccustomed to all forms of returns and accounts, to enable the Board in London to check or control their proceedings. I am quite certain that this branch of the service would not be performed by the Ordnance officers without incurring great inconvenience and loss. But this is not all. The Ordnance have no establishments at the places marked in the enclosed paper, No. 2. One of these, in New South Wales, to which articles have been sent during the period of the account, amounting in value to above one-fourth of the whole expenditure of the Storekeeper-General's department.

Now, although I doubt that the Ordnance stores could supply all or nearly all the articles sent to and issued in New South Wales, on the requisition of the Commissary-General, yet in order to issue them in New South Wales to convicts and others, the Ordnance must form an establishment which will cost no small expense, and which must be in addition to the establishment which the Commissary-General must still keep up in that

country, and, after all, this new and expensive Ordnance establishment must transact business with persons in a mode and according to forms to which the Ordnance are not accustomed, and which will not afford to the Board the usual means of check and control. The same objections apply in a great measure to the detailed issues to captured negroes and villages, to military settlers, and to Indians. The Ordnance have but very small establishments at Sierra Leone and in Upper Canada. These are quite unequal to the performance of such duties, and I am quite certain that the duty of issuing to the persons above-mentioned could not be performed satisfactorily by the officers of the Ordnance, as the departments at those stations are now composed.

But it does not follow that because the officers of the Ordnance could not with advantage be employed to make the issues to convicts, negroes, military settlers, and Indians, the ordnance stores in England could not with advantage supply to the commissariat many, if not all, of the articles to be issued, and thus get rid of the expense of warehouses, inspection, packing, &c., adverted to in the paragraph of the Memorandum.

In respect to paragraph 3, I have already mentioned that I conceive it would be desirable that we should have a list of the articles supplied by the Commissariat, with their prices annexed, in order to compare them with those paid by the Ordnance for the same articles. There will still remain to be made a comparison of the relative quality. In the Ordnance department it is believed that their contracts are made upon as good terms as in any other. If this is not true, their system must be altered; but setting aside standing contracts as decidedly objectionable for many reasons, I confess I should doubt the expediency of making small contracts for specific quantities, excepting in cases requiring this mode of proceeding in consequence of the alteration of specimens and patterns. I should likewise doubt the capacity of the Ordnance to manage such a concern as work done at the Penitentiary. Such work must be badly done, and might answer for convicts, negroes, or Indians; but could not be issued to the troops by a responsible Board.

My idea, then, of the arrangement to be adopted between the two departments is, that the Ordnance should supply everything that is manufactured, and requires magazine and store-room to keep it, pack it, or prepare it for use or embarkation, with the



exception perhaps of medicine alone (which is an article which I will discuss hereafter), and that the Commissariat should supply everything that is not manufactured and that does not require store-room or magazine to keep, or pack, or prepare it for issue on service. Under this last head would be classed some of the materials for building enumerated in the list, No. 1, and marked. But as the Ordnance will, under these arrangements, have to construct all buildings, it might perhaps be as well that this department should supply all the materials for building. This is a point, however, upon which I have not at present any decided opinion. Thus, besides provisions and forage, the Commissariat must supply fuel and straw for barracks, wherever and by whatever department required.

I must here observe that these would be the duties of the Commissariat if the troops were in the field instead of the barracks. All issues to the troops, excepting provisions and forage, and barrack articles, which come under a particular department and regulations, and medicines, for reasons to be discussed presently, should be made by the Ordnance; and all issues to convicts, negroes, military settlers, and Indians, as well as provisions and forage to the troops, should be made by the Commissariat.

In respect to the medicines, they are not properly an article of supply by the Commissary of Stores. I believe they were formerly supplied by the Apothecary-General; and the Treasury having, for good reasons, taken the supply out of his hands, handed it over to the Commissary-General. But medicines are not an article of equipment of the troops, which is what ought to be handed over to the Ordnance. They require but little if any magazine room, and no packing, excepting what is done at Apothecary's Hall, and the supply as well as the issue of them ought to remain with the Commissariat (unless, indeed, it should be handed over to the medical board), which department ought to supply the Ordnance as well as the army with the article.

In respect to No. 4, I have already stated that the packing carried on in Tooley-street can be performed in the Ordnance stores. It may require additional labourers in the Tower or at Woolwich, but most probably not many.

I concur in the contents of paragraph, No. 5, with the exceptions above stated, and likewise of Nos. 6 and 7. I don't exactly understand what is meant in paragraph No. 8, by *the custody*

*of all public buildings.* If barracks are meant, the buildings belonging to the barrack department at home and abroad are under the care of a particular set of officers, who are to be transferred to the Ordnance; and those buildings are kept in repair, and the use made of them, and the consumption in them, are regulated by a code which is still to continue in force and to be carried into execution strictly.

I cannot agree that the officers of the Ordnance, whether as storekeepers of the army if the department of the Storekeeper-General should be transferred to the Ordnance, or as barrack-masters if the department of Barracks should be so transferred, will be accountable for the execution of these duties *solely* and *exclusively* to the Board in London, who will in these cases be responsible to the public. Who ever heard of the officers of the Commissariat abroad or of the Barrack-masters not being accountable to the Commissary-General, the Treasury, or others, their official superiors?

The duties of these departments must be performed under certain rules and regulations, from which no officer can depart, or order a departure, excepting at his peril; and he must be able at all times to show the clear necessity for such departure. In such cases of necessity officers in command abroad must give orders upon *emergent* service to the officers of the Ordnance in the execution of the duties of the Storekeeper-General, and of Barrack-master, in the same manner as they now do in the execution of their other duties with the army; but still the officers of the Ordnance, in the execution of these orders, must be responsible and accountable to their own superiors, as they now are, and as the officers of the Commissariat and of the Barrack departments are to their superiors, for the accounts of expenditure and for the due transaction of the business of the department.

I concur in paragraph No. 9, with the same exceptions as above stated.

In respect to paragraphs Nos. 10, 11, and 12, I quite concur in what is proposed in regard to all articles, of which, according to my notion, the supply ought to be in the hands of the Commissariat. The others would be supplied by the officers of the Ordnance, in the usual manner.

In respect to paragraph No. 13, I quite concur that all land transport and inland water transport should be supplied by the Commissariat. I conclude that it is intended that transport by

sea should continue to be supplied by the Commissioners of the Navy.

I don't understand what buildings paragraph No. 14 has in contemplation. What is therein proposed is not necessary in relation to ordnance buildings, nor in relation to barracks, unless it should be now the regulation in regard to the latter.

In respect to what is proposed in No. 15, I would recommend to the Treasury to adhere to the existing regulations, and, if possible, to make them more strict. At present works and buildings of all descriptions are undertaken by general officers, without much control over their actions, and are paid for out of the army extraordinaries. Excepting in case of danger from an enemy, or other extraordinary emergency, no work or building of any kind, beyond the cost of \* ought to be allowed to be undertaken by any authority whatever, unless from full communication with the Treasury, and after having submitted their plans, estimates, &c.

All works already constructed should be handed over to the Ordnance, with orders to destroy such as may be deemed unnecessary; and all buildings, either the ordnance or barrack office, according as they may be within or without forts.

I concur in what is proposed in paragraph 16, excepting as far as is objected to in this Memorandum.

I quite concur in the whole of the paragraphs Nos. 17 and 18. The several stores of the barracks would be in charge of the Ordnance. It is my opinion, however, that great advantage would be derived to the public service from the arrangement proposed in the Memorandum that the Ordnance should take from the Commissariat all the straw and fuel that department should require, whether on account of barracks or any other, and that the Commissariat should become the only purchasers of these articles in the market on account of the public.

The arrangement proposed in paragraphs 19 and 20 will answer the purpose. The officers to be put in charge of the barracks in Ireland and abroad should be such officers as the Ordnance should appoint to take charge of them.

WELLINGTON.

\* Blank in manuscript.

To Mr. W. H. Freemantle.

[ 101. ]

MY DEAR FREEMANTLE,

London, 3rd Dec., 1821.

Since I saw you this morning I have learned that Lord Sidmouth is to remain in the Cabinet by the King's particular desire. I have not seen Lord Liverpool, but I conclude that he omitted to mention this from forgetfulness. Indeed, I had myself forgotten that the King had in the discussions of last summer, desired it.

I beg you, however, to recollect that ours is not, nor never has been, a *controversial* Cabinet upon any subject; and that a man more or less of any particular opinion will not have the slightest influence on the decision of any question.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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To Viscount Sidmouth.

[ 102. ]

MY DEAR LORD SIDMOUTH,

Stratfieldsaye, 4th Dec., 1821.

11 P.M.

I have just received your letter, dated the 3rd, but which I conclude was written this day, regarding the authorities which the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland requires should be given over the Ordnance in that part of the United Kingdom. I believe his Excellency has already the power of calling upon any of his Majesty's storekeepers to issue any arms or ammunition which he may think proper; but if he has not, I am quite sure he should have such power during the existing emergency.

But in granting this power, I beg leave to suggest to your Lordship that care should be taken that it may neither be delegated nor abused, and accordingly that his Excellency should be required to give regular warrants, under his own signature and properly countersigned, for all issues of arms or ammunition which he may require should be made, and that the persons to whom they may be issued may be held accountable for the same to the Ordnance, in the usual manner.

With respect to the second part of his Excellency's desire, that the respective officers of the Ordnance *should conform themselves in all respects to the wishes and instructions of the government in furtherance of the public service, without reference in the first instance for the sanction of their Board*, I really do not understand to what it refers.

If it is to public works, or to the employment of officers to be paid by the Ordnance, I must object to the exercise of such powers by any person. The usual mode in which services of this kind are carried on in countries similarly situated, is for the person who has the chief command to order the construction of such works as he may think proper, by such officers or others as he may think proper, and to pay for the same out of the extraordinaries of the army. No expense can be incurred on account of the Ordnance, excepting under the order of the head of that department; and it is obvious that this rule cannot be broken through.

I imagine that works and the employment of officers are the objects in contemplation, because, in consequence of a report from the chief engineer in Ireland, I have this day had occasion to give my opinion upon proposals of this kind. I am sure that your Lordship will see that his Excellency, having the power of effecting that which he may wish to do, in the usual manner, ought not to adopt an unusual mode of proceeding, and thereby involve the Ordnance Department in great expense for which no provision has been made, and responsibility for acts over which they have no control.

With respect to the proposal to add 200 men to each of the regiments of the line in Ireland, I am of opinion, as I told you in conversation yesterday, that you cannot adopt it without the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief, and without calling together the Cabinet.

In my opinion, there are as many regular troops in Ireland as the emergency requires, so far as I have any knowledge of it. I wish there was more cavalry; but I have not seen or heard of anything yet to induce me to think that there is not enough of infantry.

Supposing the emergency to become stronger, the plan proposed has one advantage, viz., that it takes out of the reach of temptation about 5000 men; but I should doubt the expediency of adding 200 men to each battalion of 578, or 25 to each company of 70 odd, that is, of making each company 100 strong, without adding officers and non-commissioned officers. I should doubt the expediency of such a measure, particularly on such a service as Ireland, where men must be detached. Now I say there ought to be no detachment without its officers and non-commissioned officers, and to add to the number of soldiers, therefore, without increasing proportionably the number of officers and non-commissioned officers, is to add worse than nothing.

Though, as far as I have seen, I should say that your infantry is strong enough, I regret the loss of the two regiments of cavalry.

There is one part of this plan to which I positively object ; and that is, that part which proposes that each regiment should have with it 200 stand of arms for the levies. There are arms at various depôts in Ireland, and there can be no difficulty in procuring them, as wanted. To send the arms to the regiment before they have the men to use them, would only tend to render the regiment less disposable by making it necessary always to have a strong guard over the arms.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I beg, upon perusing my letter, to explain that all officers and persons of the Ordnance, are, and must be, at his Excellency's service ; but that he must find the means of defraying all extra expenses.

WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Sidmouth.*

[ 103. ]

MY LORD,

Stratfieldsaye, 9th Dec., 1821.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 1st, to which I have delayed to send an answer, as I wished to receive from the office an exact statement of the existing relations between the government of Ireland and the Board of respective officers of the Ordnance in Dublin ; and I have now the honour to enclose to your Lordship an extract from the instructions to the respective officers in Dublin, which direct "That all requisitions from his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, or by his directions, or from the commander of the forces in Ireland, whether addressed to the respective officers collectively, or to any of them individually, which shall be stated to be of urgent and immediate necessity," are to be complied with as expeditiously as may be possible.

The attention of the respective officers has been drawn to this article in their instructions ; and I have to inform your Lordship that I have now before me reports of the transmission of ammunition to Limerick and of other arrangements under the direction of his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant, which show that the practice has been in strict conformity with the instructions above referred to.

I do not consider any addition to these instructions to be necessary ; but as it is probable that in the existing emergency in Ireland the Irish government may be induced to order the issue of arms and ammunition to newly-raised corps and even to individuals, I beg leave to recommend that instructions should be sent to the Lord-Lieutenant, recommending to his Excellency to require that all persons to whom arms or ammunition may be issued from his Majesty's stores or magazines, under his Excellency's authority, may be accountable for the same to the Ordnance, according to the existing practice.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 104. ]

*To Lord Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Stratfieldsaye, 9th Dec., 1821.

I have more than once had occasion to draw your attention to the case of the Rev. Mr. Briscall. He was chaplain at my head quarters from the year 1808 to the end of the year 1818, always conducted himself in the most exemplary manner, and I believe did more good and more for the cause of true religion than it ever fell to the lot of any person in his situation to do ; and he was respected by the whole army. On the army being broken up he was put on half-pay, although I believe the senior chaplain in the service ; and he is now the curate of this parish, which is all that I have been able to get for him, and he can't live in the rector's house on account of the expense. I really think that to see a man so respectable as this is, and in every respect so qualified as a clergyman, so neglected after such services, is not creditable, and I beg leave again to recommend him to your patronage. There is now a canonry of St. Paul's vacant. Of course I don't look to this dignity for Mr. Briscall ; but you will probably confer this dignity upon somebody who has some other preferment, and in the promotion to the canonry something may become vacant which may be given to Mr. Briscall in acknowledgment for his known and valuable public services.

I assure you that if Mr. Briscall was not one of the most respectable clergymen I know, I would not recommend him to you as I now do.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Lord Beresford.*

[ 105. ]

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

Stratfieldsaye, 14th Dec., 1821.

I ought long ago to have acknowledged the receipt of your letter of the 21st October, but I had nothing to tell you on the subject to which it relates principally, and I now write to you in consequence of your letter to Lord FitzRoy Somerset. He will endeavour to find among my papers anything relating to ———; but I am afraid that much is lost. At all events we can judge from our index what there is in the Secretary of State's office that we have lost, and we can apply for copies.

There have been in different meetings and different newspapers vague accusations that ——— had been kept back by jealousy of some great personage! The accusers do not define who they mean, and it is generally understood that I am the person; but I dare say that if I were to move and challenge to the proof, you would be pointed at. But I think it best to pass over all this folly and nonsense as unworthy of attention, and I have not said a word to anybody nor shall I. But I suppose we shall have the whole question in the House of Commons, where the best thing to do will be to keep it on its own grounds.

When I left London last, about a week ago, Lord Londonderry thought of sending the Garter to the King of Portugal by Mr. Thornton, who was from thence to go on the mission to Naples. I have not heard that Lord Liverpool made any objection, and I conclude that that scheme will be carried into execution. If it is not, the objection will be founded on the conduct of Portugal in respect to the Slave Trade. But I think we ought to give the King, in the existing difficulties of his affairs, some mark of the goodwill of this country towards himself personally.

It does not appear to me that anything will save him in the independence of Portugal. The colonies of both kingdoms are gone, and those who have revolted must by this time have discovered that others can revolt as well as themselves, and that no country in what is called a modern constitutional state can keep a dependency. They must likewise in Portugal at least have discovered that they cannot stand, much less walk, alone. Their policy is and must be to throw off this country, because the result of their continued connection with this country will be eventually to bring those who have revolted to the punishment



which they deserve; and this country is, I am sorry to say it, sufficiently shortsighted to think that its interest lies on the side of relinquishing the connection with Portugal. There is no road open, then, but a connection with Spain under the auspices of the revolted. This will be the result of what is going on in both countries, whether Spain continues a monarchy, or what is more than probable, a federation of republics. In the former case Portugal will be added to Spain as so many additional departments; in the latter one or more additional republics to the League, in proportion as Oporto may think herself strong enough to claim or not to be the capital of a northern Lusitanian republic.

In all this I put out of the question any resistance on the part of the King or his family, or of his nobility. They are *geldings* in every sense of the word!

Yours sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ 106. ]

To Lord Londonderry.

MY DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,      Stratfieldsaye, 17th Dec., 1821.

As you don't receive very early or very accurate intelligence from Sir Charles Stuart, and you will not see Count Lieven, I think it as well to make you acquainted with the purport of a letter which he has received from Pozzo, which he has shown to me. Events at Paris are at their crisis, and the Duc de Richelieu had been obliged to consider whether he should dissolve the Chambers or not, and had determined that he would not, because the dissolution would be considered as an appeal to the people; and as the royalist party were not very popular, he was apprehensive of a *reaction* and its consequences. This reason and determination are, in my opinion, highly honourable to him. He had been offered by the "*Puissance du Jour*" (which is, I think, the expression in the letter, and means, I believe, *Monsieur*) to be placed at the head of the royalist government, but had declined, not liking to undertake to manage the royalists, and had determined to go out with his friends, all of whom, with the Duke de Richelieu, had given in their resignations. A royalist government was then formed, at the head of which was the Duke de Blacas as *Ministre des*

*Affaires Étrangères* and *President du Conseil des Ministres*, assisted by Villèle, Corbières, Matt. de Montmorency, and such others as they could agree to act with.

These are the circumstances mentioned by Pozzo, upon which he makes no reflections of any importance.

Considering the grounds upon which the Royalists and *Libéraux* have coalesced to overthrow the Duke de Richelieu's government, I cannot conceive a more unfortunate event than the formation of this royalist administration. In order to acquire a little popularity and a national character, they must meddle in foreign politics, and this against the system of the Quintuple Alliance. I have, therefore, thought it desirable to draw your attention to this change as soon as possible.

Believe me ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone.*

[ 107. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

Stratfieldsaye, 17th Dec., 1821.

This letter will be delivered to you by Colonel Dalbiac, of the 4th Light Dragoons, who is going to India, and as he understands to Bombay with his regiment to relieve the 17th.

This officer served for a considerable number of years under my command in the Peninsula, and I assure you that I don't know in the service one more able, more trustworthy, or more zealous than he is.

If you should have it in your power I shall be very much obliged to you if you will forward his interests and views, and I assure you that you will very soon find that your government has in him one of its ablest servants.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Marquess of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Avington, 19th Dec., 1821.

I am very much obliged to you for your note. I feel sincere and great pleasure in seeing the prospect which now opens to us of more intimate connexion with the government, and I feel very sensibly your kind wishes and

exertions to forward it. I have no difficulty in saying that it gives me greater pleasure in proportion as it gives me the means of a more confidential connexion with *yourself*. I have much more to say upon this subject than I choose to put to paper, but I trust we shall soon meet, when I can explain myself further *and in perfect confidence*. Suffice it for the present to say that my anxiety is to act with you and your brother Lord Wellesley.

Ever, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

CHANDOS-BUCKINGHAM.

[ 108. ]

*To the Duc de Richelieu.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Londres, ce 21<sup>re</sup> Déc., 1821.

Il ne vous sera pas difficile à croire combien de peine les rapports que nous avons reçu des derniers évènements à Paris nous ont causé à tous, et surtout à moi. Je vous assure que je n'y trouve que la seule consolation que vous vous êtes sacrifié pour la cause du Roi, de sa famille, et du bonheur publique.

Il n'y a pas de doute que le remède du mal en circonstances ordinaires aurait été de casser la Chambre ; mais il est aussi vrai que ce remède aurait causé une réaction dont les suites auraient pu accélérer, si elles n'eussent pas occasionné en grande partie, tous les maux que nous appréhendons ; et il est digne de vous de vous être sacrifié plutôt que de faire encourir des risques à des intérêts si chers au monde.

Je souhaite que Messieurs vos successeurs aient le même désintéressement, et surtout la sagesse de réfléchir un peu, après avoir pris connaissance de cause, avant de se hasarder à marcher sur la ligne qu'ils se sont tracée par leur adresse au Roi et dans leurs discours à la Chambre des Députés.

Croyez moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

EXTRACT FROM A MEMOIR ON THE PRESENT STATE OF NAPLES.

*From Lord Burghersh.*

1822.

My object is to ascertain whether the operations of government from August to January (1821-2) have been such as to establish the dynasty and to unite it with the mass of interests which preponderate in the Neapolitan nation, after the cessation of the *surveillance* and the precautionary

measures merited by the excesses which have been committed ; so that profiting by the experience which our misfortunes have offered, we may resume an independent station in the social system of Europe.

The obstinate opposition of the Department of Justice to the code is confirmed by the opinion of the Commission of Scrutiny.

The effect of this system is fatal to the public interest, to private morals, to the unity so much desired, and to the confidence which should be established between the throne and the nation. Laws ill applied become acts of arbitrary power and disgust all ; since all are in want of civil and criminal justice. They tend to corrupt lawyers, judges, and litigants, all of whom are interested in eluding them, and recourse is had, in consequence, to the interference of men in power.

Honest men fall victims to that corruption which they are incapable of employing ; undecided men employ it as necessary, and wicked men acquire from it strength and influence in society. The first class cannot be attached to a government without justice ; the second feel themselves placed in the alternative of being oppressed or corrupters ; and the last seek nothing but their own interest.

Another effect of the new system is, that the late magistrates have now become lawyers (pleaders), and have a great advantage over their inexperienced successors.

Prussia and France have given examples worthy of imitation. Provincial councils may serve as a communication between the government and the nation ; and sacrifices on the part of the court (and the employés) would render those of proprietors, and of the people, more just and less felt. But unfortunately the facility of credit has deluded the government, and has induced it to satisfy caprices but little analogous to the privations endured by individuals. This conduct has removed the effects of the revolution from its authors, who, as emigrants, have become objects of pity, to the ministers.

Little is to be said against the system of finance ; but the administration of it suffers from the uncertain character of the public officers, both as to probity and activity. The scrutiny serves as a pretext to the corrupt, and corrupts those who were pure ; which is felt particularly in the customs.

The system of the Minister of the Interior has made the government weak, without making it less despotic. It has imbittered the spirit of the provinces and the communes, by which it has strengthened one of the most powerful motives of the Revolution. By favouring ignorance and proscribing knowledge, it has oppressed rising industry ; has checked the opinions of the thinking, and the interests of the feeling ; and has increased the discontent and want of sympathy with the government. The disbanding of the army has condemned it to the contempt of Europe and of its countrymen. It is an unjust measure ; for he who deserves it is insensible to honour, and those only are its victims who do not deserve it.

Besides this general measure, individuals are liable to a separate scrutiny which will fix their destiny in the new army. Can an army change its collective opinions whilst those of the individuals who compose it remain the same ?

It has been attempted to attack the army in mass, and to save individuals in detail ; this has produced its natural effect, that of destroying the corps,

in a moral sense, without saving individuals. We must then give up all dependence on national troops, and attach ourselves to the forces of foreign nations.

The problem of the military convention is this: To occupy the kingdom with a force that may preserve order, and which may not disgust by its expense either public opinion or public interest, or prevent government from forming a moral force, consisting of proprietors, and a *material* force which may replace the army of occupation. Let us see whether this problem is solved by the convention of 18 September 1821. The expense of this treaty is calculated at nine millions a year at least; calculating the march as far as the Po, for which the old budget is not sufficient; so that it must be paid with a million and a half, leaving a regular deficit of six millions and a half, allowing five for the war if it is required.

To organize and pay a division of six regiments of infantry and cavalry, to occupy Sicily, we must add the interest on eighteen millions and the debts left by the constitution; which add more than another million, and leave an annual deficit of nearly eight millions.

No one will doubt how this progressive deficit can solve the problem. We must pay, from their very formation, our rising national army, and must furnish the Austrians as far as the Po; a double expense, and too heavy to be borne.

If I am told that errors must be paid for, I ask what was the object of the Allies in interfering with the affairs of Naples,—was it to avenge the king, or to gain a moral victory over the Revolution? I believe both; but the second is the most important and the most consistent. The first is gained by the condemnation of the factions which, if they composed the whole population, would destroy the basis of the second: as in such a case a nation must have satisfaction in claiming its wants, and must not be punished for expressing them. The second cannot be obtained by imbittering the public mind and leaving the nation at war with the throne.

The two alleviations would be a diminution of number or of expense.

At Laybach the convention of Paris was taken as a basis, and it was proved that a King of Naples must be satisfied with the treatment of a King of France. If this maxim is just, we should reflect that, as in the first war against France, the Allies resolved to reconquer the territory they had lost in former wars; in the second they strove to recover the funds they had expended. These circumstances do not exist at Naples, and the tariff of 1815, and the convention of Piedmont, would have been sufficient for the Army of Occupation, and would have relieved the nation.

The number of 40,000 men supposes that a nation unsupported by public opinion, which has been momentarily surprised, operated the revolution, and is too much as soon as that opinion is restored. 25,000 occupying the fortification and the capital would be sufficient. A local force of proprietors would be easily organized.

As a physical victory is notoriously insufficient, the Pope has excommunicated the Carbonari; introducing into his Bull, John Huss and Jerome of Prague. This is impolitic. Heresy has never entered Naples. There were incredulous men, but no heretics; the latter will now be propagated and the former will not be diminished.

In short the convention has not combined present security with the solid

establishment of the throne. The Bull has done much harm and no good. The difficulty of governing Sicily increases with the necessity of so doing.

Instead of uniting the king and the nation, the Allies have widened the breach between them; and, instead of burying in oblivion the events of last year, they have marked them by granting the title of prince to a foreign general.

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*To Mr. Arbuthnot.*

MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSED DEMAND ON PORTUGAL FOR [ 109. ]  
PAYMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THE LINES AND OF  
PRISONERS OF WAR.

8th Jan., 1822.

The two points on which I am desired to give my opinion are—1st. Whether the government ought to persist in demanding payment from Portugal of any part of the expenses of the works called the Lines of Torres Vedras. 2nd. Whether Portugal ought to pay the whole or any part of the expenses of the prisoners of war. I conclude that the other points discussed in these papers have been decided upon, and that there is no occasion for my giving any opinion upon them.

1st. In regard to the works: There is no doubt whatever that they were undertaken and carried into execution without the consent or knowledge of the local government of Portugal; that that government was never consulted upon the subject; and that, if the opinion of that government had been consulted, it would have urged the strongest objection to the system of defence founded upon the construction of those works; and as they were constructed by the peasantry of the country, they certainly might have prevented their construction if the measure had been persisted in contrary to their declared wishes. To this statement I have to add that the government and people of Portugal suffered great losses and privations by the adoption of the system in question, which may be considered in some degree a *set off* against the expenses of the construction of the works. I have likewise to add that I believe nothing was charged either in the way of purchase or hire of the ground on which the works were constructed, or of that over which the communications with the several works were carried. Whether this ground was the property of the public or of individuals, whether this use of it cost the Portuguese government or not, is not material. It appears to me that they could still have a

fair claim to set off the purchase or hire of the ground on which the works stood against the expenses of their construction. Upon the whole it has always appeared to me that the demand of payment of any part of the expenses of the construction of these works ought not to be made upon the Portuguese government.

2nd. In respect to the prisoners of war: They were taken by the Allied armies generally, and the expense of their maintenance during the period of their captivity ought to have been paid by the Allies in certain proportions, which ought to have been settled at the time.

As this probably was not done, we must endeavour to find some fair principle on which we can found a decision of the question now under discussion. The prisoners were taken in Spain or in Portugal, and were generally sent to Lisbon or some other seaport to be embarked for England. When arrived in England they were maintained solely at the expense of the British government, and it does not appear that there is any demand for their expenses after quitting Portugal or the Peninsula. The whole expense then of their removal to England, of their subsistence on the voyage, and of their maintenance in England, falls upon the British government.

Upon the same principle as the British government does not call upon Portugal to defray any of the expenses attending the prisoners, either on board its ships or in England, Portugal might fairly be called upon to defray all the expenses attending the prisoners of war in Portugal; and Spain, all the same expenses while they were in Spain. Neither country would have to pay an expense at all proportionate to that paid by Great Britain, as in point of fact the prisoners were invariably sent to England, as soon as possible after they were taken, for security, and in order to save the expense of their maintenance in the Peninsula, and to avoid the trouble and inconvenience of guarding them in those countries.

This proposed principle then appears to be fair, unless indeed Great Britain claimed, in the discussion of the different cartels of exchange with France, an advantage over the other two Allied powers.

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 110. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 27th Feb., 1822.

I return the box with Lord Wellesley's letters, and the reports from Lieutenant-Colonel Thornton. I was always of opinion that the military, without the assistance of the provisions of the Insurrection Act, could not get the better of the disturbances in the south of Ireland; and Colonel Thornton's reports represent a state of things nearly similar to that which I had supposed existed. It is quite clear that the patrols of the troops, as their movements are called, cannot prevent the banditti from carrying into execution their projects, but I am far from thinking that because they cannot produce all the good effects which might be wished from this fatiguing duty, it ought to be discontinued. The movements of the troops must, if judiciously conducted, tend to cramp those of the banditti, and to prevent many from joining them, and I would recommend the continuance of these movements under some system of combination even where the Insurrection Act is not in force.

But I look to the Insurrection Act as the remedy for this evil, which consists in the assembly of persons by night for the purpose of the robbery of arms, murder and terror. The mode in which the Insurrection Act operates is by obliging all persons to remain in their houses. It is perfectly true that wherever the Insurrection Act is in force there must be troops to carry it into execution. But I must observe that a comparatively small body of troops will produce more effect where the Insurrection Act is in force than where it is not. All the movements, or patrols, are, if attended by a magistrate, effective movements. Whenever made, the object must be effected of searching one or more houses, and discovering whether the inhabitants are at home or otherwise; and even if all should be found in their houses, those whose houses are searched must be sensible that there are means of carrying that law into execution, and they will be apprehensive of venturing upon any future expedition.

I am not surprised that it should have been discovered that there are not sufficient troops to carry into execution the Insurrection Act. This was the cry of faction here at the time the bills were discussed; and it was to be expected that it



would reach Ireland, and that the gentlemen of the country should take advantage of it to do nothing.

Colonel Thornton, however, says that the country is covered with troops; and he is surprised that the troops cannot prevent the banditti from carrying on their schemes without the assistance of the Insurrection Act; and I think that no man can doubt that the Insurrection Act, which makes it criminal for any man to be out of his house at night, whether he is met by the troops and found abroad, or his house is found empty, and which affords for the operations of the troops defined objects, must enable those who are to contend with this evil to get the better of it with fewer troops than they could without the assistance of the provisions of the act.

I admit that the fears of the magistrates, and their disinclination to cooperate in putting the Insurrection Act in force, are serious difficulties. The remedy, viz., the employment of the officers of the regiments as magistrates, cannot be effectual, as these must want the local knowledge as well as that of the characters of the people, which the gentlemen of the country must have. But Colonel Thornton, or whoever commands, must endeavour to supply the deficiency of knowledge by a combination of the movements and operations of the troops, and by constant private communications between himself and the most intelligent of the officers and the gentlemen of the country. By those means I hope that the act may be put in execution, and if that is once accomplished we shall very soon find the gentlemen of the country not only disposed, but eager to cooperate in the work.

There are different duties to be performed by magistrates under the Insurrection Act, each of which requires a distinct consideration whether the officer of the army ought to be employed to perform them. The first is the demand that the county or district should be proclaimed. In my opinion the officers of the army ought not to be permitted to attend any meeting for such a purpose. The next is the search of houses. This duty may, and I believe must be performed by the officers of the army, as it is very probable that the gentlemen of the county will be disinclined to perform it in the first instance. The third is the arrest of the man found abroad at night, or whose house will have been found empty. This duty cannot be performed without the assistance of the troops; and I am

afraid that, however desirable that it should be otherwise, the officer must perform it. The fourth is the trial of the man arrested for being out of his house at night, and here I conceive that no officer ought to be allowed to sit, excepting perhaps the commanding officer of a regiment, or one of higher rank. Indeed my opinion is that it would be an improvement of the act, and silence the only founded objection to it, if the Lord Lieutenant was required to name the magistrate who, with the King's serjeants and assistant barristers, should carry into execution this part of it.

There is nothing more that occurs to me upon this subject at present.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—The mode of proceeding which I would recommend in respect to the search of these houses, is that it should be carried into execution at as many places as possible at the same time on the same night. That very few people, not more than may be necessary to force an entrance into the house, if such entrance should be resisted, should be employed in the actual search, and the remainder, the main body of the detachment employed, should be in reserve. This operation cannot be attended by any risk to a detachment. Either the people will be in their houses, in which case they will be separate, and cannot injure the detachment, or they will be out of their houses, employed at a distance in some object of their own, in which case they can do no mischief to the detachment, and the absent from their houses will be ascertained, or they will be collected and prepared to resist the execution of the law. In this last case perseverance in the execution of the law at that particular time and place becomes a question of prudence. If the officer chooses to persevere he has a defined duty to perform, the performance of which must have its effect; and at all events if he finds the means of resistance too great for him, the consequence will not be worse than if he were to find, upon any of the usual movements of the troops, that the banditti instead of dispersing in the fields were disposed to dispute the possession and passage of the road.

[ 111. ]

*To Sir Herbert Taylor.*

MEMORANDUM. COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE EXPENSE OF  
THE ARMY IN 1792 AND 1822.

London, 28th Feb., 1822.

The army of 1792, exclusive of troops in the East Indies, consisted of 48,553 men, including those on the Irish establishment, and paid by Ireland.

The total expense, as far as it can be made out from the	£.
English and Irish journals, was .. .. .	2,500,000
Exclude pensions, half pay, &c. .. .. .	463,720
Exclude extraordinaries .. .. .	350,000
	<hr/> 813,720

The actual expense for the ordinaries, excluding pensions and half pay, will be .. .. .	1,686,280
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The pay of the officers and men has since been increased.

The latter, 6d. per diem, or 9l. 3s. each per annum. The officers to a greater amount; but add for 48,553 men, 9l. 3s. each .. .. .	444,229
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This is the expense of the ordinary of the army of 1792 at the rates of pay of the present day.

The numbers of the army, according to the estimate of 1822, are 68,802, exclusive of troops in India. These numbers are 20,249 more than in 1792.

Add for them at the same rate of expense as that above calculated for the 48,553 .. .. .	874,000
Expense of 68,802 men calculated according to that of 1792, with the addition of the pay of the present day, and without half pay, pensions, or extraordinaries .. .. .	<hr/> £3,004,509

The ordinary, as in the estimate of 1822, for 68,802 men, is .. .. .	6,019,892
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Deduct for half pay, pensions, &c. .. .. . 2,744,558

For the pay of general officers without regiments not existing in 1792 .. .. . 182,425

For the charge of volunteer corps not existing in 1792 .. .. . 183,000

Increased expense of recruiting for the East Indies, that in 1792 being .. .. . 8,345

that in 1822 being .. .. . 23,198

Difference .. .. . 14,853

Exchequer fees not appearing on estimate of 92 .. .. . 33,000

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3,164,836

Cost of the army in 1822 without pensions or other charges which did not exist in 1792, and without extraordinaries .. .. .

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£2,955,066

Nearly the whole of the miscellaneous services in the estimate of 1822 ought to be deducted, as these charges did not exist in 1792, but particularly the charge for beer-money ought, as being a positive addition to the pay of the troops, not existing in 1792. This would be a farther diminution of the comparative charge of 1822, amounting to 54,000*l.*, allowing for the difference between English and Irish currency.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duke of Buckingham.\**

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 6th March, 1822. [ 112. ]

Your letter of the 3rd followed me into Hampshire, from whence I returned this day, and I assure you that I am much flattered by your confidence.

You are quite right; the country gentlemen treat the government exceedingly ill. What I complain of is, not the votes of individuals upon the Salt-tax, or the Lords of the Admiralty, or upon any other question of reduction, as, in the existing temper of the country, men may find themselves obliged to follow the torrent rather than stem it; but what I complain of is their acting in concert and as a party independent of, and without consultation with, the government which they profess to support, but really oppose. In ordinary times, and under ordinary circumstances, this conduct could not be borne for a moment. The government would necessarily be obliged to take the line which you suggest, and I think that under ordinary circumstances the result would be what you suppose. I think it also not impossible that we may find ourselves obliged to take this step before this session closes, but I confess that I shall take it myself, and see it taken by my colleagues, with the greatest reluctance and pain, for reasons which in fact constitute the great difference between these times and others.

It would not be difficult to form a government to succeed to us out of our own party, but, if we are unable to conduct the government, they would be still more unequal to it, and they would want particularly our experience in tiding over the difficulties of the day. The Opposition are still more unable than ourselves or others to form and conduct a real govern-

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\* The Marquess of Buckingham was created Duke of Buckingham and Chandos in January, 1822.

ment, but they would be able,\* and not unwilling, to do a great deal of mischief; enough probably to prevent us, or any others who should succeed to them, from being able to conduct the government again. They would soon find that they could not govern upon their new system, and they would not be supported by the country on that or any other, but they would just have the power to render the government of the country impossible to their successors.

I have stated to you very shortly my view of this question, which I believe is the true one. I believe then that however painful it may be to us—and I declare most sincerely it is so to me—it is our duty to remain where we are as long as we can, and, at all events, endeavour to overcome the difficulties of this most critical of all moments.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 113. ]

To ———.\*

London, 21st March, 1822.

Shortly after the misfortune occurred in your family I was very anxious to discover the means of preventing the necessity of your going to India, and I had some correspondence with your brothers on the subject. The result was the idea that you might join Sir Thomas Maitland's head-quarters, to be there employed as he might think best, and be put on the Staff in the Mediterranean if there should be a vacancy, or, in short, take your chance nearer home than you would be in the East Indies.

I adopted this idea for several reasons, which I will now detail to you. There is no war, or even a chance of war, at the present moment; and, although your going out in command of a regiment of dragoons is of itself a respectable and lucrative situation, and with your rank and pretensions it is more than probable that you would be employed in some of the commands, still the advantages were not likely to be such as in a few years to enable you to pay your debts. I considered then the disinclination which your father and family would naturally feel to part from you for such a distance and such a length of time

\* The officer to whom this is addressed was addicted to gambling.

at this particular period, and the expense to be incurred in procuring your exchange, and in your equipment, passage, &c., and putting these against the advantages such as I have above stated, it appeared to me upon the whole to be best and most advantageous to you to take this chance in the Mediterranean at present, and to look to go to India hereafter when you will be a Major-General, and can look to be placed on the Staff, and to have those advantages which will to a certainty enable you in a few years to return with means to pay your debts.

I have accordingly suspended your exchange into the 16th Light Dragoons, and it will remain suspended till the answer will come from yourself stating your own decision upon this subject. If you should judge differently from your brothers and me it will go on; if you should agree with us, some other person will be substituted for you. It is not intended that at all events Murray should command the regiment.

I cannot conclude this letter without urgently entreating you to recollect what it is that has obliged you to separate yourself from your family and friends, and to quit the most advantageous and agreeable position that can fall to the lot of any man in England. I am afraid that you can go to no part of the world, whether near or distant, in which you will not find means and opportunities of getting into similar scrapes; and you may rely upon it that their only result will be to occasion fresh and increased regret to yourself, and sorrow to your family and friends, and to none more than to him who subscribes himself yours most sincerely and affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Mr. Crew,*

MINUTE UPON THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF WORKS AND [ 114.]  
BUILDINGS IN THE CANADAS TO THE ORDNANCE.

23rd March, 1822.

This subject is one of great importance, and requires a good deal of consideration by the Treasury, and possibly some discussion, before the plan proposed can be adopted, which goes to put all the public buildings and works in Canada under the care and direction of the Ordnance.

If this were done this year the Ordnance estimates would be increased to the amount of 68,000*l.* for buildings and repair of buildings in Canada alone; whereas the amount of the estimate for buildings and repairs of all descriptions under the Ordnance throughout the British dominions, including Canada, is only 53,000*l.*!

The subject then is a very serious one, and ought to be well considered in all its bearings before the arrangement proposed is adopted.

The mode in which I understand this business has been conducted hitherto is this: the governor or commander-in-chief in the colony, after consulting with the officers of engineers, or other persons as he may think proper, transmits to the Treasury an account of the necessity of any particular works or building, such, for instance, as the citadel of Quebec, with plans, and an estimate of the probable expense of constructing it, and the Treasury give their concurrence for its construction. Without their concurrence it is understood that no works or building can be undertaken by a governor abroad which will cost more than 500*l.* These works are in general planned, estimated, and executed by the officers of engineers stationed in the colony, and paid by the Ordnance department; but they are not necessarily constructed by these officers, and, at all events, they do not at present act under the Ordnance department in any matter relating to these works and buildings. For instance, I believe that to this moment this department have no knowledge whatever of the citadel of Quebec.

These works and buildings so constructed are charged to the extraordinaries of the army; and it appears that they are so charged in time of peace, because they would necessarily have been so charged in time of war and of active operations.

The Ordnance are a responsible Board for the conduct of a particular branch of the public business, and the expenditure of a certain sum of money granted by parliament for the particular services stated in the estimates.

The first question is, could the Ordnance undertake the care and direction of all the public works and buildings in Canada? Upon this question there is no doubt. The officers placed by the Ordnance in these provinces, and paid by the Ordnance, are the persons who, in general, plan, estimate, and execute these works; and there would be no difficulty, in my opinion, in

making them act in every respect in regard to the works and buildings, as they do in regard to those which are at present under this department.

The next question is, could the business be transacted as it is at present if these works and buildings were placed under the care and direction of the Ordnance? It would be impossible for this department, responsible as it is, and charged as it is with the care of the defensive works of the empire, and as it would be in a greater degree than ever when this measure should be adopted, to allow of the construction of any works or buildings, or even the repair of any works or buildings, without considering in detail the object to be attained, the plan, estimate and means of construction. There is no doubt but that such consideration would be a public advantage, and the question is, whether it can be given without public inconvenience. In time of war, and in case of active operations in the field, or of apprehensions of invasion, the commander of the forces cannot be superseded. He ought then to be allowed to construct or repair such works and buildings on his own responsibility as he might find necessary, and to charge the amount to the extraordinaries of the army. But in time of peace it appears to me that the decision of the Treasury would be assisted in every case by the consideration and opinion of the Board of Ordnance officially, before any work, building, or repair should be undertaken. This Board would then be responsible for every building and work, and would introduce the expense of their construction into its estimates, but it is impossible that it should do so unless the necessity for the work or building, and plan and estimate, should have been first submitted to the Board, and this department should have full opportunity of considering the subject in all its bearings. As all these matters must now be submitted in detail to the Treasury before any work can be undertaken above the cost of 500*l.*, it appears to me that the public service would not suffer greater inconvenience or delay by their being submitted to this department than they would when submitted to the Treasury alone, and that the public would gain all the advantage of their being considered officially in this department.

WELLINGTON.



To Mr. Ward.\*

[ 115. ] MEMORANDUM ON THE REDUCTIONS IN THE ORDNANCE, 1822,  
AND COMPARISON WITH 1792.

24th March, 1822.

In respect to the military reduction of the Ordnance ; it has been carried as far as it was possible ; and, striking out drivers and horse artillery, and allowing only for the number of men actually employed in the new colonies, there are rather less artillery now than in 1791-92 :—

The artillery in those years in Great Britain amounted to .. ..	3763
Add Irish artillery .. .. .	602
	<hr/>
	4365
Add employed in additional colonies :	
Malta .. .. .	134
Ionian Islands .. .. .	189
Cape .. .. .	67
Ceylon .. .. .	143
Mauritius .. .. .	60
Berbice, &c. )	
St. Lucia     )	
Tobago        )	100
Trinidad     )	
On passage to relieve .. .. .	255
	<hr/>
	5313
Present establishment, including drivers .. .. .	5547
	<hr/>
	234
Deduct drivers .. .. .	326
	<hr/>
Making .. .. .	92

men less than in 1792.

The officers of the Driver Corps, which has been reduced and incorporated into the regiment of Artillery, have been placed *en second* in the regiment, on the pay of the foot artillery. It was thought more expedient to dispose of them in this manner than to put an equal number of the juniors of each rank on half, or rather two-thirds pay. By the latter arrangement a very trifling saving would have been made, and those on whom the reduction would have fallen had but recently been restored to full pay, and had necessarily gone to a considerable expense for a fresh equipment, fairly expecting that they would not again be reduced.

\* Clerk of the Ordnance, and as such a member of the Board of Ordnance, which he represented in Parliament.

The reduction of military corps cannot go further.

In respect to reductions in the civil branch, they are of three descriptions :

Reductions of establishments ; reductions of officers where establishments are kept up ; and reductions of salaries.

Reduction of establishments has been carried as far as possible. Every establishment has been discontinued not absolutely necessary for the service, and the discontinuance of which would not occasion greater expense (putting the inconvenience out of the question) than its maintenance.

Upon this point of the discontinuance of establishments, it is necessary to observe that the discontinuance of an establishment at any station does not bring with it a discontinuance of the demand for arms and stores by the armies and fleets of the country even in time of peace. These would still be to be supplied at the expense of the transport of the stores in small quantities and in charge of officers, in proportion as they should be demanded ; a system which, besides its fatal delay and inconvenience, would be found more expensive than that of forming dépôts and establishments in those places where the fleets and troops are likely to act.

But this is not all. Wherever stores are required, magazines of them have been formed at considerable expense. If the establishments are to be discontinued, these magazines must be either sold, or destroyed, or withdrawn.

There would be no demand for their contents, and they could not be sold excepting to those to whom the justice and policy of the government would not allow their sale. Even their destruction would cost money ; and their removal would in many instances cost a sum of which the interest would do more than pay the expense of maintaining the establishment of persons to take care of them.

These mixed considerations, of their continued utility and the expense of discontinuing them, have been the inducement for the maintenance of some of these establishments.

In every instance in which it has been possible, offices have been discontinued in the establishments which it has been thought proper still to maintain.

These establishments have been divided into four classes, according to their relative importance to the service. In all,

excepting in Dublin, the office of clerk of the survey has been discontinued; and the office of clerk of the cheque, in all excepting the Tower.

It is proposed that the duty of the former officer shall be done by persons employed for the immediate purpose by the Surveyor-General, and by more frequent surveys of stores, with the assistance of the officers of the army and navy.

Instead of the clerk of the cheque, an officer called deputy-storekeeper is appointed to all the stations of the first class, and to certain others of other classes situated at a great distance from home, or in unhealthy climates in which there is a greater chance of casualty from sickness, and where the want of a second officer, in case of the sickness of the principal, might prove fatal to the service.

These reductions of officers at the out-stations have certainly diminished the check upon all the proceedings of the officers of the Ordnance at these stations respectively, but it has been endeavoured to apply a remedy to this evil by calling for more frequent and more accurate accounts, journals, and returns, and by bringing under the cognizance of the officers of the Board in London more accurately and frequently all the acts of the storekeepers at the out-stations. Notwithstanding that the adoption of this system has necessarily brought upon the Board of Ordnance and upon the officers in the Tower a great increase of business, the number of persons employed, as well in Pall-Mall as the Tower, has been considerably decreased.

In respect to salaries, the Ordnance department has proceeded upon the same principle as the other departments of the government. Upon examination it was found that in every instance in which salaries had been increased in this department, it had been done either in consideration of the loss of fees, or of good services, or of length of service; and upon considering what might be a fair compensation for the performance of the business in any particular office, and for the confidence reposed in the officer, and the security required for him, and adding thereto a salary for length of service on a reduced scale, as proposed to be adopted hereafter in this department, it was found that few salaries could be reduced, and those few were enjoyed by the ablest, most efficient, and most trustworthy servants in the department. The reduction of salaries, then, at

present is confined to the operations of the Treasury minute of the \* ; but a new establishment has been formed, fixing salaries for the several offices in the department according to their importance to the service; their duties, and the security required from the holders; and bearing an increase in proportion to length of service, as stated in the estimate.

WELLINGTON.

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*Lord ——— to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

Tournai, Flanders, 25th March, 1822.

Though aware of the liberty I am taking in addressing your Lordship, yet from my peculiar situation in not being able to pay my personal respects to you, and from once having the honour of being known to your Lordship, and the Marquis of Wellesley, who I received the most distinguished attention from when in India, will I hope plead an excuse for trespassing on you.

Embarrassed in my circumstances, I am unable to exert my personal influence in England for my son, who is an ensign in the 6th regiment now at the Cape of Good Hope; I pray your Lordship to forgive, therefore, my entreating your influence in giving a letter of recommendation for him to Lord C. Somerset the governor. Could he procure any Staff appointment, however small, it might enable him to look forward with confidence to a profession to which he is entirely dependant for his bread. Should your Lordship do me the honour of a reply, may I request the favour of its being sent to the Countess ———. Begging your Lordship to forgive the liberty I have taken in troubling, which necessity alone has driven me to,

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,  
your Grace's most obedient and most humble servant,

[30th March, 1822.]

The Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to Lord ———, and has received his Lordship's letter regarding his son, now an ensign in the 6th regiment at the Cape. This regiment served under the command of the Duke in the Peninsula; and it would be impossible for the Duke to select for recommendation to the governor of the Cape an officer nearly the youngest on the list of ensigns, and who did not serve with the regiment in the Peninsula, to the prejudice of all those who did.

The Duke is extremely concerned that it is not in his power to comply with Lord ———'s wishes in this respect.]

\* Blank in manuscript.

[ 116.] TO MR. CREW AND SIR A. FARRINGTON,\* RESPECTING THE  
REVISION OF VARIOUS POINTS OF ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT.

3rd April, 1822.

The Master-General having, on the 14th instant, visited Woolwich, and made an inspection of the different pieces of ordnance, carriages, ammunition-boxes, hereafter mentioned, recommends the following arrangements to the Board: That the brass 8 and 10-inch howitzers should be entirely discontinued in the service, and that the iron 8-inch howitzer should be substituted for the former, and the iron 10-inch howitzer for the latter. The field-carriages constructed for the former will answer for the latter.

The Master-General likewise recommends that the light 5½-inch howitzer should be entirely discontinued; the new 12-pounder brass howitzer, called a *Licorne*, of the calibre of inches 4-5, is to be substituted for this piece of ordnance. The field-carriage heretofore used for the light 5½-inch howitzer will answer for this new piece of ordnance.

The Master-General likewise recommends that no more of the heavy 5½-inch howitzers should be cast; but that in lieu thereof brass 24-pounder howitzers, called *Licorne*, of the calibre of 5-66, should be cast. The field-carriage hitherto in use with the heavy 5½-inch howitzer will answer for this piece of ordnance.

The Master-General likewise recommends that no more of the small-arm ammunition carriages should be constructed, but that in lieu thereof small-arm ammunition limber waggons should be constructed according to the pattern approved of; and that by degrees, as occasion may offer, the serviceable small-arm ammunition waggons now in store may be reformed into the new pattern limber waggon.

The Master-General likewise recommends that no more barrels should be constructed for the carriage and storing of small-arm ammunition; but that in lieu thereof a box should be substituted with copper fastenings, to hold 1000 rounds, of the pattern approved of; together with a bag, of the pattern

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\* Sir A. Farrington was a General of Artillery, and Director of the Field Train Department.

approved, to carry the same on the back of an animal. The seams of this box to be secured with cement.

The Master-General would likewise recommend the use of boxes, of the pattern approved of, instead of barrels, for the carriage and the stowing of powder in magazines. They should contain 80 pounds of powder each, so as in the whole to weigh only 100 pounds each. They should be copper fastened, and their seams secured by cement.

The Master-General likewise recommends that iron axle-trees should in future be made use of for the travelling carriages of the iron 24-pounders.

He likewise recommends that cast iron carriages should be constructed for garrison purposes for carronades. He likewise recommends the future use of oiled paper to pack up musket-ball cartridges, as being a better preservative against wet and damp.

The Duke recommends also that the shells known to the service by the term  $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch, both common and spherical, should in future be cast of the same diameter as 24-pounder shot, and those termed  $4\frac{2}{3}$ ths, both common and spherical, should in future be cast after same diameter as 12-pounder shot, and that the spherical of every nature should be cast of the same dimensions as its corresponding shot.

[Before I can do anything upon this subject, I should consider in the same point of view the 12-pounder howitzer, and report upon it.

Before this paper goes in, I wish to know accurately what is wished respecting the calibres of howitzers and shells.

If we cast the new howitzers exactly of the same dimensions as the 24-pounders, will the  $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch shells now in store answer for them?

Will  $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch shells, to be cast in future of the exact dimensions with 24-pounder shot, answer for the old  $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch howitzer?

Locks for guns. Is it wished to apply locks to guns in all situations of service on shore, viz. field, garrison, field—I mean field-pieces? or only to the first?

WELLINGTON.

[ 117.]

*To Mr. Crew.*

MEMORANDUM ON THE SUPPLY OF FORAGE TO THE HORSES  
OF THE ORDNANCE, UNDER THE CONTRACTS MADE BY THE  
COMMISSARY-GENERAL.

4th April, 1822.

Every officer and soldier, whether stationary or in movement, is stationary or in movement in consequence of an order or route.

The orders or routes for the stationing or movements of the officers, troops, and horses of the artillery should be communicated to the Commissary-General, and he should issue his orders to the contractors to supply the officers, troops, and horses with forage accordingly.

The officer, or noncommissioned officer, or soldier, in command or in charge of any detachment of horses, must make his requisition in writing to the contractor for forage, specifying the order by which he is at the place, the number of horses, and his own name; and after receiving the forage he will sign a receipt at the back of the requisition for the quantity of forage received.

This document will be the contractor's voucher for making the charge to the Commissary-General for the forage issued.

The Commissary-General will once a month transmit these documents, with an abstract of them, to the Surveyor-General, who will thereupon order payment for the value.

If there should have been any improper requisition for forage, it must be charged against the person making it, upon the examination of the requisitions and orders upon which they are founded.

The annexed form of a requisition might be printed and given to officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers ordered to move.

The same form would answer either for the troops at Woolwich or for any other stationary detachment; and for a month or any other period of time, or one or any number of horses.

This arrangement does not refer to troops in billets, excepting where these troops receive their forage from a contractor.

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Having been ordered by route or order, dated the \_\_\_\_\_,  
to march from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_, or to halt

at \_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_ horses belonging to the Royal  
 Artillery, you are hereby required to issue hay, oats, and straw  
 for the above-mentioned \_\_\_\_\_ horses for the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_,  
 18 \_\_\_\_\_, or for \_\_\_\_\_ days, from the \_\_\_\_\_ to the \_\_\_\_\_.

(Signature.)

Received from \_\_\_\_\_, contractor for  
 forage at \_\_\_\_\_,

Oats . . . . . pounds

Hay . . . . . "

Straw . . . . . "

upon the requisition on the other side, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_,  
 18 \_\_\_\_\_.

(Signature.)

WELLINGTON.

To \_\_\_\_\_.

[ 118. ]

SIR,

Brighton, 9th April, 1822.

I had the honour of receiving this morning your letter of the  
 5th instant, and I am highly flattered by the mark of your  
 respect which you are pleased to present to me.

It appears by your letter that you are desirous of obtaining  
 some employment, civil or military, an ambition which I think  
 highly commendable, and that you wish me to confer upon  
 you such an appointment.

When you first did me the honour to address me, I conceived  
 that you wished that the pictures painted by your grandfather,  
 which you declined to sell, should find a place in my collection ;  
 and I accepted the offer you made me of two of them on the  
 score of your respect for the services which I had been enabled  
 to render the country, and with a view to gratify this desire of  
 yours. If you had then mentioned your wish to obtain employ-  
 ment I should have declined your offer, as I consider myself  
 obliged to do since the receipt of your letter.

I am perfectly aware that your desire of employment is quite  
 distinct from the other subject on which you have written to  
 me. If I did not think so, I should probably treat it in a  
 different manner. But you must be sensible that public men  
 in this country cannot be too cautious or too free from sus-



picion; and upon consideration you will not be surprised that I should inform you, that if by Monday, the 15th, I should not receive from you an intimation to what place you wish the three cases of your pictures, now at my house in Piccadilly, should be sent, I will send them to you to No. 9, St. Vincent's Parade, Hotwells, Bristol.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 119. ]

*To Mr. Goulburn.*

London, 15th April, 1822.

The Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to Mr. Goulburn, and has the honour to enclose a letter which he has received from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Dudley St. Leger Hill.

The Duke, in submitting this application to Mr. Goulburn, feels it due to the Lieutenant-Colonel to state for his information that if the Irish government are in want of officers to be employed under any system of police, he does not know a better one, or one more likely to be of use in such a situation, than Sir Dudley Hill.

[ 120. ]

*To Lord Londonderry.*

MY DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,

London, 19th April, 1822.

I enclose a Memorandum which I have drawn, which explains my opinion upon the existing question between Russians and Turks, and my view of the mode of proceeding, which I send, that you may turn it over in your mind between this and Sunday.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM UPON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS BETWEEN THE  
RUSSIANS AND TURKS.

The Emperor of Russia has stated four points, the adoption of which by the Porte would induce his Imperial Majesty to resume the diplomatic relations of his Court with the Porte, viz. :

That the churches destroyed should be rebuilt.

That Christians in the Turkish dominions should be protected in the free exercise of their religious worship.

That there should be a distinction between the guilty and the innocent in the measures of punishment adopted by the Porte for the existing rebellion of its Christian subjects.

That the Porte should withdraw its troops from the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and name the Hospodars for the government of those countries in conformity to the treaties with Russia.

The justice of these demands has been admitted by all the Allied Courts, and they have been urged upon the Porte by their authority; and it must be observed that the Porte itself neither denies their justice nor declines to carry them into execution, but has hitherto delayed to carry them into execution, or to fix any time at which they should be carried into execution.

In the mean time these four points, which were in the first instance stated and considered as the whole amount of the demands of his Imperial Majesty to induce the renewal of his diplomatic relations with the Porte, have been represented as preliminaries; and propositions have recently been brought under the consideration of the Allied ministers at different courts for the adoption of a plan for the amelioration of the condition of the Greeks under the dominion of the Porte.

It is clear that the ministers of the divan have for some time suspected that such a plan was in the contemplation of the Russian Cabinet; and they have more than once called upon the Allied ministers, at Constantinople, to guarantee them from ulterior demands of Russia. This state of things is the real cause of the difficulties which have occurred in the negotiations at Constantinople; and in order to remove those difficulties, it will be necessary to bring back the Russian demands to the exact state in which they were defined when first made, and then to convince the Porte that no more is in contemplation than is expressed in the original demands themselves, the justice of which is admitted by the Allies, and even by the Porte.

The inducement to both parties to adopt this course should be the withdrawing our minister from Constantinople, whose example, it is probable, would be followed by those of the other

four Courts. The Emperor of Russia should be informed that we would consent to withdraw our minister only on condition that he restricted his demands to the four points originally stated; and, on the other hand, the Porte should be apprised of this communication to the Emperor; and that his Majesty considered their resistance to these just demands so unwarrantable, and so likely to lead to the total destruction of the Turkish government, that he should not leave his ambassador at Constantinople to sanction by his presence their conduct, and to witness the misfortunes which must be its consequence. They would then see that the withdrawing the ambassador was a proof that we at least were convinced that the Emperor was sincere in confining his demands upon them to the four points originally stated; and having admitted their justice, they would be more likely to carry them into execution.

Before the ambassador should be withdrawn, all the measures should be adopted to secure and facilitate his retreat; and notice should be given to the merchants and others resident at Constantinople that they might secure their property and persons. These measures would give time for reflection, would show that we were in earnest, and would tend to bring the Porte and their advisers to reason.

I confess that I am one of those who believe that if this measure is adopted in the manner proposed, it will produce its effect, and secure peace. If it does not, and the ambassador should be withdrawn, and there should be a war, I can entertain no doubt of the result. The Turkish government in Europe will, in fact, be destroyed, which will probably be the smallest misfortune which will be the consequence of this state of things. This alone ought to induce us to adopt some strong measure to extricate the world from the existing difficulty.

But when we consider that the serious operations in which the Emperor of Russia will be involved in the east of Europe must occupy his whole force; that the occupation chalked out for the Austrians in Italy, and which the events in the east of Europe will tend to render more onerous, will take up their whole force, and that there is nothing which can be trusted to check the tide of revolution from the Atlantic to the Austrian frontiers; that the first step taken by the Emperor of Russia in the course of this warfare will give rise to a most important question between him and the Emperor of Austria, the difficulty of solving which

will be augmented by every subsequent step; and that these difficulties can end only by putting the two Imperial Courts in positive opposition to each other, and by the dissolution of the Quintuple Alliance, and probably a general war in Europe, I think it will be admitted that we should allow no trifling consideration, nor no speculation upon the advantages of having our ambassador at the Porte at a particular period, nor upon the difficulty of getting him back again, to prevent us from taking a step which may preserve peace and all its existing advantages.

It must be observed, that if it is right to adopt these measures, no time should be lost in adopting them. If the Principalities are not evacuated, I don't see how the Emperor can avoid marching early in June.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Mr. Crew and Mr. Hill.\**

[ 121. ]

MEMORANDUM ON THE DRAFT OF THE TREASURY MINUTE  
RESPECTING THE TRANSFER OF THE BARRACK AND STORE  
DEPARTMENTS.

24th April, 1822.

I have perused the Memorandum of the minute of the Treasury transmitted to me by Mr. Hill, in his letter of the 20th instant, and having conferred with the Board of Ordnance on the various points to which it refers, the following is the result:

I have no observation to make on that part of the Memorandum which relates to the barracks in Great Britain.

In respect to the barracks in Ireland, this department has up to this moment no information whatever regarding them; and we wish to have the same information regarding them, that is, the establishment, the regulations for their conduct, &c., which we have received regarding the barracks in Great Britain. As this information is wanted, it may be doubtful whether we shall be able to take charge of them so soon as the 24th of September; but we will on the 24th of December, and even on the 24th September, if it should be possible.

In respect to the barracks in foreign garrisons and colonies,

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\* Mr. Hill was in the Board of Treasury, and eventually became Assistant Secretary. He acted as the agent of the Treasury in its communications with the Ordnance department.

it appears that they are regulated in each of those garrisons and colonies upon a different system, and under the direction of the commanding officer of the troops in such garrison or colony; and this department has no knowledge of the establishment or of the regulations for the conduct of the barrack department at any one of those garrisons or colonies. It would be difficult for the Ordnance to undertake the performance of any duty so complicated without previous information, and particularly at such distances as these garrisons and colonies are, within the period specified. It appears then to be desirable that the Treasury should give to the Ordnance, as soon as possible, all the information that department may possess on this subject, and that orders should be sent out that such further information as may exist may be sent home, to be communicated eventually to the Ordnance; and that the period fixed for the Ordnance to take charge of the barracks in foreign garrisons and colonies should be the 24th of April, 1823.

It is supposed that the works referred to in pages 21 and 22 of this minute are the buildings and works handed over to the charge of the Ordnance under the minute, and it should be so expressed. There would be no objection to extend the spirit of this regulation to the works at present exclusively under the Ordnance; but it must be done with more consideration and caution. The persons at present employed in the store department of the Commissariat must be handed over to the Ordnance service in the first instance, till otherwise disposed of by their orders.

It is understood that the building materials and articles of military store, referred to in page 37, and the payment of wages for labour, referred to in page 38, are building materials and articles of military store for the construction of, and wages for labour on, buildings and works transferred to the Ordnance under this minute.

I have no objection to extending this rule to all articles, and even to labourers employed by the Ordnance in the transaction of its present business; but this regulation if adopted must be further considered in its details.

In respect to the points referred to in Mr. Hill's letter, viz. the proceeds of the charges against the regiments for damages done by the troops to barracks, and the produce of the sale of barrack furniture, I have no objection to their being disposed

of under the direction of the Commissariat, but credit should be given for the amount to the Ordnance in its accounts with the Commissariat.

There is one point not touched upon by Mr. Hill in his Memorandum or his letter, and that is the pay of the artillery and engineers on foreign stations. The pay for these troops might pass from the Commissariat to their commanding officers or paymasters without passing through the hands of the storekeeper; and in this manner much advantage would be gained.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Dr. John Taylor.*

[ 123. ]

SIR,

London, 20th April, 1822.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 24th instant from Tours; and I have to inform you that the cases containing your pictures, which you had sent to my house in London, were returned to your address by the van of the \* unopened. Never having seen the pictures, therefore, it would be impossible for me to make any offer for any of them, even if I did not feel an insuperable objection at all times to fix a value upon the property of anybody.

I have already stated the reasons which made it quite impossible for me to accept any of these pictures, which reasons cannot be got the better of.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Lady Bathurst.*

[ 123. ]

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CARRIAGES OF PERSONS GOING TO  
THE IRISH BALL.

London, May, 1822.

The door of the Opera House in the Haymarket leading to the concert room to be reserved for his Majesty and the royal family and their suites, and the foreign ministers. All other persons are to arrive at the Opera House by the following lines.

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\* Blank in manuscript.

No. 1.—The carriages of persons residing in the vicinity of St. James's, south of Piccadilly and west of Regent-street, and of those residing between Piccadilly and Oxford-street, west of Bond-street, are to enter the line of carriages at the top of St. James's-street, and proceed down St. James's-street, and along Pall-Mall, and set down at the door of the Opera House in Pall-Mall. After having set down they are to return by the same line.

No. 2.—The carriages of those residing north of Oxford-street, west of Portland-place, and in Bond-street, and west of Regent-street, and east of Bond-street, are to enter the line of carriages from Bond-street along Piccadilly; and thence down Regent-street to the door of the Opera House in Charles street.

After having set down, these carriages are to proceed along Charles-street up the Haymarket, &c.

No. 3.—The carriages of persons residing east of Regent-street and Portland-place, in the City, and in Westminster, are to join the line of carriages at Charing Cross, thence to the great door of the Opera House in the Haymarket.

These carriages will return by James-street, Orange-street, into St. Martin's lane, and the Strand.

*The Return.*—The carriages which will have set down by the line, No. 1, will be parked in two circles in St. James's-square; the rear of the carriages towards the footways round the square; the heads fronting each other, and leaving a clear passage for a carriage between each circle. These carriages proceed from St. James's-square by John-street, will take up at the door of the Opera House in Pall-Mall with the horses' heads towards the Haymarket. They will turn and proceed home along Pall-Mall.

The carriages, which will have set down by the line, No. 2, will be parked in two lines in Regent-street, taking care that they do not stop the communication by Charles-street; the backs of the carriages towards the footways, the heads fronting each other, and leaving a clear passage for a carriage between each line. These carriages will take up at the door in Charles-street, and will proceed up the Haymarket and thence home.

The carriages which will have set down by the line, No. 3, will be parked in two lines at Charing Cross, and thence down

towards Whitchall, the rear of the carriage towards the foot-ways, the heads fronting each other, and leaving a clear passage for a carriage between each line. These carriages will take up at the great door in the Haymarket, and proceed thence along James-street, Orange-street, and St. Martin's-lane, and thence home.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Marquess of Londonderry.*

[ 124. ]

MEMORANDUM. EXAMINATION OF THE PRESENT EXPENSE  
OF THE DIPLOMACY OF THE COUNTRY AS COMPARED WITH  
THAT OF 1793.

London, 10th May, 1822.

The grand total of the expense of his Majesty's diplomatic service abroad was, in 1793, 113,989*l*.; in 1822 it is estimated at 265,962*l*.; the difference being 151,973*l*. This difference is made up of certain expenses beyond the control of the government, of others arising from the increased business of the country, and increased intercourse with foreign courts; and others from more extended commercial relations with foreign countries.

Under the first head are pensions to retired ministers, which in 1793 amounted to 11,486*l*.; and in 1822 to 52,642*l*.: the difference being 41,156*l*.

Under the second head are the extraordinary and incidental expenses, such as sending messengers, &c., which in 1793 amounted to 5,985*l*.; and in 1822 to 27,217*l*.: the difference being 21,232*l*.

Under the third head may be classed the salaries to consuls and Barbary consuls, which in 1793 amounted to 12,255*l*.; and in 1822 to 33,392*l*.: the difference being 21,137*l*.

Thus the additional expense of pensions is 41,166*l*.; that of communication, &c., 21,232*l*.; that of consuls 21,037*l*.; 83,435*l*.; leaving the real additional expense of the diplomacy of the country compared with 1793 at the sum of 68,418*l*.

From this sum of 68,418*l*. ought first to be deducted the ten per cent. on the salaries of the diplomatic servants abroad, 14,777*l*.; secondly, the expense of the mission to Constantinople, which was not paid by the public in 1793, 10,000*l*.;



thirdly, the expense of that to Paris, which did not exist in 1793, 12,000*l.*, making in the whole 36,777*l.*; so that the real addition to the diplomatic expenses of the country, as it appears by this comparison, for which the government would be responsible is 31,671*l.* per annum. In order to account for this sum, it must be recollected that we have ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Vienna at present, where we had in 1793 only ministers plenipotentiary. In the course of the transactions of the last thirty-five years many States have been aggrandised to the extent of four and five times their former magnitude and importance; and no comparison can be made between the state of Europe at the present moment and in the year 1793 with a view to form a datum on which to found a return of the relative transactions between Great Britain and each court. Then it must be recollected that the salaries of the ministers of foreign courts were in 1793 avowedly too low, and that all agreed that they ought to be raised, and it does not appear that the salaries of any class of minister has been raised higher than the amount necessary to defray the fair expenses of his station.

WELLINGTON.

[ 125. ]

*To the Earl of Clancarty.*

MY DEAR CLANCARTY,

London, 6th June, 1822.

I received last night your letter of the 3rd inst., and I hasten to reply to it. I had before me some days ago the desire of the Archbishop of Tuam to build a church on the Ordnance ground at Shannon bridge; and I was very sorry to be under the necessity of declining to comply with this desire. This department could not have complied with it without injury to the objects in having any works at all at Shannon bridge, of which it is their duty to take care; and I have great pleasure in telling you that there is ground at Shannon bridge adjoining to the Ordnance ground, on which a church would be nearly equally well defended by the works as it would be if built on the ground belonging to the Ordnance, and nearly equally conveniently situated for the garrison which may be at that place.

There was no delay here in giving the Archbishop an answer

excepting what was absolutely necessary to make the inquiries on the spot.

I agree very much in opinion with you regarding the distress in Ireland. The truth is that there is no want of provisions, but a great want of money to buy them. If a few more of the landed proprietors had done what you have this spring, and had gone over to look at their properties instead of *brawling* and *balling* in London, the distress would have been relieved. I am really alarmed, however, about the state of Ireland. A population of seven millions, increasing in an immense proportion, without employment, and inhabiting a country which, without their being adequately employed, produces a superabundance of every thing that is wanted in this market, and this population, owing to the great number of absentee proprietors, getting in fact nothing in return for the produce of their country thus consumed in this, appears to be a dangerous phenomenon in political economy.

I believe we have not yet seen the last call of the Irish population on the charity of their English countrymen; and we shall yet have something more to do for them than give charity balls and brawl upon distress.

We want in Ireland the influence of manners as well as laws. How we are to get the former in the absence of nearly all the landed proprietors is more than I can tell.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Mr. Goulburn.*

[ 126. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 17th June, 1822.

I enclose you a memorial which I have received from an officer, Lieutenant Bennett, late of the 5th Foot, and a report from Mr. Greenwood in answer to an inquiry respecting his conduct.

I am sorry to be obliged to be so troublesome to you; but these gentlemen, who have been so long serving under me, naturally look to me to forward their views and interests.

I must say this for them all, that if I were to carry into execution such a measure as the Irish government are likely to have to carry into execution, I should select for it the retired

officers and soldiers of the army who have served before the enemy in the field, as in that service they must have acquired a certain degree of experience, intelligence, and discretion.

Upon this you may rely, that I will not willingly recommend anybody to you of whom I shall not upon inquiry receive a good character. In this case, the 5th regiment being abroad, I have been obliged to go to the agent. In every other, I write either from personal knowledge or knowledge acquired by inquiry from those most capable of giving it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 127. ] MEMORANDUM ON THE SUBJECT OF THE SYSTEM OF DEFENCE  
ADOPTED BY THE PRUSSIANS.

London, 3rd July, 1822.

It is very desirable that I should see Jones on the subject of the practice applicable to the new system of fortification adopted by the Prussians.

The officers of artillery write of it as Carnot's system; whereas I believe it is only a modification of his system. Desire Jones to call here any day he comes to town, and I will talk to him respecting the position and dimensions of these detached walls, as constructed by the Prussians, before any steps are taken respecting the practice.

Inform Colonels Frazer and Dickson.

WELLINGTON.

[Letter written to Colonel Jones, July 3rd, 1822.]

[ 128. ]

*To Mr. Arbuthnot.*

MEMORANDUM ON THE NECESSITY OF DEFINING THE MODE  
IN WHICH THE DUTIES OF THE BARRACK DEPARTMENT  
ARE TO BE CARRIED ON.

Ordnance Office, 4th July, 1822.

It appears to me that these papers require that the principle of the transfer of the barracks to the Ordnance should be clearly defined, as it appears not to be understood at the Treasury as it is at the Ordnance. I understand that the Comptroller of Barracks has been an officer acting under the

immediate directions of the Treasury. This must have been the case, as the estimates for barracks were made up at the Treasury, were moved for by the Treasury, the grants were made to the Treasury, and the issues of money made by the Treasury.

This is not the case in respect to the barracks when in charge of the Ordnance. This Board must form and lay the estimates before Parliament. They must be moved by the Ordnance. The grants will be made to the Ordnance; and the issues of money will be made by the Ordnance; and the Ordnance and its officers must be responsible for the due execution of the business under the general regulations of the Treasury and of his Majesty.

Now let us see whether the letter of the 29th of June is consistent with this system.

It relates to barracks at Totness and Modbury, also to some at Aberdeen, Ayr, and Dundee, upon which the Lords of the Treasury had received letters from the late Comptroller of Barracks, of the 12th and 16th of April, and from General Taylor, of the 9th of May; and on which their Lordships do not make a reference to the Board of Ordnance as would have been consistent with the new system; but they state an intention to take into their consideration at an early period whether the barracks at Modbury and Totness shall be kept up; and in respect to the barracks at Aberdeen, Ayr, and Dundee, they give detailed directions for their disposal, and that of the barrackmasters and serjeants belonging to them.

I beg leave to observe that if this is the system on which it is understood at the Treasury that the Barrack department is to be conducted, the sooner it is taken out of the hands of the Ordnance the better.

It is impossible for the Ordnance to be responsible for the conduct of details which are to be directed by another Board. It will be much better to give charge of the conduct of those details to those who have hitherto conducted them to the satisfaction of the Treasury.

Their Lordships may rely upon it that there is no inclination in the Ordnance to keep up a single barrack or establishment which is not essentially necessary for the service; but that department must insist upon it, that if they take charge of the

barrack department, the conduct of it, subject to the general regulations of the Treasury and of his Majesty, must be left in all its details exclusively to themselves.

WELLINGTON.

[ 129. ]

*To Mr. Crew.*

MEMORANDUM ON LETTER FROM TREASURY CONCERNING THE  
ERECTION OF BARRACKS AT TRINIDAD.

5th July, 1822.

It appears by that letter, and minute of the 11th June annexed, that the Treasury had determined to build a barrack to contain 400 men, according to a plan and estimate, for which purpose building materials had been sent out to the West Indies; and their Lordships have required that the department should issue their orders to the proper officer of engineers in the West Indies immediately to carry into execution the buildings according to the plans originally decided upon by the Lords of the Treasury, and for which the materials had been sent out, according to such directions as may be given by the officer commanding the forces in the West Indies in regard to these barracks.

It appears to me that the Lords of the Treasury have in their letter and minute upon this subject anticipated the execution of the arrangements of their minute of the 24th May, 1822, which placed the execution of repairs to buildings and the construction of buildings on foreign stations under the Ordnance only from the 24th December next.

If I am right in this conjecture, it is desirable that the Board of Treasury should communicate to this Board some further information than has yet been conveyed to it.

1st. Who formed the plans and estimates according to which these buildings are to be executed?

2nd. Upon what data are they furnished?

3rd. What materials have been sent to the West Indies for the purpose of constructing these works?

4th. To what port, and to whom conveyed?

If, however, the Board of Treasury desire no more, in their letter of the 17th June, 1822, than that the officers of engineers and the Ordnance department in the West Indies should give every assistance in their power to carry into execution this work,

under the direction of the Commander of the Forces, there cannot be the smallest objection to give such assistance, and directions will be given accordingly.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Mr. Crew.*

[ 130. ]

MEMORANDUM ON THE MINUTE RELATIVE TO THE CHARGE  
OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS AT FOREIGN STATIONS.

8th July, 1822.

The Treasury minute of the 24th May requires that this department should, on the 24th of December next, or as soon after as possible, take charge of public buildings on foreign stations; and that this department should give such directions as it may think proper to its officers on foreign stations to prepare estimates of the expense of the repairs of such buildings, to be submitted to the general or other officer commanding on the spot; but not to be carried into execution till approved by this department, as well as by the Board of Treasury; nor, when approved of by the Board of Treasury and by the Ordnance department, without the direction of the officer commanding the forces.

In order to carry this system into execution, it will be necessary that the Board should take the subject into consideration at an early period; and what follows is recommended to their attention.

General Mann should direct the officers commanding the engineers at Gibraltar, Malta, Canada, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, at Jamaica, in the Leeward Islands, at the Cape, Mauritius, &c., to procure from the officer in charge of the barracks and public buildings at those stations respectively, plans and descriptions of the barracks and public buildings at each, copies of which must be sent home to the office of the Inspector-General of Fortifications without loss of time.

Previous to the 1st of November in this year the officers commanding the Engineers in each of those stations will send to the office of the Inspector-General of Fortifications reports of the state of those several buildings, and estimates in the usual form, of the expense of the repairs which may be necessary to them in the course of the year 1823, which he shall have previously submitted to the officer commanding the forces.

From stations at such a distance as that these reports and estimates cannot be sent home by the 1st of November, 1822 : they are to be sent home as soon as possible afterwards ; and in every subsequent year care is to be taken to send these reports and estimates off, so that they will arrive in London by the 15th of December, in order that the Board may have time to consider them before they are laid before Parliament.

In case any new buildings should be in the course of construction in any station, estimates must be sent of the expense to be incurred upon them in the course of the year.

The Board, having this information before them in the course of the month of December, will be able to communicate with the Treasury upon it, and receive their sanction for incurring the expense, before the estimate will be laid before Parliament.

WELLINGTON.

[ 131. ]

*To Mr. Crew.*

MEMORANDUM ON TRANSFERRING BUILDING BRANCH OF  
BARRACK DEPARTMENT TO THE ENGINEERS, AND ABOLISH-  
ING INSPECTORS.

10th July, 1822.

As soon as the barrack office will be brought completely under the immediate direction of the Ordnance department, it is my intention to propose to the Board to put the building branch under the Engineer department ; and I will propose to the Board the consideration of the measures to be adopted for this purpose as soon as I shall have obtained more knowledge than I have at present of the details of the Barrack department.

It appears to me likewise that a considerable saving might be made if the instructions of the inspectors of barracks were to be revised, and these duties were to be performed, as occasion might require in the several districts, by the officers of engineers.

The inspectors of barracks are now paid 400*l.* per annum and their travelling expenses, and 10*s.* a day while travelling on their inspections. It appears to me that all the advantage would be gained by appointing the officers of Engineers in the several districts to be occasional inspectors of barracks, paying them for the performance of this duty 15*s.* a day while travel-

ling, and their travelling expenses in addition to their present allowances.

Annexed to this Memorandum are the instructions to inspectors of barracks, which I beg the Board to look over; and if they should concur in opinion with me that this reform can be made, I would then propose to refer the subject for the consideration of General Mann.

WELLINGTON.

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*To Mr. Crew.*

[ 132. ]

MEMORANDUM ON APPLICATION FROM THE STOREKEEPER AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE TO BE RELIEVED FROM THE CHARGE, ON ACCOUNT OF SEIZURE OF GUNPOWDER BY THE CUSTOMS.

10th July, 1822.

I have perused the memorial of the storekeeper at the Cape of Good Hope, and the letter from Major Hollway and Captain Hope, enclosed in the Board's letter of the 8th instant, and I confess that I see nothing in those papers to alter the decision which I had originally formed on this subject, as stated in my minute of the \* , 1819, and in Lord FitzRoy Somerset's letter of the 9th March, 1821; and I never can consent that any charge should appear in the estimates of this department to make good the loss sustained by the public upon this occasion.

Indeed I am certain that if such a charge were to be made in the estimates, and its nature were to be investigated by a committee of the House of Commons, that all the circumstances which had occasioned it would appear of a nature to bring great discredit upon the government and its servants.

This memorial and letter, however, do throw some farther light upon this transaction, and tend to show not only the view with which the seizure was made, but likewise the spirit with which the prosecution of the seizure was carried on in the colonial court. The perusal of them may induce the Lords of the Treasury to revise their former decision upon this seizure; and their Lordships may be induced to believe that there are circumstances in the case which may enable them to interfere for the protection of the storekeeper. I therefore recommend that these papers should be sent to their Lordships, with this minute.

WELLINGTON.

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\* Blank in manuscript.



[ 133. ]

*To Mr. Wortley.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 17th July, 1822.

I return Mr. Ogilvie's memorial, upon which I have to make the following observations. 2,200,000 francs do not amount to quite 90,000*l.* instead of 110,000*l.*, as stated by Mr. Ogilvie!! I don't believe that since 1816 the exchange has been lower than 24 francs, instead of at 20 francs.

I likewise wish to have some explanation from Mr. Ogilvie regarding the sum of 48,000*l.*, which I have underlined in the latter part of the memorial. I rather believe that this sum is for goods confiscated at Bordeaux, in 1814, belonging to British merchants, under a decree of the Duc d'Angoulême. If this is the case the government cannot be called upon to give Mr. Ogilvie compensation for recovering this money, which must have been paid immediately to the owners of the property confiscated.

When one has to fight a battle of any kind, it is desirable to know exactly the ground upon which one has to stand, and not to take up any which must be abandoned immediately.

All the statements in the enclosed memorial are so extravagant that Mr. Vansittart would not have the smallest difficulty in overturning them; and Mr. Ogilvie will get nothing. I wish he would make a quiet statement of his services to government in this transaction, and leave it to me to do the best I can for him. I am quite certain that I shall not succeed if I am to found my exertions upon an inflated statement such as is in this memorial.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 134. ]

*To Mr. Crew.*

MINUTE ON THE QUESTION OF TRANSFERRING THE STORE IN  
TOOLEY STREET TO THE PRINCIPAL STOREKEEPER.

London, 23rd July, 1822.

I have perused Mr. Singleton's letter to the Board of the 19th July; and Mr. Singleton has informed me, in conversation, that he does not consider himself bound to take charge of any stores not in the Tower.

The government and the Treasury have thought proper to

transfer to the Ordnance that part of the business of the commissariat which was heretofore under the commissary of stores, as an arrangement convenient to the public service, and likely to be economical. The foundation of this arrangement is, that there are stationed necessarily in different parts of the world officers of the Ordnance having in their charge storehouses, &c., &c., who have not much to do, and who might be employed with advantage in taking charge of this branch of the public business, in addition to the duties which they execute at present.

This object will certainly be defeated entirely as far as relates to the business in London if the mode of transacting the business recommended by Mr. Singleton should be adopted. The department in Tooley-street will be a separate concern, as it has been under the Commissariat; and the same expense must attend the transaction of the business there.

The first question, however, is this. Will Mr. Singleton, as principal storekeeper, undertake the conduct of the receipt and issues of the stores of the commissary of stores in London? Upon this I must require a distinct answer.

If the answer should be in the negative, I must consider of the measure which it will be necessary for me to adopt for the benefit of the public service. If the answer should be in the affirmative, I would then recommend that the store in Tooley-street, and all its contents, should be made over to the principal storekeeper, with the clerks, &c., whom it may be thought proper to retain on the establishment there.

In respect to the revision of stores in Tooley-street, I should have conceived that a revision having been taken on the 24th of June, and the account of issues having been carried on from that time, there could be no necessity for a new revision to be taken on the 24th July. If, however, the principal storekeeper takes charge, and insists upon this labour being undertaken again, and the consequent expense being incurred, I cannot object. I only insist upon it that this transaction should be a real one, and that it should be conducted with due celerity; and that as it will cost the public a considerable sum of money, and it is undertaken for the satisfaction and security of the principal storekeeper, he shall himself attend to it.

WELLINGTON.

[ 135. ]

*To Mr. Vansittart.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 24th July, 1822.

I enclose you a memorial from Mr. Ogilvie, late of the commissariat of the army under my command in the Peninsula, on the services which he rendered to the government at Bordeaux, in the year 1817. This memorial was given into my hands by Mr. Wortley, who told me you were not indisposed to consider Mr. Ogilvie's case, if I should recommend it; and I therefore beg leave to bring it under your consideration. There is no doubt that Mr. Ogilvie did render essential service to the government on the occasion in question; and I should think that the remuneration usual on such occasions is fairly his due.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 136. ]

*To Mr. Crew.*

MEMORANDUM ON BUILDINGS REQUIRED FOR PREVENTIVE SERVICE IN IRELAND. OBSERVATIONS ON NECESSITY FOR SOME SECURITY THAT THEY SHALL BE RETURNED IN THEIR ORIGINAL STATE.

1st Aug., 1822.

It appears by my letter of the 21st May, 1822, that I have no objection to give up the buildings required for the purpose of the water-guard at Loughswilly; and I have never refused to give my consent to such demands of the Ordnance buildings for any public service.

But it must be observed that this department is responsible to Parliament for the expenditure of the public money granted to carry on the public service under its superintendence, and for the care of the public buildings and stores entrusted to its charge; and I have considered it my duty, upon each of these occasions of the transfer of a public building, to require that an engagement should be made to return such building to the Ordnance, when required, in the form and in the state of repair in which it should be transferred from the Ordnance.

It is useless to point out the reasons for which I have made this stipulation; those acquainted with the service will agree that it is a necessary one.

I found that the only engagement which was given to this

department that its buildings should be kept in repair and not altered, was the signature of the officer or petty officer of the Navy occupying such building at the moment it was delivered over. The Lords of the Treasury consider this signature a sufficient security, which I confess I do not; and as I am responsible for the due care of these buildings, I will not consent to allow the use of any of them till I shall be assured by some responsible authority that they shall be returned, when required by the Ordnance, in the form and in the state of repair in which they will be delivered over by the Ordnance.

I am the last person to wish to throw any impediment in the way of any branch of the public service, as is well known; but it is my duty to see that the buildings entrusted to my charge are taken care of and are not rendered inapplicable to the service for which they were constructed, and I must perform it.

WELLINGTON.

*Mr. Bankhead to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

Lower Brook Street, 9th Aug., 1822.

I am this moment (8 o'clock) returned to my own house from Lord Londonderry's, where I have been for two hours; and I lose not a moment in answering the letter which your Grace has condescended to write to me. Thirty years intimacy with Lord Londonderry makes me know his peculiarities intimately. His nerves are never unstrung unless when he has some bodily indisposition. I conceive that at this moment he has a preternatural fullness of the vessels of the head, and that this (rather than the wear and tear of work) makes him nervous. I have had him cupped, and he experiences the greatest possible relief in the feelings of his head and of his mental competency.

He is gone down to Cray with Lady Castlereagh, and I purpose to see him there to-morrow. Perhaps a feverish affection of a few days may follow this casual derangement of the system, but knowing the natural soundness of Lord Londonderry's constitution, I have no doubt but that by quietness and ordinary care of a few days he is likely soon again to be reinstated in his general health.

I know that Lady Londonderry has written a few lines to your Grace before she left St. James's Square.

I have the honour to be,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES BANKHEAD.

*Lady Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

London, 9th Aug., 1822.

From your kind feeling with respect to Lord Londonderry I am sure you will be glad to hear that he saw Bankhead, who ordered him to be cupped. The blood resembled jelly, and he was instantly relieved, and I have hopes that he will be well in a few days; but I really think he was upon the verge of a brain fever.

Yours most sincerely,

E. A. LONDONDERRY.

*Sir W. Congreve to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

13, Cecil Street, London, 9th Aug., 1822.

Having had the honour of exhibiting to you the accuracy of direction to which the rockets are now brought, and the facility of manœuvring and bringing them into action, one point only remains for demonstration, which is not in itself so apparent to the observer as those above alluded to, and which I therefore think it my duty to take this mode of stating to your Grace.

It is, my Lord Duke, that the penetration of the rocket far exceeds that of any other projectile of the same weight. Thus a 12-pounder rocket will penetrate above 20 feet into the solid butt after ranging 1200 yards, whereas a fieldwork of 12 feet thick is considered sufficient protection against a 12-pounder gunshot, or, indeed, against any other field artillery.

Colonel Jones, of the Royal Engineers, can attest this fact to your Grace, himself having seen a 12-pounder rocket dug out of the butt which had penetrated 22 feet into it. Nor could there, my Lord Duke, be any doubt of its penetrating with proportionable effect in masonry, as I have seen an oak post of 10 inches square cut through by a 12-pounder rocket. The 3-pounder rocket will also penetrate 9 feet into the butt, the 6-pounder upwards of 12 feet, and the heavy rocket which your Grace saw fired the other day at 1000 yards with a 24-pounder shot at the end of it, the whole weighing upwards of 48 lbs., will bury itself 30 feet in the ground. This, my Lord Duke, arises not only from the cylindrical form of the rocket, but from its velocity being continually increased as it approaches the object; whereas the velocity of a shot or shell is continually decreasing after it leaves the piece.

Your Grace will, I am sure, pardon my having addressed you on this important subject, and will permit me to subscribe myself with great respect,

Your Grace's faithful humble servant,

WILLIAM CONGREVE.

P.S.—Under your Grace's patronage and protection, I feel confident of giving complete perfection to the rocket system in a very short time, and making it not only the most powerful, but also the most economical weapon that can be used.

*To Earl Bathurst.*

[ 137. ]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

Dover, 10th Aug., 1822.

Before I left London I put in train the question of the buildings at Gibraltar. It is necessary that it should be referred to the Treasury, as no provision has yet been made by Parliament for them; and I hope that the answer of the Treasury will be given by the time I return to England, at which period I will write to you officially on this subject.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 12th August, 1822.

It is with great concern that I have to announce to you the melancholy intelligence of the death of Lord Londonderry, which took place, by his own hands, this morning between seven and eight o'clock.

I enclose a copy of Bankhead's statement, which will show you what occurred from the time you first sent him to attend Lord Londonderry, and will prove to you that you were right in the apprehensions you expressed to Bankhead that his mind was not what it ought to be.

Lord Liverpool, whom I saw as soon as he arrived from Combe Wood, desired me to communicate this lamentable event to you, and to express to you his wish that you should return to England immediately. He is in the greatest distress. His first idea was to set off for Scotland immediately, and break the intelligence to his Majesty himself; but upon reflection he has thought it best not to leave London, but to depute Mr. Peel to do that office for him. He laments your absence amazingly, and would have requested you to go to the King if you had been in the way. As it is, however, his Majesty is better prepared for the shock than anybody else, for he mentioned to Lord Liverpool on Saturday, that he had seen Lord Londonderry the day before, and was quite convinced that he was not right in his mind, and that he felt great alarm for the consequences of the break up of such a mind as Lord Londonderry's.

Lord Liverpool has written to the King, and entreated his Majesty not to make any arrangement for filling Lord Londonderry's office till his return from Scotland, assuring him that he will keep the machine going till that time in the best way he can.

I understand from Bankhead that Lady Londonderry apprehended the possibility of Lord Londonderry's making away with himself, and placed everything out of his reach that she thought him likely to make use of; but unfortunately he had in one of his despatch-boxes the knife with which eventually he put an end to his life. He had got up in the night and gone into the dressing-room to wash his face, and then returned quietly to his bed.

I presume you will be able to arrive here between Thursday and Friday. Lord Liverpool looks forward to your return with great anxiety. Lord Westmorland and Lord Maryborough are the only ministers in town. The latter would have written to you, but Lord Liverpool has employed him to write to Lord Harrowby and Lord Wellesley; and as I am writing, he thinks it unnecessary to do so.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Fife House, 12th Aug., 1822.

From the time Dr. Bankhead first saw Lord Londonderry on Friday evening last he was satisfied that his head was seriously afflicted, and that he laboured under very general mental delusion. He had been cupped in his house in St. James's Square on that evening, from which he seemed much relieved; and in the quiet of the evening Lord and Lady Londonderry went down to Cray, Dr. Bankhead promising to follow them the next day, and to stay at Cray all Sunday. On Friday night Lord Londonderry was restless, and asking many questions during the night, which manifested incoherence and delirium. On Saturday morning he took some opening medicine which Dr. Bankhead had sent him, remained in his bed all the day, and was kept particularly quiet, using slops only as nourishment, and barley-water as drink.

When Dr. Bankhead arrived at Cray in the afternoon of Saturday he found Lord Londonderry rather better from the favourable operation of the cooling medicine, but still there was heat and fever, great thirst, and an unusual watchfulness and suspicion of manner, and a constant anxiety lest he should not be well enough to go abroad in the appointed time. He asked several questions very irrelevant and quite at variance with his usual calm manner. In the night of Saturday he had some refreshing sleep, but on the whole of Sunday his fever still continued, as well as the delirium and unhappiness of mind and manner. Dr. Bankhead quitted his room about midnight, leaving his Lordship tolerably comfortable, and Lady Londonderry in the room with him, both retiring to rest. Dr. Bankhead slept in a room close to his Lordship, and on the morning of this day, about 7 o'clock, Lady Londonderry's maid called him, saying that Lord Londonderry wished to see him. Dr. Bankhead instantly repaired to the bedroom, but found that his Lordship had that moment gone into the dressing-room adjoining to the bedroom. On entering this instantly, the Doctor saw Lord Londonderry standing opposite to the window with his face to the ceiling, having on his dressing-gown. The Doctor immediately ran towards him, saying, "My dear Lord, why do you stand so?" upon which, without turning, he answered, "Bankhead, let me fall upon your arm; it is all over." In the agony of the moment, Dr. Bankhead caught him on his arm, and, dreadful to relate, saw a short-bladed knife in his right hand fiercely clenched, with which he had deeply divided the carotid artery; and from the sudden effusion of blood he fell instantly from Dr. Bankhead's arms on his face upon the floor, and was instantly dead without a struggle.

## MEMORANDUM ON THE LAST DAYS OF LORD LONDONDERRY. [ 138. ]

13th Aug., 1822.

I saw Lord Londonderry frequently during the last days of his life.

I dined with him on Saturday, the 3rd of August, at Cray, and sat next to him at dinner. There was a very large party, and I thought Lord Londonderry was in particularly good spirits at dinner.

I had occasion, both before and after dinner, to talk to him on subjects on which the delusions of his mind would have appeared, if he had at that time laboured under any. They related to certain anonymous letters received by Mr. Arbuthnot and others of the Treasury, which were known to come from a person by the name of Jennings, who had been under examination before a committee of the House of Commons; and although I thought Lord Londonderry was cold in his manner on the subject of some of these letters, which was not unusual with him, I never saw him more decided or more clear in his opinion. I saw a letter from him to Mr. Arbuthnot on the same subject the next day, Sunday, the 4th of August, in which he expressed himself with more than usual clearness and decision.

I did not see Lord Londonderry on Monday the 5th, but on Tuesday the 6th he came to the Ordnance office early, to a meeting of certain persons to consider of the means of reforming the commissariat in Canada.

Upon this occasion I thought him very low. He took no part in the discussion, and manifested no interest in it. After the meeting had broken up he waited to talk to Mr. Arbuthnot and me about Jennings's letters, about which he showed that he felt more than I thought he had on the preceding Saturday, but there was no appearance of agitation respecting them.

I met Lord Londonderry at the Cabinet on Wednesday the 7th of August.

The subject of discussion was the instructions for himself on his mission to Vienna. Lord Liverpool read them to the Cabinet, and there was some discussion upon them; but Lord Londonderry took no part in the discussion, and he appeared very low, out of spirits, and unwell. There was, however, no appearance of agitation. After the Cabinet was over I went



into Mr. Beckett's, and after leaving him I met Lord Londonderry as he was coming out by the back door of his office.

We walked together through the Park and the Ordnance office to his own house. Lord Londonderry was remarkably low and silent. He held me by the arm, but scarcely said a word; but there was no symptom of agitation.

After leaving him at his door I returned to my office, and in about half an hour went to Carlton House to take leave of the King previous to my departure for the Netherlands. I found Lord Londonderry at Carlton House. The King was gone out, and I walked with Lord Londonderry back to his own house, where I left him. He was equally low as before.

I had occasion, in about an hour afterwards, to go to my own house, and as I was returning down the Park I stopped to speak to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, who was in his buggy. Lord Londonderry came up the Park on horseback, and joined us, and in a few seconds I left him and the Duke of York together; he then appeared very low and out of spirits.

I did not see him on Thursday the 8th of August.

On Friday the 9th I was proceeding on horseback through St. James's Square from the Ordnance office to my own house, to set out for the Continent at about four o'clock in the afternoon. Lady Londonderry called to me, and was talking to me from her window, when Lord Londonderry passed me in rather a quick and hurried pace, and told me he wanted to speak to me. I followed him into his house and his room.

I cannot give a better account of what passed in this interview than by copying a letter which I wrote to Mr. Arbuthnot (who had left London that evening) immediately after it was concluded, before I set out for Dover:—

"MY DEAR ARBUTHNOT,

" London, 9th August, 1822.

"I am just setting off, but I cannot go without making you acquainted with the impression made upon my mind by an interview I have just had with Lord Londonderry.

"It appears to me that his mind and body have been overpowered by the work of the session, and that he is at this moment in a state of mental delusion. He took me into his house to talk to me about the same story that he told to you and to Lord Liverpool; and, strange to say, he imagined from my manner at the last Cabinet and afterwards walking home

with him that I had heard of something against him and believed it. He thought the same of the Duke of York; and he told me some strange story of a man telling him this day that his horses were waiting for him when he was coming out of Carlton House, of his not having ordered his horses to town, and of the arrival of the horses, and of his being informed of their arrival, as proofs that the person who had ordered up his horses, and that the person who informed him they were waiting, thought there was so much against him that he ought to fly the country. This impression was so strong upon his mind that he rung the bell to desire that inquiry might be made as to who had ordered up his horses, and the delusion was not removed till he was informed that the horses were not in town.

"He is certainly very unwell, and I did not conceal from him my opinion that he was so, and that his mind was not in its usual and proper state. I offered to stay with him, but he would not allow me, as he said it would make people believe that there was some reason for it. I begged him to send for Dr. Bankhead, and, between ourselves, I have informed Dr. Bankhead that it is my opinion that he is labouring under a temporary delusion. He cried excessively while talking to me, and appeared relieved by it and by his conversation with me, and he promised me to see Bankhead.

"I am afraid that he has mentioned the story above referred to, to more persons than Lord Liverpool, you, and me. I have entreated him to say no more about it to anybody, but I fear he will.

"I write you all this in order to urge you to see him as soon as you can after you will return to London and observe him well, and see if his mind is quite right. If it is not, and he should go abroad, I think you ought to make him take Bankhead with him; and, if that is not accomplished, I think you ought to mention the matter to Planta. Otherwise, it is my opinion that this impression of mine should never go beyond ourselves.

"He is quite clear and right about public matters, but agreed with me that his mind had been overpowered by the work of the session, and that he was labouring under a delusion.

"Destroy this letter, and believe me, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

As soon as I left Lord Londonderry I went to Dr. Bankhead's and called upon him twice; but, as he was not at home, I wrote him a letter, of which the following is a copy.

"DEAR SIR,

" London, 9th Aug., 1822.

"I called upon you with the intention of talking to you about Lord Londonderry, and of requesting you would call upon him. He promised me that he would send for you, but, lest he should not, I entreat you to find some pretence for going down to him.

"I entertain no doubt that he is very unwell. It appears that he has been overworked during the session, and that his mind is overpowered for the moment and labours under a delusion. I state the impression made upon me in the interview I have just had with him. I told him that this was my impression, and I think it is his own, and he will probably communicate it to you; but, lest he should not, I tell you what I think, begging you never to mention to anybody what I have told you.

"I am setting out this moment for the Netherlands; I would have stayed with Lord Londonderry, but he would not allow me. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will write me a line and have it left at my house to let me know how you find him, and particularly if you think I am mistaken.

"Ever, dear Sir, yours most faithfully,

"WELLINGTON.

"I believe he is going down to Cray this afternoon."

[ 139. ]

*To the King.*

London, 16th Aug., 1822.

Your Majesty's gracious commands of the 15th instant reached me last night, and I am not surprised that the catastrophe which we all lament should have severely affected your Majesty. I know how much your Majesty regarded Lord Londonderry, and how sensible your Majesty was of his merits, of his attachment to your Majesty's person, and of the value of his services to your government, and his loss at the present moment is certainly one of the severest calamities which could befall your Majesty's kingdom.

The feelings of your Majesty upon this occasion must have been aggravated by the circumstance attending it, and by the fact that your Majesty had the misfortune of observing that that great mind was in a state of delusion, and that your Majesty even anticipated the fatal event which we all lament.

Lord Liverpool has told me that when he informed your Majesty of this misfortune he had requested you not to consider of the measures to be adopted to fill the situation which our unfortunate colleague filled in your Majesty's councils till your Majesty should return to town. It will be our duty likewise to come to the discussion of those measures, with no object in view excepting the transaction to your Majesty's satisfaction, ease, and comfort, of the important business hitherto so ably transacted, under your Majesty's directions, by the late distinguished individual, and the honour of your Majesty's government.

All this is humbly submitted by your Majesty's most devoted and faithful subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Earl of Dalhousie.\**

[ 140. ]

MY DEAR LORD DALHOUSIE,

London, 19th Aug., 1822.

You are aware that the government have been for some time occupied in the reduction of all the departments of the State : a duty which they have been called upon to perform not less by the voice of Parliament than by their own sense of their duty to the public. The interests of individuals may render it expedient to keep up large establishments of officers in the civil departments of the government at a period when the army and all its military departments have been reduced so low as to render it scarcely possible to perform the required duties. But the well understood interests of the State require a different policy. The parliament and the people must be made to feel that nothing but a view of the public interest will occasion the keeping up any employment not absolutely necessary for the transaction of the public business.

Upon these principles the government have lately had under their consideration the commissariat establishment in Upper and Lower Canada. It appears, by their own accounts, that

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\* Then Governor-General of Canada.

you have to provide 4500 men with rations; and to supply these with provisions, the first cost of which is estimated at about 48,000*l.*, there is in Canada a commissariat establishment consisting of 49 persons, at the cost of 14,000*l.*, being 33 per cent. on the provisions they supply. We are aware that, besides the supply, the care, and the issue of provisions, the Commissariat have many other duties to perform in Canada; but still, not undervaluing the nature and importance of these duties or the labour of the individuals employed in them, we conceive that, comparing the number of troops employed in Canada with the number in other countries, and the number of commissariat officers, &c., in that country with the numbers with any other army ever heard of, and making every allowance for the extent of the country, the difficulty of its communications, and the number of posts necessarily occupied in it, the number is much larger than ought to exist. The government have accordingly thought proper to order an immediate reduction of 18 commissariat officers upon the establishment in Canada of 49 of that rank; and with the letter announcing this reduction you will receive directions to make such further reduction as, upon a revision of the establishment, will appear to you to be practicable.

In making this reduction the government have not touched upon any of the detached posts. As now informed, the government understand that the principal part of the duties of supplying, keeping in store, and even of issuing to the troops in detail the provisions and fuel at each of these posts is performed by contractors. If this is the case, it would appear that the commissariat officer might be dispensed with, particularly in the posts occupied by small numbers of troops; and this is a point to which the government wish you particularly to turn your attention. I am aware that in case of war it would be very desirable to have in the country a body of commissariat officers acquainted with its resources from the habit of procuring them and supplying the wants of the army; but, admitting that in peace the commissariat establishment should be formed with a view to war, which is not generally admitted in this country, it would still appear that with an establishment reduced much lower than it has been by the order of the government, and lower even than it can be expected that you will reduce it, there will still remain in Canada a very large

number of officers to perform the duty, probably fully in proportion to the number of men as employed in any army in any country.

Being aware of my old connexion with you, and thinking it probable that you might think my opinions upon this subject deserving your attention, the government have expressed a desire that I should write to you upon it, which is my reason for troubling you.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Ryde, Isle of Wight, 20th Aug., 1822.

I arrived at this place yesterday, after a long cruize to the westward, and heard only four days ago at Jersey of the calamity which has befallen the country and the government by the shocking death of Lord Londonderry. I understand that your Grace is to proceed to the Continent to execute the instructions intended for his mission. Before, however, you leave England, I am anxious to take advantage of the friendship which you have always shown me, and the confidence which you have placed in me, to explain to you the situation in which politically this calamity places me. With the feelings which my friends and I entertain upon the subject of Irish policy, we found ourselves enabled to join the government, not only by reserving to ourselves full and entire freedom upon that subject, but by being satisfied, that whilst so efficient and leading a minister as Lord Londonderry, managing, as it is called, the House of Commons, concurred with us in those views, we had a security that whenever a proper and fitting opportunity presented itself for bringing them forward, they would at all events receive his powerful support, and most probably would have been brought forward by him as a minister of the crown. It may, perhaps, not be difficult so to arrange the Cabinet as numerically to balance that question in the same manner in which it stood previous to Lord Londonderry's decease. I feel, however, that if this is all that is done, and that the leading minister of the crown in the House of Commons shall be pledged to oppose those views, we no longer stand in the same situation in which we were, neither have we the same security. On the contrary, we shall know that every exertion of the leading minister in the House of Commons will be used to crush those views in the beginning, to prevent their being brought forward, and to oppose them if urged. I feel, therefore, that I should not deal honestly towards those who in our connexion with the government looked to additional security that their interests would not be lost sight of, if I did not express the difficulty which I should feel in being connected with a government in which that essential change shall have taken place in its views of Irish policy. I state this, supposing the lead in the House of Commons to be placed in the hands

of one decidedly hostile to those views, and the Cabinet only to be numerically placed, as with respect to them, in the same situation in which it was previous to Lord Londonderry's death. Should the lead in the House of Commons be placed in the hands of Mr. Canning, all difficulties would be removed on that head, and additional security would be given to us, as well as to the whole well-meaning part of the community, resulting from his known sentiments on the subject of reform, and the extraordinary eloquence with which he is enabled to express those, as well as all other his, opinions in Parliament. In the situation in which the government is placed, I know of no other arrangement which can be made so satisfactory to the country and so conducive to its interests. No one knows better than I do, the difficulties which surround it. But I trust that they would not be found insurmountable, and that they would give way to the imminent danger in which the country and the government are placed. In truth I myself see but little daylight in any other arrangement. If, however, those difficulties cannot be removed, it becomes necessary for me to declare that under the circumstances in which I find myself placed, I should find great difficulty in being intimately connected with the government, anxious as I am to support it, and to prevent its falling into the hands of its adversaries, unless our views of Irish policy acquired additional strength in Cabinet, or additional security from the declared intentions of the Crown and the government. To prevent mistakes as to my meaning, I distinctly point to the introduction of Mr. Plunket into the Cabinet, or if that be impossible, of such person as shall be known to be most actively and anxiously connected with the adoption of those views. I have thought it right thus plainly to state my feelings as to the present and the future situation of the government, and I have done it thus early because of your immediate departure for Vienna. Should you wish it, you are welcome to show this letter to Lord Liverpool, expressing to him, however, at the same time, my strongest anxiety to support his government, and my great confidence in his integrity and constitutional feelings. If you do show it to Lord Liverpool, I will request you to keep it secret from all others. Any communication which you or he may choose to make to me of your or his views upon this subject, shall be considered strictly confidential by me; and I need not add how anxious I shall be to consider any suggestions which you or Lord Liverpool may point out whereby our present political connexion may be kept up consistently with the principles on which it was formed, and which the dreadful calamity which has befallen us has again necessarily brought forward into discussion.

Believe me, my dear Duke, with the truest friendship and affectionate esteem, yours sincerely,

C. BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

[ 141. ]

*To Lord Londonderry.*

MY DEAR CHARLES,

London, 21st Aug., 1822.

I do not trouble you to tell you that of which I am certain you are convinced, — my heartfelt grief for the deplorable

event which has recently occurred here ; but I would not allow the post to go to Vienna with the account that the King has desired that I should be sent there without taking a few lines from myself. You will have seen that I had witnessed the melancholy state of mind which was the cause of the catastrophe. I saw him after he had been with the King on the 9th instant, to whom he had likewise exposed it. But, fearing that he would not send for his physician, I considered it my duty to go to him, and, not finding him, to write to him ; which, considering what has since passed, was a fortunate circumstance.

You will readily believe what a consternation this deplorable event has occasioned here. The funeral was attended by every person in London of any mark or distinction of all parties, and the crowds in the streets behaved respectfully and creditably. There was one exception at the door of the Abbey, which showed that even upon such an occasion the malevolence of the Radical party could not avoid displaying itself. Those who misbehaved there, however, were few in number, were evidently employed for the purpose, and were ashamed of showing themselves.

God bless you, my dear Charles ! Pray remember me kindly to Lady Stewart, and

Believe me, ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duke of Buckingham.*

[ 142. ]

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 21st Aug., 1822.

I have received your letter, which, according to your permission, I have communicated to Lord Liverpool. When the deplorable event occurred which gave occasion for your writing it, Lord Liverpool requested the King not to consider of the measures to be adopted to fill the situation in his Majesty's councils which had been held by Lord Londonderry till his Majesty should return to London ; and he assured the King that he likewise, on his part, would take no step whatever on the subject till he should have the honour of seeing his Majesty. This matter, then, stands exactly as it did on the day of the fatal catastrophe, and so will remain till the King's return.

Lord Liverpool is very anxious that your Grace and those



who wish well to the government should take no step and make no declaration previously to his Majesty's return which might embarrass the government or themselves. He hopes that you will so far confide in him as to be certain that he will do what he ought upon this occasion; and you may rely upon his taking the earliest opportunity of making you acquainted with the steps which he shall have taken.

Believe me, my dear Duke, with the most sincere respect and affection, ever yours,

WELLINGTON.

[ 143. ]

*To M. le Prince de Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

Londres, ce 21<sup>me</sup> Août, 1822.

Je vous écris deux mots pour vous annoncer que S.M. a daigné me nommer pour le représenter au Congrès de Vienne, en conséquence du catastrophe déplorable qui est arrivé il y a huit jours. J'aurais été prêt à partir de suite; mais les Ministres de S.M. jugent qu'il serait préférable que je puisse avoir l'honneur de voir sa Majesté à son retour d'Écosse, qui ne pourra avoir lieu avant la fin du mois; et je ne pourrai arriver à Vienne avant le 14<sup>me</sup> ou le 15<sup>me</sup> du mois de Septembre.

Je connais votre amitié pour votre infortuné ami, et combien vous aurez regretté sa mort funeste; et je reconnais combien peu je suis capable de remplir le rôle au Congrès qu'il aurait rempli avec tant d'avantage aux intérêts de l'Europe. Mais vous me connaissez assez pour être assuré de ma bonne volonté, et de mon zèle pour consolider l'alliance générale, et le système de l'Europe.

Croyez moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 144. ]

*To the Hon. Robert Gordon.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 21st Aug., 1822.

The King having been pleased to approve of my representing his Majesty at the Congress of Vienna, I propose to leave London to repair there as soon as his Majesty shall return from Scotland, which will be in about ten days. I shall

be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to allow any arrangements which had been made under your directions for the residence of the late Marquis of Londonderry to hold good in respect to me.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Mr. Whaley.*

[ 145. ]

DEAR SIR,

London, 22nd Aug., 1822.

Your letter of the 6th instant was sent after me into the Netherlands and was returned here after some delay, and I received it only on Monday.

I am very much flattered by your desire that I should possess one of your mares; and I am really much concerned that, having nothing to say to the Turf, and not feeling any desire to breed horses, I cannot avail myself of your offer.

I am equally concerned that I cannot consent that these mares should be landed at Liverpool as mine, and should be thence sent to Stratfieldsaye as mine. As they will not be mine in reality, I could not with propriety say that they are mine; and, if I was not prepared to say so, those who might have claims upon them would, of course, discover that they were not my property, and would seize them.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Ryde, 22nd Aug., 1822.

I beg that you will assure Lord Liverpool that nothing could be further from my intention or wishes than to hasten forward any discussion, or precipitate any decision respecting the steps to be taken to complete and strengthen the government under existing circumstances. On the contrary, no one is more convinced than I am of the absolute necessity of the gravest and most mature deliberation on this very momentous question. For this very reason I thought it due to Lord Liverpool that he should, at as early a moment as possible, be put in possession of the sentiments and feelings of those connected with the government, provided you thought mine of sufficient importance to be transmitted to him.

Believe me always, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

C. BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

[ 146. ]

*To Mr. Crew.*NOTE ON THE TRANSFER OF STORES FROM COMMISSARIAT  
IN CANADA.

23rd Aug., 1822.

Order the storekeepers at Quebec, Montreal, and Kingston respectively to take charge of the stores in the schedules marked A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, L, I, and O, from the department of the commissaries of stores.

Order them to report whether the magazines now in their charge are capable of containing these stores; if they are, and the business can be equally well carried on in them, they are to remove those stores to the Ordnance magazines and buildings: if not, they must keep them in the buildings in which they are kept at present.

Request the Treasury to make the Board acquainted with the number of clerks and labourers employed at each of the stations in Upper and Lower Canada about the stores and the department of the commissary of stores.

Observe to the Treasury that the Indian presents and stores for settlers are specially excepted in their Lordships' minute of 24th May, and therefore that no orders have been given to the officers of the Ordnance in Canada to take charge of said stores.

WELLINGTON.

[ 147. ]

*To Mr. Crew.*MEMORANDUM ON A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE COMMANDANT  
AT CHATHAM AND THE BARRACKMASTER.

2nd Sept., 1822.

These papers convey the first information which I have received of any difference between the commandant at Chatham, and the barrackmaster of Chatham barracks. The difference appears to have originated in the order given to receive the Marine Artillery into Chatham barracks, which order was given at the desire of the Admiralty, and communication made of it to the Quartermaster-General for the pleasure of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief.

The difference which has occurred here is to be attributed to the situation of the commandant of Chatham barracks, which

is in reality anomalous, in relation to the regulations of the King's warrant for the government of barracks.

The 3rd and 4th articles state that the barrackmasters "Shall attend the arrival of the troops in any barrack, and, having received from the commanding officer, or such officer as he shall appoint, a return specifying the numbers of officers, &c., for which barrack accommodation is required, the said barrackmaster shall allot the same (*i.e.* the accommodation) according to our regulations; and having with the commanding officer, or such officer as he shall appoint, viewed the said barrack, &c., shall deliver the same to such officer, with an inventory thereof, under his hand, &c.; two copies of which inventory shall be signed by the commanding officer and barrackmaster, one copy of which shall remain with the commanding officer, and the other with the barrackmaster." "And from the time of such delivery the commanding officer shall stand charged with said barracks, &c., according to the inventory, until such regiment or detachment shall be relieved or ordered away," &c.

It appears to me that the commanding officer referred to throughout his Majesty's warrant is the commanding officer of the regiment or detachment who makes the return of the troops, and not the general commandant of the troops. Indeed, when it is considered that this commanding officer *stands charged* with the barracks, &c., delivered over for the use of the troops, it is obvious that it must be the commanding officer of the regiment, and not the commandant of the troops at the station, who must have been in the contemplation of the King's warrant.

That being the case the question becomes simplified. The first consideration is, whether the barrackmaster had any right to deprive the 58th Regiment of the barracks delivered over to them, that regiment having been neither relieved nor removed, and the number of officers on the return on their arrival being still present with it.

It appears to me that the barrackmaster had no such authority under the King's warrant; and that when asked to provide quarters for the Royal Marine Artillery in the barracks under his charge—a compliance with which orders required a new disposition of the troops in those barracks—he ought to have applied to superior authority for such fresh disposition. The

question, then, arises whether the commandant at Chatham can be considered such superior authority. The barrackmaster would naturally report to his immediate superiors, and the Board of Ordnance would state the case to the Quartermaster-General for the pleasure of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, who alone could in strictness give orders for the removal or relief of the 58th Regiment.

This appears to be the mode of proceeding according to the strict construction of the King's warrant, but it is not necessary that this strict construction should at all times and in all cases be given to it. The service must be carried on; and, provided none of the principles are violated on which his Majesty's warrant is founded, and none of the checks abrogated, if a shorter mode could be devised of effecting the same object, it ought to have been adopted.

I have already pointed out my opinion that the commanding officer in the warrant means the commanding officer of the regiment or detachment, and not the commandant of Chatham barracks. The commanding officer of a regiment or detachment when he receives the barracks can dispose of them as he pleases in detail, as far as the barrack regulations are concerned, provided he allots the different rooms to the description and rank of the officer or soldier for whom they are wanted, but not to the commandant of the troops. The barrackmaster might, however, have reported to the commandant of the troops the order which he had received to make room for the Marine Artillery, and the necessity for the *removal or relief* of some of the officers and troops already occupying them.

The commandant might then, if he should think he had the authority, or if he should think proper, order the removal or relief of a part of those officers and troops; and thus the barracks would become regularly vacated, and at the disposal of the barrackmaster, to be granted, under the 3rd and 4th article of the Regulations, to the Marine Artillery.

But, as the King's warrant stands now I should think that the commandant of Chatham could not venture to issue an order, nor the barrackmaster venture to obey an order so issued for the allotment in detail of any quarters to any officer whatever. The reason of this is that the commanding officer must sign the inventory, *and stands charged*, and then allots in detail.

I beg that this Minute may be communicated to the Quartermaster-General. I think it will be found exactly conformable with the principles and practice of the service. If any mode of carrying it on can be devised which will be more convenient, and afford an equal check, I can have no objection to such a one, but it is desirable that it should be well considered before it is adopted.

There are other complaints against the barrackmaster at Chatham: of delay in receiving the barracks when the Buffs marched, and of being absent by leave.

In regard to the first charge there is very little that is positive in it; but this is very clear to me, that the commanding officer of the troops about to march, and not the barrackmaster, ought to fix the moment at which the charge should be delivered by the former to the latter, and I beg that orders may be given accordingly.

I was not aware that the barrackmaster of Chatham had leave of absence. I quite disapprove of barrackmasters having leave of absence when the barracks under their charge are occupied by troops; and I beg leave to recommend to the Board to consider of a regulation that no barrackmaster of a barrack occupied by troops shall have leave of absence unless on the representation of a case of emergency; and in no case whatever without previous reference to the Quartermaster-General to know whether he can be allowed to absent himself without inconvenience to the service.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. J. C. Villiers to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Spenn Hill, 2nd Sept., 1822.

Having unfortunately been disappointed of seeing you, I take the liberty of troubling you with this letter.

I shall be much obliged (in case you have no objection) if you will favour me with a letter to Sir Thomas Brisbane, recommending two sons of Mr. Rowcroft, whom their father has settled as colonists in Van Diemen's land, to any good offices in his power to show them. I believe that you would do the governor of that colony a service in so doing; for they are young men of talents, of good education, and of excellent dispositions. The father's remarkable benevolence and integrity of character, joined to considerable abilities, which have served others and the public more than himself, are the motives which interest me so warmly in his cause, as to take this liberty with you. Nor is it the least of Mr. Rowcroft's merits, in

my estimation, that he was one of the most zealous promoters of the noble and just tribute to your glory and to your brave fellow soldiers' wounds, in the Waterloo subscription.

I have less scruple in calling your attention for a moment to another subject; because, if the circumstances admit of its being at all attended to, it is one in which your own just popularity is intimately concerned: I mean in regard to the slave trade. You well know the constant and laborious attempts which Lord Londonderry has for some time been in the habit of making with France, and with other powers, upon that subject. He has met with but little, and with rather decreasing success.

One of the pleas of the present French ambassador is really so curious and contemptible that it deserves to be mentioned, viz., that it is the more difficult for the French government to give effect to their promises (to which by-the-by they are as much bound by profession of principle as by engagement) because it is an article of the treaty made upon your victories.

I do not know that this great subject can be brought under the cognizance of the Congress; but believe me that you cannot render a greater service to humanity, or by any possibility make a greater addition to your own glory, than in finding the way (not merely of getting a new document for Parliament) of doing something really effectual upon this subject. I know well that if you do anything, it will be of that description.

I am sure that you will pardon my troubling you with these suggestions. It is not only the public cause itself which I could plead in my excuse. If you knew half the satisfaction which your conduct upon this subject, and your reception of the persons particularly concerned in it, when you were Ambassador at Paris, had occasioned, you would think that the liberty I am now taking in recalling your attention to the subject was a proof of the sincerest friendship, zeal, and attachment.

Heartily wishing that your journey may be productive of every satisfaction and pleasure,

I remain, with the greatest respect and regard,

my dear Duke, most truly yours,

J. C. VILLIERS.

[ 148. ]

*To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers.*

MY DEAR VILLIERS,

London, 3rd Sept., 1822.

I enclose a letter for Sir Thomas Brisbane, in which I have recommended to his attention and protection the sons of Mr. Rowcroft, who are going to Van Diemen's Land.

I wish it was as easy to discover a mode of effecting the other object which you have recommended to my attention. I saw yesterday Mr. Macaulay and Mr. Allen upon the subject of the slave trade, and had a long conversation with them, and I hope to have others with Mr. Allen at Vienna. I don't think we made

much progress in discovering another advantageous step to be taken on this subject. I will attend to it, however, and you may rely upon my doing whatever may be in my power. I am fully aware of the interest with which this subject is considered here, and I must say that I think that up to this time we have done more harm than good, as far as our object is to abolish the traffic in negroes.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Lord Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Vienna, 3rd Sept., 1822.

There are griefs that annihilate all powers of expression. Such is the awful and overwhelming description of the catastrophe that has occurred, I pray to God to give me force to sustain those that are dependent upon me through it, as well as myself. But this is no easy matter; for although Lady S. supported me and herself in a wonderful manner at first, she has been since very ill, and I am by no means comfortable about her.

I have endeavoured to do my duty, as far as my powers have enabled me, and I hope I have done right, and I shall continue to do so. I look upon your letter in this heartrending event as a singular mark of God's protecting providence. Because, how much worse would it have been if our enemies could have put the construction of a moral crime upon the act, instead of a fatal and cruel malady, brought on by interminable business, and, possibly, a gony affection to the head. I might dwell on what I have suffered, but alas! my dear Duke, when the whole world have felt the blow as they have done, what right have I to intrude my sorrows; I who owed so much and who was so devoted to him? I dare not, by expressions, renew all that I know you have felt; and as we shall have, I trust, personal communication so very soon, it is needless to add more.

My object in sending these despatches by Paris, is to meet you, and to entreat of you to make all the haste you can here; as although there is every allowance made for us, under the cruel circumstances, still it is conjectured all will be out of humour at kicking their heels here until you come. The Emperor of Russia will positively be here on the 9th.

Farewell till we meet.

Believe me ever, my dear Duke, yours most affectionately,

V. L.

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*Mr. Watson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Carlton House, 4th Sept., 1822.

Mr. Watson is honoured with the King's commands to express to the Duke of Wellington his Majesty's particular desire that his Grace will not expose his health to the least hazard by venturing out; and that his Majesty will make a communication to his Grace in the course of the day, in lieu of seeing him at Carlton House.

*Le Comte St. Martin D'Aglié to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

RÉSUMÉ \* DE L'ENTRETIEN que le soussigné a eu le 7<sup>me</sup> du mois d'Août avec S.E. le feu Marquis de LONDONDERRY.

Londres, ce 4<sup>me</sup> Sept., 1822.

Le soussigné, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne près S.M. Britannique, a eu l'honneur, à la date précitée, d'exposer au Marquis de Londonderry, d'après les instructions qu'il avait reçues de sa Cour par un courier extraordinaire: Que l'approche du Congrès qui doit s'occuper des affaires d'Italie engageait S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne à s'ouvrir confidentiellement au cabinet Britannique, et à solliciter de lui les bons offices et la cordiale assistance que S.M. et ses augustes prédécesseurs avaient expérimentés en toute occasion: Que le soussigné avait en conséquence reçu l'ordre de lui manifester quels étaient les desirs et les vues de S.M. Il fit sentir d'abord au Marquis de Londonderry que le Roi son maître était justement persuadé que personne ne pouvait mieux que lui-même connaître les besoins et la situation de son propre pays, et qu'il tenait extrêmement à ce que l'on s'en rapportât entièrement à son jugement, ainsi qu'on l'a fait jusqu'à présent, pour tout ce qui concerne l'intérieur de ses états. Le soussigné retraça ensuite à S.E. la situation actuelle du Piémont, et les importantes améliorations ordonnées par S.M. Sarde dans plusieurs branches de l'administration publique: il a ajouté que son auguste Souverain, d'après la parfaite tranquillité de son pays, et le succès des mesures adoptées après les évènements de l'année dernière, serait très probablement disposé à demander que l'occupation militaire d'une partie de son pays ne se prolongeât pas au-delà du terme fixé par la Convention de Milan. Le Marquis de Londonderry fit observer alors au soussigné qu'à Naples le manque de troupes nationales suffisantes avait fait désirer la continuation de la présence du corps d'armée Autrichien, et lui demanda si S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne avait assez de ses troupes pour garder son pays sans avoir besoin de secours étrangers. A ce propos le soussigné eut l'honneur de rapporter à S.E. que l'armée de S.M. Sarde était à peu près dans le même état qu'avant les derniers évènements: qu'elle fournissait les garnisons de Turin, de Gênes, de Coni, de Nice, de la Savoie, et de l'Isle de Sardaigne; et que sous ce rapport le départ des troupes Autrichiennes ne pouvait produire le moindre inconvénient, puisqu'elles n'occupent qu'un petit coin du pays.

Que S.M. Sarde entre parfaitement, et en toute sincérité dans les vues de ses hauts et puissants Alliés, et que si elle pouvait découvrir le moindre danger pour la tranquillité de son pays, ou du reste de l'Italie, elle serait la

\* Another précis of this interview is given at p. 309.

première à solliciter la continuation du séjour des troupes Autrichiennes : mais que d'un autre côté, il était trop naturel que S.M. fût empressé de délivrer ses sujets d'une charge aussi considérable, et de leur accorder la plus grande des satisfactions, lorsque cette marque de confiance et de bienveillance de sa part, bien loin de mettre en danger la tranquillité du pays, ne pouvait au contraire que produire les meilleurs effets : Que d'ailleurs le soussigné avait l'ordre exprès de déclarer que le Roi a toutes les raisons de se louer de la conduite des troupes Autrichiennes dans son pays, ainsi que des rapports qui subsistent entre les deux gouvernemens : Que par conséquent si S.M. se déterminait à demander la cessation de l'occupation militaire d'une partie de ses États, ce ne serait jamais pour aucun motif de jalousie ou de méfiance envers la Cour de Vienne, avec laquelle elle désire de conserver les relations les plus intimes, mais uniquement, par la considération des intérêts et des besoins de ses propres sujets. Le soussigné finit par faire remarquer au Marquis de Londonderry que le Roi son maître avait la ferme confiance d'obtenir dans cette occasion de la cour Britannique l'appui et les bons offices que ses ancêtres n'avaient jamais sollicité en vain. Lord Londonderry répondit au soussigné que les affaires d'Italie seraient probablement traitées dans le Congrès qui se tiendrait dans ce pays-là, et qu'il lui était impossible de rien préjuger à cet égard ; mais en même temps, il assura le soussigné d'une manière très marquée que le gouvernement Britannique prendrait toujours à cœur les intérêts de la cour de Sardaigne, et qu'il emploierait avec empressement dans toutes les circonstances ses bons offices en sa faveur.

L. E. COMTE ST. MARTIN D'AGLIA.

*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Carlton House, 5th Sept., 1822.

I was very glad to learn by the *friend* whom I sent to your bedside yesterday, that you were rather better, and I hope that I shall have your further amendment confirmed by him to-day.

He gave me a most faithful and detailed account of your opinion and kind feelings under the painful embarrassment in which we are at present placed ; and I must confess that it has produced a stronger conviction on my mind than anything that had been previously urged by others. If I could get over that which is so *intimately connected* with my *private honour*, all might be well, but how, my friend, is that to be effected ? I have a perfect reliance in your dutiful affection towards me as your Sovereign ; I have the most unbounded confidence in your sentiments of regard towards me as your friend ; my reliance therefore in you is complete. I am, with great truth,

Your affectionate,

G. R.

*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Carlton House, 7th Sept., 1822.

If you are quite well enough to come out to-day, of course I shall be most anxious to see you; but let me desire of you in the strongest manner not to leave your room at any hazard.

I have written to Lord Liverpool to say that I shall defer my interview with him until I shall have had the pleasure of seeing you. My friend whom I again send with this, will receive from you, in the interim, any new sentiments or opinions that further reflection may have induced you to form on the painful subject under consideration. I am most sensibly impressed with your dutiful and affectionate attention to my interests and happiness.

Believe me, with great truth, your affectionate,

G. R.

[ 149. ]

*To the King.*

London, 7th Sept, 1822.

Your Majesty's most gracious commands have reached me, and I am much concerned that I am still unable to wait upon your Majesty, and am much obliged to your Majesty for permitting me to address you in writing.

I have already detailed to the gentleman whom your Majesty was so kind as to send to me, my reasons for thinking that it was desirable, and would contribute to your Majesty's ease and comfort to admit Mr. Canning into your councils in the situation recently filled by Lord Londonderry. These reasons are shortly, that this gentleman's talents and abilities are much considered, and the continuance of his presence in the House of Commons is anxiously desired by many of the best friends of the government, whose support would probably be lost if advantage were not taken of this opportunity of introducing him into your Majesty's councils; that I am convinced he will serve your Majesty in that situation with ability, zeal, and fidelity, and will give your Majesty satisfaction; that his principles and opinions are in all the main points of your Majesty's policy, domestic as well as foreign, the same as those of your other servants; and that there is no other arrangement which will not leave the government in a state of inefficiency in one or more of its departments, which will be felt in the next session of Parliament, and will greatly disturb and annoy your Majesty.

Having been aware of your Majesty's reasons for objecting to the admission of Mr. Canning into your councils on a former occasion, I confess that it is with pain and difficulty that I

brought myself to recommend this arrangement to your Majesty, and I have anxiously considered the circumstances mentioned to me by the gentleman whom your Majesty sent to me, and your Majesty's feelings upon this subject. I have the most profound veneration for the opinions of the Lord Chancellor, and I should certainly say that no arrangement ought to be adopted which should oblige the Lord Chancellor to withdraw from your Majesty's councils; but there is no difference of principle or opinion between the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Canning, which does not exist between the Lord Chancellor and others of your Majesty's servants, and certainly none which can render such a step on his Lordship's part necessary. I believe that Mr. Canning referred, in the end of the last session of Parliament, to a measure in which the Lord Chancellor had taken a part, in terms which he might as well not have used, in relation to a person in his high situation, and so respectable and venerable in every point of view; but still events of this kind are so common among public men in this country, and as the Lord Chancellor had certainly previously observed upon a measure of Mr. Canning's in terms though not so acrimonious nor unjustifiable, still sufficiently harsh, I do not conceive that this offence, if it can be so called, ought to weigh with the Lord Chancellor; nor will it, I am convinced, when he comes to consider the question fairly, induce him to take a step which would prevent your Majesty from adopting an arrangement otherwise beneficial to your service, and recommended by nearly all your servants. Neither do I think that the opinions given to your Majesty by Lord Sidmouth are at all conclusive upon this subject. Mr. Canning has taken a line upon the criminal laws, and is known to entertain opinions on the Catholic Question different from some of your other servants, but it does not follow that because he entertains such opinions he would attempt to use the influence of government in the House of Commons in a manner different from that which should be decided by the deliberate opinion of the government; and I am certain that if no other reason existed for not admitting Mr. Canning into your Majesty's councils, these would not be listened to.

I come now to consider that which is the most important point of all in this question—your Majesty's feelings—and I assure your Majesty that I do so with that interest and dutiful affection by which I am bound to your Majesty in every

manner in which a subject can so feel towards his Sovereign. Your Majesty conceives that Mr. Canning has offended you, and that your Majesty's honour requires that you should resent this offence. If I were to consider such a question as between two individuals, as I have just done in relation to the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Canning, I might be of opinion that the public interests and the public duties of those individuals would render it necessary that their private feelings upon such a question should be laid aside, and that the offence, for the benefit of all parties, should be buried in oblivion. But in a case in which the offender is a subject, and the offence given is towards the Sovereign, I can have no doubt upon the subject. The honour of your Majesty consists in acts of mercy and grace, and I am convinced that your Majesty's honour is most safe in extending your grace and favour to Mr. Canning upon this occasion if the arrangement in contemplation is beneficial to your Majesty's service.

I really believe, as I have before told your Majesty, that Mr. Canning never intended to do anything displeasing to your Majesty, and I feel assured that he would be too happy to explain any part of his conduct which might have had that effect. But I confess that I doubt that any explanation would be satisfactory to your Majesty, and I am quite certain that the call for it, or even the admission of it, would not be so consistent with your Majesty's dignity, and would not give such ease to your Majesty's mind, as the act of royal grace which I have taken the liberty of suggesting.

I have now submitted to your Majesty the result of long and anxious consideration upon this subject in a manner which I hope your Majesty will excuse, in consideration of the state of health in which I am at this moment. I have endeavoured to place myself in the situation in which your Majesty condescended to desire that I should consider myself, and I assure your Majesty that I never felt on any subject more anxiety than that your Majesty should on this occasion adopt an arrangement which at the same time that it should be beneficial to the public interests, should conduce to your Majesty's ease and comfort, and, above all, should be consistent with your Majesty's dignity and honour, all of which is submitted by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM SHOWN TO LADY LONDONDERRY UPON [ 150. ]  
APPOINTING MR. CANNING TO OFFICE.

7th Sept., 1822.

When the misfortune occurred, it was necessary for the government to consider what measures should be adopted for its reorganization.

We could look to two persons to take the lead in the House of Commons, and to two modes of arranging the offices of government.

If we looked to Mr. Peel, we had only one individual who could pretend to take a great line in Parliament: and, giving him every credit for talents, we could not believe that he would prove himself more capable than him whom we had lost to carry on such a concern alone and unsupported. His health is not very good, and he had more than once complained in the last session that he was not equal even to the moderate share of the labour which had devolved upon him, and we could not expect that alone he could be equal to the whole.

Then we knew and were informed that a large number of the supporters of government, some even in office, had, during the last session, lamented that a person of Mr. Canning's parliamentary talents should have been allowed to go away; and it was found that many individuals, some in office, declared that they could not support if, under existing circumstances, an attempt was not made to detain Mr. Canning in the country. These individuals were principally those who favour the R. C. cause, and what I should call the *Liberals* among the supporters of government; and I entertain no doubt that if we had determined to endeavour to carry on the government without making an offer to Mr. Canning, we should have lost the support of all these and of Mr. Canning's particular party, and we should, moreover, have left ourselves, in respect to parliamentary talents, in a situation far inferior to that in which we had been for many years. It was determined to recommend the King to recall Mr. Canning to his counsels. When this was determined, the question was, to what situation he should be called.

Upon this point common sense, strengthened by former experience, could leave no doubt.

Nothing can be so erroneous as to place any individual of

great activity and talents in a situation in which there is no scope for his activity, and in which he must feel that his talents are thrown away. His views must always be directed to disturb rather than to preserve the existing order of things, in order that out of a new arrangement he may find himself in a position better suited to him. But there exist other circumstances which render it impossible to appoint Mr. Canning to any other situation. He must be the leader in the House of Commons, and, as such, he must be either Chancellor of the Exchequer or Secretary of State in one of the three departments.

I believe it would be impossible to place two leading men in the Treasury. There remained then only the offices of the Secretary of State. Mr. Peel cannot talk French, and is totally unaccustomed to the Foreign affairs; and Lord Bathurst's office, in time of peace, is certainly less important than either of the others. It was, therefore, deemed advisable to place Mr. Canning in the Foreign office, on the principle above laid down (which is undeniable), of placing him in the situation in which there will be ample scope for his activity and talents.

WELLINGTON.

[ 151. ]

*To the Lord Chancellor (Eldon).*

MY DEAR LORD CHANCELLOR,

London, 8th Sept., 1822.

I have wished to speak to you for three or four days, but I have been so ill as to be unable to ask you to come here, and I cannot yet quit my house; I wish, however, that you would look in here previous to your *sederunt* this day.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Eldon to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

London, 8th Sept., 1822.

When I saw his Majesty this morning, he seemed disposed to inform me as to the nature of some communication he was about to make to Lord Liverpool, and to ask my advice upon it. I stated to him, as I had before stated to Sir W. McKnighton, that it could not be proper for me to give him any advice upon a measure which I did not concur in. I understood

that that communication had been reduced to writing, and I might have seen it, but I declined seeing it.

I most gratefully thank you for your kindness to me this morning. I could not, however, induce myself to act according to the advice you gave me, highly as I feel my obligations to you for it, and sincerely and cordially as I value the person who offered that advice to me.

In truth, I know not how any person, who has seen the King in the distress in which I have seen him during this week, and has heard what has fallen from his lips during this week, could, if he had himself no reasons for disliking the proposed measure, in any way further it.

At the same time what your Grace was kind enough to say to me, I think, has led to some improvement in my own conduct; and, if I had your permission, I should call upon you to-morrow morning.

For the sake of the world I hope your health improves hourly.

I am your Grace's obliged servant,

ELDON.

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*To the Lord Chancellor (Eldon).*

[ 152. ]

MY DEAR LORD CHANCELLOR,

London, 8th Sept., 1822.

I have received your note, for which I am much obliged to you. As I am not quite well yet I don't know whether I should get up time enough in the morning to receive you before you would go to your Court, but I will send you word when I shall get up, and I shall be very happy to see you if you should have a moment to give me a call.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Coombe Wood, 8th Sept., 1822.

It will be a relief to your mind and a satisfaction to you to hear that I have received the King's letters respecting Canning; and I am of opinion that they ought to answer every purpose we can desire. I am most truly sensible of the value of your services and assistance upon this important crisis, without which it never might have been brought to such a result.

I was most happy to hear this evening that you were so much better, and I trust I shall learn upon coming to your mansion that you are rapidly proceeding towards recovery. I only deprecate any unnecessary exertion on your part for some days.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.



*Mr. Hervey to Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD,

Madrid, 10th Sept., 1822.

In all the interviews which I have had with M. de San Miguel, the new minister for Foreign affairs, he has expressed the greatest anxiety to cultivate the amicable relations which exist between the two countries, and to meet the wishes of the British government upon all the subjects under discussion; to which I have replied by general observations, giving his Excellency at the same time to understand that we have been too long amused by promises, and that nothing short of immediate payment of the several claims so long pending, and the prompt redress of the grievances complained of, would satisfy the British government.

M. de San Miguel has also testified much anxiety respecting the Congress to be held at Vienna, and has directly questioned me as to the part that Great Britain would take on Spanish affairs. In answer, I explained to his Excellency that I had no official notice of the holding of a Congress for the purpose of discussing the affairs of Spain, but that there were no grounds for suspicion that Great Britain would depart from those principles which had invariably regulated her conduct towards other nations, and towards Spain in particular; and then I repeated the concluding paragraph in the late Lord Londonderry's dispatch to me, No. 14, of the 4th August.

On the subject of the South American colonies I found that no decision had been taken; and when I referred M. de San Miguel to the late Marquis of Londonderry's note to M. Onis, of the 28th June, as explanatory of the views of Great Britain upon that interesting question, I found, to my great surprise, that his Excellency had no knowledge of the note; and I was still more astonished when, upon sending for the note to the Chancery, it was ascertained to be lost, or mislaid, or taken out of the office. At his Excellency's request I furnished him with a copy of the same, but I cannot say that when I last saw him this important document appeared to have met with that attention which it so amply deserves.

The measures adopted by the present ministers and the removal from office of all persons upon whom they cannot absolutely rely, to make way for their own friends, have excited considerable alarm among those who are apprehensive of an exaggeration of the revolution; and a party is forming against them, composed of the late ministers and of many of the nobility; but I have no doubt that the administration will be supported by a large majority in the Cortes, particularly in the execution of their plan for considerably augmenting the standing army, and for placing the kingdom in a state of defence.

There is not the least doubt that the violent party has obtained great advantages from the events of the 7th July, and that the revolution made rapid strides since that.

It is on this account the more to be regretted that the French government cannot be persuaded to withdraw the sanitary cordon, and to observe a rigorous impartiality; for the line of conduct they have hitherto pursued towards this country, and the notorious support of every kind which they have furnished to the insurgents, have tended to exasperate all parties, and to advance the cause of the revolutionists more effectually, than all the intrigues and efforts of their own partizans.

I have, &c.

LIONEL HERVEY.

*To the Earl of Hopetoun.*

[ 153. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 11th Sept., 1822.

You will have heard that the office of Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance has become vacant by the sudden death of Lieutenant-General Sir H. Oaks. I have great pleasure in informing you that when I reported this misfortune to the King, he immediately directed that I should write to you, and propose to you to be appointed Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, and I cannot express to you the gratification with which I obey his Majesty's commands.

I confess that I am not without my doubts that you will feel inclined to relinquish your other avocations to undertake the duties of this office in time of peace. If you should, it will give me the greatest satisfaction to have your assistance, and to renew my old habits with you. If you should not, it will be satisfactory to you to know that the King is desirous of availing himself of your services whenever an opportunity may offer.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To ———.*

[ 154. ]

MY DEAR ———

London, 12th Sept., 1822.

I am much concerned that I have been unable to see you since you came to town, and that you should have had any trouble respecting your relation.

As far as I am personally concerned, it is a matter of indifference to me what becomes of him. His threats against me at Paris, which were communicated to me by a friend, first made it known to me that such a person existed in the world; and I performed what I conceived a duty, in communicating to the magistrate that which had been communicated to me; and in apprising you, the only relation of his with whom I was acquainted, of the circumstances as they were related to me, and of the steps which I had considered it my duty to take.

It was found that he was insane, and he was confined to a madhouse, from whence he has since escaped, having still the same delusions on his mind, according to the opinions of his keepers; and, having been for some time at large, he has

again been put in confinement, and I understand from your letter that he is to be examined by four physicians, and is to be enlarged if they should not find that the delusion under which he has been supposed to labour still exists. Nothing can be more reasonable or proper; but, as I don't put much reliance on the opinions of physicians upon the first and only view of a person who has been undeniably in a state of mental delusion, and knowing how cleverly persons in this situation contrive to conceal their malady, you cannot be surprised at the intention which I beg to inform you I entertain of getting regular informations of what passed at Paris, and making the magistrate acquainted with the circumstance, in case I should find your nephew again calling at my house, or resorting to this neighbourhood.

Ever, my dear ———, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ 155. ]

To ———.

MY DEAR ———,

London, 13th Sept., 1822.

I return Mr. ———'s letter, for the perusal of which I am much obliged to you. It really gives me the greatest concern that you should feel any uneasiness on this subject. It is certainly a great misfortune that your nephew should be deranged, but I beg you will feel no uneasiness on my account, as I certainly feel none on my own.

Ever, &c. &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 156. ]

To Mr. Crew.

MEMORANDUM. BARRACKS CONSTRUCTED FOR THE ARTILLERY (EXCEPT WOOLWICH) TO BE APPLICABLE TO THE SERVICE IN GENERAL. DIRECTS THE SELLING OF BARRACKS.

13th Sept., 1822.

I propose to order that the barracks constructed for the artillery, exclusive of those at Woolwich, should in all cases be, equally with those of the line, applicable to the service in general, and that a return of those barracks should accordingly

be made to the Quartermaster-General. The barracks for the artillery at Woolwich had better still be kept exclusively for the use of the artillery, excepting in such cases as the emergency of the service may require the use of them for any part of the troops of the line.

When the artillery, or any troops under the Ordnance, require the use of any barracks, excepting those at Woolwich, the Quartermaster-General would be apprized.

Supposing this arrangement to be agreeable to his Royal Highness, as it would render a larger number of barracks disposable for the general service of the country, I would then propose for his Royal Highness's consideration the dismantling immediately, and eventually disposing of, the following barracks:—

The artillery barracks at Canterbury, held on lease, built of brick and stone, for 1008 men, and 483 horses;

The barracks at Chichester, built of wood, the property of the public, for 940 men, and 350 horses;

Those at Eastbourn, built of brick, the property of the public, for 58 men, and 63 horses;

Those at Dorchester, built of brick, held on lease, for 178 men, and 180 horses;

Those at Hilsea, part brick, part brick-nogging, public property, for 156 men;

Those at Weymouth, built of brick, held on lease, for 270 men, and 46 horses;

Those at Radipole, wood, and weather-tiled, held on lease, for 462 men, and 594 horses;

Those at Exeter, brick, public property, for 177 men, and 202 horses;

Those at Birmingham, of brick, on lease, for 169 men, and 188 horses;

The artillery barracks at St. John's Wood, of brick and stone, for 121 men, and 35 horses.

Let this Memorandum be laid before the Board, and, if they should approve of it, let it be shown to the Quartermaster-General, with the accompanying state of the barracks in Great Britain.

I should be glad to talk to General Gordon on the subject of this Memorandum.

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 13th Sept., 1822.

You will be glad to hear that my audience with the King went off very satisfactorily. He had nothing to object to Canning's Memorandum; and he has fixed Monday at 3 o'clock for the council, to deliver to him the seals. I am going to Coombe, but shall be in town early on Monday; I hope to hear in the mean time a favourable account of you from Arbutnot.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Carlton House, 4 p.m., 13th Sept., 1822.

I am glad to find by my friend that you are better to day; and I hope and trust that the indisposition is nearly over.

Lord Liverpool has just been with me, and the affair respecting Canning may be considered as concluded. The reason given for the delay was what you kindly sent to me this morning, namely, the sentiment expressed relative to my letter, which either you, or I, should have settled in five minutes. I was glad to find that there was no other crotchet or proposition behind. Thus ends the last calamity; my reliance is on you, my friend, be watchful therefore. God bless you.

Your sincere friend,

G. R.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 14th Sept. 1822.

I have the honour to transmit, for your Grace's guidance in the execution of the commission with which his Majesty has been pleased to entrust you in consequence of the lamented death of the Marquis of Londonderry, a Memorandum which was originally drawn up by his Lordship, and having been approved by his Majesty's confidential servants, was submitted to his Majesty and received his Majesty's sanction.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

your Grace's most faithful servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

FAIR DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM. — INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE  
DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

The subject-matter upon which the Allied ministers will have to deliberate at the approaching meeting at Vienna may be classed under the following heads,—

1. The Turkish question, internal and external.
2. The Spanish question, European and American.
3. The affairs of Italy.

As British points, the Slave trade, the Austrian debt, and the late Russian ukase, will demand attention.

In treating of the three first heads, the last in order, viz., the affairs of Italy, may be regarded for the present as of very secondary importance. When it was determined, two years since, at Laybach, that a Congress should be held in the autumn of 1822 at Florence, it was in the hope that the withdrawing the armies of occupation from the Sardinian and Neapolitan territories might by that time have become practicable; but so little progress has yet been made in restoring the military efficiency of the army of either State, more particularly of the Neapolitan, that it is altogether improbable that the Kings of Naples and Sardinia would consent to dispense for the present with the aid of the Austrian forces.

The political concerns and relations of the Italian states cannot in themselves give occasion to much deliberation. Upon these the position of the British minister, consistently with the principles laid down at Troppan and Laybach, must necessarily be somewhat distinct from that of his colleagues at Vienna, as we are no parties to the acts which were taken by the Allied cabinets there assembled. We acquiesced in their measures, and reserved to ourselves the right to interfere when we saw occasion; but we did not agree to charge ourselves with any superintendence of the system decided on, and we may therefore regard the duty of the British plenipotentiary upon Italian affairs as limited to informing himself of what is going on, and taking care that nothing is done inconsistent with the general system of Europe and the observance of treaties.

The affairs of the East present a much more extensive field for consideration.

Perhaps the better way to examine the future course to be pursued will be to retrace the principles hitherto acted upon.

After the breaking out of the Greek insurrection, which was very early followed by a succession of differences between the Russian and Turkish governments, which ended in the withdrawal of M. de Strogonoff from Constantinople, the object of all his Majesty's efforts was directed, first, to prevent a rupture between Russia and the Porte; secondly, to soften, as far as possible, the rigour of war between the Turks and Greeks; thirdly, to observe in the contest a strict neutrality.

In the progress of the discussions growing out of this complicated state of affairs, our object has been to obtain an equitable satisfaction for Russia for admitted infractions of existing engagements, and to replace the lives, properties, and religion of the Greek population under the protection of treaties now in force.

In furtherance of this end, the ultimatum delivered in by Russia to the Porte on the 6 (18) July, 1821, has been made the substantial object of all our efforts, and, according to the latest accounts, the prospect of its acceptance and execution is now encouraging, if the events of war do not provoke the Turks to fresh acts of severity and resistance.

It is probable, before the British plenipotentiary can reach Vienna, that the issue of the negotiation confided to Lord Strangford will have been ascertained. As it is likely to end in a refusal, on the part of the Turkish government, to send a plenipotentiary to the frontier, the first object of the British negotiator's efforts should be to prevent this refusal from having any unfavourable influence on the mind of the Emperor of Russia, and to reconcile his Imperial Majesty to the pursuit of the same end by varied means:

What most merits attention at the present moment, as bearing upon the future state of the negotiation, is the degree in which the Ottoman naval power has been paralysed in the Levant; the total inactivity to which the Turkish commanders in the Morea have been reduced from the failure of all naval support; the consequently probable fall of some of the principal Turkish fortresses; and the progress made by the Greeks towards the formation of a government.

This latter circumstance exhibits a new and altogether distinct view of the character of the contest. So long as the force of the insurgents was directed by the mere will of their leaders, the principle of neutrality led to no other consideration than that of giving an equal rule of accommodation to the parties; but by the erection of a government admitting of formal acts being done on the part of that government, we are more positively brought to deal with them *de facto*, upon matters of blockade and other questions dependent upon the law of nations.

Considering the course pursued by Great Britain now for so many years towards the local governments exercising dominion in South America, and her avowed neutrality as between the Greeks and the Turks, it may be difficult for this country, if a *de facto* government shall actually be established in the Morea and the Western Provinces of Turkey, to refuse to it the ordinary privileges of a belligerent; but it must be done with caution and without ostentation, lest it should render the Turks wholly inaccessible to our remonstrances.

The course to be taken must be left to discussion on the spot, with a reference home, if necessary.

Should an intervention be suggested between Turks and Greeks, directed either to submission upon amnesty and assurances of protection for persons, property, and religion, or to the creation of a qualified Greek government; in either case, care must be taken not to commit this country to any immediate or eventual concert of this nature that shall go beyond the limits of good offices: engagements in the nature of a guarantee are to be considered altogether inadmissible.

The Spanish question has been stated to divide itself into two branches; the European and the American.

With respect to the first, there seems nothing to add to or to vary in the course of policy hitherto pursued. Solicitude for the safety of the royal family, observance of our engagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country, must be considered as forming the basis of his Majesty's policy.

It is of great importance that the British plenipotentiary in his passage through Paris should have a full explanation with the French government, and should endeavour to come to some distinct understanding with them, founded upon these principles, the arguments in favour of which are too well understood to require insertion in this instruction.

The present state of South American affairs is of a more serious nature. If the actual governments of South America shall maintain themselves, and if Spain shall, neither by her councils nor her arms, re-establish her authority within a limited time, other States will acknowledge them sooner or later; and it is the interest even of Spain herself to find the means of restoring an intercourse where she cannot succeed in re-establishing a dominion. The whole may be regarded rather as a matter of time than of principle.

In looking at the question of time, there are three distinctions to be attended to in the position of the country, with reference to which the decision is to be formed.

1. The territories within which the contest still subsists.
2. The territories in which the struggle may be said to be over, and the possession become complete on the part of the local government; and
3. The States in actual or intended negotiation with Old Spain.

In the first there can be no justifiable ground for recognition. The number of provinces in which any show of resistance can now be said to be made by Spain must be regarded as very limited.

In the third case it is equally obvious that we should await the result of the negotiation.

It is upon the second case on which the real question for discussion arises, and upon which the British plenipotentiary will have especially to explain himself to the Allied courts.

In doing so, he will recall to their attention the intercourse which for a long period of years has subsisted between Great Britain and the provinces so circumstanced, and the impossibility of its now being obstructed or checked without the certainty of rousing the utmost spirit of discontent in the commercial world; that the British parliament, in its late session, has found it necessary to give to that intercourse a character of reciprocity, and to relax in its favour the former principle of our Navigation Act, viz., the exclusion of the produce of South America, except in British ships. The question then resolves itself into one rather as to the mode of our relations than as to whether they shall or shall not subsist, to the extent, in matter of right, as regulated by the law of nations.

In judging this point it is material to distinguish the following descriptions of recognition:—

1. The recognition, *de facto*, which now substantially subsists.
2. The more formal recognition by diplomatic agents.
3. The recognition, *de jure*, which professes to decide upon the title, and thereby to create a certain impediment to the assertion of the rights of the former occupant.

Now, as to the last description of recognition, there can be no fair pretence for calling upon this country to commit herself by its adoption. It is for the two contending parties themselves to settle the question of title, not for third parties to interfere. They have a motive of convenience in doing so, however difficult may be the adjustment.

The practical question then is,—How long should the *de facto* system of recognition be maintained, to the exclusion of the diplomatic, and when should the latter be adopted?

Some of the cases, where the adoption of such a change would be positively objectionable, have already been stated. To these may be added the propriety in many others, if not the necessity, of a previous explanation with Spain and our Allies. With the former certain communications have already taken place. It will be the duty of the British plenipotentiary to enter into discussion with the Allied cabinets, endeavouring, as far as possible, to bring them to the adoption of common sentiments, but taking care, in every alternative, to leave to the British government an independent discretion to act according to circumstances.

There only remain for special instructions the Slave trade, the Austrian debt, and the late Russian ukase.

The Slave trade requires no comments. The British plenipotentiary cannot press too strongly the necessity of some settlement of the British claims on the next of these questions; the arguments and principles upon which they are to be urged will be found in the previous correspondence. Upon the Russian ukase, the objections to its enactments, in principle, are set forth in



the note addressed to Count Lieven, in reply to his communication of the ukase to the British government. The duty of the British plenipotentiary will be to bring the Russian cabinet to some distinct explanation as to the mode in which the differences of opinion on this instrument may be reconciled.

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*The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Avington, 15th Sept., 1822.

Charles Wynn notified to me on Friday Canning's acceptance. I am convinced that no other arrangement would have held together a week. How this even will answer the end remains to be seen. It is not very encouraging to you to have to fight the House of Commons' battle with diminished forces. I do trust, however, that the absolute necessity will be felt and acted upon of bringing back the House of Commons to its real situation in the constitution, and not to allow it to become a Cortes.

I regret to hear of your severe indisposition, and that you are undertaking so arduous a journey, when, I fear, not quite strong or recovered. Pray take care of your health, and believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

C. BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

[ 157. ]

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 21st Sept., 1822.

I had a long discussion with M. de Villele yesterday on the relations of this government with Spain, of which it is impossible in this despatch to give you the details, but of which the result will give you a tolerably correct notion of the system on which this government has been acting up to this moment, and of that on which they will act in Congress upon this subject.

It appears that for a considerable time past—I believe since the alarm of infectious fever in Spain—the French government have been collecting troops in the southern departments of France, and that they have now an army of 100,000 men of all arms, fully equipped for the field, so posted as that they can be collected for service in a very short period of time. They have not on the immediate frontier a larger body of men than are sufficient for the performance of the duties of the *cordon sanitaire* as long as that precaution is necessary, in consequence of the prevalence of an infectious fever in the neighbouring provinces of Spain, or than can fairly be deemed necessary for

the purposes of observation of a country which is the seat of a civil war, and for the protection of the French frontier from insult by the different parties in operation immediately on the borders; but they have behind a force which, together with that in front, amounts to 100,000 men, fully equipped for service in the field.

There are two opinions in the Cabinet regarding the mode of making use of this force. Some are of opinion that they ought to proceed at once to attack the Spaniards by what M. de Villèle called an *avanture*, or a *coup-de-main*; that two columns ought to be moved into Spain, one consisting of 40,000 men, by Perpignan, into Catalonia; and the other, of 60,000 men, by Irun, upon Madrid. The object of this last would be to rescue the person of the King; and they expect that they would find him at Madrid, as the municipality would probably keep him there, in order, through him, to make terms for their own safety. Those who have adopted this plan do not propose either to impose upon the Spaniards any particular constitution or plan of government, or to remain in Spain with the whole, or any part of the army, as an Army of Occupation for the protection of the King, longer than the few months necessary to enable his Catholic Majesty to collect about him a force on which he could rely, and to form and put in execution the constitution and plan of government by which he should propose to govern his country in future; and it is intended, on entering the country, to proclaim this determination not to interfere, and to depart immediately, and throughout their stay in Spain to preserve the most severe discipline among the troops, and to pay for all the supplies they should receive. The framers and favourers of this plan do not propose to go farther than Madrid on any account. It was not difficult to convince M. de Villèle—as, indeed, it was his own opinion—that this plan was attended by all the difficulties and risks of any invasion of Spain under any circumstances, and that it most probably would produce no result whatever. It was probable that even the possession of the King's person would not be attained by the execution of this plan, as it was to be supposed that even in the hypothesis of the municipality of Madrid entertaining the design to detain the King's person, in order to give him up to the French army, there would be some leader of a corps of troops who would see the advantage which the French

army and the counter-revolutionary party would derive from having his person in their keeping, and would carry him off to Cadiz, or elsewhere, out of the scope of this plan. It was likewise to be observed that even if the King should fall into the hands of the French army, much time would be required to enable his Majesty to collect and equip an army capable of taking possession, and, in fact, conquering the country, and all its strongholds, from those now, and who would be still, in possession. It was, besides, to be apprehended that his Catholic Majesty would inspire no confidence, and would be joined by few, if by any, of the leading characters of the country; and that the cause would become more unpopular in consequence of his having been assisted by a foreign, and, above all, a French army.

M. de Villèle admitted the truth of these, and other observations which I made upon this plan, to which he said his own opinion was opposed, although he thought that the other alternative—that of waiting to see the result of what was going on—was not unattended by its inconveniences and risks, and, after all, the principal object of any interference of the French government in Spanish affairs might not be attained. His object was to save the King from being deposed, and his Majesty and his Royal family from being murdered; and he could not but admit to those who proposed the first-mentioned plan, that he saw no termination to the existing state of things in Spain than one or other, or both of those misfortunes, which it would be out of the power of the French government to prevent, or adequately to avenge, by the adoption of any plan.

It appears that an apprehension is entertained by some of the moral contagion in France of the success of the Spanish revolution; though I think that when I pressed M. de Villèle upon this point he could not but admit that there was no great cause for such apprehension; and he admitted that there was danger from the collection, for a long period of time, of such an army as the French government had upon the frontiers of Spain, and from leaving the troops unemployed. He said, however, that every precaution had been taken to keep the troops separated as much as possible, and he stated his belief that the *morale* of the French army was very much improved, if it was not now entirely to be relied upon.

It is certain that there have not been wanting provocations to war on both sides. M. de Villèle assured me that this government had given no assistance or encouragement, whether in money or otherwise, to the Spanish insurgents; but from all that I have heard from other quarters, I should be inclined to believe the contrary.

The Liberal party in both countries are acting in concert to force the two nations to a war; and, strange to say, the King of Spain is playing the game of these same *Liberales*, and urges this government in the strongest terms to declare war, and to enter the country, at the same time that he is the willing instrument in the hands of his Liberal government at Madrid to excite the people against the French government, and to obtain there a declaration of war against France.

Then M. de Villèle reckons that the King must be deposed, and he and his Royal family murdered; and he considers that the honour of the King of France will impose upon his Majesty the necessity of avenging such a catastrophe; and that at all events the course of such a revolution as prevails in Spain, leads necessarily to foreign war. He considers, then, that it is his duty to be prepared for this probable event, and that he must maintain upon the extreme frontier a corps of observation, which shall preserve the frontier from insult from either party, and maintain that neutrality which the King is determined to observe; and behind such a body of troops and such means as will enable this country to act with promptitude and vigour if it should be required.

As I before stated, M. de Villèle was not insensible of the danger which I represented of the continuance of this state of things; and he listened with attention to all that I represented to him of the increased probability that the very evils which he apprehended would occur in consequence of the irritation occasioned in Spain by the state of preparation in which the French government was upon the Spanish frontier, and the constant menace and apprehension of invasion. I likewise pointed out to him that the conduct of the French government was liable to be misrepresented, and that even unprejudiced and moderate persons might attribute to the French government the misfortunes which might befall the Royal family of Spain, in the same manner as the misfortunes which had befallen Louis XVI. and his family had been attributed to the Duke of Brunswick's

invasion and proclamation. But I don't think that what I stated to him induced him entirely to alter his plan. In a second conversation, however, which I had with him in the evening, I found him more inclined to peace; and he told me that I might rely upon it that he was sincerely desirous of preserving peace, and that the French government would take a line in respect to Spain, in all matters, that should convince every reasonable Spaniard that if there should be war, it was not the fault of the French government.

In case of war becoming necessary on any of the grounds above stated, the plan of operations would be, I believe, to advance to the Ebro; but these operations were not so clearly explained to me as those according to the plan to which I have first adverted.

In respect to the Congress, M. de Villèle desired me to observe that his whole policy in relation to Spain was founded upon French interests, and that it was entirely unconnected with anything the Congress might determine. He should ask no assistance from any other Power; nay, more, he could not receive it, and should oppose it if endeavoured to be forced upon him, if the assistance to be given was to be a body of troops to be passed through France. But he said that the assembly of the Congress at the present moment was not a matter of indifference in relation to the situation of affairs in Spain, or to the relation in which the two countries stood towards each other. There was no doubt that expectations were formed respecting the result of the deliberations of the Congress on the affairs of Spain, as well in Spain as elsewhere; and that if the Congress were to separate, and to come to no decision on those affairs, it was probable that the existing evils would be greatly aggravated, and that the two countries might be forced into a war, therefore he, M. de Villèle, wished that the Congress would take into consideration their actual position in relation to Spain, and the hypotheses under which they might be forced into a war, and that the four other Powers of the Alliance should declare what line they would each take in case of the occurrence of any of the events which they conceived would force them to war.

I told M. de Villèle that it would be quite impossible for us to declare beforehand what would be our conduct upon any hypothetical case. I did not think that if I were in his situation

I would beforehand advise the King of France to go to war in case the King of Spain was deposed or murdered; much less would I advise what line the King of Great Britain ought to adopt in case of the occurrence of such a war. I did not think that any government could adopt such a measure, and I was quite certain that ours could not, which was liable to be called to account for its conduct at every moment. I besides stated that a declaration of this kind, to be of any use, must be public, and that I thought the Spanish government would have some reason to complain if the Congress were formally to adopt a measure founded upon a supposition that they might depose or murder their King, and his Royal family, or that they might invade France without cause.

In answer M. de Villèle observed that we had declared what line we should take at the time the Austrians were about to invade Naples; and that very recently the Allied ministers at Madrid in a joint note, and Mr. Hervey separately, had protested against any violence towards the King's person.

I begged M. de Villèle to recollect that when we declared that we should remain neuter in the hostilities between Austria and Naples, the Emperor of Austria had determined upon his line of action. It did not rest upon hypotheses, and the whole case was clearly before us.

In respect to the recent transaction at Madrid, I begged him to recollect that the contest, under the very walls of the palace, was going on at the moment the notes to which he referred had been presented; and this contest alone fully justified the protest which they contained against any violence towards the person of his Catholic Majesty.

I have now, I believe, made you acquainted with the result of a very long conversation with M. de Villèle, in which I must do him the justice to say that he displayed more ability, candour, and fairness than I have ever observed in any French minister. You see now exactly how this government stands, and what are their plans and expectations at the Congress and hereafter. It appears to me that they assembled their army in a hurry, with a view probably to the execution of the plan to which I have just adverted in this despatch, and which they abandoned upon discovering its difficulties, its risks, and its probable want of successful result. I think they would be now glad to disperse their army again if they could; and they wish to avoid the disgrace of

retiring from the advanced position which they had taken in the question of war or peace, by covering themselves with the protection and sanction of the Allies in commencing hostilities in the event of the recurrence of either of the cases which they consider would render war necessary. They besides conceive that such a declaration as they require from the Allies, would render the occurrence of those cases less probable.

Upon the whole, I should wish to receive his Majesty's instructions what line I shall take, and what arguments I shall use, in case the French government should make the proposition at the Congress, which M. de Villèle has made to me respecting the declaration by the Allies.

I have seen the King and Monsieur this morning, and went over with them nearly the same grounds that I had with M. de Villèle. I found them both, particularly the latter, very reasonable; both aware of the faults of the King of Spain and of the danger of any interference; and both desirous of avoiding it if possible.

Upon reading over this despatch I observe that I have omitted to advert to one topic which occurred in my discussion with M. de Villèle, in which his observations were very remarkable. I asked him whether he had ever adverted to the probability that in case the French army should enter Spain, the Allies would immediately assemble an army in Germany, to be prepared for the possible result of that operation; and what he felt upon that measure. His first answer was that the expedition would be over before the Allied powers could assemble their armies; but upon my pressing him further he said that he would not object to such a measure of precaution, although he might wish that it should not be adopted. He felt, however, very strongly the difficulties which would attend the arrangement of such a measure. He could not understand how such an army, composed as it would be of Russians, as well as Austrians and Prussians, was to be paid and subsisted if it were to remain long under arms; nor, above all, what Power would consent that it should be assembled within its frontier. He conceived, therefore, that this was a point to which he, as Minister of France, was not under the necessity of paying much attention.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 158. ]

SIR,

Paris, 21st Sept., 1822.

I have taken an opportunity of talking to M. de Villèle respecting the state of the slave trade as it is carried on by this country, and of urging him to adopt some effectual measures for its repression. M. de Villèle stated that the King and the French government were sincerely anxious to put an end to this traffic, but that they could devise no measures which could have that effect which they could hope to prevail upon the chambers to adopt; that the measure so often recommended to their attention by the British ambassador at this court—that of attaching a *peine infamante* to the conviction of this crime—would be inefficient if they could prevail upon the legislature to adopt it, but he doubted his being able to prevail upon the legislature to pass such a law. He said that he would not conceal from me the fact that the abolition of the slave trade was unpopular in France, not because any value was attached to the colonies, because he believed that there was a very general opinion in France that their colonies were useless to them, but because the abolition had been pressed upon the King by Great Britain; and he begged me to observe that the existing law for the abolition of the slave trade, was the only law that had ever passed the legislature without discussion, no person having spoken either for or against it; that this silence upon it was not to be attributed to indifference to the subject, but to the sense entertained that the abolition had been forced upon the King, and that every measure to carry it into execution was a national disgrace.

Then he observed that if the law were made more severe the tribunals and juries would not convict, and would thus give fresh encouragement to the trade.

I replied that I did not think that we were called upon to point out to them the measures which they ought to adopt in order to carry into execution their own engagements; that we stated the measures which had been found most effectual in England and elsewhere, and we certainly had reason to complain if the treaty were broken, as it was avowedly, and none of those measures, nor any other measures, were adopted by France to carry into execution her engagements, the decree of the King, and the law of the country.



M. de Villèle said that they had done, and would do, all in their power; that they maintained cruisers on the coast of Africa, and off Madagascar, for no purpose excepting to check this traffic, to which they were sincerely desirous to put an end, if for no other reason than to avoid angry discussions with us.

He then said that he wished we would deprive them of all pretence for resorting to the coast of Africa by depriving them of their colonies on that coast, giving them in exchange some other colony, for instance, the Isle of France.

I told him that I should certainly draw the attention of the Allied courts to this subject at the Congress, as they, equally with ourselves, were parties to the Treaty, and anxious for the total abolition of this traffic.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 159. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 21st Sept., 1822.

The expectation is so general here that the contest in the Morea is at an end, and that there remains but little difficulty in the settlement of all questions between the Emperor of Russia and the Ottoman Porte, that neither M. de Villèle nor the King said much upon the subject; both, however, expressed their wish that everything might be done at Vienna to facilitate to the Emperor the renewal of his diplomatic relations with the Porte in a dignified manner.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 160. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 21st Sept., 1822.

I took occasion to converse with M. de Villèle respecting the relations between this government and the Spanish colonies in South America. I explained to him the relation in which we had stood towards those colonies in a political point of view, as considering their governments *de facto*, and recognising their belligerent rights as powers at war; and, in a commercial point

of view, in carrying on trade with them for many years under the British flag. I then explained the alteration in the commercial relation which had taken place in the last session of parliament, and the probability that his Majesty's government might deem it expedient to send persons to those colonies to transmit reports on which we could rely, of the real state of their relation with the mother country, and on which we might found our anterior measures respecting them. M. de Villele said that the French government had employed persons to go to some of those colonies to ascertain the circumstances on which we wished to be informed; that they had but little commercial intercourse with any of them, and had not, nor should they, encourage any; nor had they recognised them in any manner. Considering the difference of the relation in which we stood towards those colonies, and that the French government had foreborne to acknowledge them in any manner, he observed that it was strange that the Spanish government should have directed against them all its bitterness and enmity.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM FROM MR. GORDON ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS  
AND THE SUBJECTS LIKELY TO COME UNDER DISCUSSION.

Vienna, 22nd Sept., 1822.

All parties being agreed that no difficulty remains in coming to an understanding upon the Turkish question, it seems probable that the state of Spain will chiefly occupy the deliberations of the approaching Congress; and the manner in which the French plenipotentiary has already expressed himself upon the subject seems to render this unavoidable.

France has shown herself to be far advanced in her conclusions; and it is confessed that she was a principal mover of the scenes of the 7th and 8th July. She maintains that however impossible it may be to continue her *cordón sanitaire* upon the plea which gave rise to it, yet it cannot possibly be withdrawn under present circumstances; and must be kept on foot as an army of observation, and if necessary be marched into Spain in support of the Royalist cause, which can only be supported effectually by arms. France does not pretend to have entrusted to her the sole execution of such forcible measures, but invites the cooperation of the Alliance; protesting at the same time that nothing could induce her to permit the passage of foreign troops through her territories.

Such were the first sentiments expressed by M. de Montmorency on arriving at Vienna; but when he found the Allies—and principally Austria

and Prussia—were far from contemplating an active interference, and on no account were prepared to march troops into Spain, either through France or otherwise, the French plenipotentiary showed great readiness to depart from his views of action; and has been satisfied to represent to the Congress the danger which threatened from the actual state of affairs in Spain, and the deep interest which France necessarily takes in them; thus forcing her to consult her Allies as to the best mode of averting an evil which cannot be suffered to remain in its present impending posture.

These principles are but too acceptable to Russia, however great may be her objections to French interference. The Emperor Alexander is ardent upon the Spanish question. He presses for a decision upon it on the part of the Alliance, and is resolved upon destroying the Spanish constitution. How this is to be done he knows not; and the French notions will not willingly be adopted by his Imperial Majesty, whose animosity against French counsels and principles is unbounded.

Hence it becomes most essential to prevent Prince Metternich from lending a favourable ear to M. de Montmorency's suggestions; to which his ardent desire for promoting the counter-revolution might easily lead him. At present his Highness is sufficiently disposed to oppose them upon the grounds of the incapability of the French ministry, and the conviction that, in spite of present professions, no French government could carry the point as ultimately wished for by him. There is little doubt that Prince Metternich's last and great object would be to destroy everything like a representative government in Europe, with the exception of that of Great Britain: at the same time he does not look forward to the re-establishment of absolute monarchy in Spain, but wishes she may be governed according to the forms which were her own in former times, and which are best calculated to benefit her own interests. In short, the late proclamations from Catalonia breathe Prince Metternich's sentiments, and are as if written by himself.

As yet he has neither combated the Russian or the French views on this question, but has simply required time to answer and enter into explanations upon the former; meaning to do so after concert with the Duke of Wellington, and through the medium of a *Mémoire*, to be drawn up by M. de Montmorency, upon the subject. Some difficulty may arise in refusing to permit France to follow that line which she may allege to be essential to her own interest and safety, and therefore in unison with the principles professed and sanctioned by the Alliance in the course of the conferences at Troppau and Laybach.

The first wish of the three Powers is to keep together in their action, respecting Spain; to induce Great Britain to join in preserving an attitude which may if possible favour the royalist cause, and certainly not espouse that of the existing government. If the latter cannot with one accord be attacked, the former it is hoped may at least be supported in secrecy; and under any circumstances it will be the endeavour of the four Allied cabinets not to have Great Britain ranged upon an opposite line from their own.

General Pozzo di Borgo it is probable will attempt to work out the Spanish question upon his own grounds, which may be similar to those wished to be established by France, but are in no way connected with the

French ministry, whom he holds extremely cheap, with the exception of a single individual, M. de Villèle.

He has no high opinion of M. de Montmorency, who, on the other hand, is far from being well disposed towards the general.

M. Pozzo di Borgo's talents are too eminent not to require strict observation at the present moment. They have beyond a doubt been turned of late towards the question of Spain, now coming before Congress. He is labouring to restore himself in the Emperor Alexander's opinion, which he has lost by his language and conduct on the Greek question, and which perhaps is no longer to be regained but by procuring a result upon that of Spain which may be conformable to his master's views. General Pozzo has been of the *Capo d'Istria's* faction; and his Emperor has barely said a word to him since his arrival in Vienna.

Count Nesselrode, however, stands his warm friend; and has found hitherto the means of saving him from utter disgrace.

Nothing can exceed the Emperor Alexander's displeasure at the present moment with all those of his ministers who have warmly espoused the Greek cause. He sees in their conduct an inclination to defend a cause, the success of which would prove his own ruin. He has said, "Tous ou le pluspart de mes employés sont ou Grecs ou Libéraux. Comment se tirer d'affaire avec de pareils gens?"

It is nevertheless probable, as first stated, that the Turkish question will be settled by Russia without much further controversy with her Allies; and certainly without a chance of involving herself in a Turkish war. The former conference upon this subject may possibly be continued, but it is not probable that further demands will be forced upon the Porte; the latter having asserted that she will actually carry into effect the most of what is required of her, Russia may be induced to take her at her word, but wait for the actual fulfilment of such engagements. Should this be wanting, it may lead to a permanent rupture, otherwise no time will be lost in dispatching a Russian minister to Constantinople, and the proper relations will be previously re-established in the Principalities.

The Congress at Verona, although exceeding all others in point of affluence, will probably be inferior to them all in point of business, if we except the two preceding questions. All the Italian sovereigns and their ministers will be invited to repair thither as soon as the above are disposed of. It is possible that the affairs in Piedmont may give rise to much discussion. Although the King of Sardinia has never intimated his wishes direct to the Austrian government, it is certain that he will call for the withdrawal of the Austrian troops. But it is improbable that his demand will be complied with. The Emperor of Austria will declare he desires nothing more truly; but, as the Treaty of occupation has been signed by these powers, the consent and advice of Russia and Prussia must be first obtained; and the former will strenuously uphold the necessity of continuing the occupation.

It is also understood the King of Sardinia will insist upon his intention and right, publicly to declare the succession of Prince Carignan to the throne as null and void; upon a principle that the interests of his country absolutely call for such a declaration, and require for it the support of the Allies. Austria is of opinion that such an act cannot possibly be sanctioned

by the Alliance, since the right of succession has been formally established by a treaty of congress, which there is no ground for breaking. It would be a dangerous experiment for the Alliance, and one that would stain its character by the exercise of an unjust and arbitrary power; but if the King of Sardinia will consent to let things take their course, the Allies will engage to bind over the Prince of Carignan, by promises and treaties, so to govern the country on coming to the throne, as may satisfy the monarchical doctrines of the present king. France will certainly not listen for a moment to the setting aside of Prince Carignan, who is, as it were, her own offspring; and yet the King of Sardinia is said to be positive and obstinate in his determination.

His interview with the sovereigns will doubtless change his views, and perhaps bring them to coincide with those of the Allies, but it may be asked, is it expedient, after considering the state of the king's mind, and the state of the Piedmont nation, to withdraw the Army of Occupation in the course of the present year?

With respect to Naples, there is no idea of the wish even existing on the part of the Neapolitan Government to have the Austrian army withdrawn. The Emperor of Austria has resolved to make a diminution however in the pecuniary demands for the maintenance of his army to the amount of two or three millions of florins.

*Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR CANNING,

Coombe Wood, 27th Sept., 1822.

I return the drafts. The one upon Russia and Turkey, that upon Piedmont, and the half of the other upon Spanish America, I entirely and in the most unqualified terms approve; with one slight modification in the first, which is not very material, but makes your position rather safer. So do I approve the first part of No.\* as far as it goes; but I think it now appears that France and the other Allies are looking more to an interference in the internal affairs of Spain than was contemplated when the original instructions were prepared. Now, considering this question as one of *principle* and *practicability*, my mind cannot conceive the case in which it would be expedient to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain *by force*, and I doubt the policy of interfering in any other way. The conduct and character of the King makes even the *personal* question the weakest I ever recollect in a case of revolution; and, though I would not remove from the revolutionary party the check that may be imposed upon them by the apprehension that any personal violence to the King might be resented by other powers, I am not at all prepared to say that if a change of dynasty should be the result it would or ought to be a ground for hostile interference, in any way, from other powers.

With these impressions I own I think the Duke of Wellington cannot be too explicit in stating the opinion of his government, and of himself, as to any hostile operations against Spain. If you think it advisable to transmit to him this note, I have no objection.

\* Blank in manuscript.

I quite agree in what you have done about Verona. The inclination of my opinion is, that he should comply with the application. The distinction is not of sufficient importance to stand out upon, when there are so many essential matters under consideration and deliberation.

Ever yours, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 27th Sept., 1822.

Upon the affairs of Spain, whether European or American, I have nothing to communicate to your Grace which can in any degree vary the tenour of the sentiments expressed in the heads of instruction of which your Grace is already in possession, or of the conduct which your Grace is therein directed to observe.

But something has occurred since your Grace's departure, tending so strongly to confirm the views of policy under which those heads of instruction were drawn, that I think it right to lose no time in reporting to you those occurrences for your Grace's information and guidance.

The messenger from Vienna by whom I received those despatches from Lord Londonderry upon which my last despatch to your Grace was founded, brought instructions to the Austrian, Russian, Prussian and French ministers in London to remonstrate with the British government against what the Allied courts appear to have considered the precipitate departure of Sir William A'Court on his mission to Madrid.

The Austrian and Prussian chargés d'affaires called upon me together. M. de Neumann, after apologizing for the absence of the Russian chargé d'affaires, who (being also consul-general for Russia) resides in a distant part of the city, put into my hands an instruction from Count Nesselrode to Count Lieven, in which the alleged inconveniences of Sir William A'Court's arrival in Spain at the present conjuncture (that is to say, after the events of the last two months at Madrid, and before the meeting of the Allied powers at Vienna), the hopes that it would excite in the disaffected party, the colour which it would give to the reports of disunion amongst the Allies, &c., are detailed with much warmth of expression; and an earnest entreaty is added that measures might be taken without delay to stop Sir William A'Court at Paris or elsewhere, before he should reach his destination. M. de Neumann then read to me a despatch from Prince Metternich directing him (M. de Neumann) to make similar representations on the part of the Emperor of Austria; and M. de Werther expressed verbally the entire concurrence of his court in the sentiments conveyed in the Russian and Austrian despatches.

While these gentlemen were yet speaking, the French chargé d'affaires was announced, and upon my desiring him to be admitted, immediately declared himself to be instructed to support the representations of his colleagues. I am thus particular in mentioning the separate arrival of the French chargé d'affaires, because I since know it to have been studiously contrived by him; though nothing that he said or omitted to say, in the

conference, suggested to me at the time any suspicion of such contrivance; nor can I now assign any motive for it. Possibly he may have designed to obtain a separate audience, which design may have been defeated by my happening to summon him to the conference already begun; but he has not since requested to see me, nor made any further communication.

To all these remonstrances, written and verbal, I had no occasion to make any other reply than by producing a letter received from Sir William A'Court, a few days before, in which that minister announced his arrival at Bordeaux on the 13th instant, and his intention to pursue his journey to Madrid the following day.

This information, as it precluded any chance of being able to interfere with effect to prevent Sir William A'Court's arrival at his destination, seemed also to preclude the necessity of any discussion. I contented myself therefore with only observing that I did not think it likely that Sir William A'Court's arrival at Madrid would be felt to be of the importance which the four Courts appeared to assign to it. Our diplomatic intercourse with Spain had suffered no interruption. Mr. Hervey had resided there since Sir Henry Wellesley's recall; Mr. Hervey's health required his return home, and Sir William A'Court went to replace him; with a character higher indeed than that of Mr. Hervey's, but inferior to that which had been before borne by Sir Henry Wellesley.

No reply was offered to these observations, and I thought it much better to treat the matter, on which there was obviously nothing to be done, as lightly as possible, than to allow myself, on so unimportant an occasion, to be drawn into inconvenient discussion.

It is obvious, from this combined movement on the part of the four missions, that some joint public declaration on the affairs of Spain is in the contemplation of the Allied sovereigns; while the attempt of the French chargé d'affaires to find an opportunity for separate communication appears to indicate an apprehension that there may be some shade of difference between the views of France and those of the other Allied powers.

The nature of this apprehended discordance may possibly be explained by M. Villèle's avowal to your Grace of the determination of France, even if that government should itself send an army into Spain, to deny any share in the enterprise to the other continental powers by refusing a passage through the French territory. From whatever cause it may arise, such a discordance may probably afford to your Grace an opportunity of evading the proposal of a joint declaration, without putting your objection on the single ground of the difficulty of framing an instrument which should at once be such as to express the full sense of the continental powers and to admit of our concurrence.

With respect to an invasion of Spain, what I have next to state to your Grace may perhaps be worthy the consideration of the French plenipotentiaries and their government.

The Portuguese chargé d'affaires, M. de Sarmiento, requested an interview with me the day before yesterday, at which he read to me the note a copy of which I have the honour to enclose.

His intention was only to use this paper as a Memorandum for ensuring the correctness of the verbal representations which he was instructed to make to the British government. But, apprehending no small incon-

venience in the discussions which may hereafter grow out of this representation, if I should have nothing to refer to in certification of its purport beyond M. Sarmiento's and my own joint, or perhaps conflicting, recollections, I induced him to leave the paper with me, and to authenticate it with his signature, as a note verbale.

I gave no other answer to M. de Sarmiento than the assurance that I did not believe Portugal to be in any danger of invasion from the Pyrenees. And when he cited the events of the year 1807, in proof that such danger might not be altogether chimerical, I contented myself with pointing out the essential difference of circumstances by which the two periods are distinguished, and particularly the evidence afforded by the example of the former period, that Portugal is not likely to be overrun from France, except with the previous consent, if not cooperation, of the Spanish government.

I reserved to myself to give a written answer to M. de Sarmiento's application, when I should have had opportunity of considering it more maturely, and of taking his Majesty's pleasure upon a matter which, however absurd in terms, may nevertheless be in design substantially important.

That the apprehensions which M. de Sarmiento has been instructed by his government to express, are not only visionary, but pretended, it is impossible not to see. But it would be desirable to ascertain whether the object in bringing them forward may have been simply to obtain from this country a renewed declaration of guarantee, after the changes which have taken place in the Portuguese monarchy; with a view of inferring therefrom his Majesty's countenance and approbation of those changes; or to found on the refusing or withholding of such a declaration, a pretext for that consolidation of projects and interests between the popular parties in Portugal and Spain, which some of the more violent spirits in both kingdoms are said to have long meditated, and which might lead to a change of dynasty in Spain, in favour of a prince of the Braganza family.

M. Sarmiento plainly avows that such a refusal, or even the refusal of succour in the shape of an armed force, against the danger of an invasion from France, (when that danger should, in the apprehension of his government, become imminent), would be the signal for an alliance offensive and defensive, between Portugal and Spain. The Portuguese government does not disguise from itself that such an alliance would absorb and extinguish the independence of the weaker power. If this consequence be so obvious, and if the pretext for incurring it be, as it undoubtedly is, false and unfounded, it is difficult not to believe that Portugal must look for some compensation for such a degradation of the Portuguese nation; and that compensation could nowhere so obviously be found, as in the elevation of the Portuguese dynasty to the throne of the predominating kingdom.

That the Portuguese government, and the King of Portugal himself, should, at such a moment, and in such a state of his affairs as the present, conceive notions of such extravagant ambition, would perhaps be altogether incredible, if it were not recollected that no sooner was the Royal family of Portugal established in Brazil, after their flight from their European dominions, than they began to entertain projects of conquest and aggrandizement; and to realize them too, so far as their force would enable them, at the expense of their Spanish neighbours.



However that may be, the demand, strange as it apparently is, of M. de Sarmiento, and the consequence threatened unless it be complied with, will furnish your Grace with an additional argument (if additional argument be necessary) against the projects of the French government for the invasion of Spain, by showing that independently of the tendency of such projects to create that very peril which they are intended to prevent, to the person of the King, they may, by no remote possibility, tend also to the utter overthrow of that "Bourbon dynasty," the existence of which is considered by the French government as imposing peculiarly upon France the duty of immediate and forcible interference in Spanish affairs.

These facts, and the arguments which they naturally suggest, may possibly enable you effectually to discourage the notion of armed interference in the affairs of Spain; and to evade any question of a threatening declaration without coming to an open difference of opinion with the Allies, such as might lead, though not to a general disunion, to a partial separation of counsels.

But if, as I confess I see reason to apprehend in the late communications both from Paris and Vienna, there is entertained by the Allies a determined project of interference by force, or by menace, in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are his Majesty's government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference,—so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, and so utterly impracticable in execution,—that, if the necessity should arise, or (I would rather say) if the opportunity should offer, I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come what may, his Majesty will not be a party.

I now turn to the affairs of Spanish America.

I have the honour to inclose to your Grace the copy of a letter, upon which I believe a perfect reliance may be placed, announcing the conquest of the city of Quito in South America by the army under General Sucre, and the annexation of the district of which it is the capital, to the territories of the Columbian republic.

This important success to the arms of a province which has so long thrown off its allegiance to the Spanish monarchy, and the accession of strength, political and moral, which it derives from such an augmentation of its territory and population, must lead to such an increased confidence on the one part, and to such increased difficulty and despondency on the other,—in any struggle which Spain might yet attempt to renew for the recovery of her ascendancy in that province,—as to make the question of its independence as a separate state, a question hardly open to any practical controversy.

One argument is thus added to those with which your Grace is furnished for discountenancing any declaration in the name of the Allies, as to the maintenance of the rights and dominion of Spain over her revolted colonies, and for declining on the behalf of your government, if the other Allied courts should persevere in such a declaration, to take any share in it, or to fetter in any degree the discretion of your government, as to the time, the mode, or the degree in which it may be found expedient tacitly to admit, or more or less formally to recognize the *de facto* States of the Spanish American continent.

Indeed it would not be fair to withhold the expression of an opinion that

before Parliament meets, the course of events, the interests of commerce, and the state of navigation in the American seas, will have obliged us to come to some understanding more or less distinct, with some of those self-erected governments.

With respect to the last of these three causes, your Grace is aware that the facility afforded by the appearance of so many new flags in the American seas, and the utter relaxation of the authority of old Spain over the whole of that part of the world, have let loose a multitude of pirates and buccaneers, who lurk on the coasts and in the harbours of the Spanish colonies, (not excepting those which are still under the dominion of Spain), and disturb the trade, and insult the flag of Great Britain, by acts of violence, confiscation, cruelty and murder. This evil has been suffered for a long time, in the hope that Spain would be willing and able to put it down. Representations have been made to the Spanish government which have produced promises of redress, but no redress has followed.

The British government has been at length obliged to take the task into its own hands: but it is impossible to expect that the evil should be thoroughly extirpated without the cooperation of the local authorities occupying the ports and coasts of South America. And it is not improbable that the necessity of such cooperation may (as I have said) hasten the establishment of such an understanding as I have described.

Of one thing the Allied Powers may be perfectly assured, that no State in the New World will be recognized by Great Britain, which has not frankly and completely abolished the trade in slaves.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

NOTE VERBALE, read to Mr. CANNING on the 25th Sept., 1822, by M. DE SAELEMENTO, Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal.

The constant and regular accounts which for these two last months the Portuguese government has received of the march of troops for the frontiers of Spain on the side of France; their increased number, and the warlike preparations on the part of France, can no longer leave any doubt as to some plan of invasion or attack on the Peninsula by a foreign power. Such an attack, once agreed to, cannot be indifferent to Portugal; and H. M. F. Majesty's ministers would not correspond to the confidence the King has been pleased to entrust them with, and certainly would be called to an account by the representatives of the nation, if in due time they had neglected to employ all the possible means to avoid it, taking at the same time proper steps to repel any invasion in the Portuguese territory, intended under whatever pretext, but especially with a view to overthrow those regulations and form of government which the whole nation, in concurrence with H. M. F. Majesty, have lately most uniformly and willingly assented to. In order to avoid the execution of principles hitherto unknown in the laws of nations, but unfortunately followed of late by some of the European powers; I mean the practical right any nation assumes of interfering in the internal arrangements and regulating forms of

government adopted by any other independent nation; dictating by force of arms such a constitution as seems adapted to its views, though contrary to the wishes and the welfare of the subdued country; H. M. F. Majesty's government is determined to put in practice all the means he can have at his disposition to avoid as far as it is possible any such interference on the part of a foreign power, and if he fails in his negotiations, then the Portuguese nation, with that energy they have so characteristically shown in fighting for the independence of their country, will repel by force any invasion on their territory, or hostile measures dictated to them by any foreign nation.

In the situation which H. M. F. Majesty's government is placed, attending his local circumstances, and all his resources, either to evade by means of negotiations or to repel by force any foreign interference in the domestic arrangements of Portugal; there are only two ways of bringing such measures into effect, accompanied with a happy result as far as can be expected.

The first, and which H. M. F. Majesty very confidently resorts to, rests entirely with the British government, his most ancient and constant ally; and on this account the Portuguese government most urgently desires to ascertain whether it can continue to rely, as hitherto it has done, on the good offices and effective assistance on the part of the British government. The treaty of friendship and alliance of the 19th of February 1810, in the first and second articles, is very provident on this subject, and most expressively determines the course that one of the two contracting powers is to follow, when the other is either menaced or attacked by a third.

Under this consideration, H. M. F. Majesty very properly calls the attention of his constant ally to the existence of one of the hypotheses of the above mentioned articles, the menacing position of the French troops collected on the Pyrenees, which induces H. M. F. Majesty to ask an immediate and formal declaration from the British government, that they will forthwith fulfil the stipulations of the Treaty, and guarantee Portugal against any foreign attack or invasion, employing for that purpose its most earnest and effectual influence and interference; and should either one or the other prove useless, then H. M. F. Majesty expects that, agreeable to the same Treaty, British forces will be sent over to Portugal to cooperate in defending its independence and integrity.

However, if against our most sanguine expectations the British government will no longer accede to the requisitions presented on the part of H. M. F. Majesty, and either by new connections with other cabinets or a material change in its political system deems it proper to abandon Portugal to its own means of defending the honour, rights, and independence of the nation; then H. M. F. Majesty, over constant in the attention and regard towards his ancient and faithful ally, presents now a most convincing proof; ordering me to announce to the British government that, if abandoned by his natural and constant ally, it is his Majesty's firm and immediate intention to follow the other course left to him as the only means of providing for the maintenance and defence of the rights of a nation to whom he is connected by the most sacred ties; and this course will be a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Spain.

The Portuguese government is aware that such an alliance will prove more beneficial to Spain than to Portugal, whose situation will not bring the immediate necessity of receiving those succours that it can bestow on Spain, and the British government must be equally so, as to the extraordinary influence that Spain may in future regain over Portugal; which may be productive not only of alterations in the balance of the European system, but with particular regret may I be permitted to say, will check the ties of natural friendship and

alliance between Portugal and Great Britain, to which will consequently follow great alteration in the commercial transactions of both countries. Moreover if, *salus reipublica suprema lex sit*, Portugal must then, though with the greatest reluctance, seek for new friends and allies with whom it can make common cause and defend the integrity of its territory and the form of government which the nation most uniformly has adopted. These are the sentiments of H. M. F. Majesty and the whole Portuguese nation, which I am authorised most solemnly to declare to his Britannic Majesty's government.

DE MORAES SARMENTO.

## II.

*Messrs. Hyslop and Co. to the Marquis of Londonderry.*

MY LORD.

Kington, Jamaica, 25th July, 1822.

We have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that our advices from Santa Fé communicate the details of the decisive actions by which Bolivar has annexed Quito to the Republic of Columbia.

The capitulation of Quito to General Sucre, and that of Pasto to the President, took place the one on the 25th of May, and the other on the 7th of June.

The Santa Fé gazette of the 30th of June contains the articles of capitulation by which the whole of the royal troops surrender prisoners of war, and are to be sent to Cuba at the expense of Spain.

An arrival from Porto Bello: this brings the additional intelligence that the prisoners had reached Panama, and that transports were ready to receive them at Chagres.

Columbia will now secure to Great Britain a most important market, and we avail ourselves of the earliest conveyance to communicate the intelligence to your Lordship, for the information of his Majesty's government.

Our partner will have the honour of presenting the official documents at the Foreign Office on the arrival of the packet now in port.

We have the honour, &c.,

M. HYSLOP & Co,

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 27th Sept., 1822.

Although by the position in which this country stands with respect to the affairs of Italy, and according to the tenour of the instructions with which your Grace is already furnished, you are in a great degree precluded from offering any proposition with respect to the measures to be adopted on those affairs at the Congress of Verona—so long as there is nothing in them to affect either obligations of treaty or the rights of independent Powers, or the political balance and general tranquillity of Europe—I yet do not hesitate to transmit to your Grace the enclosed copy of a note which has been delivered to me by the Sardinian minister, Count d'Aglié, containing, as he affirms, the substance of representations already made to this government, and, as he flattered himself, not unfavourably received.

The object of these representations is to induce this government to obtain for his Majesty the King of Sardinia, a substantive voice in the councils relating to the safety of the north of Italy, and more particularly to that of his Majesty's own dominions; and secondly and specifically, to interest itself for the accomplishment of the object which his Majesty has most at heart, the withdrawing of the Austrian troops from the Piedmontese territory.

How far the safety of Piedmont can be considered as secured without the presence of these auxiliaries, is a question of fact which your Grace will probably have opportunity of ascertaining without mixing directly in the Italian discussions. But in the event of your Grace being satisfied that the wish of the King of Sardinia may be consulted without hazard to the safety of his dominions, and consequently to the repose of that part of Europe, there can be no impropriety in your Grace's stating it as the opinion of your government, that the withdrawing of the Austrian garrison from Piedmont would, in that case, be a step in the highest degree wise and salutary; as giving to the Congress of sovereigns the grace of an acceptable compliance; as exonerating Austria from the possibility of suspicion in the quarter in which unfair designs have most frequently been imputed to her; and as justifying in the eyes of all Europe, the continuance at Naples—at the genuine desire of the King of Naples and his government—of those precautions which he consents to relax where the judgment and wishes of the monarch himself call for the relaxation.

It would be the more expedient that your Grace should find an opportunity of expressing this opinion, if (as I have before said) it should be the opinion which you form; because the court of France is understood to have promised to the King of Sardinia its good offices to bring about the relief which he desires; and it would not be seemly that restraints of however necessary rigour, with respect to the imposition of which France and Great Britain were almost equally passive, should be removed by the active interference of France alone.

On the other hand should it appear to your Grace's conviction that the continuance of an Austrian garrison in Piedmont is still absolutely necessary, your Grace has only to keep yourself within the line of your original instructions, and preserve an absolute silence in any discussion of Italian affairs.

There may be yet a middle state of things, which would admit of a qualified decision. Supposing the danger in Piedmont to be so far subdued as to render the actual presence of Austrian troops no longer necessary; and yet not so thoroughly eradicated as to enable the King of Sardinia to forego altogether the means of foreign protection; in this case, while the withdrawing the Austrian force from the garrisons of the King of Sardinia might soothe the national feelings, and greatly relieve the finances of his government, it might be not unreasonable that he should consent to furnish a reduced contribution, for the purpose of maintaining an Austrian corps of observation upon the frontiers of his kingdom, but within the Austrian territories. Should a difference arise between the Austrian and Piedmontese governments, as to the withdrawing or continuing the Austrian garrison in Piedmont, and should your Grace be of opinion that every necessary purpose

of precaution would be answered by such a compromise, perhaps it might be suggested by your Grace with advantage, and without prejudice to that character of neutrality but not of indifference, which, with respect to the affairs of Italy, it is our avowed policy to maintain.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Le Comte D'Aglie to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Londres, le 23<sup>me</sup> Sept., 1822.

Le soussigné, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne, a l'honneur de présenter ses complimens à Mr. Canning, et de transmettre à S.E. le résumé du dernier entretien qu'il a eu avec le feu Marquis de Londonderry. Le soussigné saisit cette occasion pour offrir à S.E. l'assurance de sa haute considération.

ST. MARTIN D'AOLIE.

II.

PRÉCIS DE L'ENTRETIEN que le soussigné a eu avec le feu MARQUIS DE LONDONDERRY, le 7<sup>me</sup> du mois d'Août, 1822.\*

Le soussigné, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne près S.M.B., eut l'honneur, à la date précitée, de dire au feu Marquis de Londonderry, que l'approche du Congrès qui allait s'occuper des affaires d'Italie engageait S.M. Sarde à s'ouvrir confidentiellement au cabinet Britannique, et à solliciter de lui l'appui et les bonnes offices que ses angustes prédécesseurs avaient expérimentés en toute occasion. Que le soussigné avait en conséquence reçu l'ordre de lui manifester quels étaient les vœux et les desirs de S.M. Le soussigné fit sentir d'abord à Lord Londonderry que S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne était justement persuadé que personne n'était mieux que lui en état de connaître la situation et les besoins de son propre pays, et qu'il tenait extrêmement à ce que l'on s'en reportât entièrement à son jugement pour tout ce qui concerne l'intérieur de son pays, ainsi qu'on l'a fait jusqu'à présent. Le soussigné traça ensuite à Lord Londonderry la situation actuelle des états de S.M., ainsi que ses intentions bienveillantes envers ses sujets, sous le rapport d'importantes améliorations commencées. Le soussigné ajouta que vu la tranquillité actuelle du Piémont, et le succès des mesures adoptées par le Roi après les événemens de l'année passée, S.M. serait probablement disposée à demander que l'occupation militaire d'une partie de son pays ne se prolongât pas au-delà du terme fixé par la Convention de Milan. Le Marquis de Londonderry lui fit observer à ce propos, qu'à Naples le manque d'une force militaire nationale faisait désirer la continuation de la présence des troupes Autrichiennes, et il lui demanda si le Roi de Sardaigne avait des forces disponibles et suffisantes pour pouvoir se passer de secours étrangers. Le soussigné répondit à Lord Londonderry que l'armée de S.M. était à peu près dans le même état qu'avant les événemens de l'année passée; qu'elle fournissait même à présent les garnisons de Turin, de Gènes, de Nice,

\* See p. 272 for version of this interview sent to the Duke of Wellington.

de Navarre, de la Savoie, et de l'Isle de Sardaigne; et que sous ce rapport le départ des troupes Autrichiennes ne pouvait produire aucun inconvénient, puisqu'elles n'occupaient qu'un petit coin du Piémont.

Que S.M. Sarde entre parfaitement dans les vues des Alliés, et que si elle pouvait entrevoir le moindre danger pour la tranquillité de son pays, et du reste de l'Italie, elle serait la première à solliciter la continuation du séjour des troupes Autrichiennes; mais que d'un autre côté, il était trop naturel que S.M. fût empressé de délivrer ses sujets d'une charge aussi considérable, et de leur accorder la plus grande de toutes les satisfactions, lorsque cette marque de bienveillance et de confiance de sa part, bien loin de mettre en danger la tranquillité du pays, ne pouvait, au contraire, produire que les meilleurs effets. Que d'ailleurs le soussigné avait reçu l'ordre exprès de déclarer que S.M. Sarde a toutes les raisons de se louer de la conduite des troupes Autrichiennes dans son pays, ainsi que des rapports qui subsistent entre les deux gouvernemens; que par conséquent si S.M. se déterminait à demander la cessation de l'occupation militaire d'une partie de ses États, ce ne serait jamais par aucun motif de jalousie ou de méfiance envers la Cour de Vienne, avec laquelle elle désire de conserver les relations les plus intimes; mais uniquement par la considération des intérêts et des besoins de ses propres sujets. Le soussigné finit par faire remarquer à Lord Londonderry que S.M. Sarde a la ferme confiance d'obtenir dans cette occasion de la Cour Britannique l'appui et les bons offices que ses ancêtres n'ont jamais sollicités en vain. S.E. répondit, que les affaires d'Italie seraient probablement traitées dans le Congrès qui aurait lieu dans ce pays-là, et qu'il lui était impossible de rien préjuger à cet égard: en assurant en même temps le soussigné d'une manière très marquée, que le gouvernement Britannique prendrait toujours à cœur les intérêts de la Cour de Sardaigne, et emploierait en toute circonstance ses bons offices en sa faveur.

Dans le même entretien le soussigné eut l'honneur d'appeler l'attention du Marquis de Londonderry sur la négociation qui avait été commencée avec la Sublime Porte, sous les auspices de l'Angleterre, et que de malheureuses circonstances ont interrompue au moment où elle allait se conclure d'une manière favorable. Le soussigné exprima à Lord Londonderry tout le désir qu'avait S.M. que cette négociation, si importante pour le commerce de ses sujets, peut être reprise au point où elle en était restée. Le soussigné dit à Lord Londonderry, que parmi toutes les raisons d'utilité générale sur lesquelles était fondé ce désir de S.M., une des principales était la considération de l'excellent effet que la franchise accordée par le Divan au pavillon Sarde ne manquerait pas de produire sur l'esprit public dans la duché de Gènes.

Le Marquis de Londonderry écouta avec intérêt tout ce que le soussigné eut l'honneur de lui dire à cet égard, et l'assura que lorsque S.M. vendrait faire reprendre cette négociation, elle trouverait auprès de l'Envoyé Britannique à Constantinople la même assistance et les mêmes bons offices que lorsqu'elle fut commencée il y a une année.

Le soussigné eut devoir prévenir le Marquis de Londonderry que les insurgés Grecs, ayant saisi très injustement des bâtimens appartenant à des sujets de S.M., il serait possible qu'elle ordonnât à son escadre sur les côtes d'Afrique d'entrer dans ces parages, et de se faire restituer par la force, s'il était nécessaire d'en venir à cette extrémité, les bâtimens capturés. Le Marquis de Londonderry répondit au soussigné qu'il ne voyait à cela aucun inconvénient; et que si S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne croyait devoir prendre ce parti, le commandant des forces navales de S.M. Britannique dans ces parages donnerait à l'escadre Sarde toute l'assistance dont elle pourrait avoir besoin.

ST. MARTIN D'AGLIÉ.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 27th Sept., 1822.

Your Grace is already in possession of all that has passed both here and at St. Petersburg, on the subject of the issue, in September of last year, by the Emperor of Russia, of an ukase, indirectly asserting an exclusive right of sovereignty from Behring's Straits to the 51st degree of north latitude on the west coast of America, and to the 45th degree north on the opposite coast of Asia; and (as a qualified exercise of that right) prohibiting all foreign ships, under pain of confiscation, from approaching within 100 Italian miles of those coasts. This ukase having been communicated by Baron Nicolai, the Russian chargé d'affaires at this court, to his Majesty's government, was forthwith submitted to the legal authorities, whose duty it is to advise his Majesty on such matters, and a note was in consequence addressed by the late Marquis of Londonderry to Count Lieven, the Russian ambassador, and also communicated to his Majesty's ambassador at St. Petersburg, protesting against the enactments of the said ukase, and requesting such amicable explanations as might tend to reconcile the pretensions of Russia in that quarter of the globe, with the just rights of his Majesty's crown, and the interests of his subjects. As such explanations will probably be offered to your Grace during the conferences about to take place at Vienna, I hasten to signify to you the King's commands as to the language which you will hold on the part of his Majesty upon this subject.

The opinions given in November and December last by Lord Stowell, and by his Majesty's Advocate-General (copies of which are already in your possession), will furnish you with the best legal arguments in opposition to the pretensions put forward in the Russian ukase; and as in both these opinions much stress is very properly laid upon the state of actual occupation of the territories claimed by Russia, and the different periods of time at which they were so occupied, I have obtained from the governor of the principal company of his Majesty's subjects trading in that part of the world the information which your Grace will find in the enclosed papers.

That information will enable you sufficiently to prove to the Russian minister, not only that the point of prior discovery may be fairly disputed with Russia, but that the much more certain title of actual occupation by the agents and the trading servants of the Hudson's Bay Company extends at this moment to many degrees of higher latitude on the north-west coast of America than is claimed as the territory of Russia by the ukase in question.

Enlightened statesmen and jurists have long held as insignificant all titles of territory that are not founded on actual occupation, and that title is in the opinion of the most esteemed writers on public law to be established only by practical use.

With respect to the other points in the ukase which have the effect of extending the territorial rights of Russia over the adjacent seas to the unprecedented distance of 100 miles from the line of coast, and of closing a hitherto unobstructed passage, at the present moment the object of important discoveries for the promotion of general commerce and navigation; these pretensions are considered by the best legal authorities as positive



innovations on the rights of navigation ; as such they can receive no explanation from further discussion, nor can by possibility be justified. Common usage, which has obtained the force of law, has indeed assigned to coasts and shores, an accessorial boundary to a short limited distance, for purposes of protection and general convenience, in no manner interfering with the rights of others, and not obstructing the freedom of general commerce and navigation. But this important qualification the extent of the present claim entirely excludes, and when such a prohibition is, as in the present case, applied to a long line of coasts and also to intermediate islands in remote seas, where navigation is beset with innumerable and unforeseen difficulties, and where the principal employment of the fisheries must be pursued under circumstances which are incompatible with the prescribed courses, all particular considerations concur, in an especial manner, with the general principle, in repelling such a pretension as an encroachment on the freedom of navigation, and the unalienable rights of all nations.

I have indeed the satisfaction to believe, from a conference which I have had with Count Lieven on this matter, that upon these two points—the attempt to shut up the passage altogether, and the claim of exclusive dominion to so enormous a distance from the coast—the Russian government are prepared entirely to waive their pretensions. The only effort that has been made to justify the latter claim, was by reference to an article in the Treaty of Utrecht, which assigns thirty leagues from the coast, as the distance of prohibition. But to this argument it is sufficient to answer that the assumption of such a space was, in the instance quoted, by stipulation in a treaty, and one to which, therefore, the party to be affected by it had (whether wisely or not) given its deliberate consent. No inference could be drawn from that transaction in favour of a claim by authority against all the world.

I have little doubt, therefore, but that the public notification of the claim to consider the portions of the ocean included between the adjoining coasts of America and the Russian empire as a *mare clausum*, and to extend the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of Russia to 100 Italian miles from the coast, will be publicly recalled ; and I have the King's commands to instruct your Grace further to require of the Russian minister (on the ground of the facts and reasonings furnished in this despatch and its enclosures) that such a portion of territory alone shall be defined as belonging to Russia, as shall not interfere with the rights and actual possessions of his Majesty's subjects in North America.

I am, with great truth and respect,  
my Lord Duke, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

COPY of a LETTER from the Deputy-Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company.

I.

Sir,

Hudson's Bay House, London, 25th Sept., 1822.

I have the honour to address you on behalf of the Hudson's Bay company, upon the subject of the claim set up by Russia, to that part of the north-west coast of America, which is to the north of the 51° north latitude.

It appears to the directors of this company that the claim of Russia is not well founded; and as the interests of the company and of the British fur trade would be essentially and greatly injured, should the claims of Russia be admitted by the British government, I feel it to be incumbent upon me, in addition to the representations which I have already made upon this subject, to state briefly the progress of the British fur trade in that part of North America, and to apprise you of the forts or trading stations situated to the north of the 51° north latitude, which are now occupied by the traders and servants of this company.

In the year 1793 Sir Alexander M'Kenzie crossed the Rocky Mountains in 60° 30' north latitude, and penetrated to the Pacific Ocean in latitude 52° 20'. Immediately after his return the British fur traders sent expeditions, and established trading posts in the country to the westward of the Rocky Mountains. New trading stations have been gradually formed as the country was more fully explored, and until 1821 the whole trade of an extensive district named New Caledonia, and extending from the mouth of Fraser's River, situated about 49° of north latitude, to about 60° north latitude, was carried on by the British North-West Company.

The partnership of the British North-West Company being then about to expire, arrangements were made in 1821, by which the Hudson's Bay Company acquired possession of all the forts and trading stations of that association, situated in New Caledonia, as well as in other parts of British North America.

The principal forts, or permanent and central trading stations in New Caledonia, now occupied by the traders and servants of this Company, are situated at the Rocky Mountain Portage, in 56° north latitude, and 121° west longitude; on Stewart's lake, in 54° 30' north latitude, and 125° west longitude; on M'Leod's lake, in 55° north latitude, and 124° west longitude; and on Fraser's lake, in 55° north latitude, and about 127° west longitude. And there are several minor trading posts, the situations of which are occasionally changed according to local circumstances. By these means an extensive trade is carried on with all those Indian tribes, which inhabit the country from about 60° north latitude as far south as the mouth of Fraser's river, which is in about 49° north latitude, and between the Rocky Mountains and the sea.

The British fur traders have never met with the traders of any other nation in that country, and it does not appear that any part of it has ever been occupied by the subjects of Russia, or of any other foreign power.

All the considerable rivers which fall into the Pacific Ocean in this extent of coast have not yet been sufficiently explored to ascertain whether any of them are navigable with large boats, and have safe harbours at their discharge into the sea; the furs procured in that country have therefore been brought to England down the Peace river and through the Hudson's Bay Company's territories. But it is probable that in such an extent of coast some practicable communication with the sea will be discovered, which would save the expensive transport of goods and furs through the interior of America.

A direct communication by sea is found to be advantageous in the country to the south of New Caledonia situated on the various branches of the Columbia river, where this Company have extensive trading establishments, extending to the headwaters of that river in the Rocky Mountains; and the same advantages would be derived from a direct communication by sea with New Caledonia.

This company has trading establishments also in M'Kenzie's river, which falls into the Frozen Ocean as far north as 66° 30' north latitude, which carry on a trade with those Indians who inhabit the country to the west of that river, and to the north of 60° of north latitude, and who from the nature of the country can communicate more easily with M'Kenzie's river than with the trading posts in New Caledonia.

I have thus given a brief outline of the British trading stations on the north-west coast of America, and I feel confident that his Majesty's government will take the proper measures for protecting the interests of this company, and of the British fur trade in that quarter of the world.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. H. PELLY, Dep. Gov.

## II.

### OBSERVATIONS on Claim of the Russian Government to North-West Coast of America to 51° North Latitude.

The grounds on which the Russian government claim the whole north-west coast of America, from Behring's Straits to the 51° N. lat., are detailed in a correspondence which took place at Washington in the months of February, March, and April, 1822, between the American government and the Russian ambassador, the Chevalier Pierre de Politzka.

1. The discoveries made by the Russians during the reign of Peter I.

It does not appear that any discoveries were made during this reign . . . though this monarch formed many plans for discoveries.

The Empress Catharine, however, in conformity to her deceased husband's instructions, ordered an expedition to be fitted out in 1728, and gave the command of it to Vitus Behring, a Dane by birth, who ascertained the separation of the two Continents as high as 67°, on the coast of Asia: in the following year he made an attempt to discover the coast of America, but was unsuccessful; and from this period no attempts at discovery were made "till the year 1741." (See Coxe's 'Account of Russian Discoveries'.)

2. The discoveries made by Behring and Tshirikoff, in 1741, during the reign of the Empress Anne, and the map published by the Imperial Academy, in 1758, the result of the labours of the Academicians who accompanied the expedition, viz., Müller, Steller, Fisher, Delde de la Crayère, Krasilnicoff, &c.

That Cape or Mount St. Elias was named by Behring.

Müller, who gives an account of this voyage, and who is the authority on which the Russian government relies, states "that Behring came in sight of land in 58° 28' N. lat., and Tshirikoff in lat. 56°; that Behring did not land on the mainland . . . but sent a boat on shore for water on a large island."

"That he named a point of land which projects into the sea, Cape St. Elias, but that he never landed or took possession."

Müller further states, which Steller confirms, that on the 21st of July leaving their anchorage-place between two islands . . . on one of which a

boat's crew, with Steller, had landed: they set sail, and attempted to trace the coast to  $65^{\circ}$ ; but their course was so interrupted by islands they could proceed no further north.

From Müller's account, it is doubtful whether they ever reached America: they certainly never landed on the mainland or took possession.

Steller likewise states he landed on islands, but never on the mainland.

Behring died in this expedition, on an island near Kamschatka, which is now called after him, and his vessel was wrecked.

Müller's account of Tchirikoff is, that he made the land in  $56^{\circ}$ , that he sent ten men in a boat for water, but, never returning, it is supposed they were massacred: six more were dispatched in another boat to look after their comrades (who probably shared the same fate).

On the 27th July Tchirikoff took his departure for Kamschatka, and arrived on the 9th October in Avatka Bay.

The famous astronomer, De Lisle, was with Tchirikoff; and it is not probable that in the observations he took he would have made a mistake of seven degrees. (The celebrated geographer, Guillaume de Lisle, from the papers of his brother, De Lisle de la Croyère, who was with the expedition, gives the lat.  $55^{\circ} 36'$ .)

The map alluded to was published under the direction of Müller, and which, as will be seen, places Cape St. Elias about  $59^{\circ}$ , and the coast discovered by Tchirikoff in about  $56^{\circ}$ . (This map is in the 'History of Kamschatka.') On reference to the maps, according to Cook, Vancouver, &c., it will be seen that the coast where Tchirikoff made the land in  $56^{\circ}$  consists entirely of islands, and that  $49^{\circ}$  is Nootka Sound.

Müller, in his map, marks the coast as without islands, proving that Tchirikoff mistook the islands for the mainland. Tchirikoff does not appear to have again visited the north-west coast of America. (See 'History of Kamschatka.')

That Tchirikoff pushed his discoveries as far as  $49^{\circ}$  N.

3. The discoveries by private individuals to 1743.

4. In 1763, Russian establishments extended as far as the Island of Kodiak, or Kichtak. In 1778, Cook found them at Unalashka, and some Russian inscriptions at Kodiak.

Vancouver saw the Russian establishment in the Bay of Kinai.

In fine, Captain Meares, Portlock, La Peyrouse, unanimously attest the existence of Russian establishments in these latitudes.

5. If the Imperial government had at the time published the discoveries made by the Russian navigators after Behring and Tchirikoff, viz., Chlodiloff, Serebriancoff, Krusenitchoff, Paycoff, Pousheareff, Lazerriff, Medwedoff, Solowieff, Lewasl'eff, Kriustin, and others, no one could refuse to Russia the right of first discovery; nor could even any one deny her that of first occupation.

6. That Don José Martinez, in 1789, did not remove the Russian colonists from Nootka; and that the Spaniards acknowledged, by the report of Captain Malespina, that they had no right beyond Cape Blanc, in lat. 42° 50'.

These discoveries were entirely to the Northern Archipelago, so called, named the Fox and Aleutian Islands. The voyages from 1741 to 1778 were entirely confined to the Fox and Aleutian Islands, &c., not at all extending to the north-west coast of America.

Unalashka and Kodiak are both islands unconnected with the north-west coast; but Captain Cook had discovered and taken possession, in the name of his Britannic Majesty, of the whole coast, which the Russian government claims. Captain Cook made the coast in 49° 29'.

Vancouver was visited by Russians in Prince William's Sound, which is in upwards of 60°.

Meares and Portlock saw Russians in Cook's Inlet. Captain Meares commanded the *Nootka*, and Captain Portlock the *King George* . . . ships engaged in the fur-trade between Canton and the north-west coast, from 1780 to 1790 . . . but it cannot be found where. Peyrouse attests their existence, though in the 234th page of the 2nd vol. of the Paris edition of his *Voyages*, published in 1798, there is the following sentence: "J'ai trouvé parmi leurs bijoux, des morceaux d'ambre jaune ou de saurli; mais j'ignore si c'est une production de leur pays, ou si, comme le fer, ils l'ont reçu de l'ancien continent, par leur communication indirecte avec les Russes."

On a reference to Coxe's 'Russian Discoveries' it is evident that the whole of these expeditions were confined to the Fox and Aleutian Islands; and from the order in which the names are placed, it would appear that M. de Politien took his information from this work.

Neither Cook or Vancouver mention these settlers. So little did the Court of Madrid know of settlers at Nootka that in its state-paper to Mr. Fitzherbert it mentions they were informed that Russia intended forming establishments. (See 'Annual Register,' 1790, pp. 287 to 305.)

7. That in 1799 the Emperor Paul I. granted to the present American Fur Company its first charter; he gave it the exclusive possession of the north-west coast of America which belonged to Russia, from the 55° N. lat. to Behring's Straits. He permitted them to extend their discoveries to the south, and there to form establishments, provided that they did not encroach upon the territory occupied by other powers.

This act, when made public, excited no claim on the part of other Cabinets, not even on that of Madrid, which confirms that it did not extend its pretensions to the 60th degree.

When by the Treaty of Washington the American government acquired all the rights of territory which belonged to Spain beyond 42°, no northern boundary was named, because Spain could not define her right.

8. The 51° being only the mean point between the Russian establishment of New Archangel, in 57°, and the American colony which is found at the mouth of the Colombia, in 46°.

9. That in 1789 the Spanish packet *St. Charles* found in the latitude of 48° and 49° a Russian colony of 20 families, which were descendants of the companions of Tchirikoff.

The Court of Madrid had, in the year 1790, claimed to lat. 61°, and quotes, in a letter from the Spanish to the French Minister, 16th June, 1790, an admission of Russia to the claim of Spain to the 61° N. lat., though perhaps a little equivocal.

See J. Q. Adams' letter in answer, 30th March, 1822.

It is not at all defined that the mouth of the Columbia belongs to America. By a Convention with the United States, January, 1819, the country to the westward of the Rocky Mountains is left common to both nations for ten years.

This establishment, even if authentic that they were the descendants of Tchirikoff, would be on Nootka, an island, and therefore giving no right of possession to the mainland. It is singular, if they were the descendants of Tchirikoff, that neither Krusenstern or Kotzebno mention the circumstance; and that neither Vancouver or Cook, or any traders, have mentioned it.

### III.

[This is a former Representation of the Hudson's Bay Company, added for the further information of your Grace.]

*Sir J. H. Pelly to Lord Londonderry.*

My Lord,

Hudson's Bay House, London, 27th March, 1822.

It has fallen under the observation of the governor and committee of the Hudson's Bay Company, that the Russian government have made a claim to

the north-west coast of America, from Behring's Straits to the 51° of north latitude, and in an imperial ukase have prohibited foreign vessels from approaching the coast within 100 miles, under penalty of confiscation; likewise that the American government are claiming a very considerable extent of country bordering on the Pacific Ocean, and that a bill is in progress in the House of Representatives for settling the Columbia and forming it into a State of the Union.

In the report presented to the house on which this bill is founded the committee state that the title of the United States to the sovereignty of the territory from the 41° to the completion of the 53° of north latitude is unquestionable, but that in the opinion of the Committee the American government have a good claim as far as 60° north latitude.

I need not remind your Lordship that a large portion of that country was discovered by British navigators, and taken possession of on behalf of Great Britain, nor of the affair of Nootka Sound in 1789 in consequence of aggressions committed upon British subjects on that coast, but it may be necessary to state to your Lordship that the Americans had no trade with the natives until long after the British establishments had been formed in the country to the westward of the Rocky Mountains.

In the year 1792 Sir Alexander M'Kenzie, then a partner in the late North-West Company, explored from the interior the country west of the Rocky Mountains, and was the first who penetrated to the Pacific Ocean. In the preceding year Captain Vancouver had surveyed the Columbia river, from the mouth to the falls, 200 miles from the sea.

For about 20 years the British fur traders have had settlements; and the Company have an establishment of 200 men on the Columbia river at this period, and large and valuable establishments to the northward.

It was not until the year 1806 that the Americans explored this country, when an expedition was fitted out under Captains Lewis and Clarke, who proceeded to the head of Mississourie, thence across the Rocky Mountains to the River Columbia, and down it to the mouth, and returned by the same route.

Soon after the return of these gentlemen an American chartered company was established under the name of the Pacific Fur Company, who began their operations in 1810. Ships were sent, and a fort built at the mouth of the Columbia. This fort was given up to the late North-West Company in the American war, when they bought of the Pacific Fur Company their whole stock in trade, and the country was abandoned by the Americans, and they have not since had any traders in the Columbia, or to the northward.

The fort, after the Treaty at Ghent, was demanded by the American government as included, with other fortified places, in that Treaty, although it is more properly only a trading station; and it has been delivered up, but it remains unoccupied.

By a convention in October, 1818, subsequent to the Treaty, it was agreed by the contracting parties that the country in question, for the purposes of trade, was to be free to the subjects of both nations for ten years.

The fur trade of Great Britain, by an act of last session and grant from his Majesty, is vested in the Hudson's Bay Company; I cannot therefore refrain from calling your Lordship's attention to this matter as of considerable importance at the present moment, and not unlikely to lead to very unpleasant occurrences at some future period, if no notice is taken of these proceedings of the Russian and American governments, the effect of which would be to exclude British subjects from the north-west coast of America, and a valuable trade in the interior.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. H. PELLY, Dep. Gov.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 161. ]

SIR,

Vienna, 30th Sept., 1822.

I enclose despatches from Lord Strangford and Mr. Hamilton from Constantinople. Lord Strangford arrived here on the 26th, but I have not yet had an opportunity of conversing with him since my arrival.

It appears that the enclosure of his Lordship's despatch number 147 having been communicated to the Emperor of Russia, his Imperial Majesty was much displeased that Lord Strangford had allowed the Ottoman ministers to impute to the intrigues of the Russian agents in the Morea, &c., the insurrection of the Greeks, and an angry note has been written by Count Nesselrode, and circulated, upon the subject.

I will send you a copy of this note by the earliest messenger. I have not yet seen the Emperor, but I am to see him to-morrow, and I hope to be able to convince him that he has not so much reason to be dissatisfied with Lord Strangford as it now appears that he thinks he has.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 162. ]

SIR,

Vienna, 30th Sept., 1822.

I left Paris on Tuesday, the 23rd, and arrived here last night. On my arrival at Munich on Friday I met Mr. Gordon, who gave into my hands a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy, from Prince Metternich, inviting me to proceed to Saltzburg, to meet him, as the sovereigns and their ministers were on the point of their departure for Italy, and the copy of Lord Londonderry's despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 15th. It was obvious to me that the question whether I should go to Verona or not was not in my hands. It rested entirely with his Majesty, who might decide either that I should proceed to Verona, taking care that the discussion of the Italian questions should be postponed till my departure; or that I should wait at Vienna the return of their Imperial Majesties and of the Allied ministers from Verona; or his Majesty might leave to me to decide whether I should go to Verona or not according to my



view of the state of affairs here upon my arrival, still taking care that the discussion of all Italian affairs should be postponed till my departure from Verona, if I should decide to go to that place.

In any of these cases it appeared to me to be my duty to come here without loss of time, and I wrote to Prince Metternich by Mr. Gordon, to apprise him of that intention, and to request him to allow me to have an opportunity of seeing him previous to his departure.

I have accordingly seen Prince Metternich this morning, and have pointed out to him the inconveniences attending this sudden decision to proceed to Verona. I stated to him that the offer of the option whether to begin by Vienna or Verona had been made to his Majesty, and that he had accepted it, and had desired to commence the business at Vienna; and that before his Majesty's answer had reached Vienna—at all events before his plenipotentiary had even set out from England—it had been decided to remove the transaction of all the business to Verona. I then told him that since the assembly of this Congress had been desired, his Majesty had been anxious to avoid sending any of his ministers as a plenipotentiary to take part in the deliberations at Verona; not alone because his Majesty was determined not to depart from the line which he had taken heretofore respecting affairs in Italy, but likewise because his Majesty was anxious to avoid the misunderstanding of his conduct by the public, which might be the consequence of one of his ministers being present at Verona during these discussions, and because explanations of his Majesty's conduct would become necessary. I therefore pointed out to Prince Metternich the possibility that his Majesty's servants might consider it to be their duty to advise his Majesty not to permit me to proceed to Verona, and the consequences which must follow in showing to the world a disunion among the Allied governments, manifested as it would be by four of the Allied ministers first waiting here three weeks for the fifth, and then setting out for Italy on the day after his arrival. I put out of the question the awkward position in which I should find myself here during their absence, but I thought the position of the Alliance under these circumstances ought to be considered; and as the journey of the sovereigns could not be delayed on account of their engagements to the King of Bavaria, and they could not

return here after their visit to Bavaria previous to their journey to Italy, on account of the advanced period of the season, I proposed that the ministers should remain here during the period that the sovereigns should be engaged in their visit to the King of Bavaria, and that our conferences should commence immediately, and that we should proceed to join the sovereigns when they should arrive at Inspruck, where we should close our conferences on everything excepting Italian affairs.

Prince Metternich admitted the expediency of this plan, but stated that it was impossible to execute it, as, in fact, the ministers of the Russian Cabinet could not proceed even to a conference in the absence of the Emperor of Russia.

I therefore stated my determination to wait here the orders of the King my master.

The Prince expressed his anxious hope that they might be to allow me to proceed to Verona, and he pointed out in strong terms the evil consequences which must attend my absence on this occasion. He tells me that in his despatch to M. de Neumann he has stated the precautions which had been taken to prevent all misunderstanding regarding the nature of the business to be transacted at Verona during my presence there; that the ministers of the different governments in Italy had been requested not to come to Verona till I should have departed from thence; and he hoped that the King's ministers would see that everything had been done to make it clear to the public that the King had not altered his line of policy in regard to Italian affairs; and that they would feel the inconvenience which would result to the Alliance in general from the apparent disunion which would be supposed to exist in consequence of my absence.

It is certainly most unfortunate that I was not apprised at or near Paris of this intended alteration of the seat of the conferences. If a duplicate had been sent by Paris I could have waited there for his Majesty's commands, and might either have proceeded to Verona, or might have returned to England, there to wait the return of the sovereigns to Vienna, in case his Majesty should have decided that I should not attend a congress at Verona. I cannot but feel that the inconvenience and evil which will result from the absence of a British plenipotentiary from Verona, and which under existing circumstances will amount, in appearance at least, to a total separation from

the Alliance, and will, at all events, tend in a certain degree to shake the influence which we have hitherto had over their councils, is to be attributed to the necessity which existed for detaining me in England, and to my unfortunate illness. It is certainly true that the season for the journey to Italy is nearly gone by, and that the Emperor must return to St. Petersburg early in the winter.

Under these circumstances I am anxious that his Majesty may have decided that I should go to Verona; and if his Majesty should have left the question to my decision, I shall certainly proceed to that place, taking every precaution that we may not be involved, or even supposed to be involved, in the affairs of Italy; and I send you this messenger by the direct road, in order to apprise you of the exact state of things here, and what my conduct will be in case his Majesty should have determined to leave the matter to my decision.

The sovereigns do not now propose to arrive at Verona before the 16th of October; if, therefore, his Majesty should have any commands to give to me, founded upon what will appear from this despatch to be the state of things here, I could still receive your despatch in time to arrive at Verona before any business could be commenced.

I don't believe the sovereigns will be able to return to Vienna before the middle of November, and that M. de Montmorency will not be able to return with them. Thus it appears difficult, if not impossible, to do any good excepting at Verona.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. G. Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 30th Sept., 1822.

However sincere the anxiety of his Majesty and his government to devise all means which may tend in any way to the extirpation of that scandal of the civilized world, the slave trade, and however confident I am that your Grace will exert yourself with the utmost alacrity and zeal to impress upon the minds of the Allied sovereigns and their ministers the duty of perfecting the work of the abolition, I confess that your Grace's conversation with M. de Villèle, as represented in your despatch, has greatly damped my hopes of any favourable result from the approaching conferences.

The positive refusal of France not only to enter into any new engagements or to pass any new laws for the suppression of the slave trade, but her neglect and repugnance even to execute those by which she has already bound herself; and the notorious continuance of that traffic by her subjects in spite of law and of treaty, and with the knowledge at least, if not with the connivance, of her government, leave little doubt but that all the authority of the French plenipotentiaries will be employed at Vienna to prevent the adoption of any effectual resolution by the Allies, or if adopted, to frustrate its operation.

Every effort must nevertheless be made to bring at least the moral influence of the congress to bear upon this most momentous subject: and as the other three members of the Alliance are disinterested in the consideration of it, we may hope at least that such a manifestation of opinion may be obtained from them as may show that their sentiments, as declared in 1815, have undergone no change, even if they are not prepared with any additional means of enforcing them.

The difficulty under which this country now labours in pressing the subject of the abolition, beyond what it experienced in 1815, arises partly from the lowered tone of sentiment throughout Europe upon subjects appealing to the feelings of mankind, compared with that which prevailed at a moment of general excitement and enthusiasm, and partly from the notion sedulously inculcated by other Powers having colonies, that self-interest now mingles with our humanity, and that by our persevering efforts to bring about the abolition in other countries, we are only seeking to inflict upon the colonial possessions of our rivals a portion of the evils which the partial abolition is alleged to have brought upon our own.

Your Grace may confidently affirm, in reply to such insinuations, that among the causes which have contributed to the depression of colonial produce in this country, so far is the abolition of the British slave trade from being one, that its continuance would unquestionably have aggravated that depression; and its revival would be deprecated by no class of men more than by the colonists of Great Britain.

But in proportion as the interests of that class of his Majesty's subjects have been exposed to hazard by the legislature of this country in setting the example of the unqualified renunciation of a practice originally incorporated with the system of all colonies, and long supposed, however falsely, to be necessary to their existence—a renunciation dictated by considerations of a higher order than have usually guided the conduct of States—in the same proportion is the British government called upon to leave no effort untried to give effect to that example, and to take care that it shall not have been set in vain.

At present, whatever may have been the advantage or disadvantage to the British Colonies, it is much to be feared that to Africa the abolition by Great Britain has been injury rather than gain. The slave trade, so far from being diminished in extent by the exact amount of what was in former times the British demand, is upon the whole perhaps greater than it was at the period when that demand was the highest: and the aggregate of human suffering and the waste of human life, in the transport of slaves from the coast of Africa to the colonies, is increased in a ratio enormously greater than the increase of positive numbers. It seems as if those who

continue this abominable traffic had a malicious pleasure in defeating the calculations of benevolence, and in visiting upon the innocent victims of their avarice the fruitless endeavours to rescue those victims from their power.

Unhappily it cannot be denied that our very attempts at prevention, imperfect as they yet are under the treaties which now authorize our interference, tend to the augmentation of this evil. The dread of detection suggests expedients of concealment productive of the most dreadful sufferings to a cargo with respect to which it hardly ever seems to occur to its remorseless owners that it consists of sentient beings. The numbers put on board in each venture are so far from being proportioned to the proper capacity of the vessel, that the probable profits of each voyage are notoriously calculated only on the survivors; and the mortality is accordingly frightful—to a degree unknown since the attention of mankind was first called to the horrors of this traffic.

To these enormous and, I am afraid, even growing evils, we have nothing to oppose but the declaration, now obsolete and powerless, of the Congress of Vienna, and our treaties with Spain and the Netherlands, abolishing the trade definitively and totally; and that with Portugal restricting the Portuguese slave trade to the south of the line.

The provisions of those treaties are about to receive a beneficial extension, by an article which those governments respectively have agreed to add to them, inflicting the same penalties of capture and confiscation on vessels on board of which slaves may *have been*, as on those on board of which slaves are actually found at the time of visiting them.

I enclose a copy of this article, and of the instruction with which it is conveyed to his Majesty's missions at the courts of the Hague, Madrid, and Lisbon.

I enclose also a copy of a despatch which I address to the same Ministers, the object of which is to procure a further extension of the same principle by admitting the peculiar fitting of a slave ship as evidence of the purpose and proof of the criminality of its voyage.

The former extension being already (as I have said) agreed to, and wanting only the form of signature to make it binding and operative, I have not thought it prudent to hazard the reopening of a discussion upon it by bringing forward a proposition for carrying that article to a further extent. But, having gained the object of that article, the consequence which I propose to treat as naturally following upon it, may, I hope be admitted without much difficulty: for it is in truth absurd to talk of *prevention*, if the vessel must actually have completed the purpose of its voyage, before that purpose, however evident, can be suspected; and if, while the having on board a single negro is to be conclusive proof of guilt, the manifest preparations for the reception of hundreds are not to be considered as leading to a presumption of it.

But, even when all this is done, little, very little way, is made towards the accomplishment of our great work, so long as Portugal continues the trade with half the continent of Africa, so long as France is determinately hostile, and, I fear I must add, the United States lukewarm, if not indifferent, to our purpose.

The government of the United States has, as your Grace is aware, posi-

tively refused to direct its minister at Paris to join with his Majesty's ambassador in any representation to the French government upon the manifest infractions of the laws of France abolishing the slave-trade, by French subjects. And as to France herself, there can be no doubt, after M. de Villèle's open declaration to your Grace, but that, so far from any advantage being likely to be obtained by the separate urgency of the British government with that of his Most Christian Majesty, every fresh representation does but irritate and confirm the spirit of resistance, and tend to convert more and more a question of moral duty and political obligation into one of national pride.

It is important to take this plain, though discouraging view of the situation of this great question; because, neither the past efforts of his Majesty's government, nor those which your Grace is directed to make at the present congress, can be viewed in their just light, if it is supposed that they have been, or are to be, employed upon willing or even unprejudiced minds; or that the failure to produce the desired effect is to be attributed to want of zeal or of importunity on the part of those who argue and remonstrate, and not to indifference, obduracy, self-interest (however mistaken), vanity, and (in proportion as the pressure of the pleading becomes more strong) resentment, on the part of those who listen, or refuse to listen, to such arguments and remonstrances.

It is important that, all compliment and courtesy laid aside, it should be known as the truth (however lamentable or incredible) that, by the testimony of the French government itself, there is no public feeling, none, on this subject, in France, which responds in the smallest degree to the sentiment prevalent in England; that no credit is given to the people or to the legislature of this country for sincerity in these sentiments; that our anxiety upon the matter is attributed to a sense of national interest; that a ministry in France, which should agree to a mutual right of visit, would infallibly seal its own immediate downfall by such an agreement; that a new law founded on a proposition from England for new restrictions on the illicit slave trade, would be thrown out on the first reading in whichever chamber of the legislature it was introduced, and that the rejection of it would be justified, if any justification was thought necessary, or any discussion vouchsafed to it at all, not on the merits of its provisions, but on its *primâ facie* inadmissibility as the suggestion of a foreign power; as the sequel and sanction of a concession forced upon France in the hour of her humiliation; and finally, that, if such a law were passed, the tribunals and the juries would not enforce it.

That this is the state of public opinion and public feeling in France, your Grace knows from unquestionable authority, and it is fit that it should be here recorded, because as France is no inconsiderable member of the confederacy to which your Grace is to appeal for giving efficiency to the measures taken and to be devised for completing the abolition, it is but just that it should be remembered what difficulties on the part of that Power your Grace may have to encounter.

There are obviously but three modes by which nations or individuals can be brought to accept an unpalatable proposition; the first is persuasion, the second coercion, the third interest under all its different modifications.

As to the efficacy of persuasion on this subject, as applied to France, it is unnecessary to say more than has been said already.

The government of France *cannot* grant the right of mutual visit, if they would : the attempt to persuade them into it is therefore so much exertion thrown away.

Neither is it probable that the plenipotentiaries of his Most Christian Majesty would think themselves at liberty to join in any public declaration recommending the enforcement with respect to other nations, of an arrangement which France rejects for herself.

Of modes of coercion, the most direct that has been recommended by persons laudably anxious for the attainment of the great object in view ; is that the congress should declare the carrying on of the slave trade to be piracy. But does there appear the slightest probability that the French plenipotentiaries would concur in a proposition qualifying as acts of piracy, acts which, as the French government are perfectly aware, their own subjects are committing every day ? and thus laying open the ships and properties of those subjects, not to a right of visit to be mutually exercised, but to sweeping uncompensated capture by the cruisers of Great Britain ? Would such a declaration by the three other members of the Alliance, the three great continental Powers who have no colonies of their own, carry great weight in Europe ?

Possibly it may be worth the trial ; but, as coming from them, the utmost extent (as it appears) to which such a declaration could safely go, would be the manifestation of an opinion and desire that the maritime Powers should enter into negotiations among themselves to bring about an understanding on this point. So far the moral authority of the three Powers might perhaps avail ; but any assumption on their part of a right to legislate in matter of public law, and to establish a new principle of maritime police, could hardly fail to excite in Europe and in America, a disposition to demur to their jurisdiction.

There is a minor degree of coercion which is undoubtedly within their right, as well as their power, and which has been more than once pressed upon their attention, though I am afraid without effect. It is, that they should each in their dominions, whether severally or by joint compact, prohibit the introduction of colonial produce from the colonies of States which have not legally and effectually abolished the slave trade.

This is easy, this is practical, this would be attended with some immediate and perhaps with greater ultimate good effect ; and this would be done in the exercise of an undoubted and legitimate authority, which even those who might suffer by it could not call in question.

But I confess if this simple mode of at once manifesting their sentiments and giving effect to them shall be overlooked, in favour of some more ostentatious but more questionable exhibition of virtuous indignation, I shall cease to augur very confidently of the good to be done by the intervention of the three great continental Powers on this subject.

The species of coercion last mentioned partakes of the nature of the third class of motives by which any nation is to be lured to sacrifice or concession : I mean that of interest.

But there is a more direct operation of interest which has been alluded to in the proposal opened to your Grace by M. de Villèle. He proposes to

exclude French ships from all pretence for frequenting the coast of Africa, by exchanging the French settlements on that coast against the Isle of France.

Upon this proposal we have reflected and enquired, as much as the interval since your Grace's despatches were received, would allow. And I will state to your Grace the considerations which appear to stand in the way of the acceptance of it.

In the first place the comparative value of the things to be exchanged is preposterously unequal. But I do not state that objection as conclusive. If we cannot achieve our object by persuasion or by force, we must be contented to do it by purchase. We have done so, in fact, in other cases. We paid largely to Spain for her total abolition (such as it is); and largely to Portugal for her partial abolition (which is in fact none at all). If we could buy from France a real abolition with the difference between the value of her settlements on the coast of Africa, and that of the Mauritius, we should make a better bargain than heretofore; not because we should pay less, but because we should get what we paid for.

But should we get what we paid for?

In the first place, would our possession of the French settlements on the coast of Africa enable us to exclude them altogether from that coast? There is an innocent trade to the coast of Africa in which our merchants are pretty largely concerned. The French perhaps are not so; but would they stipulate never to embark in it? How would such a stipulation accord with those feelings of the French legislature, and the French people, which M. de Villèle has told your Grace (and I fear too truly) would defeat any attempt of the government to legislate for the effectual repression of illicit slave trade? And if the French flag were at liberty still to appear in those seas, would they then agree to the right of visit any more than now? And if all these questions must be answered in the negative, might we not find that here again we should have paid the consideration without obtaining the object? But there is a still more serious difficulty in respect to the achievement of that object by these means. There is a slave trade carried on also on the eastern coast of Africa. The French import slaves into the Island of Bourbon, even while we are in possession of the neighbouring island. But once masters of both, there would be no limit to their importations into both: and from those settlements they might feed their West India Islands with cargoes of slaves not only without impediment but without question, since we ourselves allow the transport of negroes from one slave colony to another.

To speak of guarding against this extension of the evil by stipulations in the treaty would be idle; considering that evasion, or rather open violation of public engagements, is the very mischief to which we are endeavouring to find a cure.

Another project there is which has been suggested to your Grace, not coming exactly under either of the foregoing heads; but being rather a matter of regulation than a step towards the abolition of illicit slave trade: of which suggestion, after turning it fully in my mind, I confess I do not see the advantage.

It is, that agents or consuls should be appointed reciprocally by the British and French governments (I suppose by the British and Spanish



governments too) to reside in the colonies of each other, for the purpose of inspecting the registration of slaves in each respective colony, and reporting every instance of violation of the abolition law, by the importation of new negroes.

Now to what end? If there were any doubt whether the law was violated by the French, this might be a mode of detection: but is not the fact already perfectly notorious? Are not slave ships publicly fitted up at Havre and at Bordeaux? Are not shares in the ventures of those ships openly saleable in all the seaports? Are not the cases of *Le Rodeur*, *L'Africain*, *Le Dauphin*, and many other French vessels captured with cargoes of slaves on board, known to all the world—and known through the proceedings of French courts or the publication of French pamphlets or speeches? What necessity is there for further evidence? Or would the fact, so well ascertained, that French vessels filled with negroes, sail from the coast of Africa, be at all strengthened by the evidence that their cargoes were landed at Martinique in the face of an English supervisor?

On the other hand, would there not be something peculiarly harsh and unjust towards our own colonists, who are unsuspected of any violation of the slave trade laws, and are sufferers by the non-execution of the laws of other States, to place them by public compact with a foreign State on an equal footing of jealousy with persons, whom we not only suspect but know to be guilty of constant systematic violation, either of existing treaties, or of the laws of their own country?

I say nothing of the improbability of the French government admitting this right of reciprocal residence ashore, any more than that of reciprocal visit afloat. But I cannot help adding that I hope this suggestion to your Grace has not arisen from a desire to stigmatize and to punish our own West India colonies for the reluctance which some of them have idly and perversely shown to consent to an efficient system of registration. No effort of the government will be left untried to carry that system into complete operation. But I should doubt the policy of employing the agency of a French resident for that purpose: which on the contrary must, as I conceive, according to every principle of human nature, excite in all the colonies a feeling of discontent and of resistance to so novel an authority.

The advantages to be derived then from the union of sovereigns to the cause of the abolition, appear to resolve themselves into these two:—

1st. An engagement on the part of the continental sovereigns to mark their abhorrence of this accursed traffic by refusing admission into their dominions of the produce of colonies belonging to Powers who have not abolished, or who notoriously continue the slave trade.

2ndly. A declaration in the names, if possible, of all the five Powers; but if France shall decline being a party to it, then in the names of the three great Powers of the continent, renewing the denunciation of the Congress of Vienna, and exhorting the maritime Powers who have abolished the slave trade to concert measures among themselves for proclaiming it and treating it as piracy; with a view to founding upon the aggregate of such separate engagements between State and State, a general law to be incorporated into the public law of the civilized world.

Such a declaration, as it assumed no binding force, would not be obnoxious

to the charges which would attach to a declaration of new public law by an incompetent authority: while at the same time its moral influence might materially aid us in our negotiations with other maritime States; and would at least enable us to bring to a test the sincerity of their acts and professions.

We could have no difficulty in consenting that subjects of the United Kingdom found trading in slaves should be treated as pirates: upon reciprocal admission of the same principle by other States.

The only State upon which both these two measures would operate by force, is Portugal—or to speak more properly, Brazil.

As to the first—the exclusion of her produce from Russia, Prussia and Austria—she has no right to complain. It is a regulation wholly within the power of every independent government.

As to the second it cannot be denied that supposing all other powers to agree in considering the traffic in slaves as piracy, the imposition of the result of such general concurrence upon Brazil without her consent, would be a measure of some, though justifiable violence:—justifiable, because to hold out, as that country or colony would then do, against the proclaimed and recorded sense and example of every State in that quarter of the world in which the mother country is situated, and of every State in that quarter of the world in which it is situated itself, in the prosecution of a criminal and proscribed traffic, would be to put itself in some measure out of the pale of social connection with other nations, and to call down upon itself the resentment of them all. If it be true that no combination of great Powers can justify an infliction of injury upon a smaller Power; it may be affirmed on the other hand that no Power has the right (nor has it at all the more for being insignificant in strength) to interrupt by its single act, the consenting policy of all the civilized world on a matter on which the dictates of Christianity and morality are clear; and to perpetuate to a large portion of their fellow creatures misery and sufferings which all other Powers are conspiring to heal.

It is a consolation also that there is in the present circumstances of Brazil a peculiar facility for obtaining her concurrence in a general measure for the abolition. Separated from the mother country by a dissent which is already almost qualified as rebellion, Brazil must speedily be looking to other Powers for recognition, if not for support. It is needless to observe that such recognition can only be purchased by a frank surrender of the slave trade.

I have only to add that should your Grace's endeavour to obtain the prohibition of the importation of the produce of the slave-trading colonies into the dominions of the continental Powers, be met by an inquiry, whether this country would be prepared to exclude from its ports the like produce, which comes here in transit but not for consumption? your Grace will express your readiness to refer that proposition for immediate consideration to your government.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

## [ENCLOSURES.]

## I.

COPY of an INSTRUCTION to his Majesty's envoy at Madrid, and minister at the Hague, and minister at Lisbon.

SIR,

Foreign Office, 30th Sept., 1822.

Referring you to the despatch which, under date the 22nd of September, 1821, was addressed to you by his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs upon the subject of that part of the Treaty, [Convention] between Great Britain and , for preventing illegal traffic in slaves, which exacts that ships of war may detain and bring in vessels suspected of illegal traffic, in the event only of their actually finding slaves on board; and in reference, also to the acquiescence of the government as signified by you, in the proposition which, by the despatch above mentioned, you were instructed to make upon this point; I now enclose to you by the King's command the projet of an article drawn up in strict conformity with the proposition then made, with a view of insuring the true object of the Treaty [Convention] as concluded at the time; and I have to instruct you to lose no time in seeing the minister, and urging him to take the orders of the King his master for enabling him to sign such an article.

Full powers for the purpose required will be transmitted to you without delay; and the King doubts not that his Majesty will promptly issue the necessary authority to his minister to sign the article in question, with the view of giving full effect to the assurances which his Majesty has already conveyed to the King upon this subject.

I am, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

## II.

COPY of an INSTRUCTION to the ambassador at the Hague, his Majesty's minister at Madrid, and chargé d'affaires at Lisbon.

MY LORD, [SIR—YOUR EX.]

Foreign Office, 30th Sept., 1822.

You are authorized by my despatch No. 7, of this date, to proceed to the signature of an article extending to vessels which shall be proved to have had slaves on board, the penalties of capture and condemnation, hitherto applicable to those only on board which slaves should be actually found at the moment of visiting them.

As this extension has been already agreed to by the government of I have not thought it advisable to risk the retraction of their consent, by opening a new proposition, until the signature of the article prepared for giving effect to it shall have been obtained. But as soon as that object is accomplished you will, in discoursing with the minister upon the effect of the article, and the mode of carrying it into execution, observe that in the absence of other evidence, the fitting up of a vessel evidently for the purposes of the slave trade, must be held to show so plainly the intention of her voyage as to be received in proof of the fact against the interested testimony of the navigators.

It is indeed quite impossible to imagine any pretext for those arrangements on board a ship which are calculated for the receipt of a living cargo, except

the purpose for which they are really destined; and it would be quite mockery to pretend that the purpose so manifested differs in any degree, in guilt, from the total or partial execution of it, however under the Treaty [Convention] as it originally stood the actual presence of the miserable victims was held to be necessary to substantiate the charge of trading in them.

If there be (as the admission of the extended article gives his Majesty reason to hope) a sincere desire on the part of the [Netherland, Spanish, Portuguese] government to execute their engagements fairly, there cannot be a hesitation on the part of the minister appointed to sign this article with you, to admit, and, if thought necessary, to record the supplemental provision, that the fitting-up of the ship [which may be described in as precise terms as the minister requires] shall be held to be *prima facie* evidence of the nature of the cargo.

The burden of the proof to the contrary must rest with the captain of the vessel; who will have to show, to the satisfaction of the captors, to what other purpose such fitting can be applicable.

I enclose a draft of a proviso which may be added to the clause, and which your full power will equally enable you to sign, if the minister can be induced to concur in it. If not, you will not in the first instance press it upon him, but stating that such you apprehend to be the sense on which the new article must necessarily be acted upon, you will consent to transmit home that article signed, referring the matter of the proviso to the consideration of your government.

If the minister should be ready to agree to such a provision, but should prefer its being added to the Treaty in the distinct shape of a separate article, you are equally authorised to sign it in that form. Or if any suggestions are offered for avoiding the possibility of error as to the illegal purpose of a voyage, you will profess your readiness to refer them for the consideration of your government, in the confidence that the real and *bond fide* intention of the government is to give validity and effect to the prevention of illicit slave trade.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

### III.

#### PROVISO.

It being well understood that in the absence of oral or documentary evidence, the fitting of the vessel with [here insert the description] shall be considered as *prima facie* proof of the nature of the cargo; and shall render the said vessel liable to capture and condemnation.

### IV.

EXPLANATORY ARTICLE to the Treaty [Convention] between his Majesty and the King of \_\_\_\_\_, concluded and signed at \_\_\_\_\_, on the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 18 \_\_\_\_.—Annexed to the Treaty concluded between his Majesty and the King of \_\_\_\_\_ on the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 18 \_\_\_\_.

#### ARTICLE.

Whereas it is stated in Article 1 of Instructions intended for the British and \_\_\_\_\_ ships of war, employed to prevent the illicit traffic in slaves "that ships on board of which no slaves shall be found, intended for purposes of traffic, shall not be detained on any account or pretence whatever." And whereas it has been found by experience that vessels employed in the illegal

traffic have put their slaves momentarily on shore, immediately prior to their being visited by ships of war ; and that such vessels have thus found means to evade forfeiture, and have been enabled to pursue their unlawful course with impunity, contrary to the true object and spirit of the Treaty [Convention] above mentioned.

The high contracting parties therefore feel it necessary to declare, and it is hereby declared by them, that if there shall be clear and undeniable proof that a slave or slaves has or have been put on board a vessel for the purpose of illegal traffic in the particular voyage in which the vessel shall be captured, then, and on that account, according to the true intent and meaning of the stipulation of the Treaty [Convention], such vessels shall be detained by the cruisers and finally condemned by the commissioners.

This explanatory Article shall have the same force and effect as if it were inserted word for word in the said Treaty [Convention], and shall be held to form part of the same.

In witness whereof the undersigned, furnished with full powers to that effect from their respective sovereigns, herunto signed their names and affixed their seals.

Done at	the	day of
(L.S.) Signed.	‘	(L.S.) Signed.

*Le Prince de Metternich to M. le Comte de Nesselrode.*

Vienne, le 30<sup>me</sup> Sept., 1822.

Le soussigné, Chancelier de Cour et d'État, s'est empressé de soumettre à l'Empereur son auguste maître la note que S.E. M. le Comte de Nesselrode lui a adressée le (14) 26<sup>me</sup> Septembre dernier.

L'Empereur a le sentiment d'avoir prouvé à S.M.I. de Toutes les Russies, et à ses autres augustes Alliés, par chaque parole comme par tous les actes émanés de son cabinet, le jugement que S.M.I. a professé invariablement sur la déplorable complication que le génie du mal a fait naître dans le Levant. Enfantée par le jeu d'une secte, nourrie et soutenue par elle, le peuple Grec n'a servi que d'instrument à des hommes qui, sous des dehors trompeurs, n'ont eu d'autre but que de jeter les germes de la discorde entre les puissances Alliées, et en particulier entre les deux Cours impériales d'Autriche et de Russie ; de servir les efforts des fauteurs de bouleversement dans d'autres parties de l'Europe, et de retirer enfin des profits du trouble général.

Les perfides desseins que le crime et l'erreur avaient conçus ont été déjoués par la sagesse. S.M.I. de Toutes les Russies s'est créée des droits imprescriptibles à la reconnaissance de l'Europe ; elle en aurait acquis de plus particuliers encore à celle de S.M.I. et R. Autrichienne, si les deux monarques n'avaient depuis longtemps pris l'habitude de confondre leurs intérêts particuliers respectifs avec ceux de l'Europe entière. C'est dans sa propre conscience que S.M. l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies doit trouver aujourd'hui la récompense véritable, et la seule que l'Europe puisse lui offrir pour tout ce que, dans l'une des complications les plus déplorables, elle lui a spécialement fourni de preuves et de grandeur d'âme et de force de caractère.

C'est avec le regret le plus véritable que l'Empereur a eu lieu de se convaincre que la Porte semble ne pas être assez éclairée encore pour séparer le jeu de la secte de la politique des puissances. La conscience de l'Empereur

le portera toujours à défendre, partout où sa voix pourra atteindre, les intérêts de la vérité, et la cause du bon droit.

Le Cabinet Autrichien se sent engagé en conscience et en devoir à contribuer autant qu'il sera en son pouvoir à faire sortir le gouvernement Ottoman de cette erreur. Il a le droit de rappeler à Constantinople, que longtemps avant l'explosion de la révolte ouverte dans l'empire Ottoman, il a cru devoir rendre attentif le Divan au travail coupable des sectaires et des conjurés dans les états du Sultan, et que les ministres de la Porte ont traité ce travail comme ne pouvant être de nature à les inquiéter.

Pénétrée du sentiment le plus véritable d'admiration pour le monarque qui a su allier à un degré aussi éminent que S.M.I. de Toutes les Russies la modération à la sagesse, S.M.I. regardera toute démarche de sa part dans le but d'éclairer la conscience du Sultan, et comme un devoir d'honneur et comme un devoir politique.

L'Empereur a retrouvé avec une satisfaction véritable dans la note de S.E. M. le Comte de Nesselrode des preuves nouvelles de l'esprit de conciliation qui anime son auguste allié. S.M.I. réunira ses efforts à ceux des autres cours, dans le but que S.M.I. et ses Alliés désirent à un égal degré atteindre dans l'intérêt de l'humanité, dans ceux d'une saine politique, et enfin dans celui de l'honneur même des puissances.

METTERNICH.

*Sir C. Stuart to the Marquess of Londonderry.*

MY DEAR STEWART,

Paris, 30th Sept., 1822.

I am very much indebted to you for your letter of the 20th, which arrived yesterday morning, and in return I send under the Duke of Wellington's cover the copies of all the despatches sent home since he left Paris, together with the copies of the communications which have reached me from Mr. Hervey and Sir William A'Court.

In order to keep you perfectly au fait respecting the circumstances which preceded these communications, I must apprise you that, during the day the Duke stayed at Paris, he had a very long conversation with M. de Villèle, of which he sent the result to England in a despatch, upon which I think it probable that the instructions transmitted to Vienna will be founded.

The substance of this despatch tended to show that two parties exist in the French Cabinet which entertain different opinions upon the course to be pursued respecting Spanish affairs.

As they have an army of 100,000 men in the southern provinces, one party proposes that they should divide this force into two bodies of 60,000 and 40,000 men, and that they should march upon Madrid by both roads, making a coup-de-main in order to get possession of the King's person; and the other wishes merely to march directly to the Ebro, backed by a declaration of the Allies that they intend to remain there until a new Constitution has been framed, and the King has organised a force capable of defending him, which course the advisers of this plan think would induce the revolutionary party to give up the King.

Villèle added that so far from wishing any armed interference on the

part of other Powers, they would resist the march of the troops through France. The Duke observed that any foreign interference, particularly on the part of France, would probably lead to the King's destruction before any step could be taken for his relief; that the Allies had declared already they would resent an injury to his person in the Note, and in that of Mr. Hervey, on the 9th July; that no opinion could be given on the part Great Britain would pursue, because it is impossible to foresee the course an uncertain event may render expedient. Villèle admitted the danger of maintaining the present large force in a state of inaction, and yet he manifested reluctance to separate them without having done anything, though he asserted in strong terms his desire to omit no effort which can lead to the maintenance of peace.

These being the opinions of the Cabinet since Villèle has had the complete direction of affairs, you may conceive that Montmorency's language goes rather further than they are at present inclined to support.

I hope that Lady Stewart and yourself are gradually recovering your spirits, and that sea-bathing will do her good.

Ever faithfully yours,

CHARLES STUART.

*The Right Hon. G. Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 1st Oct., 1822.

I have nothing to send to you to-day but my slave trade despatch, in which I wish I could help you to solutions as easily as I suggest difficulties.

I think, however, that your Grace may possibly get the declaration, recommending to the maritime powers to *negotiate* slave-trading into piracy. As to letting the Holy Alliance *DECLARE* it piracy, it would be to give them an authority, which they might turn to worse purposes; and which, perhaps, other powers—but certainly America—would laugh at.

The other expedient seems simple enough; but there is a consideration, which I put to you at the end of my despatch, which complicates it. The Brazilian trade, even the transit trade, is an immense object to this country. Nevertheless, we cannot expect to be allowed to keep it ourselves, and engage others to prohibit it. Liverpool had agreed with me (*i. e.* Liverpool the *person*, not Liverpool the town, with which I should have much greater difficulty) to engage at once that we could exclude the Brazilian produce, if the three Powers did, and I had originally so drawn the paragraph; but, upon reflecting on the magnitude of the sacrifice, I remodelled the proposition to what you see. That the blow will be hit, I doubt not; but you need not anticipate it. Against your reference (if it comes) we will have made up a definite opinion. It will be fit that Wilberforce should know the price that we must pay for this, and, I am afraid, for every other step towards the abolition.

As to the interchange of agents in the colonies respectively, I entreat you not to think of it. It would drive our West Indians mad. I suspect their old enemy, Master Stephen, to be at the bottom of the suggestion.

There is a second despatch about Sarmiento and his note. If it shall

turn out that the treaty *was* signed on the 14th, what a pretty trait is this proceeding of reformed national policy !

Letters from Madrid, which I have seen, speak of a declaration of war against France as one of the first acts which is likely to be done by the Extraordinary Cortes.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,  
most sincerely and faithfully yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. G. Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 1st October, 1822.

I have the honour to enclose to your Grace, first, a copy of the answer which I have been commanded by his Majesty to return to the *note verbale* of the Portuguese chargé d'affaires, copy of which I transmitted to your Grace in my despatch, No. 4. Second, extract of a communication from Mr. Ward, his Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Lisbon, by which your Grace will see that Mr. Ward had reason to believe that the offensive and defensive treaty with Spain, which M. de Sarmiento was instructed to hold out as a probable consequence of his Majesty's refusal to protect Portugal from a French invasion, was actually signed on the 14th September, ten days *before* the date of M. de Sarmiento's *note verbale*.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*The Right Hon. G. Canning to M. de Sarmiento.*

Foreign Office, 1st Oct., 1822.

The undersigned, &c., has not failed to lay before the King, his master, the *note verbale*, first read and afterwards delivered to the undersigned by M. de Moraes Sarmiento, chargé d'affaires of his Most Faithful Majesty, on the 25th ultimo.

The undersigned is commanded to assure M. de Sarmiento that, according to every information which has reached the British government, nothing can be more visionary than the apprehension entertained by the King of Portugal and his ministers, of an invasion of Portugal from the Pyrenees. But the undersigned can have no hesitation in assuring M. de Sarmiento that his Majesty would not see with indifference an attempt upon the independence or security of Portugal by any foreign Power whatever; and his Majesty would be always ready to afford whatever protection is due from Great Britain to Portugal, not indeed in virtue of the Treaty of Alliance of 1810, referred to by M. Sarmiento (which treaty is distinctly declared to be void by the treaty concluded at Vienna in January, 1815), but in consideration of ancient engagements and obligations.



## 336 THREATENED ALLIANCE OF PORTUGAL WITH SPAIN.

The intimation by M. Sarmento that, in the event of a denial of assistance from Great Britain, in a case of adequate emergency, the King of Portugal must betake himself to other alliances, is received by the undersigned as a friendly communication of a purpose contingent upon circumstances happily not yet existing; and (the undersigned sincerely hopes and believes) not likely to take place.

It would, therefore, perhaps be premature to observe, that while a *defensive* alliance between any two powers is matter neither of suspicion nor of jealousy to a third Power, an *offensive* alliance, such as (in the utterly improbable case supposed by the Portuguese government) M. de Sarmento is authorised to declare his Most Faithful Majesty would contract with Spain, is a measure of a very different character; it is a measure which, by putting the decision of peace or war for Portugal into the breast of her new ally, would necessarily absolve her old one from engagements contracted only with reference to defensive protection.

A war declared by Spain after such a treaty had been signed, must necessarily involve Portugal; but it is not in a war thus voluntarily incurred that Portugal would have a right to call upon his Majesty for aid.

The undersigned, however, only makes this statement in order to leave no material part of M. de Sarmento's note without observation. For as to the hypothesis, that the King of Portugal might have reason to complain of his Majesty's refusal to assist in defending Portugal against a Pyrenean invasion, the undersigned cannot forbear remarking, that such an invasion is an evil which never has befallen Portugal, excepting the case when Spain either co-operated in the enterprise, or at least consented to it.

The undersigned requests, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

### II.

EXTRACT of a DESPATCH from Mr. WARD addressed to EARL BATHURST, and dated Lisbon, 15th September, 1822.

"The question of a defensive alliance with that Power (Spain) was brought forward in council some time since, as I have been informed, when M. Pinheiro, opposed it, as likely to give umbrage to other Powers; but he was obliged to give way, and the proposals to this effect were made at Madrid by the Portuguese chargé d'affaires. There is little doubt, however, that the suggestion originally came from Spain, through the medium of the corresponding clubs, and that M. Perez de Castro has been charged with the principal management of the business.

"As both parties are desirous to terminate, I think the matter will be speedily brought to a conclusion."

### III.

*Mr. E. M. Ward to the Earl of Clanwilliam.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Lisbon, 15th Sept., 1822.

It may not be devoid of foundation what was mentioned to me yesterday, viz., that the treaty of defensive alliance alluded to in my despatch was signed yesterday, but I have it not from a secure enough authority to state it with positiveness.

Ever yours, &c.,

E. M. WARD.

*To Count Nesselrode.*

Vienna, 2nd Oct., 1822.

The undersigned Minister Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty has had the honour of receiving the note which Count Nesselrode addressed to him on the 14th (26th) September.

The King his master, at the same time that his efforts have been unceasing to bring the Ottoman Porte to a just sense of what was due to his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, by the performance of the stipulations of its treaties with Russia, and thus to preserve the peace of Europe, has uniformly applauded the magnanimity of his Imperial Majesty, and the moderation and sound policy of his government, in refraining from adopting those measures which circumstances might have justified, in order to avenge the conduct of the Ottoman Porte.

The undersigned entertains a sanguine hope that the efforts of the King his master, in concert with those of his Allies, will still prevail upon the councils of the Ottoman Porte to do ample justice to his Imperial Majesty, by the performance of the stipulations of its treaties with Russia, and thus by satisfying the just demands of his Imperial Majesty, enable his Imperial Majesty to resume his diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Porte.

There is no doubt that the magnanimous conduct of his Imperial Majesty in these transactions, the declaration which his Imperial Majesty issued at the commencement of the disturbances in Wallachia and Moldavia, his absolute disavowal, disapprobation, and dismissal from his service of the leader of those disturbances, and the moderation of his government in refraining from hostilities, notwithstanding the undenied breach of treaty of which the Ottoman Porte was guilty, and in confiding to his Imperial Majesty's Allies the task of obtaining justice from the Porte, ought to have convinced the Ottoman ministers, that whatever might have been the conduct of certain of the lower agents of Russia in the insurgent provinces, it was unknown to his Imperial Majesty or his government, and could not have been encouraged or connived at by any of those of his servants who approach his person, or who could be supposed to act under his Imperial Majesty's orders.

The undersigned regrets that his Imperial Majesty should have considered it necessary to direct Count Nesselrode to express any disapprobation of the conduct of Lord Viscount

Strangford, his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in his recent conference with the ministers of the Porte.

The undersigned hoped that Lord Strangford, by the successful exertion of his talents and abilities in the execution of the orders of his government and the suggestions of the Allied Courts, to bring the Ottoman Porte to a sense of what was due to his Imperial Majesty, had deserved the high honour of his gracious approbation.

An attentive perusal of the précis of the conference of the 27th August will show that Lord Viscount Strangford did repel the assertions and insinuations of the Ottoman ministers against the servants of his Imperial Majesty.

The reasoning upon this part of the subject used by Lord Strangford in this conference is unanswerable. He showed that the known conduct of his Imperial Majesty's government, the events which had occurred, and every fact, proved that it was impossible that his Imperial Majesty's government could have had any concern in producing the insurrection of the Greeks. If he did not proceed farther to justify all the servants of the Russian government who had been employed in the countries which were the seat of the insurrection, it was because his Lordship had not in his possession the means of refuting the assertions of the Ottoman ministers, founded, as his Lordship had reason to believe them to be, on proofs put into their hands by the insurgents themselves. Not possessing those means of refutation, his Lordship did not deem it expedient to give to the Ottoman ministers an opportunity of producing and placing on the protocol those alleged proofs, which would only have tended to circulate still farther the imputations which they had made. But his Lordship did not fail to draw, and point out to the Ottoman ministers, the clear distinction between the intentions of a government as proved by its acts and uniform conduct, and the actions of obscure individuals, its agents, who might have taken upon themselves to act, not as instructed by his Imperial Majesty and his ministers, not in conformity with the known wishes and upright intentions of his Imperial Majesty's government, but according to their own views.

The undersigned cannot but regret that when the précis of the conference of the 27th August was laid before his Imperial Majesty, the despatch of the 3rd September which accompanied it was not likewise brought to his knowledge. His Imperial

Majesty would therein have seen that the charge was made against the Russian agents in the Morea and Archipelago; and that Lord Strangford regretted that he had not in his hands the means of justifying them. If his Imperial Majesty had seen this despatch, the undersigned is convinced that those principles of justice which direct every action of his Imperial Majesty's glorious life would have induced him to refrain from passing a censure upon a man to whom it is the greatest satisfaction that he has been the instrument in the hands of his own Sovereign to forward the views of his Imperial Majesty in preserving the peace of Europe.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*À Son Altesse Sérénissime le Prince de Metternich.*

[ 164. ]

MON CHER PRINCE,

Vienne, ce 2<sup>m</sup> Oct., 1822.

Vous verrez ma note en réponse à celle du Comte de Nesselrode. J'ai eu une longue conversation hier avec S.M. l'Empereur, et il m'a paru satisfait qu'il avait fait tort à Lord Strangford. Il l'a bien reçu après l'entrevue que j'ai eue avec S.M.I.

Sur d'autres sujets il m'a paru que vous aviez bien jugé la carte du pays. Il n'est pas nécessaire de vous en dire plus.

J'ai parlé à S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche; et je désire beaucoup que vous donniez un peu de votre attention à cette affaire d'argent, sur laquelle vous aviez eu quelque discussion avec Lord Londonderry l'année passée à Hanovre.

Le principe de notre réclamation est admis, et j'ai dans les mains les bons.

Lord Londonderry tenait beaucoup à ce que cette affaire fût arrangée, ou par Monsieur Gordon, ou par Lord Stewart, avant son arrivée; et vous pouvez vous assurer qu'il aurait eu grande difficulté à se présenter au Parlement à la session prochaine, s'il eût retourné en Angleterre sans faire un arrangement à ce sujet.

J'y tiens autant que lui; et tenant en vue votre crédit public, et même la politique de l'Autriche, il lui est autant à désirer qu'à nous de finir cette affaire. Je vous prie donc de la mettre en train, ou en autorisant le Comte Stadion, ou quelqu'autre que vous voulez, d'en conférer avec moi pendant

mon séjour ici ; ou si je dois aller à Verone d'y faire apporter les documens pour que nous puissions l'arranger pendant mon séjour dans cette ville.

Je vous assure que c'est très important que vous donniez votre attention à ce sujet, sans perte de temps, parce que je ne peux me présenter à mon gouvernement sans avoir fait un arrangement, ou avec vous, ou avec quelque autre, qui voudrait nous débarrasser de ces bons.

Le courrier n'est pas arrivé de l'Angleterre. Je vous avoue qu'après avoir lu avec attention la dépêche de Lord Londonderry du 15 Septembre, et celles de la même date que vous aviez écrit à Monsieur de Neumann, je suis d'opinion qu'on me donnera l'ordre de ne pas aller à Verona.

Toujours à vous, mon cher Prince,

WELLINGTON.

[ 165. ]

*A Son Altesse Sérénissime le Prince de Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

Vienna, ce 3<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

Depuis que je vous ai écrit hier au soir j'ai reçu les réponses à l'expédition de Lord Londonderry du 15 Septembre ; et me trouvant muni de la discrétion qu'il me fallait, je compte vous rejoindre à Vérone.

Comme je ne partirai d'ici qu'après demain, je pourrais à peine arriver à Inspruck que jusqu'à la veille du départ de LL. MM. II. de cette ville ; et je compte passer par Laybach, et si j'ai le temps j'irai voir Venise.

Toujours à vous, mon cher Prince,

WELLINGTON.

*Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON CHER DUC,

Salzbourg, ce 3<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

J'ai trouvé à mon arrivée ici, hier au soir, le Comte de Lieven. Il m'a rapporté dans le courant de notre entretien quelques détails relatifs à des conversations qu'il a eu avant son départ de Londres, et après le vôtre, avec le Roi, Lord Liverpool, et Mr. Canning, lesquels m'ont semblé assez intéressans pour être portés à votre connaissance. Je l'ai prié de vous les transmettre par écrit, et vous trouverez ci-inclus sa lettre. J'ai bien lieu de me flatter qu'avant l'arrivée de la présente expédition vous aurez reçu de Londres une réponse à la demande que les cabinets y ont adressé pour vous faire obtenir l'ordre de nous suivre à Vérone. Dans les petites comme

dans les grandes affaires de ce monde, il fait bon toutefois de savoir le plus possible, et c'est dans ce but que j'envoie à Vienne la présente estafette.

Ma course a été favorisée jusqu'ici par le tems le plus beau du monde. J'espère que vous ne serez pas moins heureux. Quand vous aurez décidé et votre route et le jour de votre départ, je vous prie de faire donner vos ordres pour les chevaux par le Baron de Stürmer. Il aura soin que votre service soit soigné. Londonderry ou Gordon vous arrangeront cela.

Vous concevez que ce n'est pas de Salzbourg que je puis vous donner des nouvelles, et les assurances réitérées de tous mes sentimens pour vous ne sont pas des nouvelles. Veuillez les agréer avec votre bonté accoutumée.

METTERNICH.

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*Le Comte de Lieven to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Salzbourg, le 3<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

J'ai conté à M. le Prince de Metternich et au Comte de Nesselrode les derniers entretiens que j'ai eu avec Lord Liverpool et Mr. Canning, après votre départ de Londres, Monsieur le Duc, et c'est d'après leur désir quo je vous en rends compte ici, puisqu'ils se rapportent à la demande qui vous a été faite de vous rendre à Vérone, et que ce récit pourrait peut-être servir à vous fortifier dans l'opinion que le parti que vous embrassez ne pourra que rencontrer l'assentiment de votre cabinet.

Leur ayant représenté, et à Lord Liverpool surtout, que vu le retard de votre arrivée à Vienne, Monsieur le Duc, les Souverains pouvaient s'être trouvés dans l'obligation de se transporter à Verone, afin de s'y trouver à l'époque fixée pour cette réunion, il serait fort désirable que dans ce cas vous vous trouvassiez autorisé à vous y rendre également. J'ai ajouté que quoique le Marquis de Londonderry eût décidé que dans aucune hypothèse il ne pouvait aller en Italie, il me semblait que cette résolution ne reposait sur aucune base solide; que le nom du lieu ne désignait pas la nature des affaires que les cabinets y traiteraient; et que si toutefois le nom d'Italie impliquait les affaires d'Italie, et quo le ministère eut intérêt à décréditer l'opinion que vous prenez part à ces délibérations, une seule ligne semi-officielle insérée dans le 'Courrier' pouvait rectifier toute erreur à cet égard.

Lord Liverpool n'a pas objecté un mot à cette représentation, et la manière dont il a accueilli ce que je lui soumettais, m'a laissé l'impression qu'il ne trouvait aucun motif plausible à s'y opposer.

Le Roi, auquel j'ai de même osé en parler, s'est fortement exprimé en faveur de cette idée.

Voilà, Monsieur le Duc, ce que je crois de mon devoir de vous rapporter. Vous ne doutez point du vif plaisir que je me promets de vous revoir à Verone, Monsieur le Duc, et de celui que j'ai eu d'apprendre que vous ne vous êtes senti qu'en bien de votre voyage.

Veuillez agréer l'hommage de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Duc,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LIEVEN.

[ 166. ]

*To Lieut.-Gen. ———.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Vienna, 3rd Oct., 1822.

Since my passage through Carlsruhe I have received two letters from you on the subject of your appointment to a regiment. I had already some time ago forwarded an application from you to the Commander-in-Chief on this subject, and I am perfectly ready, and will now apply again in your favour.

But it is quite impossible for me to be the channel of conveying to the Commander-in-Chief the kind of reproaches which your letters contain.

I am quite persuaded that his Royal Highness means to do justice by every officer, and particularly by those who have served, as far as may be in his power with the limited means at his command; and at all events, whether he does or not, I can't be the channel of an angry correspondence with him.

Believe me, my dear General, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 167. ]

*To Major-Gen. Sir Herbert Taylor.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Vienna, 3rd Oct., 1822.

I have received two letters from General ——— since I passed through Carlsruhe earnestly urging me to recommend him for a regiment of cavalry, that which he had having been reduced.

General ——— was a very old officer of cavalry, as his Royal Highness knows. He commanded a brigade of cavalry during part of the war in Spain, and in the battle of Waterloo. The command of the whole cavalry devolved upon him on the march to Paris; and he was afterwards put off the Staff because he had a regiment, which he has since lost.

Believe me, my dear General, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 168. ]

SIR,

Vienna, 4th Oct., 1822.

Since my arrival here I have had long conversations with the Emperor of Russia, and with the Austrian Emperor and French ministers, on the existing state of affairs, and their future views.

In another despatch I propose to transmit to you a note which the Russian minister circulated here previous to my arrival, and a copy of my answer to it; and I will in that despatch inform you of the state of the question between the Emperor and the Ottoman Porte. The principal question here at present is that of Spain, upon which I am inclined to believe that that of the peace of the East is in a great degree dependent.

Prince Metternich feels as we do, an anxious desire that the Spaniards may be left to themselves. He wishes that it were possible to interfere to overturn the existing order of things in Spain, and that the King were left to himself either to govern as he did from the year 1814 to the year 1820, or to grant such constitution to his people as he might think proper. But his Highness is sensible of the difficulty, danger, and doubtful result of any military operation in Spain; and he thinks it better to leave matters as they are than to incur those risks.

I don't think that the French ministers have made known the position in which they stand on the Spanish question, as detailed in my despatch to you from Paris of the 21st ultimo, marked separate. When I conversed with the Emperor of Russia yesterday upon this subject, he was certainly not aware of it, as you will observe from the following account of what passed.

After the usual cordial reception of myself, and inquiries about my health, and some conversation respecting the late Marquis of Londonderry, for whose loss his Imperial Majesty expressed the deepest sorrow, his Imperial Majesty went immediately into the state of affairs in Spain. He said that he considered that country as the head-quarters of revolution and of Jacobinism; that the King and Royal Family were in the utmost danger; and that so long as the revolution in that country should be allowed to continue, every country in Europe, and France in particular, was unsafe. He then contended that



the case of Naples was a precedent entirely applicable to the case of Spain. That in both cases there was danger to their neighbours from what was passing in the interior of the country ; and that the Sovereign of each had called for assistance ; the Sovereign of Spain repeatedly.

His Imperial Majesty then stated that he was apprehensive that Great Britain, by her objections, would prevent the good that might be done in Spain.

I told him that it was certainly true that we had insuperable objections to interfere in the internal concerns of any country. That we considered that we had no such right, excepting in a case in which there should be danger to ourselves from what was passing in the interior of such country. That considerations of prudence or policy might induce us to place danger to our ally on the same line with danger to ourselves ; but that such a case was similar to any other case of alliance. That we felt besides that we could not interfere with advantage to the country in question. That we had tried the experiment once in relation to Sicily in a period of war, when our troops were the garrison of that island, and we had found that the institutions of the country impeded the measures necessary for its defence. That we established that which we thought the best of constitutions, viz. a government by a parliament, constituted on the principles of that in Great Britain, without its supposed abuses ; but that this government failed in all the duties and purposes of government, even to a greater degree than that which had preceded it ; and that very soon it had been found necessary to destroy this boasted constitution as the other had been destroyed. That with us therefore it had become a principle not to interfere in the internal concerns of any foreign country excepting in a case of necessity, being convinced that we could not interfere with advantage to such country, or with honour to ourselves. I added, that these principles were not to be considered as growing out of our parliamentary constitution. That in my opinion they ought to be the guide of all governments, be their constitutions what they might. But that I was about to mention one reason for refusing to interfere, which was the consequence of our peculiar political system of government, viz. that the moment his Majesty should be advised to become a party to an interference in the internal concerns of any country, the Parliament had, and would exercise, the right of

discussing all the measures adopted in relation to that country, which would not be very desirable to those concerned.

I then pointed out the distinction which appeared to me to exist between the case of Naples and that of Spain. We had always considered that the Emperor of Austria and the other powers in Italy might have some reason to complain of the revolution in Naples, and of the secret societies in which it originated, and which upheld it, and which had ramifications in the Austrian dominions and in other parts of Italy; but that I had never heard of any apprehension of danger from the revolution in Spain; that I did not believe that it was complained of in France on the score of danger; and that I could not think that the demand of the King of Spain, however urgent, could justify an invasion of Spain to overturn the existing order of things.

His Imperial Majesty insisted upon it that danger positively existed; and he endeavoured to prove this assertion from the information derived from the different police establishments in Europe, from the evidence produced on the recent trials in France, from the pleadings of the counsel on the defence of the several prisoners, and from the correspondence and cooperation of the *Liberales* in France and Spain with the common object of overturning the throne of the Bourbons in the former country.

I stated in reply the fact that the *Liberales* in France and Spain, the ultra-Royalists in France, and the King of Spain, were all endeavouring to force the two countries into a war; but that it was to be hoped that the French government would be sufficiently wise to avoid being involved in hostilities.

His Imperial Majesty then said that he did not think that France could be relied upon for such an operation as that which he had in contemplation, although the protection and safety of the French government was its particular object. His Imperial Majesty felt no confidence either in the loyalty or the military qualities of the French army of the present day; and he considered that this operation, if undertaken at all, must be the work of the Alliance. That French troops might form a part of the army to be employed, but that the great force must be one in whose loyalty and military qualities complete confidence can be reposed; and his Imperial Majesty evidently pointed at his own troops.

I asked his Imperial Majesty whether he had any data by which he could form a judgment respecting the opinion of the French government upon the question of allowing an Allied army to pass through France, and making France the basis of an operation upon Spain? His Imperial Majesty answered that he had not a doubt that they would not object; but that he had made it a rule to have no communication with the French government excepting in concert with his Allies, and that he could not say that he was informed.

I then told his Imperial Majesty that I was informed upon that point. That on my way through Paris I had considered it my duty to speak to M. de Villèle and to the King respecting their position in relation to Spain, and to inquire what they intended to do with the troops which they had collected upon the Spanish frontier; and that I had found that those troops were collected with a view to observe what was going on in Spain, to protect the frontier from insult, and eventually to act as circumstances might render necessary. That the French government considered that certain events might render necessary a war between the two countries, such as the murder or deposition of the King, or any insult or attack upon the French frontier; and that in such a case they should consider the question as one exclusively French, and not only should not require assistance, but should refuse to receive it, and even resist its approach, if such assistance was to be in the shape of troops to be marched through France.

The Emperor appeared surprised by this piece of information, but said that he could not consider it an obstacle to what should on deliberation be found to be necessary for the world in general, and even for the safety of France herself. He particularly objected to the notion that it should be France to take up this cause, and should consider herself justified in making an attack upon Spain in case of the death or deposition of the King. He considered this line of proceeding as one of aggrandizement, to which we were all bound to object and to make resistance. He then went much at length into the state of the French army, its disposition and military qualities; and he declared his conviction, founded upon the information of those who had been in the country, and had taken pains to acquire information, that they had not half of the number of men disposable for service in Spain that I was informed they had.

I thought it proper to correct his notion that the French government meditated any conquest or aggrandizement in the execution of their views with regard to Spain, or that they would take any step without full explanation of their intentions; and then, after a short *résumé* of our conversation, and after pointing out to the Emperor that we had not yet touched upon the important points of the question respecting the difficulties of any operation in Spain, and the chances of any result, the conversation ended.

I have thought it proper to give it to you in as much detail as it is possible in a despatch, because I think it shows that our deliberations will turn almost entirely upon the affairs of Spain. The Emperor wishes to interfere in that country; but only by means of a Russian army. He will object to any operation by a French army, or by any other of which the principal part is not Russian. I don't think he was aware of the objections of the French government to allow any foreign troops to pass through France in order to attack Spain; and in combatting these objections, his Imperial Majesty certainly forgot altogether the point on which he had principally relied in the former part of our conversation, viz. the danger to France of the prevalence and success of the Jacobin principles in Spain, as he contested the right of France to interfere for her own protection. The idea then which is certainly uppermost in his Imperial Majesty's mind is the employment of the Russian army in Spanish concerns, if possible; but at all events its employment.

From all that I can learn in conversation with Count Nesselrode and Prince Metternich, the opinion in Russia, and particularly in the army, has been very much against the proceedings of his Imperial Majesty in the Turkish question. The sort of answer which has been given to their clamours for entering upon the support of the Greeks has been, that it is necessary for his Imperial Majesty to attend to the progress of the Jacobins and revolutionary parties in the west of Europe, and particularly in Spain; who, while the Russian armies should be employed in the east, might destroy all that had been done in the last ten years.

The Emperor thus finds himself in an embarrassing position between Spain and Turkey. On the one hand but little if any cause remains for attacking the Turks; and on the other, I think the result of the Conferences at Verona will be an

unanimous decision to leave the Spaniards to themselves. I think we shall then find the Emperor more difficult upon the Turkish question; but upon this I write to you more fully in another despatch.

It is obvious that the contest at Verona will fall principally upon me. Prince Metternich and Count Bernstorff will remain behind, and leave to the French ministers and to me to fight the whole battle. I think I may rely upon the accuracy of the notion which I formed at Paris of the position of the French government in the Spanish question; that their ministers at the Congress will firmly oppose the passage of any foreign troops through France; and that they will not press very strongly an attack by France upon Spain, unless the latter should insult or attack their frontier.

The Emperor of Russia will find this opposition to a passage through France, strengthened, as I understand it will be, by the Sovereigns in the south of Germany refusing to allow any passage through their territories, to be more than he can overcome; and he will probably then give up the whole question, and join with us in endeavouring to prevail upon the French ministers to remain quiet.

This appears to me to be the course which the discussions will take; and their probable result will be to leave Spain to herself.

The Emperor was so much taken up with the notion of the attack upon Spain through France that, in his conversation with me, he did not advert to one by sea; and probably had never considered the subject in that view, excepting as subsidiary to an attack by land. But the difficulties of such an attack are so obvious that it is scarcely possible that his Imperial Majesty should not at once see that they are insurmountable.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 169. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Vienna, 4th Oct., 1822.

Before I came here, Lord Londonderry had sent home his resignation by his son; and I understand that he expects his letter of recall, which he proposes to present at Verona.

I gave him your letter under flying seal unfortunately before I had read your despatch, No. 2; and I don't now understand exactly whether he proposes to go through the Conferences at Verona on Italian affairs before he presents his letter of recall, or he intends to present it as soon as he shall receive it. I will endeavour to understand him exactly upon this point before I leave Verona; and if I should find it uncertain, I will make use of the power given to me to appoint Mr. Gordon (the Secretary of the Embassy) to attend the Conferences on Italian affairs in the absence, or on the going away, of Lord Londonderry.

You had better send him these orders direct from the office. If you send them to me, I will take care they shall reach him.

I have arranged the communication with Verona by way of Paris.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 170. ]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Vienna, 4th Oct., 1822.

I am very much obliged to you for your letters and despatches of the 24th September, of which you will have seen that I expected the arrival. You may rely upon my taking care to keep clear of the conferences upon Italian affairs.

In my conversation with the Emperor, which lasted two hours, he talked of you with great fairness, and did not manifest any of the feeling which you imagined he might have. He observed, in which I certainly agree, that it would have been very desirable if you had come yourself, as it would have given you an opportunity of seeing and becoming acquainted with the Sovereigns and their ministers, and of observing the manner in which they transact their business, and then an opportunity of knowing you. I told him that I did not doubt that the King would have desired you to come if it had not been necessary to make an arrangement to send some person before you had come into office, and that you had of course much to attend to at home upon your first appointment.

I am a great deal better ; and I think I shall reach Verona by easy stages without inconvenience.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 171. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

4th Oct., 1822.

In the conversation which I had with the Emperor of Russia yesterday but little that was expected passed on the real points of the Turkish question. His Imperial Majesty professed his continued moderate views, and his determination to leave himself entirely in the hands of his Allies ; and I expressed to him the satisfaction which his Majesty had derived from his moderation, and the hopes which we entertained that its continuance would preserve the peace of Europe.

Previous to my arrival here, however, a note, of which I enclose the copy, had been circulated by the Russian minister to the plenipotentiaries of the different Courts, which reflected severely on the conduct of Lord Strangford. He had arrived from Constantinople just at that moment.

I can find but one reason for circulating this note. Lord Strangford is the person to whom principally, or indeed solely, is due the merit of having brought the question between the Emperor and the Porte to the state in which it is now ; and although he had failed in prevailing upon the Ottoman government to consent to the Emperor's desire that they should send a plenipotentiary to meet one from his Imperial Majesty on the Russian frontier, yet he had exerted himself most zealously and ably in the cause ; and it was obvious that the failure was to be attributed to the difficulty of obtaining the object at all, and not to any deficiency in him who was employed to negotiate it.

The perusal of the précis of the conference of the 27th of August, enclosed in Lord Strangford's despatch No. 147, will show that the alleged ground for his Imperial Majesty's displeasure did not exist. In fact, Lord Strangford did defend the Emperor and his government and his servants from the imputations of the Ottoman ministers as far as was in

his power; and made use of the very arguments in their defence which the note of the 25th September asserts that he ought to have used. If he did not do more, it was because he was not in possession of information to enable him to defend the servants of the Russian government more effectually; and he was aware that the Ottoman ministers had in their possession proofs of the misconduct, in the Morea and Archipelago, of some of the agents of the Russian government; and he was desirous to avoid to force them to place these proofs on the protocol. This state of the case is explained in Lord Strangford's despatch, No. 147, which the Russian ministers did not lay before the Emperor with the précis of the conference of the 27th August, because blame was imputed in it to Mons. \* , who had lately been employed in the Russian mission at Constantinople.

The only conclusion I can draw from this note is that the Emperor wished to lay the grounds for breaking off with the Turks eventually, by stating his dissatisfaction with what had been done, and a new version of his terms at the very moment when others conceived that all the difficulties were removed, and the questions between him and the Turks were upon the point of being settled; and at the same time he took the opportunity of conveying his displeasure against Lord Strangford, who had been principally, or indeed alone, concerned in all the negotiations at Constantinople, and who, as English ambassador, is in a manner the protector of the Turkish government.

If his Imperial Majesty had not spoken to me on the subject of this note, I should have considered it my duty to mention it to him. He returned, however, to the Turkish subject in the interview I had with him by adverting to this note, and by stating that he thought that the Ottoman ministers had treated him and his servants very ill. I told his Imperial Majesty that if he had not commenced the subject I should have mentioned it to him, as I really thought that he had not done justice to Lord Strangford, who had made such exertions to serve his Imperial Majesty, and to forward his views of peace; and this only because Lord Strangford's despatch, No. 147, had not been laid before him as well as the précis of the conference which accompanied it. I then explained what

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\* Blank in manuscript.



I understood of the *précis* of the conference, and the additional explanation given by the despatch; and I told his Imperial Majesty that I had brought with me a copy of the despatch, taking out only the names of the persons mentioned, which I offered for his perusal, and which I was convinced would fully justify Lord Strangford in his opinion. His Imperial Majesty asked, "Why strike out the names? Why should I not be informed who is accused, and what are the proofs?" I answered that I could not make myself the informer against any of his servants, particularly having no proofs in my hands, and not being certain that the Ottoman government possessed any. That all I wanted was to justify Lord Strangford, and to remove his Imperial Majesty's displeasure against him.

His Imperial Majesty asked me very abruptly whether the person charged was Mons. Capo d'Istria. I answered, "No;" and he then went into a long detail to prove, from the manner of doing business in Russia, no order could ever be sent by any minister, and no person to whom such order was sent was justified in obeying it, unless his Imperial Majesty's approbation and signature were affixed to it.

The conversation, however, ended very quietly, his Imperial Majesty declaring that he did not intend to censure Lord Strangford; that he would receive him perfectly well, as he did afterwards; but he did not take from me the despatch.

You will observe that Mons. de Nesselrode's note contains a new version of the Russian demands upon the Porte, which, excepting upon the commercial subject may be considered as substantially the same as the original ultimatum. I have considered it unnecessary therefore in my answer to enter into any details upon the great question of the settlement between the Emperor and the Porte, as that is properly a question to be discussed in the conferences, with a view to which we shall be assembled at Verona. I have therefore confined my note, a copy of which I enclose, substantially to the justification of Lord Strangford, and nearly to the topics which I had used in my conversation with the Emperor.

I am in hopes that this note will eventually draw from the Russian ministers a reply which will set the matter right; for which I will press as strongly as I can.

In respect to the main question between the Russians and the Porte there is no doubt that by this time the Principalities

are evacuated entirely; the Hospodars have been named and installed, and the other three original points of the Russian ultimatum have been admitted by the Porte, and are in the course of fair execution.

But I confess that, taking into consideration the circumstances stated in another despatch which I write to you this day, I doubt that the Emperor has it in his power to remain at peace upon the terms of his original ultimatum. Since his ambassador withdrew from Constantinople, the Porte have issued orders prohibiting vessels navigating these seas from the use of flags different from those of the nation to which they belong. The object and the consequence of these orders is to destroy the commerce of Odessa and of the Russian territories in the Black Sea, which was carried on either in Greek vessels which can no longer appear in those seas, or in other foreign vessels under Russian colours.

There is no doubt of the right of the Porte to issue such orders; and it is not denied by the Russian ministers. But the question is, whether it can be expected that the Emperor of Russia, having such good grounds of complaint against the Porte, having, as I have explained in another despatch, such cogent reasons for war, can sit down quietly in a worse situation than he was previous to the insurrection of the Greeks, and the occurrence of the events which have occasioned the existing differences. We may rely upon it that, even if his Imperial Majesty were disposed to resume his diplomatic relations under such circumstances, the peace could not be permanent. A great and powerful country like Russia cannot sit quiet and see the prosperity of its most important provinces checked, and even destroyed, by the capricious orders of its weaker neighbour; and I am therefore anxious that Lord Strangford should be instructed to urge the Porte to give every facility to the negotiation of those powers for permission to pass whose flags have not yet obtained it.

The just rights of the Porte will thus be preserved; and as the Russian commerce will then be upon a better footing than it was before, inasmuch as a legal commerce is more secure than one under a false flag, it may be hoped that this advantage may enable the Emperor to preserve peace.

It is very desirable that everything should be done that is practicable to preserve the general tranquillity. Exclusive of

the disadvantage which must be the result of engaging the Emperor of Russia in hostilities in the East, and of their probable success, they must bring in collision the two Imperial Courts, or these must agree in some partition of the advantages likely to result from the contest. France cannot remain quiet under such circumstances; and without reckoning upon revolutionary movements, which may be fairly counted upon as the consequence of Russia being engaged in a contest in the East, we must expect that these hostilities will eventually involve all Europe.

Besides the note from Count Nesselrode, and my answer, I enclose the copy of the answer from the Austrian minister.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 172. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Vienna, 4th Oct., 1822.

I have received your despatch of the 24th September, marked separate, and the two boxes containing the Austrian securities for the loans made in England.

I have already taken an opportunity of speaking to the Emperor of Austria and to Prince Metternich on this subject, and you may rely upon my utmost endeavour to bring it to a satisfactory termination before I shall quit Verona.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 173. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Vienna, 4th Oct., 1822.

I have had the honour of receiving your despatch of the 24th September, No. 1, in consequence of which I propose to set out from hence to-morrow for Verona by Venice.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Lord Hill.*

MY DEAR HILL,

Vienna, 5th Oct., 1822.

You are aware of the death of Lieutenant-General Oakes, late Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, and it will be a great satisfaction to me if you will allow me to recommend you to the King to fill that office. I know that it will be satisfactory to his Majesty.

The office is worth about 1500*l.* per annum; but the business is constant, and, I am afraid, will render necessary your residence in London during a great period of the year, probably the whole of it.

Be so good as to send your answer to my house in London, from whence it will be forwarded to me.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, Oct., 15th 1822.

I have not much to send to you to day, in the way of despatch: what little there is, I think rather favourable. The flagrant injustice of the Spanish tribunals in the West Indies helps us a step forward towards the inevitable consummation of Colonial independence as to Spanish America; and the declaration of that independence by Brazil, appears to me (as at present informed) to put Brazil at our mercy as to the continuance of the slave trade. I say, as at present informed, because I have no human being in Town with whom I can compare *unlearned* opinions upon that subject: and I have not yet had time to obtain a learned one since the intelligence arrived. I have summoned Sir Christopher for to-morrow.

In the absence of public topics of foreign policy, I have two private matters to mention to you, the first of which, I hope, will give you pleasure; and on the second of which you may perhaps give me some assistance.

First. I have laid before the King Lord Londonderry's notification of his wish to resign the embassy at Vienna; and have recommended your brother Henry as his successor; which recommendation his Majesty has been pleased "highly" to "approve." What are Lord Londonderry's intended movements?

Secondly. I write, or rather make Planta write, by this courier to Mr. Lamb, to offer him the place of under-secretary. The two persons to whom I felt myself bound to offer it, in the first and second instance, Lord Binning (who was to have come in with me in 1812) and Ward, having successively declined it (Ward only yesterday), I have had nothing more

at heart than to make use of it in such a way as, while I secured a creditable and efficient assistant to myself, should open a suitable mission for Lord Clanwilliam. (——'s resignation or removal I had ascertained to be wholly out of the question, except by an act of violence, with which it would have been singularly ungracious and unpleasant to begin one's official career. How could Lord Londonderry place such a man in such a situation? He is utterly immovable: having the best mission abroad, and the best office at home, in full enjoyment together; and the latter precluding by its amount a diplomatic pension, which is one temptation to retreat, and by its very nature, a peerage, which is the only other.

I have very little personal acquaintance with Mr. Lamb: but I have a high opinion of his talents. His wishes I have not even the means of guessing: but some of his friends whom I have consulted, particularly Huskisson, thought the offer likely to be acceptable to him. The King, to whom I mentioned my intention some time ago, as eventual upon Ward's (who had then my proposal under consideration) declining, appeared to be pleased with it, on Lamb's account as well as on Lord Clanwilliam's. If I aimed amiss therefore, I have at least the countenance of better authority than my own.

Huskisson would willingly have conveyed my offer to Lamb: but I thought it better to send it drily, and officially through Planta: as, should it not be acceptable, I do not wish to have the air of having conferred, still less of having asked, a favour.

Lord Amherst is the new Governor-General;—is to be, I should say, for he will only be proposed to-morrow, and balloted for to-morrow se'nnight; but I have no doubt of the result; and the King has consented to approve the nomination.

The delay in making this choice has arisen from a desire to turn the Governor-Generalship to account in arrangements at home. The Speaker to India, Wynn to the chair—the Board of Control thus opened for Huskisson, or for some one who should have made an opening for Huskisson in return, would have been an arrangement of infinite value, for strength and efficiency and popularity in the House of Commons. It was defeated, after many trials, by an impediment (something like ——'s) in the second stage: an impediment, however, not inherent I really believe in the individual himself, but created and obstinately maintained by those who have the power to regulate or restrain his movements. It is a great disappointment, and misfortune. Of choices not leading to any good effect at home, I believe that which we have made to be the most unobjectionable.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 15th Oct., 1822.

The messenger whom I sent off on the 24th of September, immediately upon the receipt of the Marquess of Londonderry's despatches announcing

the intended departure of the Allied Sovereigns and their ministers for Verona, will, I trust, have reached Vienna very shortly after the date of your Grace's despatch announcing your arrival at that capital. It is therefore unnecessary to reply to the contents of that despatch, which in truth only anticipated the instructions of your government. I have nothing more to acknowledge from your Grace; and I have no new instructions to send you.

But I think it right to convey to your Grace, from time to time, every new occurrence or suggestion which tends either to confirm, or in any degree to change, the tenor of those instructions of which you are already in possession.

In reference to that part of my despatch No. 4, which treats of the affairs of Spanish America, I enclose to your Grace copies of intelligence which has been received since the date of that despatch, announcing—

1st. The extended and aggravated system of piracy prevailing in the South American Seas.

2nd. The condemnation by the Spanish authorities in Porto Rico of two British merchant ships on the ground of intercourse with the insurgent colonies.

It is needless to point out to your Grace how strongly these two facts in their different bearings corroborate the arguments which are stated in my despatch, No. 4, for not delaying indefinitely an understanding of a political nature with the new Colonial governments.

In the present situation of Spain with respect to her colonies, we suffer equally from the maintenance of her claim of sovereignty by herself, and from the violation of it by her lawless subjects.

By our determination to abstain from all interference in the internal struggles of Spain, we do not abandon our right to vindicate ourselves against its external violences.

It is no fault of ours if her convulsions at home so far paralyze her authority abroad as to make it powerless over her colonies and annoying to other nations.

It is enough for us to know that all application for redress to Spain herself is fruitless, and it ought to be satisfactory to Spain, and to be accepted by her as a proof of our forbearance, if we do not attribute to her as want of will that which may in fact be only want of power, and if we push no farther our just resentment for grievances unredressed than by taking the matter into our own hands and applying the remedy in those points only where we experience the evil.

In reference to my despatch, No. 7, on the subject of the slave trade, I have first to call your Grace's observation to a despatch from Sir Charles Stuart (duplicate of which his Excellency will have transmitted to you) containing the welcome information that M. Gallatin, the minister of the United States of America, has received orders from his government to urge the government of France to a more active and efficient cooperation in the measures for the repressing the illicit trade. This information is the more welcome, as after that which was last received from America (and which I have transmitted to your Grace in my despatch, No. 7) I had nearly foregone all expectations of any active interference of the United States on this subject. Mr. G. is not now instructed to cooperate with

Sir C. Stuart in representation and remonstrance, but I am by no means sure that the absence of this cooperation will be prejudicial to the cause, provided that the separate urgency of the American government is sincere and earnest.

The jealousy of our interposition is too plainly a ruling motive of that obstinacy with which France has hitherto resisted all appeals to her justice and consistency.

Another event, less unforeseen but not less favourable to the cause of the abolition, has occurred in the declaration of independence by the Prince Regent of the Brazils. Whatever may be the political effect of this step in reference to general politics and to the importance of Portugal in the scale of European nations, it takes from Portugal all pretence for lending its flag to a trade henceforth carried on by and for the behoof of colonies which have renounced their allegiance. And it places Brazil in the condition of having to solicit from other nations a recognition to which may be annexed what condition those nations may think fit, and specifically, a renunciation of the slave trade; a renunciation of which all the revolted states of South America have set the example.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 15th October, 1822.

Mr. Wilberforce has put into my hands the enclosed pamphlet and the accompanying Memorandum relating to the situation and alleged sufferings of the Waldenses or Vaudois in the dominions of the King of Sardinia.

I transmit a copy thereof to his Majesty's minister at the Court of Turin, with directions to inquire into the state of the facts, and if he shall find them to be true as here stated, to make representations upon them to the Piedmontese government, communicating to your Grace the result of such inquiry and representations.

In the event of its appearing to your Grace that there is cause of complaint against the government of his Sardinian Majesty for any grievances inflicted upon these harmless and meritorious people, your Grace will avail yourself of the opportunity which the presence of his Sardinian Majesty's ministers at Verona will afford, to express the interest which his Majesty takes in the welfare of this Protestant community, and to endeavour to obtain such an assurance for their future good treatment, for toleration of their worship, and respect for their privileges, as the British government has in former times thought it their right and duty to require.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

[EXTRACT.]

14th Oct., 1822.

"Notwithstanding their (the Waldenses or Vandois) having, I am positively assured, acted fairly against the French in the last war (especially assisting the Russians when in that country), yet when the French came into Piedmont they felt the benefit of being under more liberal religionists; and they suffered much from an Edict of the Court of Turin, passed immediately on its restoration, replacing all things generally on the footing on which they had been prior to the French occupation. This, however, though sometimes complained of, was, I must say, very natural. But I am assured from several quarters that they are still treated very harshly, being not only debarred from rising above the rank of subalterns in the military profession, and from all lucrative or honourable civil offices, but prohibited from keeping a school, which they had set up (I am told by the Prussian Plenipotentiary) on a new plan of mutual instruction; not allowed to print their own books, while those they import are taxed heavily; not allowed to found a hospital for their sick, in the hope of their being forced into the Roman Catholic hospitals; and compelled to keep the Roman Catholic festival-days and ceremonies. They complain grievously also of continual molestation from attempts to proselytise them.

"My object in applying to you is to interest you on their behalf, and to obtain for them the countenance and interest of this country with the Court of Turin at the ensuing congress. The very circumstance of your showing that the British negotiator recognised them as old friends, and that the Court of St. James's took an interest in their well-being, would of itself be highly serviceable to them."

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 15th Oct., 1822.

Sir John Coxe Hippisley has entrusted to my charge divers documents and publications touching the present state and presumed views of the revived order of the Jesuits; the whole of which, with the exception of two folio volumes, are transmitted to your Grace by this conveyance.

The names of the books are noted in the margin;\* and it is supposed that if a reference to them should be necessary, they may be procured at Verona, or from Vienna.

Sir John has reason to apprehend that the concerns of this spiritual community are likely to be brought under the deliberation of the Congress.

It is not intended that your Grace should originate such deliberation, nor make yourself party to any measures to be taken in consequence of it, within the dominions of other Powers. But in the event of its being brought forward, your Grace will not discourage any measures which the Allies may think necessary to curb the intriguing spirit, and repress the dangerous designs, attributed to this active and aspiring religious fraternity.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

\* 'Dodd's Church History,' from the year 1500 to 1688.



## [ENCLOSURE.]

## I.

EXTRACT of a Letter from the Rev. P. MACPHERSON, Rector of the Scots' College in Rome.

MY DEAR SIR,

Rome, 12th July, 1822.

I have again the honour of addressing you from the eternal city. I reached it on Monday morning, the first of this month, I thank God, in good health. The only inconvenience I suffered was from the heat. No one remembers such hot weather so early in the season.

On my arrival I waited on Cardinal Consalvi, to deliver some papers entrusted to me for him at Paris and Milan. I informed him of the conversation we had with Lord Londonderry concerning the Roman College. He appeared not to dislike it. He said the Jesuitical Cardinals are doing all they can to get that University restored to the Jesuits; but nothing hitherto has been decided, and it is pretty sure nothing will during this Pope's lifetime. Since the death of good Cardinal Fontana, Consalvi himself acts as Prefect of Propaganda. He says it will only be for a short time. We all wish him to continue long in that office. Lately there was a question agitated at Propaganda which did no honour to the Society. I think I told you I left Dr. Marshall, Archbishop of Baltimore, in Rome. The chief motive of his journey was to complain of those good fathers. The subject was this: Lord Baltimore, in settling the *Jesuits in Maryland*, gave them two large farms. They have purchased much more since. One of these farms was by his Lordship intended for the support of a church. At the suppression of the order all their property devolved on their respective bishops. Soon, therefore, Dr. Carroll, an ex-Jesuit, was named Bishop of Baltimore. Between them it was agreed that he should have yearly 1000 dollars, and they keep possession of the farm. This sum they regularly paid to Carroll and to his successor, who likewise was an ex-Jesuit; on their restoration, and the appointment of Dr. Marshall, they peremptorily refused to give him a farthing. Propaganda deputed three cardinals to examine the question, viz., Della Zinga, Fesch, and Castiglione. They strongly recommended to the general of the Jesuits that he should come to a private agreement with the Archbishop. After having taken some days to consider, the Friar persisted in his former opinion, and refused making any composition, in consequence of which he had a severe reproof from the Cardinals, and a decree sanctioned by the Pope was made, giving to Dr. Marshall and his successors in office one of the farms, which was all he asked. This has made some of their friends among the Cardinals see that the old leaven still continues to work in that body. I know not if you, Sir, are aware that there are about a dozen of young men from Stonyhurst with the Jesuits here, and receive holy orders as Jesuits.

NOTE.—Mr. Macpherson's conference by appointment of the late Marquis of Londonderry was on Monday, 3rd June, 1822, the substance of which was noted by me, and left in the hands of the Marquis. Mr. M. proceeded immediately afterwards on his return to Rome.

J. C. HIFFISLEY.

*The Rev. P. Macpherson to ———.*

Portsmouth, 26th May, 1812.

In consequence of your queries concerning Angelini, I send you the following particulars:—He was professed among the Jesuits before their suppression

in 1773. After that epoch he united himself with the Jesuits, still supported by Catherine in Russia. There he remained till, I think, 1801, when he was sent by his superior in Russia to transact some affairs at Rome; and was at this time Procurator-General of his Order. While he thus resided at Rome, the Queen of Naples requested strongly of the Pope to have the Jesuits restored to that kingdom. This at last was granted, and Angelini was deputed by his General in Russia to effect it. At the French invasion, which happened soon thereafter, Angelini, with many of his order, went to Sicily where he still resides, and enjoys, as I hear, much influence at Court.

During the time he remained in Rome, he had frequent interviews with H. H. Pius VII. In one of these our British clergy, who had been members of that Society before its suppression, pretend that the Pope was prevailed on to restore them in Britain *visu vocis oraculo*, and upon this they have acted ever since. When the two bishops understood such pretensions being acted upon, they applied to Rome for the truth of them. Cardinal Borgia, then Prefect of Propaganda, informed them officially that the Pope neither knew of, nor acknowledged any Jesuit as such out of the Russian and Neapolitan dominions.

P. MACPHERSON.

Mr. M. arrived safely at Rome . . . 1813, after having been arrested for some days at Paris.

REV. P. MACPHERSON, Rector of the Scots' College at Rome, to  
Sir J. C. HIPPLISLEY.

MY DEAR SIR,

Rome, 5th Feb., 1818.

In answer to your inquiry concerning the abbays this Scotch College possessed in the kingdom of Naples, I beg leave to state that they were made over to the College in 1600 by Pope Clement VIII., and peaceably enjoyed by it till the expulsion of the Jesuits from that kingdom in 1766. At this epoch the Jesuits held the administration of the aforesaid College, and the aforementioned two abbays, viz., that of St. Elias di Melicuccia, in Calabria ultra, and of St. Merino, of St. Agata dei Goti, were confiscated in the supposition of their being Jesuitical property. The then Cardinal Protector Gio Francesco Albini, the Scotch Bishop, and the Cardinals of Propaganda, remonstrated against this measure, and proved that the College, though under the administration of the Jesuits, did belong exclusively to the secular clergy of Scotland. Marchesi Tanucci, who was then Prime Minister in Naples, offered to restore the abbays, provided the College was withdrawn from the management of the Jesuits; but the Pope Clement XIII. and the Protector were prevailed upon by those good fathers rather to sacrifice the interest of the College (that is, one-half of its certain income) than occasion them that mortification.

After the total suppression of the Society, some feeble efforts were made for the recovery of that property; but the Neapolitan Court, by throwing difficulties and delays in the way, kept possession until the re-establishment of the Jesuits in that kingdom in 1801. At that event Cardinal Erskine, the Scotch Protector, together with Cardinal Antonelli and Cardinal Borgia, advised me to write Angelini, the Superior of the Jesuits in that country, who was very powerful at the Court, to assist me with his advice and interest in recovering that property. Neither these eminent personages, as I then thought, nor I, could ever doubt of his hearty concurrence, considering the manner in which it had been lost, which at full length I explained to him. Father Angelini did not even condescend to return a written answer to my letter, though I told him I had written by orders of the above-mentioned Cardinals and of the Scotch

Bishops; he thought it was doing me full honour enough in desiring a Roman ex-Jesuit, Padre Romano, to inform me that his Sicilian Majesty was graciously pleased to assign these abbeys to the support of the Society. My astonishment at so base an action was inexpressible; but the Cardinals I have mentioned told me they expected no better from such men.

The French invasion did not allow F. Angelini nor his brethren to enjoy long the fruit of iniquity; but at the same time they put an almost insurmountable bar in the way of the College. At present these abbeys are conferred on a Neapolitan priest, a favourite of the King; and there can be little expectation of their reverting ever to the College unless the British Minister be authorised to claim them, as our Ambassadors in Paris and Madrid were relatively to the property belonging to our establishment there.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

P. MACPHERSON.

NOTE.—Although Pius VII. was disposed to acknowledge the re-establishment of the Jesuits in Russia and Sicily, Pius VI. disavowed any assent to their re-establishment in Russia.

*Vide* 'Diario Roma,' 11 Sept. 23rd Oct., 1799, a paper printed under the authority of the Cardinal Secretary of State.

It is well known that the object of the Queen of Naples in obtaining the restoration of the order in Sicily, was to endeavour, by means of the Jesuits, to effect, if possible, a counter revolution.

While the Jesuits of England consider themselves organised *viva vocis oraculo* (as they contend) of the present Pope, they are necessarily subject to the government of their General, who is a native of and resident in a State at war with Great Britain. To the General of the Order they swear obedience.

## II.

*Sir J. C. Hippisley to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

NOTES respecting the Proceedings of the English Jesuits, &c.

30th Sept., 1822.

The following notes are hastily drawn up as a summary of reference to the efforts of the Society to establish themselves as a regular monastic order within the British realm, and also to obtain the direction of the National seminaries of education on the continent.

It must be recollected that, from the instructions communicated to his Majesty's Diplomatic Ministers accredited at the several foreign Courts, as appears by the supplementary papers presented by command of the Prince Regent, and ordered to be printed on the 28th March, 1817, the following question was, in substance, introduced to each, viz.,—"What changes have taken place as to the monastic orders, and the control exercised over them by the State; and, particularly, what measures have been adopted respecting the revival of the order of Jesus?"

The official returns to the instructions were communicated from the States of Austria, Sardinia, Tuscany, Naples, France, the Brazils, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, Saxony, and Wurtemberg, and printed by order of both Houses of Parliament; and corresponding information has since been received from other Courts. With reference to the active spirit manifested by the Jesuits, even beyond the limits of Europe, since the period when these inquiries were

made by his Majesty's government, it should seem advantageous to renew them.

The efforts of the Jesuits to interfere with, and, in an essential object, to supersede the regulations established for the government of British mission of Roman Catholics, induced a remonstrance to be made to the see of Rome, on the part of the senior Apostolic Vicar (the late Bishop Gibson), in the year 1818, which, in the following year, produced also a communication to his Majesty's government, by the Roman Catholic Prelate (Bishop Poynter) officiating as Vicar-Apostolic in the southern or London district. To this communication, the Secretary of State (Viscount Sidmouth) for the Home Department informed Bishop Poynter that "his Royal Highness the Prince Regent and his Majesty's government had an insuperable objection to the establishment of the Jesuits within the realm."\*

This official intimation was conveyed by Bishop Poynter to the Cardinal Secretary of State at Rome, in reply to which the Pope directed a communication to be made to the effect, that the Jesuits would only be considered integrated as a monastic order in those States wherein the assent of the government had been obtained.† The observation thereupon made by the English Jesuits of Stonyhurst (where they are unquestionably aggregated as a regular monastic order) is to this effect, that by the several Acts of the late King, the Jesuits are legally tolerated, by name, as Jesuits, and the Papal Bull has universally and unequivocally revived the order. Uniformly acting in the spirit of this construction, the Jesuits, British subjects, both within the realm and upon the continent, maintain their original institute. They procure spiritual ordination for their élèves of Stonyhurst, "*titulo paupertatis religiosæ*," which exclusively attaches them to the order from which they derive their presentation; and as three of the English Apostolic Vicars have refused to confer spiritual ordination in these exclusive terms, the élèves of Stonyhurst are ordained by other Prelates, who have less scruple within the realm;‡ but the greater part of them have been sent for that purpose to Sicily and Rome. At present, many of the élèves of Stonyhurst are resident in the convent of Jesus.§

The only title to ordination properly recognised by the Apostolic Vicars, is that of *Titulum Missionis*, which subjects those ordained to the control of the mission, where a recognised hierarchy of bishops-ordinaries exists (as that of Ireland is so considered by the See of Rome). Titles of ordination are derived from specific parishes, &c., as in the Established Church.

Under this head it must be observed that a contest obtained between the Superior or Principal of the College of Stonyhurst and the late Apostolic Vicar of the northern district (in which Stonyhurst is situated) from the period of the general revival of the order to the present hour; but it is certain that Bishop Milner has thought himself warranted in ordaining Jesuits as such, and acted upon it, and so have certain prelates in Ireland.

It is not proposed in this sketch to enter into the details of the measures adopted in Ireland heretofore respecting the establishment at Clengowas Wood.¶

\* The first communication was in writing, and was restrictive only to England; but a second intimation was made (also in writing) with a restriction to the whole of the realm.

† The correspondence will be found in the office of the Secretary of State (Home Department).

‡ Bishop Milner is the only Prelate in England who has ordained any Jesuit, and it does not appear that either of the Scotch V.V. A. have ordained any.

§ Vide Mr. Macpherson's letter, 13th July, 1822.

|| Bishop Gibson, died recently.

¶ Castle Brown, in Kildare, purchased some years since by the Jesuits.

Mr Secretary Peel, some years since (1813), stated in Parliament his communications with Mr. Kenney, at that time Principal of the new College in Ireland, and to whom a sum amounting to 30,000*l.*, more or less, had been remitted from Stonyhurst, and not denied by Mr. Kenney. The application of this money is discoverable in the newly-erected College in the county of Kildare (16,000*l.* was paid for the ground), and the remonstrances made on that subject by the late Primate Stuart\* to the Irish government are well known. Mr. Secretary Peel's statement is detailed in 'Hansard's Debates.' †

The extraordinary proceeding of the Jesuits at Stonyhurst, which took place in the year 1813, and of which the majority of the British Roman Catholic Prelates were unapprised, may, upon this occasion, be adverted to. The Papal Bull 'Sollicitudo,' for the revival of the order of Jesuits, is dated 7th August 1814; but it has recently been discovered that a correspondence took place between the Principal of the College of Stonyhurst (then considered as a mere seminary of secular priests under the control of the National Roman Catholic Prelates) and the General of the Jesuits in Russia, where the order, as in Sicily, had been partially revived by a special pontifical rescript. The Cardinal Sevaroli, the Apostolic Nuncio at Vienna, was at that time, and during the latter period of the Pope's imprisonment, invested with plenary pontifical powers; and at length the Jesuits of Stonyhurst, by the instrumentality of their immediate superior, Mr. C. Plowden, and the Russian General of the Order, obtained a pontifical rescript to integrate themselves as Jesuits in the year preceding the publication of the Bull of general restoration, the Bull itself being a very unexpected measure, and originating at the particular instances of the late Kings of Spain and Sardinia (as avowed by the Pope to the compiler of this summary), the latter of whom actually became himself a member of the order, and died at the noviciate of the Jesuits in Rome. The partial rescript thus obtained by the English Jesuits is dated at Vienna, 24th December, 1813; and an authenticated notarial copy was transmitted from Petersburg. The date of the general Bull, 'Sollicitudo,' is of the 7th August, 1814. The whole of this proceeding was conducted with the greatest secrecy by Mr. Plowden, the late Principal of Stonyhurst, who was thereupon recognised as the provincial of the English Jesuits, and styled such in the correspondence of the Grassi agent with the congregation of Propaganda Fide.

Copies of the correspondence and of the rescript accompany this statement. It is observable that the agent at Rome enjoins the necessity of keeping the majority of the English prelates (V. V. A.) in complete ignorance of the proceedings and the successful result, as they are represented to be inimical to the Jesuits, and may turn the object to the disadvantage of that Society, and, as is not very decorously insinuated, even to the injury of the see of Rome. Bishop Milner, the V. A. of the middle district (which contains fifteen English counties of very dense Roman Catholic population) is alone excepted; and it appears, by his conduct, that he has entered fully into the views of the revived Society, by announcing, at a triennial visitation of the clergy, its complete re-establishment in England, and himself conferring spiritual ordination on the élèves of Stonyhurst (though not within the district) *titulo paupertatis religiose*, thus detaching them from a dependence on the mission, under the authority of the apostolic vicars, and producing that insubordination and confusion of which the senior apostolic vicar (Dr. Gibson) complained to the see of Rome. The proceedings of the Society, as affecting the national institutions of the British seminaries, are detailed, with great candour, by the Roman Catholic

\* This fact is stated in a letter of the Primate to Sir J. C. H.

Historian, Dodd, a very interesting work, and of great credit; and the correspondence of Father Parsons, who contrived to wrest the government of all the national seminaries on the continent from the hands of the secular priests, is introduced, principally in the second volume \* of the History, under the title of 'Records of the Jesuits.' In that correspondence it will not escape observation that Father Parsons animadverts upon the indiscretion of the agent of the English Arch-Priest, Dr. Bashit, then at Rome, as having maintained that the deposing tenet was not "*de jure*," which opinion Father Parsons (being at the head of the English Jesuits) contends was very irregular to maintain, especially in Rome. These records are of considerable interest, as they manifest the steady and successful march of the Society in obtaining possession of all the British continental seminaries of education, and converting a great part of the funds to the aggrandisement of their exclusive order.

Influenced by similar principles are the proceedings of the revived Society at the present hour, and to remonstrate against them the Archbishop of Baltimore recently arrived from America at Rome. The circumstances are stated in the letter of Mr. Macpherson, Rector of the Scots' College at Rome, dated the 12th of July last; and a copy of another letter of Mr. Macpherson is annexed, to show that a similar conduct was held by the Society some years since, with reference to the Scots' College, which involved the defalcation of nearly half of the revenues of that seminary. In the instance of the claims of the Archbishop of Baltimore, it appears with what hardness this Society, in its second infancy, maintains itself in the face of the delegated cardinals at Rome, and how little disposed the new general of the order appears to conform himself even to the pointed authority of the see of Rome itself when opposed to the tortuous interests of his own institution. The communication noticed in Mr. Macpherson's letter of the 12th July last, to have been made by him to the Cardinal Secretary of State, of the subject of a conference with the late Marquis of Londonderry, relates to another effort of the revived Society, which in its possible result might be very injurious to the system of education in the national seminaries at Rome. The Roman College is the most considerable university of theological education; and before the abolition of the order of Jesuits, by Pope Clement XIV., had been placed under their exclusive guidance; since that period it has reverted to the original establishment, and the professors' chairs, twelve of which are appropriated to divinity, and seven to philosophy, &c., are very unexceptionably filled by secular priests. The Jesuits since their revival have been indefatigable to obtain possession of this university, and with it the influence necessarily attaching to the education of the clergy and laity to a great extent. The College of Sapienza (which is also a university) is chiefly appropriated to the canon-law.

In the conference with the late Marquis of Londonderry, by his own appointment, alluded to by Mr. Macpherson on the 2nd of June last—Mr. Macpherson being then on his return to Rome to resume his charge of the Scots' College—his Lordship entered very fully into the state of education obtaining in the national seminaries on the continent; and with reference to the Jesuits, the intimation made by Viscount Sidmouth, when holding the seals of the Home Department, to Bishop Poynter, before noticed, was also adverted to. The students of our several national seminaries, as well as those of other states at Rome, are in the practice of attending the lectures and of graduating at the Roman College; such a practice must be considered as little consonant with the intimation made to Bishop Poynter, and by him communicated to the Cardinal Secretary of State, if the several professors' chairs were filled by Jesuits.

\* As the work is now scarce, the two volumes are transmitted to Mr. Secretary Canning with these notes, &c.

The result of this conference was, that Mr. Macpherson was authorised to communicate to the Cardinal Secretary his Lordship's sentiments, as an individual Cabinet Minister, "that in the event of such a proposed transfer of the chairs of the Roman College, it would not be advisable to permit the attendance of the students of the national seminaries at the lectures of Jesuit professors; and, if persisted in, it might tend ultimately to some Parliamentary regulation, interdicting the exercise of the missionary functions, within the realm, of such persons who had thus graduated, or been thus educated." A Minute was made by Sir J. C. Hippisley (who, by the invitation of Lord Londonderry, was present at this conference) comprehending the outline of the discussion, which Minute was left in the hand of his Lordship; and on the same evening Mr. Macpherson proceeded on his return to Rome.

It may be proper here to notice that Mr. Macpherson, on the reform of the national seminaries at Rome, was appointed rector of the Scots' College. Mr. Macpherson also, in the year 1795, was recognised by the late Pope and by the Viceroy of Corsica, and the Commander of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean, as the organ of communication with the Roman government, with which the British Plenipotentiary at that time entertained frequent communication, and on which delegation he conducted himself greatly to the satisfaction of those authorities. In the year 1812 he was also engaged in a very perilous effort to liberate the Pope, then in confinement at Savona, having had previous conferences with Mr. Yorke, then at the head of the Admiralty, on that subject, who was disposed to give that collateral aid which could scarcely have failed of success under the relaxation of guard upon the Pope, of which, at that time, we had information. The Pope, however, was removed to Fontainebleau,\* while Mr. M. was in his progress to Savona, having been arrested and detained some days by the French government at Paris.

This summary will be no further extended, but a reference particularly to the second volume of the Records of the Jesuits, in 'Dodd's History,' will be of considerable moment when the proceedings of the Society appear to be so much in unison with their anterior conduct with reference to the usurpation of the government and revenues of the national seminaries, and when even their proceedings have excited no light sensation in many of the continental governments as may be collected from the edicts of exclusion, &c. At Fribourg very alarming discontents were occasioned by these proceedings, and a large body of the inhabitants threatened to emigrate, in consequence of the admission of the Jesuits being carried, in the Cantonal Council, by a small majority. In Sicily the conduct of the Society induced very strong appeals to the government, about two years since, on the part of the secular prelates and clergy.

Although the Jesuits have invariably exercised all their influence against the reception of the four articles of the Gallican Church, of the year 1682 (Mr. C. Plowden, the Principal of Stonyhurst, being since distinguished by his writings against those Articles, declaring them to be the deepest wounds which had been inflicted on the prerogatives of the Roman see), nevertheless, when the alternative was put to the Society by the Chancellor Lamoignon, to swear to maintain, in their schools, the integrity of those Articles, or be exiled, the Society acquiesced in the requisition of the oath; their writings, however, are not less marked with their dissent from those Articles; and a tract was published a few years since in London, by the Chanoine Le Pointe, a French Jesuit, in loud condemnation of them.

When it is evident from adverting to the authentic records of Father

\* For the purpose of wheedling him into a Concordatum suitable to the views of Napoleon.

Parsons to his adherents, as will be found in the second volume of 'Dodd,' the historian being himself a Roman Catholic, and his history considered of unimpeachable authority. We cannot but trace the uniform conduct of the Society to have been directed to the usurpation of the privileges of the anterior existing seminaries of public education, and to wrest from the legitimate hands in which they were placed, the funds of these establishments; and with immediate reference to our own national establishments, their efforts were but too seriously manifested in the reigns of Queen Elizabeth and her successors, to the period of the Revolution, when, with ceaseless efforts, they contrived to possess themselves, not only of the chairs of the universities, but of the confessions of nearly every sovereign of Europe in communion with Rome, and those of their wives, mistresses, and ministers.

With such evidence, and with the indication that the long sleepers seem at present to be awake, and, acting with all the energies of the giant refreshed, we may rationally expect that the British government will not be less active than the governments of other States in keeping a steady eye upon the proceedings of the revived Society.

2nd October, 1822.

The second volume of the 'Ecclesiastical History of Dodd' accompanies these notes, and the records of the Jesuits during the period comprehended in the transactions narrated in the second volume, will be found at the latter end of it, particularly the correspondence of Father Robert Parsons.

### III.

A.—*From the Principal of Stonyhurst to Cardinal Litta, Prefect of Propaganda Fide.*

Stonyhurst, 3 Luglio, 1818.

All' Eminenza del Cardinal Litta, Roma.

EMO. PADRE,

Il Padre Grassi mi ha ragguagliato con quanta premura la V. Ema. ha lavorato per alleggerire le nostre correnti difficoltà, e per assicurare l'assistenza del nostro minimo corpo auxiliare, nella causa della Santa Religione. La lettera dè 13 Feb., spedita a Monsig. Gibson, sarà sempre un monumento prezioso della di lei bontà per noi; la rievocazione di essa ci mette bensì in animo di prova, ma non accecherà mai, nulla del nostro invariabile rispetto e confidenza nella S. Sede. La V. Ema. mi permetterà di umiliarle il nostro comune ringraziamento per i favori già ricevuti, e di implorare per il tempo vengente la continuazione della sua protezione. In fatto, Emo. Padre, crederci che qualche cosa s'abbia da farsi per il nostro sollievo. Se i nostri Signori VV.AA. avessero senza rumore ubbiditi all'istruzione de 13 Feb. il nostro titolo di ordinazione non sarebbe mai venuto alla notizia del governo civile. Ma questi Rmi. Signori non sanno consentire che una qualche classe de' missionarj sia un po' meno di un'altra dipendente dalla loro autorità, e forsi la loro grande ripugnanza a favorirci sarà in parte venuta da quella gelosa rivalità che in tutti tempi ha guastato tante virtù da cento sessanta anni in qua ogni volta che si è intavolata qualche negoziazione col governo per ottenere il nebbiamo delle leggi penali, sempre vi è stata una fazione sacerdotale la quale voleva esclusi i Gesuiti dalla grazia comune. Nel caso presente pare che mirino questi signori a qualche cosa di più. Il Vicario Generale di Mgr. Gibson in uno suo librucciolo non vergogna di vendicar al Signor Vescovo tutti i nostri averi, come dovutigli in giustizia sua torto da noi posseduti. Al contrario Mgr. Milner nella sua triennale adunanza de' missionarj, tenuta, nel mese scaduto intimò loro, apertamente,



l'esistenza canonica della compagnia di Gesù in Inghilterra, e di là à pochi dì, ordinò subliaccone un nostro religioso, nato nel suo vicariato "titolo paupertatis relig." Se mi fosse permesso di sollecitar nuove grazie, la prima sarebbe, che mi fosse lecito di presentar i miei religiosi per gli ordini sacri a qualunque Vescovo, che vorrebbe imporre loro le mani tit. paup. con una dichiarazione che il nostro collegio è veramente Seminario Missionario, i cui allievi devono ubbidire al proprio superiore. Di questo si è ragionato distesamente nè memoriali già presentati a V. Ema. e se questa grazia è possibile la rimetto per i minuti dettagli al R. P. Grassi, frattanto mi rassegnò di V. Ema. il servitor umilissimo ed ubbidientissimo.

CARLO FLOWDEN, S.I.

NOTE.—By the Roman postmark, this letter of Clna. Plowden arrived 28th July. It was written in Italian, as above, by C. Plowden. The indorsement of the letter is in Galeassi's\* hand, and contains the following unfair abridgment of the letter for the consideration of the Congress of Propaganda:—†

"Anglia.—Il P. Plowden ringrazia S. Ema. e prega a continuare il patrocinio; li Vicarj Aptci. sono stati sempre contrarj ai Gesuiti per gelosia e per la minor dipendenza. Allegono il pretesto del governo che nuouono al bisogno. Il Vicario Thompson ha pubblicato che i beni de' Gesuiti spettano ai Vescovi, &c. Monsignore Milner ha pubblicato la legittima esistenza de Gesuiti e li ordina titolo paup. Vorrebbe il privilegio di far ordinare i suoi da qualunque vescovo tit. pau. e dichiarar quel collegio missa."

B.—*Father Grassi's Memorial presented to C. Litta, Prefect of Propaganda. Presented August, 1818.*

EMINENZA,

Il provinciale della Compagnia de Gesù in Inghilterra‡ umilmente il permesso di esporre qualmente il Rev. Sig. Abate Thompson, Vicario Generale di Monsig. Gibson, Vic. Apost. del Nord, con sua lettera degli 8 Luglio scorso dal parte del suo Vescovo della S. Congreg. re di Propaganda Fide, e di sua Santità gli intima che la Compagnia di Gesù non è ristabilita in‡ perciò tanto l'oratore che i suoi dipendenti debbono riguardarsi come preti secolari. Considerando l'oratore da una parte che la Compagnia di Gesù è stata canonicamente ristabilita e pel rescritto del 24 Dec., 1813, poi dalla Bolla Universale del 7 Agosto, 1814, senza la minima opposizione del Governo anzi sotto la salvaguardia dell'atto del Parlamento del 1778, autorizante i Gesuiti nominalmente ad esercitare in Inghilterra i loro ministerj al pare d'ogni altro sacerdote Cattolico, per cui Mgr. Milner uno dei 4 Vicarj Apost. d'Inghilterra, come pure i RR. Vescovi d'Irlanda considerano la Compagnia di Gesù ivi ristabilita, e riflettendo dall'altra parte che una simile intima di dover gli individui di Stonyhurst esser considerati come preti secolari si oppone direttamente allo stato religioso in cui sono legalmente, prega l'Ema. Vostra a considerare che senza opportuno provvedimento da contestata S. Congre. un tale attentato produrrà senza dubbio alcuno l'irreparabile mina del Collegio di Stonyhurst, ove si allevano nella pietà e nello lettere 240 convittori Cattolici, non potendo egli ne per coscienza ne per autorità fare che i suoi sudditi segguano uno stato diverso da quello a cui sono per voto obbligate. Affidato pertanto l'oratore al noto zelo di V. Ema. per le missioni e per la cattolica educazione della gioventù,

\* Galeassi, senior ufficiale of Propaganda Fide.

† This note is annexed to the original copy transmitted from Rome.

‡ These blanks in the original copy. It does not seem that any word is omitted in the first, and in the second, Inghilterra should seem to be the word deficient.

osa supplicarla che si degni prendere in esame, se l'intima sopradetta sia conforme al volere di cotesta S. Congreg., e in caso negativo di darne notizia a Mgr. Gibson.

2. Che si degni di dichiarare se le professioni solenni e i voti religiosi fatti sull'autorità d'un rescritto pontificio e sulla pubblica fede d'una Bolla universale sieno o possano essere annullati dall'intima sopramento. Il caso essendo urgentissimo l'oratore osa sollecitare colle più vive istanze la grazia affinché sappiano ancora se possano ammettere nel proviziato varj giovani che lo domandano, i quali poi se non saranno Gesuiti non saranno nemmeno preti secolari, &c.

A nome del dto. P. Provinciale. Il Padre GIOVANNI GRASSI,\* della Compagnia di Gesù.

*Copia e Traduzione.*

Paragrafo della lettera scritta li 8 Luglio, 1818, dal Rev. Sig. Ab. Thompson, Vic. Gen. di Mgr. Gibson, Vic. Apost. del distretto del Nord in Inghilterra, al P. Carlo Plowden, Provinciale de' Gesuiti.

REV. E CARMO. SIG.,

Durham, li 8 Luglio, 1818.

Mi è stato commendato dal Vescovo d'informarvi in suo nome, e della S. Congre. di Propaganda Fide e di San Santità, ed io colla presente vi informo per soddisfazione dell'animo vostro, e de' Signori di Stonyhurst, i quali in ciò fossero interessati, a quali voi farete parte di questa comunicazione affine di togliere ogni dubbio seppure qualche dubbio vi può essere, e per mettere tutto in chiaro, che l'ordine della Compagnia di Gesù non è ristabilito, e che conseguentemente Voi non dovete riguardare voi medesimi sott'altro punto di vista, se non come preti secolari.

*Osservazioni, by Father Grassi.*

La proposizione "l'ordine della Compagnia di Gesù non è ristabilito," presa nella generalità con cui viene espressa, è certamente falsa. Potete ben dire (si così gli piace) che Monsignore Gibson (V. A. of the northern district) non riguarderà quei di Stonyhurst come preti secolari, ma come può egli obbligare i medesimi a considerarsi per tali, mentre in foro interno vi possono essere altri impegni contratti colla dovuta autorità? Il Rescritto Pontificio dei 24 Dec. quando anche non vi fosse la Bolla dei 7 Agosto, 1814, bastarebbe a nostri; ma come questo fu ottenuto in tempi assai critici non è stato comunicato ad altro Vic. Apost. fuor che a Monsignore Milner, perchè gli altri 3 RR.VV.AA. indisposti contro i Gesuiti potessero abusare a danno de' medesimi, e anche alla Santa Sede.† Il P. Prov. scrive che non ha guari a Milord Castlereagh fu detto da Monsignore Butler "voi avete atteso il Papa dal riconoscere i Gesuiti in Inghilterra." Milord Castlereagh non intese al principio ciò che gli era stato detto, la domanda esserlo spiegata. Milord rispose "Se altro danno non ha fatto rimonstranza alcuna a Roma sopra questo soggetto. Così il Padre Plowden nella sua del 13 Luglio, 1818.

P. GRASSI, S.I.

NOTA.—All'occasione dell'adunanza triennale del clero del distretto de mezzo ove Monsig. Milner è Vic. Apost. tenuta non ha guari, fu dal medesimo prelado

\* Father Grassi was sometime a teacher in the College of Stonyhurst, and is agent of the Principal (now recognised as Prov. of English Jesuits) at Stonyhurst. Grassi is by birth a Piedmontese, and recently appointed Provincial of the American Jesuits.

† This insinuation seems somewhat ungracious with reference to the majority of the British R.C. Prelates.

annunziato al clero l'esistenza canonica della Compagnia di Gesù in Inghilterra e pochi giorni dopo ordinò al subdiacono il Padre Giacomo King titolo paupertatis; l'ordinando era del destretto del mezzo. Ecco dunque pubblicato da un Vescovo la ripristinazione della Compagnia in Inghilterra. Se ne forse il Governo offeso ha fatto forse de' lamenti à Roma come pure al solo comparire della Bolla fece il Re di Portogallo. Si è forse excitata una persecuzione contro la religione Cattolica, come gli avversarj a Gesuiti han cercato, e cercano di far credere che avrebbe se i Gesuiti fossero ristabiliti. Eppure si vuol credere che il Governo non può soffrire i Gesuiti.

C.—Rescript of the Nuncio Sevaroli, Archbishop of Viterbo, dated Vienna.

BEATISSIME PATER,

Attenta difficultate Illorum et Rev. Vicariorum Apostolicum in Anglià, Hibernia, America, at que insulis Archipelagi eos Sacerdotes aut Clericos, qui ex benignitate Apostolica sub obedientia propositi Generalis Societatis Jesu, ejusdem Societatis Institutum profitentes in veste Presbyterorum secularium aut proprii ordinis ibi degunt habendi tanquam Regulares prefate Societatis Alumnos eo quod Apostolicum hac super re beneplacitum illis non innotescat. Prepositus Generalis ejusdem Societatis ea qua par est humilitate ac reverentia supplicat Sanctitati Suae ut declaratio dignetur Prefatis Illis, et R. Rmis. Vicariis Apts Clericos ac Sacerdotes supradescriptos ita ad Societatem Jesu pertinere, ut primi promoveri possint ad ordines sacros titulo paupertatis, ceteri vero in privilegiis, omnibus ibi gaudeant quibus gaudent Socii in Russia existentes. Auctoritate Apostolica à S. S. Domino nostro Pio P. P. VII., nobis specialiter tributa, sub die 10 Novembris, 1813, declaramus Sacerdotes et Clericos de quibus in precibus ita pertinere ad Societatem Jesu, ut isti titulo paupertatis ad sacros ordines, servatis servandis, possint admitti, in vero in regionibus ubi modo ex Apostolica benignitate degunt iisdem privilegiis fruantur quibus gaudent alumni Societatis Jesu in Russia.

A. G. Archiepus. Epus. Viterbii Ap. de .  
JOAN. BAPT. BRAZZI, S. Apl. Nunt. Procancelarius.

Vendibonae Ex. Aedibus S. Ap.  
Nuntiab. 24 Dec., 1813.

Fidem facio descriptum hoc exemplum suo authentico quod vidi et legi, in omnibus esse conforme.—Petropli hac die 12 Jan. 1814.

ANTONICUS LUCKMAN VON MÜLTYEN,  
Notas Apcus.

The preceding manuscripts, A. B. C., are faithfully copied from the original copy received by me.

J. C. HIPPISLEY.

Cardinal Sevaroli, then Nuncio at Vienna, during the latter period of the Pope's imprisonment in France, was invested by his Holiness with plenary pontifical powers.

It will be observed that the negotiation of Mr. C. Plowden, the Principal of the College of Stonyhurst, was by the instrumentality of the General of the Jesuits, then residing at Petersburg; and a circumstance not the least worthy of remark is that a pontifical authority for the complete re-establishment of the Society of Jesuits should have been obtained by the Jesuits of Stonyhurst anterior to the revival of the Order by the General Bull of P. Pius VII., which

revival was considered by the majority of the States of Europe as a very unexpected event. The date of the *General Bull* "*Sollicitudo*" is of the 7th August, 1814; that of the *Rescript* in favour of the Society of Stonyhurst (and through them by the Jesuits of all the *British dominions*) is of the 24th Dec., 1813.

*W. R. Hamilton, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Naples, 15th Oct., 1822.

This being the day of the Austrian Courier, dispatched direct to Verona, I do not like to lose the opportunity of writing to your Grace, though I have literally nothing to add to my acknowledgments for your private letter of the 2nd inst. No later intelligence has reached us from the East of the hostilities proceeding in that quarter than what I mentioned in my last. Sir Thomas Maitland was at Malta by the last accounts. Sir Graham Moore is at Rome; his ship at anchor in the port of Baia. Captain Clifford, with the *Euryalus*, is here. I am told that two Spaniards (Royalists) are here, and that they had some communication with the King on his road. As the result of their mission must depend on what may be resolved on at Verona, and as their residence here, if the report should be true, can have no political consequence, independent of the measures taken at Congress, I have not thought it advisable to make any particular inquiries, or to show any extraordinary curiosity upon the subject.

I have the honour to be,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

W. R. HAMILTON.

*To Prince Metternich. [Also to Count Nesselrode and Count Bernstorff.] [ 175. ]*

MON PRINCE,

Verona, 16th Oct., 1822.

I have a letter to his Majesty the Emperor [the King] from the King my master, of which I enclose your Highness [you] a copy; and I request your Highness [your Excellency] to make known to me the pleasure of his Imperial Majesty [his Majesty] regarding the time at which he will receive this letter.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The King to the Emperor of Austria. [Also to the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia.]*

SIR, MY BROTHER,

Carlton Palace, 14th Sept., 1822.

Having judged it expedient, under the present circumstances, to accredit to your Majesty Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, Master-General of

the Ordinance of my United Kingdom, a Member of my most Honourable Privy Council, a Peer of Parliament, Knight of the most noble Order of the Garter, and of various other illustrious Orders, charged with an Extraordinary Mission to your \* Majesty, I feel confident, considering the experience I have had of his talents and zeal for my service, that he will render himself perfectly agreeable to your † Majesty, by showing himself worthy of this new proof of my confidence.

I request your ‡ Majesty to give entire credence to all that he shall say to you on my part, more especially when he shall reiterate to your Majesty the assurance of my sincere esteem and affection for your person, and of my ardent desire to cement more and more the union and good intelligence which have so long and so happily subsisted between us.

With the most invariable sentiments of friendship and affection,

I am, Sir my Brother, your Majesty's good Brother,

GEORGE R.

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MEMORANDUM ON RUSSIAN UKASE OF 1821.

*To Count Nesselrode.*

Verona, 17th Oct., 1822.

In the month of September, 1821, his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia issued an ukase asserting the existence in the Crown of Russia of an exclusive right of sovereignty in the countries extending from Behring's Straits to the 51st degree of north latitude on the west coast of America, and to the 45th degree of north latitude on the opposite coast of Asia; and, as a qualified exercise of that right of sovereignty, prohibiting all foreign vessels from approaching within one hundred Italian miles of those coasts.

After this ukase had been submitted by the King's government to those legal authorities whose duty it is to advise his Majesty on such matters, a note was addressed by the late Marquis of Londonderry to Count Lieven, the Russian ambassador, protesting against the enactments of this ukase, and requesting such amicable explanations as might tend to reconcile the pretensions of Russia in that quarter of the globe with the just rights of his Majesty's Crown and the interests of his subjects.

We object first to the claim of sovereignty as set forth in this ukase; and secondly, to the mode in which it is exercised.

\* Imperial in the letters to the Emperors of Austria and Russia.

† Idem.

‡ Idem.

The best writers on the laws of nations do not attribute the exclusive sovereignty, particularly of continents, to those who have first discovered them; and although we might on good grounds dispute with Russia the priority of discovery of these continents, we contend that the much more easily proved, more conclusive, and more certain title of occupation and use ought to decide the claim of sovereignty.

Now, we can prove that the English North-West Company and the Hudson's Bay Company have for many years established forts and other trading stations in a country called New Caledonia, situated to the west of a range of mountains called Rocky Mountains, and extending along the shores of the Pacific Ocean from latitude  $49^{\circ}$  to latitude  $60^{\circ}$ .

This company likewise possess factories and other establishments on Mackenzie's river, which falls into the Frazer river as far north as latitude  $66^{\circ} 30'$ , from whence they carry on trade with the Indians inhabiting the countries to the west of that river, and who, from the nature of the country, can communicate with Mackenzie's river with more facility than they can with the posts in New Caledonia. Thus, in opposition to the claims founded on discovery, the priority of which, however, we conceive we might fairly dispute, we have the indisputable claim of occupancy and use for a series of years, which all the best writers on the laws of nations admit is the best founded claim for territory of this description. Objecting, as we do, to this claim of exclusive sovereignty on the part of Russia, I might save myself the trouble of discussing the particular mode of its exercise as set forth in this ukase. But we object to the sovereignty proposed to be exercised under this ukase not less than we do to the claim of it. We cannot admit the right of any Power possessing the sovereignty of a country to exclude the vessels of others from the seas on its coasts to the distance of one hundred Italian miles. We must object likewise to the arrangements contained in the said ukase conveying to private merchant-ships the right to search in time of peace, &c. &c., which are quite contrary to the laws and usages of nations and to the practice of modern times.

WELLINGTON.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 17th Oct., 1822.

The Count de Goltz, his Prussian Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at this court, died on Saturday last.

The funeral ceremony took place on Tuesday. I regret to inform you that all the Catholic members of the Corps Diplomatique declined to attend upon that occasion, alleging that they do not feel themselves at liberty to assist at any religious ceremony of the Protestant Church.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 17th Oct., 1822.

In answer to the representation addressed to M. de Villèle respecting the outrage committed upon his Majesty's ships in the River Bonny by three French vessels engaged in the slave trade, and of which the copy was enclosed in my despatch, I have received a letter from that minister containing arguments which tend rather to prove that the French government are disposed to use their utmost endeavours to suppress this traffic than to promise any satisfaction for the insult offered to his Majesty's flag which is not awarded by the tribunals. The desire to adhere to the letter of my instructions induces me to wait until I receive further directions of his Majesty's government before I draw out a reply.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 17th Oct., 1822.

An Austrian courier from Madrid arrived yesterday, by which opportunity the French ministers have received accounts of the debates in the first sitting of the extraordinary Cortes.

I saw M. de Villèle in the evening, who read to me the communications of the French minister; and after observing that the speeches of the minister for the War Department, of M. Isturiz, and of M. Canga Arguelles, are the evident expression of the sentiments entertained by the leaders of the revolutionary party throughout Europe, he told me that they confirmed the opinion he had always entertained, that the assembly of the extraordinary Cortes must be followed by a declaration of war against France.

He lamented the attempts of the Allied courts to ascertain whether a change can be brought about in Spanish affairs through foreign interference; since he doubted if any system could be devised to render that interference effectual; for though the insurgent authorities established at Urgel have pressed for the interference of other powers, through their own agents, and

through the numerous inhabitants of the south of France with whom they have communicated, he thinks that all measures supported by such a connection must fail; because the insurgents are in every respect unequal to the task they have undertaken; for that, notwithstanding their high tone, a careful examination of their demands has shown them to be absolutely in want of everything, and utterly unable to resist the present government: that, in the expectation of a war between France and Spain, they have embarked in hostilities with a view to get possession of the government through the aid of France, in case the Spaniards should be unsuccessful; while, in the contrary alternative, they are sure of obtaining a refuge by crossing the frontier: that he is determined they shall not embarrass the question between the two governments: that the conduct of the Spanish ministers has simplified their discussions with France, which are not connected with any project of dictating changes in that country: that although they knew the French government was desirous to avoid a quarrel, they had taken advantage of every opportunity to heap insults upon the King of France: that great reverses, followed by two military occupations, render the nation extremely susceptible of such humiliation; and if, as he expects, an hostile declaration shall be the result of the present discussions in the Cortes, that the necessity of maintaining his dignity will induce his Most Christian Majesty to employ the whole force at his disposal to resist any attack upon the frontier: that, though he believes there are a sufficient number of troops for that purpose on the first line, they may be reinforced from the second and third line, if there is any reason to doubt of success.

Though the ostensible object of the war will be reduced to this quarrel, M. de Villèle said it must not be understood that the French ministers are indifferent to the opinion of the Allied sovereigns upon such a subject, for he could assure me that all their communications at Verona show their desire to prove the purity of their intentions, and to remove every obstacle to the manifestation of the opinions which the Congress entertain upon this question.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 17th Oct., 1822.

The King of France has experienced a gouty affection on his hand during the last three days.

H. R. H. the Duchess d'Angoulême has been more seriously indisposed by a repetition of the attacks under which she suffered in the early part of last summer.

The 'Moniteur' of this day contains an ordonnance regulating the appointment of the judicature throughout the kingdom.

Since the declining health of M. de Corbière has rendered the continuance of that minister in office extremely doubtful, the difficulty of replacing him by a minister who will be agreeable to the violent party has induced M. de Villèle to cast his eyes upon M. de Chabrol, the Director-General of the



Domains, as a person who will be acceptable to every one. I fear, however, that if this arrangement does not make room for M. de Chateaubriand, who has long aspired to a seat in the cabinet, it will be difficult to induce the friends of that gentleman to view it with a favourable eye.

All other political changes appear to be deferred until the meeting of the Chambers and the return of M. de Blacas.

The government are in the mean time occupied by various speculations calculated to maintain their majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

At the time M. de Villèle offered the embassy of Constantinople to M. Hyde de Neuville, he requested that gentleman to abandon his pretensions to the representation of the department of the Nièvre, in favour of M. Marchangy.

The government have discovered that the estates upon which General Lafayette has hitherto paid the taxes which constitute his qualification belong to his children; and as a year must elapse before this irregularity can be remedied, he will not be able to appear as a candidate in the approaching elections. The Côté Gauche feel that they have been so deeply committed by the imprudence of that deputy during the late trials, that it is very doubtful if they will be anxious to remove the obstacles to his re-election in future.

The Garde des Sceaux has returned an answer to the deputies who have manifested the desire to proceed against the Procureur du Roi at Poitiers in the Court of Cassation, observing that the course they propose to pursue is irregular; that, although other legal measures may be pursued, he does not feel himself called upon to give any directions for their guidance. If, as is probable, this insinuation intimates the expediency of a recourse to the Council of State, the legality of the Garde des Sceaux' opinion may be called in question, for although the Council of State can alone authorize proceedings against public functionaries in other departments of the government, it is generally thought that the prosecution of the members of the judicature must commence in the Court of Cassation.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 18th Oct., 1822.

Your Grace's despatches, to No. 8. inclusive, were received here yesterday and have been laid before the King.

It is almost unnecessary to say, that his Majesty entirely approves of your Grace's resolution to exercise the discretion confided to your Grace in my despatch No. 1. by following the Allied sovereigns to Verona.

I enclose for your Grace's information copies of despatches which I address to day by his Majesty's command, the one to his Majesty's minister at Madrid, the other to his chargé d'affaires at Lisbon.

I am, with great respect, my Lord,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Sir William A'Court.*

SIR,

Foreign Office, 18th Oct., 1822.

You will have found, among the correspondence of his Majesty's mission at Madrid, a despatch from the Marquis of Londonderry to Mr. Hervey, dated the 19th of July last, relating to the condemnation in the courts of Porto Rico, of a British merchant vessel, the *Lord Collingwood*, which was captured in the West Indian seas, by the royal Spanish Privateer *Panchita*.

A copy of the sentence of condemnation was communicated to Lord Londonderry by the owner of the captured vessel: upon which his Lordship lost no time in addressing to Mr. Hervey the despatch to which I refer you; instructing him to represent to the Spanish government the utter illegality of that sentence, and the enormity of the injury done thereby, as well to the national honour, as to the commercial interests of this country; and to demand, in behalf of both, immediate redress and reparation.

Mr. Hervey had, previously to the receipt of this despatch, presented a note to the Spanish Secretary of State, on hearing of the capture of the *Lord Collingwood*; and had received an answer promising that immediate inquiry should be made at Porto Rico into the circumstances of the case, with a view to enable the Spanish government to take such measures there-upon as might be "conformable to justice."

This promise of inquiry on the part of the Spanish government was dated on the 16th of July. It appears that the condemnation of the *Lord Collingwood* had actually taken place on the 22nd of the preceding December.

Upon the receipt of Lord Londonderry's instruction of the 19th of July, Mr. Hervey repeated his remonstrances to the Spanish Secretary of State, in a note bearing date the 14th of August, to which, as yet, no answer has been given.

In this state of things, I have received his Majesty's commands, to direct you instantly to renew the remonstrances made by Mr. Hervey, on this outrageous case of illegal capture and condemnation. The particulars of the case, and an exposition of the principles upon which redress is claimed for it, you will find in the correspondence to which I have referred you. I therefore do not repeat them here. But in bringing them once more under the notice of the Spanish minister, I am to direct you to make this renewed demand for redress and reparation, in a tone which shall preclude delay and elicit a categorical answer.

We have been trifled with too long by the Spanish government in matters so vitally important.

The archives of your mission contain a long list of similar grievances sometimes justified or palliated by the Spanish ministers, sometimes admitted and regretted, but in no instance satisfactorily redressed. It is difficult to say whether the enumeration of such a catalogue of injuries, committed against the subjects of a friendly power, is more discreditable to the government which has inflicted or connived at them, than it would be to that which, after exhausting every amicable effort to obtain justice, should continue patiently to submit to the denial of it. The period is arrived when such submission must cease.

You are instructed to require atonement specifically in the case of the *Lord Collingwood*, not as abandoning our claim to redress in the other numerous and flagrant instances of unjust capture, and of commercial oppression, which have been brought under the notice of the Spanish government for the last six years; but because, by singling out a particular case, the circumstances of which are recent in memory, and familiar from repeated discussion, you will bring more directly to a test the disposition of the Spanish ministers, and preclude those references to authorities and promises of investigation which have enabled them so often to elude the most urgent representations.

The case of the *Lord Collingwood* is, in another point of view, more particularly adapted to this end; because the condemnation of that vessel turns mainly upon an allegation which renders the wrong inflicted a matter of direct national concern, and naturally leads to a declaration of principles and intentions on the part of this country, most important in the present conjuncture of affairs.

One specific ground of the condemnation of this vessel, is that it was found trading with the vessels of Buenos Ayres!

And this in the year 1821! Long after Buenos Ayres has ceased to yield obedience to the mother country, and after every vestige of Spanish authority has disappeared from the precincts of that colony—long after it has been distinctly and solemnly declared by England, and admitted by Spain, that if England forebore to pre-judge the question of a possible amicable settlement between Spain and her ancient colonies, by acknowledging the independent separate existence of the latter, she did so, in the complete understanding and on the condition distinctly admitted by Spain, that her trade with those colonies should be free and unmolested: nay, that Spain should not, even upon the resumption of her authority (if ever she should be able to resume it) resort to the reestablishment of her exclusive system or, if at all, at least not without a previous warning, and an equitable allowance of time for the winding up of British commercial concerns.

Is it possible that the Spanish government can flatter itself that it shall continue to enjoy the benefit of that forbearance, when the condition which was annexed to it is withdrawn?

When British merchant vessels are condemned for trading with Spanish America, on the ground that the governments of that continent are rebel governments of revolted colonies, is it not obvious, that there are two modes open to us for preventing the repetition of the like occurrences? The one, to be sure, would be to acquiesce in the pretensions of Spain, and obsequiously to prohibit all British trade with the Spanish main as illegal: but the other is to legalize the trade by a public recognition of the Spanish American governments; and the Spanish ministers may be assured that the latter is the course to which Great Britain will preferably resort.

The relaxation of the authority of the Court of Madrid, even in the colonies which remain nominally in allegiance to it, is productive of other inconveniences to other States, which at length has obliged this country to take the redress, fruitlessly solicited at Madrid, into her own hands. I refer to the piracies in the West Indian seas, committed not only under the Spanish flag, (for which abuse it might be alleged that Spain was not responsible) but by persons having their establishments on shore in the

island of Cuba itself; resorting there for refuge from pursuit, and depositing there the spoils of their plundering and murderous expeditions.

Representations and remonstrances which you will find in your archives have been made to the Spanish government on this subject; enquiry and redress have been promised; but whatever may have been the success of the enquiries, redress there has been none. Nor did the governor of the Havannah, when lately applied to on the matter, acknowledge to have received any orders from his Court to take any measures for the extirpation of the pirates notoriously sheltering themselves within the limits of his government.

Outrages such as these, neither the pride, nor the interest, nor, after fair time allowed for the effect of representations, the patience of this country can any longer bear.

The King has therefore been pleased to issue orders to his Board of Admiralty, to adopt the most decisive and summary measures for affording protection to his Majesty's subjects and to the navigation of the West Indian seas; and as to sweep the sea would be unavailing, so long as the pirates find sure and inviolable asylum in the ports and fastnesses of Cuba, the commander of the squadron appointed for this purpose is directed, after he shall have communicated with the governor of the Havanna and learnt whether or no the governor is ready to cooperate in the enterprise, in the one case with, in the other without, the assistance of that officer, to land at Cape St. Antonio, or wherever else on that coast the haunts of the pirates are to be discovered, and to take signal vengeance for the outrages which have in so many instances been committed by them against the commerce, persons, and lives of his Majesty's subjects.

That the execution of these orders involves a violation of the Spanish territory is not overlooked nor denied; but the growing magnitude, and urgency of the evil, and the clear and painful conviction that the government of Spain wants either the will or the power to suppress it, have forced upon his Majesty a decision, from which, in deference to the court of Spain, he had forbore perhaps too long; and the recurrence to which, under circumstances of such peculiar provocation on the one hand, and such entire hopelessness of redress on the other, became a measure no less of necessity than of obligation.

It will be highly agreeable to his Majesty to learn that the King of Spain allows the existence of that necessity and the force of that obligation; a necessity arising out of the apparent powerlessness of Spain to provide any other cure for the mischief; and an obligation imposed by a due regard for the interests of his Majesty's subjects, which it is the first duty of a Sovereign to protect.

In making the representations and declarations to the Secretary of State of his Catholic Majesty you will be careful to assure the Spanish minister that the frankness and determination with which you are instructed to speak are not intended to convey any intimation of a hostile or even of an unfriendly feeling.

His Majesty has no desire nor disposition to interfere in the internal concerns of Spain. He hopes and earnestly wishes that the issue of the present struggles in that kingdom may be favourable alike to its power and its happiness; to the lawful authority of the monarchy, and to the just and regulated liberties of the nation.

But in proportion as his Majesty is scrupulous in abstaining from any interference in the internal concerns of that country, he has a right to expect that, in its external regulations, Spain shall be carefully observant of his Majesty's rights and honour, and that no cause of offence shall be given to his crown, and no injury inflicted upon his subjects.

The harbouring of pirates is an offence against the dignity of any Sovereign whose subjects suffer by their depredations; the capture of British merchant vessels by Spanish cruizers, and the condemnation of them by Spanish authorities for trading with the South American provinces, heretofore possessed and still claimed by Spain, constitute (as has been shown) a breach of positive compact. For the former of these wrongs, the weakness of the mother country may be pleaded as an excuse, but the latter are acts of violence and injustice. For both, redress has in the first instance been sought through amicable representations and remonstrances; but, it is needless to repeat, to no purpose. To both, therefore, it has become necessary to apply remedies, independent of Spanish authority or concurrence. In applying these remedies, his Majesty is still desirous that the effect of them should not go beyond the occasion.

If Spanish territory is violated in the pursuit of pirates (the common enemies of all civilized nations), such an enforced violation is at once justified by the exigency which requires it, and atoned for by the acknowledgment which accompanies it.

If in the exercise of an undoubted discretion (possessed by his Majesty in common with every other crown and government) as to the recognition of those portions of South America which have thrown off their obedience to the Spanish monarchy, and erected themselves into substantive and independent States, his Majesty's decision shall be quickened by the experience of those injuries to the commercial interests of his subjects, which result from the at present unsettled relations of that part of the world, Spain cannot be surprised that his Majesty should recur to the only measure by which those relations can be adjusted, and the pretext for such injuries effectually removed. The time and mode of such a recognition must still be matter of grave deliberation, and may be governed by considerations of more general policy: but Spain has forfeited any right which she might have had to complain of it, by such proceedings as those against which we have so long remonstrated in vain.

I repeat, however, that you cannot too confidently assure the Spanish minister, that any step which the King may take for vindicating British rights and interests in a quarter of the globe over which Spain has practically, and, to all appearance, irretrievably lost all authority, implies no dissolution of those bonds of amity by which the crowns of Great Britain and Spain are connected, nor any disposition, in any degree, adverse to the rights, the interest, or the honour of his Catholic Majesty, or of his people.

I am, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to E. M. Ward, Esq.*

SIR,

Foreign Office, 18th Oct., 1822.

The declaration of independence by the Prince Regent of Brazil will probably have reached Lisbon before the arrival of this packet. With the political effects of this separation of the colonial empire of the house of Braganza from its European dominions, Great Britain has no concern; nor are you to express any opinion of your government upon it. But there is one practical operation of this event upon the treaties subsisting between his Majesty and the King of Portugal, which may be very important, and to which you will immediately call the attention of the Portuguese Secretary of State: I mean the treaties respecting the slave trade.

The act of the Congress of Vienna, No. 15, confirmatory therein of the previous stipulations of the treaty between Great Britain and Portugal of the 19th of February 1810, expresses the resolution of totally abolishing the slave trade, with such exceptions as were deemed necessary to supply the deficiency of colonial population in the Brazils, as colonial possessions of Portugal. That ground of exception is practically removed by the change of political character in Brazil. It would be monstrous to suppose that a provision made for the purpose of protecting the interests of Portugal in her colonial possessions could continue in force, or be otherwise than absolutely and *ipso facto* abrogated and annulled by an event which abolishes altogether the colonial character of the Brazils, and which may set their interests and those of Portugal directly at variance with each other.

The Treaty of the 28th of July 1817, reduces to specific agreement the spirit of those general engagements which are contracted in the Treaty of 1810, and confirmed by the Act of Congress of Vienna.

The third and fourth heads of the 1st Article expressly exempt from protection, by the Portuguese flag, cargoes of slaves carried to any other colonies than those of Portugal; and the specific limitations in the form of passport, as well as the 9th Article of Instructions annexed to that Treaty, establish clearly and beyond question the same principle, and prescribe the course which it is the right, I should rather say the duty, of the British government to take in respect to any slave trade which may be carried on hereafter for the supply of Brazil under the flag of Portugal.

You will announce to M. de Pinheiro the resolution of his Majesty's government to exercise the right which may accrue under the Treaty, from this change in the relations of Portugal and Brazil, with the same vigilance and activity which have hitherto been employed in carrying into execution the other stipulations of the treaties.

I am, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 177. ]

SIR,

Verona, 18th Oct., 1822.

Upon the perusal of the Note verbale from the Portuguese chargé d'affaires transmitted with your despatch of the 27th

September, No. 4, and your note in answer to the same transmitted in your despatch of the 1st October, No. 8, I observe that there is one possible, and even under existing circumstances probable, state of relation as between Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain which is not adverted to in the letter. This state of relation will probably occur in discussion here; and it is as well that I should inform you what my view of it is, in order that you may correct my notion if it should not agree with that of his Majesty's government.

I will suppose the relation of Portugal with Spain to continue what it is, or that it should be improved into a treaty of mutual defence; and that in either case Portugal, without consulting his Majesty's government, should supply to Spain a force to enable Spain to carry on war against France, whether commenced by the aggression of one or the other Power, Would his Majesty's government then consider itself bound, under its ancient treaties of alliance, to protect or assist Portugal? It is my opinion that his Majesty's government is not so bound.

I found this opinion upon the reasoning on which we have always declined in these conferences to extend our defensive relations and guarantee. The King's ministers cannot enter into any war or upon any political system without having the particular case before them and considering it in all its bearings, and cannot allow others, the counsellors of any other Power, to bring a war upon Great Britain. We could not allow Portugal herself to pursue a line of conduct likely to justify the attack of a third Power without remonstrance, and, as was done in the late case of Monte Video, without giving notice that unless Portugal did justice in that case to the King of Spain the guarantee of Great Britain would be considered void.

Much less could we permit that Portugal, by uniting her arms with those of Spain without stipulation, or by allying herself with Spain for their mutual defence, should involve Great Britain in war, as that would leave the question of peace or war for us not only at the discretion of the Portuguese but likewise of the Spanish ministers. If this point is started here, therefore, I shall say that I consider that, according to my opinion, we are not bound to interfere in favour of Portugal if Portugal interferes in any contest between France and Spain, either voluntarily or in consequence of a treaty for the mutual

defence of the two powers concluded without the knowledge or consent of his Majesty's government. I shall add, however, that, being uninstructed on this point, I must reserve the right of his Majesty's government to consider of the particular case when it will occur, and to act accordingly.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 178. ]

SIR,

Verona, 18th Oct., 1822.

Since my arrival here I have had some conversation with Prince Metternieh on the occupation of the Piedmontese territories by the Austrian troops, and on the desire of the King to assist at the conferences on that question. On the latter point there can be no doubt. The declaration issued by the Allied governments at Aix-la-Chapelle provided for it, and this place was fixed upon for the meeting of the Sovereigns principally for the convenience of those of Italy interested in the discussions. Upon the former point Prince Metternieh assured me that the Emperor of Austria felt as anxious to withdraw his troops as the King of Sardinia or his servants could be that they should be withdrawn; and that if the King should not desire that they should remain, which the Prince was inclined to believe he would, the Emperor would not allow him, Prince Metternieh, to attend the conferences which should decide the question whether they should remain or not. He expressed likewise the Emperor's readiness to allow their numbers to be reduced as much as General Bubna should think consistent with their safety.

I have not yet been able to ascertain what the line of the French ministers will be upon this subject, nor have I yet sufficient information to enable me to judge whether the troops ought to be withdrawn or not. If I should be of opinion that they ought, however, I entertain no doubt that, unless the King should himself wish that they should remain, the Austrian government will withdraw them.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.



[ 179. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Verona, 18th Oct., 1822.

We have not yet commenced any formal conferences, but I have had several interesting conversations with all the ministers. The conversation which I had with the Emperor at Vicina has produced its effect; and I think that all notion of what is called an European army, or any offensive operation against Spain, is at an end, and we are to meet to-morrow or next day to see what the French ministers have to say to us on that subject. The notion of the French government being, as I told you in my despatch from Paris, to consider any question between France and Spain exclusively French, the French ministers do not very well know how to begin the subject. Their object is still, however, to endeavour to obtain some declaration from the Allies in their favour, on the supposition that they should be attacked or be obliged to go to war; but I find that in all quarters the objections to give them such a declaration are felt; and I think I may assure you that nothing will be done here in regard to Spain which will be at all inconvenient to you.

Nobody has yet mentioned the Spanish colonies; and I shall of course follow what is laid down in your despatch. I wish that some of the ministers would take the trouble of wading through the histories of the war in Colombia, and see who they are whom we are going to take under our protection, and how they have conducted themselves. The conquest has been made from the Spaniards by our deserters; and after all, if the Spaniards could have placed two frigates in the Orinoco, they would have saved the colony. Then I confess I doubt the policy as much as I do the point of honour of being in a hurry to recognise this colony of Colombia in particular. The interest which is suffering most in England is that of the planters and owners of estates in the West Indies; and I confess that I think it most probable that nothing that can be done can save them. But observe, that if you really mean to have a commercial intercourse with Colombia for any other purpose than to enable such men as Mr. Hyslop to empty their warehouses, you must open your ports to the produce of Colombia; and then the West Indies will be extinguished at once, as Colombia produces nothing but what is the produce of your own islands. Remember that I tell you that in six months after the recognition

of independence you will be called upon to receive Colombian produce. I know that we must at last recognise all these governments, but I would recognise them when necessary, and only when really constituted and become powers, instead of seeking for reasons for recognizing them, and by recognizing them constitute them.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 180. ]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Vienna, 18th Oct., 1822.

I don't know what to do about Burghersh. Marie Louise, the Grand Duke of Modena, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany are all here, and he has not been invited to accompany any one of them. If he comes, therefore, it must be to attend the Congress, which I think that your instructions do not admit of.

I confess that I think the wisest and safest thing to do will be to leave the Italian conference where it was last year in the hands of those ministers who attend by invitation the Sovereigns to whom they are accredited. Upon this principle, if I should find, when Lord Londonderry comes here, that he proposes to present his letters of recall, if transmitted to him, before the Italian conferences are concluded, I should appoint Mr. Gordon to attend instead of him, as he did last year, unless some senior to him should arrive here before I go, in attendance upon the Sovereign to whom he is accredited.

Lord Westmorland thinks I have the power of ordering Burghersh here, which I don't think I have; or that if I had the power I should exercise it discreetly in ordering him here.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM ON THE NAVIGATION OF THE RHINE.

[ 181. ]

The Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty has received the directions of his government to draw the attention of the ministers of the Allied governments assembled at Verona to the state of the navigation of the Rhine.

According to the 6th article of the Treaty of Vienna, the navigation of that river ought to be entirely free from the point at which it becomes navigable to its mouth; and the principle of the freedom of commerce of the Rhine is adopted not only by that article but in the annexe, of which the first and every article has obviously the same object in view.

. Notwithstanding this Treaty, to which every power in Europe is a party, the government of the Netherlands have thought proper to close the mouth of the river against the commerce of the world; and herewith is a list of articles of which the transit by the Rhine through the Netherlands is entirely prohibited by law, contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Treaty. As this is a subject of general interest, his Majesty's Plenipotentiary has been directed to move the ministers of his Allies that an effort may be made by the ministers of the five courts at the court of Bruxelles to induce his Majesty the King of the Netherlands to adopt measures in relation to the navigation of the Rhine, in concert with other Powers bordering on that river, which may have the effect of carrying into execution the Treaty of Vienna on this subject.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 182. ] MEMORANDUM ON THE NECESSITY OF SOME FURTHER RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SPANISH COLONIES.

His Majesty has, upon more than one occasion, addressed his Allies on the relations of his subjects with the provinces on the continent of America heretofore forming parts of the dominion of Spain; and in conformity with the principles recognised in the transactions at Aix-la-Chapelle it is necessary again to call their attention to this subject.

From a period commencing during the late war with France his Majesty's subjects have had commercial relations with those provinces, with the consent of the government and of the court of Spain; and those relations, as well as the various and complicated relations which exist between his Majesty's subjects and all parts of the world, have long rendered it necessary that his Majesty should so far recognise the existence *de facto* of the governments formed in those several provinces as to negotiate with them, by means of the officers commanding his fleets and

ships, regarding the interests of his subjects, and to recognise in those several governments the rights of war as exercised by belligerents according to the laws of nations.

In the course of the last session of Parliament, his Majesty's government, had occasion to propose to Parliament a review, relaxation, and consolidation of the Navigation Laws; and vessels bearing the flag of Spain, or of any local governments in those provinces heretofore forming the dominion of Spain, carrying articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of those provinces on the continent of America, can now import into the United Kingdom.

Upon a recent occasion, when the United States of America recognised the independence of all governments established in these provinces, his Catholic Majesty having thought proper to direct that a note should be presented to his Majesty's government to make known to his Majesty that Spain was about to enter upon a course of measures in relation to those provinces, having for their object their pacification and their continued union with that country, his Majesty directed that an answer should be returned, stating his wish to witness an amicable termination of the differences existing between Spain and her American provinces; the readiness of his government to receive from the government of Spain such farther explanations as his Catholic Majesty might think proper to give, but at the same time warning the Spanish government of the rapid progress of events, of the danger of delay, and of the impossibility that so large a portion of the world could long continue without some recognised relations without disturbing the intercourse of civilised society.

To this note no answer has been received; and, notwithstanding that his Majesty would have been desirous of waiting to see what measures his Catholic Majesty's government would take either to reconcile these provinces to his government or to subdue them, it is obvious that the time is approaching at which it will be necessary for his Majesty to take some further steps on this subject.

The utter relaxation of the authority of Spain over the whole of this part of the world, and the appearance of so many new flags in the American seas, have let loose a multitude of pirates and buccaners, who lurk in the harbours of the Spanish colonies (not excepting those still under the dominion of Spain) and disturb the trade of his Majesty's subjects and insult the flag of

Great Britain by acts of violence, confiscation, cruelty, and murder. Hopes were entertained that Spain would be willing and able to put down this evil, and representations have been made to the Spanish government which have produced promises of redress: but no redress has followed.

His Majesty's government has been at length obliged to undertake the task; but it is impossible to expect that this intolerable evil should be thoroughly extirpated without the co-operation of the local authorities occupying the ports and coasts of that part of the continent of America. The necessity of this co-operation must lead to some farther recognition of the existence *de facto* of some one or more of these self-erected governments.

His Majesty, as the ally of his Catholic Majesty, has for many years made every endeavour in his power to effect a pacification between Spain and her colonies on terms of mutual liberality and advantage; and in the earnest pursuit of this friendly purpose has refused for his subjects every commercial advantage which either party was disposed to concede to them. His Catholic Majesty's government have more than once acknowledged their obligations to his Majesty in this respect. His Majesty learnt with satisfaction that his Catholic Majesty had resolved to open a communication with the Spanish provinces in America upon a new basis, from the liberality of which his Catholic Majesty expected the happiest results; and his Majesty would have wished to abstain as far as possible from any step which might prejudice his Catholic Majesty's endeavours for the termination of his differences with the said provinces. But the progress of events, the rapid growth and existing magnitude of the evils under which his Majesty's subjects are suffering in the pursuit of their lawful commerce, have rendered it absolutely incumbent upon his Majesty to adopt those measures which are necessary for their protection.

His Majesty, in the true spirit of the union existing between him and his Allies, having before had occasion to communicate to them what had passed between him and Spain upon this subject, has directed these additional circumstances to be made known to them.

WELLINGTON.

À son Altesse Sérénissime le Prince de Metternich.

[ 183. ]

MON CHER PRINCE,

Verone, ce 19<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

Depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de conférer avec votre Altesse hier au sujet de l'*Austrian Loan* j'ai examiné les documens à ce sujet, qui se trouvent dans ma possession, et surtout la lettre confidentielle que Lord Londonderry a écrite à Votre Altesse le 19<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1822; et je me réjouis de trouver que malgré que vous regrettiez qu'on n'ait pas arrangé cette affaire aux différentes occasions, où il y a eu des négociations pécuniaires entre les deux gouvernemens depuis la date des transactions qui ont occasionné cette dette, il n'y a aucune doute sur la nécessité qui existe pour l'avantage et l'honneur des deux gouvernemens de la liquidation, sans perte de temps, par un arrangement à l'amiable.

S'il était nécessaire, je crois qu'il me serait facile de montrer dans les évènements du moment des raisons suffisantes pourquoi cette affaire n'a pas été arrangée à une des occasions susmentionnées. Mais il me paraît préférable d'entrer de suite en matière pour arranger définitivement cette affaire.

Le montant de l'*Austrian Loan* de l'année 1795 est de livres sterling 4,600,000. Le montant de celui de l'année 1797 est de 1,620,000. Le capital des deux est 6,220,000. L'intérêt payé par l'Angleterre sur les deux depuis l'an 1798—car l'Autriche avait payé les premières années de l'intérêt sur la dette contractée en 1795—se montent à 10,601,955.

L'intérêt calculé sur les intérêts payés jusqu'au mois de Janvier 1822 montent à 6,693,935, faisant le total de 23,515,890, que l'Angleterre a déboursé sur le compte de l'intérêt.

De ce totale nous sommes préparés à déduire toutes les sommes payées en intérêts, dont le montant est de 10,601,955; et les sommes portées en ligne de compte comme intérêt sur les intérêts payés, dont le montant est 6,693,935; et du restant, montant à 6,220,000, nous ferons encore la déduction d'un tiers: il resterait à payer par l'Autriche la somme de 4,146,667. Je proposerais que de cette somme trois millions sterling seraient payés par l'Autriche, en numéraire, dans l'espace de deux ans, en portions égales, et 1,146,667 en bons, dans la proportion qui vous conviendrait dans le même espace de temps. En considération de ce paiement nous vous rendrions vos sécurités que nous tenons; et nous nous engagerions à consolider l'*Austrian*

*Loan* avec la dette publique Anglaise, et d'effacer ce terme de notre système de finance.

Il est vraiment essentiel à l'honneur et au crédit des deux gouvernemens que cette transaction soit terminée ; et le *Treasury* m'ayant passé les bons, je ne peux pas les ramener en Angleterre ; et je suis préparé à travailler avec vous, ou avec celui qui sera autorisé, à confectionner une convention sur ces bases.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 19th Oct., 1822.

Enclosed are copies of documents which I have received from Mr. Macanlay, an eminent merchant of this city, connected with Sierra Leone, which exhibit an instance of a practice frequently and too successfully adopted by the illegal traffickers in slaves—that of being furnished with double sets of simulated papers, indicating, one, or perhaps both, a false national character.

The vessel to which these documents relate, being taken, claimed the protection of the Swedish flag, was tried, and liberated under the protection she so assumed. She was discovered, after trial in another court, to have been employed and owned by subjects of Spain, and thus to have been liable to condemnation.

The governments of those countries which have renounced the slave trade, although they object, or have delayed, to take international measures to ensure its abolition on the part of their subjects, can hardly deny that frauds like these call loudly for their interposition.

It cannot be indifferent to their feelings or to their honour that their flag should be thus prostituted to purposes which they have disavowed, or in contravention of their own solemn abjurations.

It must be our endeavour to prevail upon the several governments which stand in this situation, to concur in some conventional act, or some public declaration, withdrawing the protection of their flag from persons by whom it shall be thus abused ; and this object may be materially facilitated if, in addition to the general declarations and recommendations which your Grace is already instructed to propose to the assembled sovereigns on the subject of the slave trade, you should be enabled to obtain one to the effect herein mentioned.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

## [ENCLOSURES.]

## I.

EXTRACT of a letter from ZACHARY MACAULAY, Esq., to JOSEPH PLANTA, Esq., dated London, 7th October, 1822.

"This transaction also seems to call, as my correspondent suggests, for such representations to the Court of Sweden as may induce that power to take measures for effectually preventing her flag from being prostituted to such nefarious purposes. Perhaps the best way of doing this would be for Sweden publicly to prohibit the using of her flag in this trade, and to denounce all who should so use it, if not as pirates, yet as entitled to no protection whatever from the Swedish flag. If this or some other means be not resorted to, in order to stop this new form of slave trade, all that has hitherto been done to abolish that trade will be rendered nugatory.

"There are other flags, as of Denmark, Russia, Prussia, Hamburgh, Naples, Tuscany, &c., which, when the Swedish flag is interdicted, may be borrowed by the slave traders. Now it would, at present, be no sacrifice to any of these States (indeed to no European State except France would it now be any sacrifice) to concur in adopting some principle which should subject to detention by all national vessels, and to condemnation, ships with slaves on board which should be found using their flags. The promulgation of such a principle by so many powers would be a most important step in advance towards the great object of constituting the slave trade, piracy, by the common consent of all civilized nations."

## II.

EXTRACT of a despatch from SIERRA LEONE, dated 9th July, 1822.

"The case of the ship *Joseph* is of a peculiar description, and as it may, and doubtless will, happen again, requires early attention. This vessel was captured at the Gallinas, and after capture pretended to be a Swedish vessel. She had on board Swedish, English, and American colours; a clearance from Matanzas, in Cuba; the measurement of a vessel called the *Joseph*, at Gustavia, St. Bartholomew's, dated July, 1819; and a certificate in English dated the same place, the same time, and purporting to testify that Johan Krause had made oath he was the owner of the said schooner *Joseph*, and signed by a notary. She had no other ship's paper whatever, except her log, kept in English by Elliot, the mate. The master, Krause, whose real name is suspected to be De la Cruz, called himself owner, and was the only one on board who pretended to be a Swede. The two mates pretended to be Americans; the sailors were Americans, French, Danes, and one an acknowledged Irishman.

"In the private examinations taken, it was found the cargo was shipped at Matanzas, by one Zacharius Atkins, whom one of the parties believed to be an Englishman. On her arrival on the coast she was repaired at Bulama, and in the Rio Grande, by the assistance of David Lawrence, a son of old Lawrence, and slaves were purchased from him and Pock, an Englishman. D. Lawrence's signature to the oath of allegiance was produced.

"Having thus a fair *prima facie* case, we determined to try how far the judge would act up to law and practice, and oblige the claimants to furnish proof in



opposition to our case, or in default of claim and proof on their part, would condemn the property; therefore libelled her under the British abolition acts. The judge, however, determined that though not properly documented as a foreign vessel, yet if she had a foreign flag we had no right to enquire into the property, unless English interest was so self-evident that it must be seen by all. That it being doubtful in this case, he should consider her as a *bona fide* foreign vessel; that Bulama, though belonging to H.M., was not in his actual possession; that David Lawrence having taken the oath of allegiance as a matter of policy or convenience, at the time of the Rio Pongas expeditions, could not be considered a British subject except when in British territory; that the fact of purchasing slaves from a British subject did not render the foreign vessel liable to any penalty; and that therefore being a foreign vessel, and in his opinion not affected by the transactions at Bulama, she must be released. That he could not allow that if no claim was made the seizers were entitled to a judgment: nor would he allow the *onus probandi* to lie on the claimants: he would in all such cases force the seizers to prove the whole of their allegations: We quoted Acts of Parliament and Admiralty decisions to show he was wrong, but to no purpose. She was released. He, however, recommended we should try our luck in the British and Spanish Mixed Commission Court. This decision took up thirty days.

"In the Mixed Commission Court a claim for restoration and damages was given in at once; proceeded over nearly the same ground, and brought home perjury to the master several times. Here the judge (Fitzgerald) was for condemnation, on the grounds that Atkins was part owner at least, and that Krause had sworn to so many lies that he could not be believed when he asserted she was a Swede. Gregory, however, objected. He believed she was a Swede, and did not think, if employed on account of Spanish subjects, or even if partly owned by them, she could be condemned if sailing under another flag. We pressed upon him that part of the fifth article which declares unlawful slave trading, "either by Spanish ships and under the Spanish flag, or for the account of Spanish subjects by any vessel, or under any flag whatever, after the 30th May, 1820, &c.," and asked him what it could apply to, but to vessels under circumstances like this. He gave no answer, and we continued in this state of suspense for five weeks with the judges of different opinions. Gregory, however, got enlightened soon after the commodore's return; found out that Krause was a great liar, the Swedish papers a sham, the vessel all Spanish, and he condemned her.

"It has at last turned out that she is not the *Joseph Krause* had at Gustavin, but a vessel picked up at Matanzas, and fitted out for this voyage under the same name."

*Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON CHER DUC,

Verone, le 20<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

C'est sous le sceau de la plus grande confiance que je vous communique les pièces ci-jointes. Elles renferment la preuve matérielle de la marche absolument erronée que le gouvernement Français a suivie dans les affaires qui ont précédées et préparées les déplorables événemens du 7 Juilliet dernier, à Madrid.

Ma correspondance avec Londres a renfermé depuis le mois d'Avril dernier des pressentiments sur le jeu aussi risquant que coupable que la faction

doctrinelle Française se permettait en Espagne ; c'est-à-dire avec le ministère également doctrinaire de Martinez de la Rosa, avec le Général Morillo, et le conseil d'état. J'ignore si votre cabinet a ajouté toute la valeur à l'exposé des pressentimens du Cabinet Autrichien que ce dernier a mis à les participer à Londres. Tant il y a que ce que nous avons admis comme pouvant avoir lieu, est aujourd'hui démontré comme autant de faits positifs.

Afin de mettre V.E. dans la connaissance entière de notre pensée, je joins également une dépêche que j'ai adressée à notre ministre à St. Pétersbourg le 31 Juillet dernier, c'est-à-dire au moment même où nous avons été informés des événemens du 7 du même mois. V.E. se convaincra que nos calculs sur les causes de ces événemens n'ont pas été faux. Je me flatte, d'un autre côté, que les principes que nous avons annoncés comme étant ceux de S.M.I. et R.A. ne seront pas désavoués par le cabinet de S.M.B.

Ce n'est que deux mois plus tard que nous avons eu connaissance de la correspondance secrète entre les Rois de France et d'Espagne. Cette correspondance dissipe tous les nuages, et elle prouve ce que voulait le gouvernement Français, et ce que n'est point parvenu à opérer l'alliance entre les deux factions doctrinaires Française et Espagnole.

V.E. trouvera enfin dans l'annexe No. 3 des remarques que j'ai fait sur la correspondance entre les deux rois. Ces remarques n'ayant point eu d'autre but que de placer sous les yeux de l'Empereur mon maître le jugement de son ministre, je prie V.E. de me renvoyer cette pièce, tandis que je la prie de regarder les autres comme un dépôt confidentiel entre ses mains. Leur contenu prouve qu'elles ne peuvent être communiquées à nul tiers.

Veuillez agréer, mon cher Duc, l'assurance de ma plus haute considération,

METTERNICH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Copie d'une Lettre du Roi Très Chrétien à S.M. Catholique.*

MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE ET NEVEU,

St. Cloud, le 28<sup>me</sup> Juin, 1822.

V.M. ne peut douter de ma tendre amitié paternelle, ni du profond et douloureux intérêt que sa situation m'inspire. C'est après m'en être bien pénétré que j'ai ordonné à mon Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'écrire au Comte de la Gardo une lettre dont ce dernier aura l'honneur de faire part à V.M.

Je vous prie d'y voir la pensée la plus intime d'un vieillard qui vous aime, et qui vous offre avec confiance le fruit de sa longue expérience et de ses réflexions sur les hommes et sur les choses.

Je vous prie également de recevoir l'assurance de tous les sentimens avec lesquels je suis, Monsieur mon frère et neveu,

De V.M. le bon frère et oncle,

LOUIS.

## II.

*Extrait des Instructions Secrètes que M. le Comte de la Garde a reçues,  
le 6 Juillet, de son Gouvernement.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

Paris, le 29<sup>me</sup> Juin, 1822.

J'ai mis vos dernières dépêches sous les yeux du Roi, qui en a été profondément affligé. Nous avons gémi souvent sur l'inutilité des efforts pour (1) établir entre le Roi Ferdinand et son ministère l'harmonie, sans laquelle il ne peut naître aucune mesure qui puisse nous mettre à portée d'être vraiment utiles à S.M.C. Nous avons attendu avec impatience une occasion favorable pour (2) vous charger de faire un effort décisif, un dernier effort auprès du Roi, pour obtenir une déclaration quelconque qui puisse tranquiliser sur l'avenir ses amis, son ministère et le parti modéré. Cette occasion paraît se présenter aujourd'hui, où vous mandez que vous êtes (3) pénétré du besoin d'une médiation. Eh bien ! cette médiation le Roi vous la confie, et son conseil en attend tout le succès que la sagesse et le zèle peuvent en obtenir. C'est vous donner la mesure de notre confiance. Je vous laisse toute la latitude pourvu que vous n'abandonniez pas le plan que je vais vous tracer. (4) Dans aucune supposition, il n'est possible que nous entriions en Espagne comme agresseurs pour y établir l'ordre des choses existant en 1814. Vous ferez sentir à S.M.C. que la résolution du Roi est à cet égard invariable. Il est possible que des hommes plus dévoués qu'éclairés cherchent à persuader au Roi que les mouvemens qui viennent d'avoir lieu dans notre cordon, et le transport de quelque artillerie, sont des évidences d'un projet d'agression de notre part. Détruisez cette illusion si elle existe. (5) Assurez le Roi que toutes les dispositions n'ont d'autre objet que de repousser une agression, si un parti était assez insensé pour la tenter ; mais qu'après l'avoir repoussée, il n'en serait pas moins impossible pour nous de dicter au peuple Espagnol l'ordre de se soumettre sans conditions au régime de 1814, ni même à tout autre ordre de choses.

Les événemens d'Aranjuez auront fait sentir au Roi Ferdinand ce qu'il y aurait de pénible pour son cœur, de dégradant pour sa couronne, de rester dans une position qui le condamne à désavouer, à repousser sans cesse des hommes qui lui sacrifient leur fortune et leur vie.

Vous n'aurez donc pas de peine à convaincre le Roi du peu de fond que S.M. doit faire sur le résultat des mouvemens que peuvent opérer les insurgés sur quelques points de la vaste monarchie, et du danger auquel S.M.C. peut se trouver exposée par la réaction des partis, dont l'inquiétude aurait redoublé la fureur.

Vous pourrez insister sur le seul moyen qui puisse rendre une médiation possible, utile pour S.M.C., et agréable à ses peuples, sans l'assentiment desquels tous nos efforts seraient inutiles.

Ce moyen est une déclaration du Roi qui puisse rassurer sur l'avenir tous ceux qui viendront se grouper autour de l'étendard royal, dès qu'ils seront convaincus que c'est de bonne foi (6) que le Roi est disposé à faire le sacrifice d'une partie de l'autorité dont il jouissait en 1814. Je ne puis rien préjuger sur la forme de cette déclaration, ni sur le moment le plus opportun de la faire paraître ; mais je vous le répète, (7) il est impossible dans quelque hypothèse que vous placiez la France, qu'elle veuille et puisse prescrire au peuple Espagnol de reprendre le régime de 1814. En soumettant ces considérations au Roi Ferdinand, vous ajouterez que la demande que lui fait le Roi, le conseil qu'il lui donne, n'est pas seulement le résultat de son affection pour son auguste parent, et des réflexions sur l'état de l'Espagne et sur celui de la France ; mais que (8) c'est le résultat des opinions des Cours Alliées, qui sont aussi pénétrées que nous le sommes nous-mêmes, de l'impossibilité de sauver l'Espagne sans obtenir

par une déclaration préalable l'assentiment de la partie de la nation Espagnole que l'anarchie effraye autant que nous. Le Roi Ferdinand a des hommes éclairés pour donner à sa déclaration la forme et la mesure convenable. (9) Le refus que ferait S.M.C. de vous confier immédiatement la déclaration que vous lui demanderez avec instance paralyserait toute action, et nous contraindrait nous-mêmes à abandonner à la Providence et à ses décrets le sort de l'Espagne. Le point essentiel auquel il faut revenir en finissant, c'est que vous puissiez obtenir du Roi la déclaration sans laquelle tous nos moyens de servir S.M.C. resteront paralysés.

Jugez quelle serait la douleur du Roi de ne pouvoir se rendre utile à son infortuné parent, fâché de ne pouvoir annoncer aux Chambres que le Roi d'Espagne a consenti à des modifications qui concilient les droits de sa couronne avec les libertés légales de ses sujets, et que S.M. Louis XVIII. sera le modérateur et le garant des concessions que le Roi d'Espagne en liberté renouvelera à la face de l'Europe.

## FIN.

## III.

## No. 1.

"Établir entre le Roi et son ministère *l'harmonie*, sans laquelle, &c., &c."

*Ad. 1.* Le ministère de Ferdinand VII. était à l'époque du 29 Juin composé d'individus mis en avant par le parti qui domine dans le Cortès, et par conséquent dévoués à ce système d'anarchie que l'on décore du titre de constitution. M. Martínez de la Rosa et ses collègues pouvaient être de fortes honnêtes gens, comme particuliers; mais comme ministres, c'étaient des hommes de la trempe du vertueux Roland, du vertueux Dumourier, du vertueux Narbonne, qui conduisirent Louis XVI. au 10 Août, et de là—à l'échafaud. Comment, si on s'occupait d'une véritable régénération de l'Espagne, pouvait-on imaginer, comment pouvait-on désirer, d'établir *l'harmonie* entre le Roi et un pareil ministère? A moins que ces hommes n'eussent subi une métamorphose totale, ce qui les aurait rendus incapables de servir le Roi, leur éloignement était le préliminaire indispensable de toute amélioration réelle.

## No. 2.

"Vous êtes chargé de faire un effort décisif, un dernier effort auprès du Roi, pour obtenir une *déclaration* quelconque qui puisse tranquilliser ses amis, ses ministres, et le parti modéré."

*Ad. 2. Obtenir du Roi une déclaration!* Voilà le grand objet de toutes les démarches des ministres de France. Mais quelle devait être la teneur de cette déclaration? Tranquilliser ses amis, le parti modéré, &c., sont des phrases générales qui ne spécifient, qui ne définissent rien; et nous chercherons en vain des explications plus précises à cet égard jusqu'à la fin de la pièce. Nous y trouverons toutefois de quoi suppléer à ce silence.

## No. 3.

"Pénétré du besoin d'une *médiation* . . . . cette *médiation* le Roi vous la confie."

*Ad. 3. Médiation!* entre qui? Entre le Roi et ses sujets? Entre le Roi et telle ou telle faction? Entre le Roi et ses ministres et ses généraux? Quelque sens que l'on puisse prêter à ce terme, il est incompatible avec toute idée de dignité royale, et il faut avoir singulièrement oublié les premiers principes du gouvernement monarchique pour admettre, pour demander même un aussi étrange médiation.

## No. 4.

"Dans aucune supposition il n'est possible que nous entrions en Espagne comme *agresseurs*, pour y établir l'ordre des choses existant en 1814."

*Ad. 4.* Nous verrons plus tard ce qu'il faut entendre par "l'ordre des choses existant en 1814." Mais quelle que soit la véritable pensée du gouvernement Français, le mot *agresseur* était bien mal-adroitement choisi. On ne saurait être *agresseur* que lorsqu'il s'agit d'intérêts et de prétentions contradictoires, mais une *intervention armée*, ayant pour objet de rétablir l'ordre dans un pays ne peut jamais être confondue avec une *agression*. Si la France ne visait point à une intervention armée dans les affaires d'Espagne, pourquoi se défendrait-elle contre de vains soupçons? Si elle nourrissait effectivement des projets de cette espèce, pourquoi les déclarer d'avance en les qualifiant de projets d'*agression*?

## No. 5.

"Assurer le Roi que toutes nos dispositions n'ont d'autre objet que de *repousser* une *agression* si un parti était assez insensé pour la tenter."

*Ad. 5.* On ne conçoit pas quel intérêt le gouvernement Français pouvait avoir à rassurer—non pas la faction ennemie, mais le *Roi d'Espagne*, sur son attitude absolument passive. Si les dispositions faites aux frontières n'avaient d'autre objet que de *repousser une agression*, quelle espèce d'encouragement ou de ressource offraient-elles au Roi? S'il en était autrement, voulait-on induire en erreur celui même en faveur duquel on travaillait?

## No. 6.

"Que le Roi est disposé de bonne foi à faire le *sacrifice d'une partie de l'autorité* dont il jouissait en 1814."

*Ad. 6.* Un Roi ne doit jamais faire le sacrifice d'une partie quelconque de son autorité. Le lui proposer, c'est lui proposer sa dégradation; et comme en consentant à cette dégradation il ne trahit pas seulement son propre intérêt, mais le salut de son peuple, c'est lui conseiller un crime. Il peut y avoir délégation de certaines branches des pouvoirs publics (de celui par exemple de faire des lois) à des corps existans en vertu d'anciennes institutions, on établit pour cet effet par le souverain lui-même. Mais *délégation* n'est point aliénation, n'est point *partage*. De même que le Souverain en confiant à ses ministres l'exercice de telle et telle partie de son pouvoir exécutif, n'en conserve pas moins la plénitude, de même tout autre pouvoir délégué est nécessairement attaché à la condition que le fonds, la substance, le capital du pouvoir reste invariablement placé entre les mains du souverain. Le seul sens du mot *constitution* admissible dans le système monarchique est celui d'une organisation des pouvoirs publics sous l'autorité suprême, indivisible, et inaliénable du monarque. Dans ce sens la meilleure constitution sera celle où les pouvoirs sont le plus sagement partagés entre les différentes délégations appelées à les exercer. Dans tout autre sens *constitution* est l'équivalent d'*anarchie*, et la prétendue *division des pouvoirs* la mort du gouvernement monarchique.

## No. 7.

"Il est impossible que la France veuille et puisse *précrire* au peuple Espagnol de reprendre le régime de 1814."

*Ad. 7.* Le régime de 1814 est un solécisme en langue de droit public. Le Roi d'Espagne, en rentrant dans son royaume en 1814, a commencé par abolir la constitution absurde et anarchique de 1812; et à l'exception d'une poignée

de démagogues, tout le pays a applaudi à cette résolution. Il a en même tems promis de convoquer des Cortès, pour gouverner avec eux d'après les anciennes lois de la monarchie. Il a mal fait, et mal jugé sa position, en retardant l'accomplissement de cette promesse. Il ne l'a cependant pas rétractée; il n'a pas manifesté l'intention de gouverner sans Cortès pendant le reste de sa vie, ou d'annuler les anciennes constitutions du royaume. Le gouvernement qu'il a exercé de fait depuis 1814, et sans doute trop longtems exercé, n'était point un régime avoué et consacré; et personne ne s'avisa "de prescrire aux Espagnols de reprendre le régime de 1814," lequel n'était après tout qu'un intervalle d'absence de tout régime légal.

## No. 8.

"C'est le résultat des opinions des cours alliées, qui sont aussi pénétrées que nous de l'impossibilité de sauver l'Espagne, sans obtenir par une déclaration préalable l'assentiment de la partie de la nation, &c."

*Ad. 8. Le résultat des opinions des Cours Alliées.* Ou se demande avec étonnement par quelles voies, par quels organes le gouvernement Français a pu obtenir ce prétendu résultat. Jamais, autant que nous sachions, les cours alliées ne se sont expliquées ni dans un sens ni dans des termes pareils; jamais elles n'ont énoncé, que pour sauver l'Espagne, il fallait "l'assentiment de la nation à une déclaration préalable faite par le Roi." Enfin la question même de la forme du gouvernement qui conviendrait à l'Espagne n'a jamais été mise en discussion entre les Puissances Alliées. Le fait, dont on paraît vouloir s'étayer dans ce passage, est donc matériellement faux; et il n'eût servi qu'à égarer le Roi d'Espagne, si ce malheureux monarque avait jugé à propos d'écouter les conseils du ministre de France,

## No. 9.

"Le refus que ferait S.M. Catholique de vous confier *immédiatement* la déclaration que vous lui demanderez paralyserait toute action, et nous contraindrait d'abandonner à la Providence le sort de l'Espagne. Quelle semit la douleur du Roi de ne pouvoir se rendre utile à son infortuné parent, fante de ne pouvoir annoncer aux Chambres que le Roi d'Espagne a consenti à des modifications qui concilient les droits de sa couronne avec *les libertés légales* de ses sujets, et que S.M. Louis XVIII. sera le *modérateur* et le *garant des concessions* que le Roi d'Espagne en liberté *renouvellera* à la face de l'Europe."

*Ad. 9.* Il y a quelque chose de fort extraordinaire dans ce langage. On menace le Roi d'Espagne de l'abandonner à son sort s'il se refuse à donner *immédiatement* la déclaration qui lui est demandée; et cependant, quoique tout roule sur cette fameuse déclaration, on ne dit pas une seule fois sur quoi elle portera, quel principe, quel système, quelle forme de gouvernement, le Roi substituera au soi-disant régime de 1814. Comment se rendre compte d'une aussi inconcevable réticence? Ou bien, le gouvernement Français se contentait d'une déclaration quelconque, d'une réuonciation pure et simple à ce qu'ils appellent le pouvoir absolu, sans en préciser, sans en définir les termes, sauf au Roi d'Espagne à deviner ce qui conviendrait à la France. Mais alors l'instruction toute entière ne serait qu'un tissu de niaiserie, et il n'est pas permis de s'arrêter à une supposition pareille. Ou bien, le Roi d'Espagne, ou au moins son ministère libéral et constitutionnel, était informé par des communications antécédentes de ce que la France entendait par la déclaration, qu'elle exigeait avec tant d'emphase et avec tant d'instance. Cette dernière hypothèse est la seule admissible pour quiconque ne veut pas taxer le gouvernement Français d'une imprévoyance et d'une légèreté sans exemple.

Nous sommes donc autorisés à croire, sans autre donnée positive, que préalablement à l'expédition de cette pièce péremptoire et menaçante le gouvernement Français et son ministre à Madrid s'étaient expliqués avec le ministère Espagnol sur le régime à établir en Espagne; et si tel a été le cas, l'instruction du 29 Juin nous fournit elle-même tout ce qu'il faut pour faire préjuger la nature de ces explications. La déclaration doit être telle, que le Roi de France puisse la soumettre à ses *Chambres*, et—qu'elle couvrie les droits de la couronne d'Espagne avec les *libertés légales* de ses sujets. Examinons d'abord cette dernière condition.

*Les libertés*—terme assez vague que les doctrinaires modérés ont substitué depuis quelque tems à celui de *liberté* pure et simple, bien plus dangereux, sans doute, parce qu'il est bien plus vague encore, et plus sujet à l'abus : les *libertés d'une nation*, pour occuper une place dans un système raisonnable de droit public, ne sauraient être que l'ensemble des droits, des prérogatives, des fonctions, et des attributions assurées aux différentes classes de cette nation par les institutions et les lois qui l'ont gouvernée pendant des siècles. En ajoutant l'épithète *légales*, on semblerait même n'avoir eu en vue que ce genre de libertés nationales. Mais nous n'avons qu'à fixer les yeux sur l'autre condition imposée au Roi d'Espagne pour nous convaincre que telle ne peut pas avoir été la pensée du gouvernement Français.

La déclaration du Roi d'Espagne doit obtenir le suffrage des *Chambres* de France. Comment y parvenir ? Si le Roi veut rendre à ses sujets leurs libertés légales, il ne les trouvera ni dans les décrets des Cortès, ni dans la prétendue constitution de 1812, ni dans le régime, ou plutôt non-régime, de 1814; il doit faire revivre, avec les modifications devenues indispensables par la marche du tems et la force des événemens, les anciennes constitutions de son royaume, telles qu'elles existaient (au moins légalement) avant l'invasion de Bonaparte, telles que le Roi s'était engagé à les rétablir par sa déclaration de 1814. Maintenant on peut le demander à tout homme instruit et de bonne foi,—est-ce là l'ordre des choses qui serait approuvé et sanctionné par la *Chambre des Députés* à Paris ? Cette question porte sa réponse en elle-même, et il serait superflu de la discuter. Par conséquent les libertés légales exigées par le gouvernement Français sont des libertés d'une toute autre espèce que celles qu'il faudrait à l'Espagne; ce sont des libertés modernes, ayant leur source dans les soi-disans droits de l'homme; c'est le système représentatif tel que de funestes réformateurs nous l'ont fait; ce sont les deux *Chambres*, la loi des élections, les tribunes, et la liberté de la presse. Voilà le seul régime que les ministres Français oseraient proposer pour l'Espagne, le seul pour lequel ils obtiendraient la sanction de leurs *Chambres*. Et voilà les *concessions* que Ferdinand VII. en liberté doit renouveler comme s'il les avait jamais librement reconnues—à la face de l'Europe.

Et c'est à ce prix que Louis XVIII. sera le *modérateur* et le *garant* du bonheur futur de l'Espagne.

Le sort de Ferdinand VII. est certainement déplorable, et il l'est d'autant plus que cet infortuné monarque a été en grande partie lui-même l'auteur des maux sous lesquels il va succomber entouré des ruines de son pays. Mais placé enfin comme il l'était dans cet affreux moment, peut-on s'étonner qu'il se soit livré à la rage de ses plus cruels ennemis plutôt que d'accepter de la main de ses amis des secours et des garanties qu'ils lui offraient à des conditions pareilles.

## IV.

*Lettre du Roi d'Espagne au Roi de France.*Madrid, le 24<sup>me</sup> Juillet, 1822.

MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE ET TRÈS CHER ONCLE,

Lorsque mon cœur était en proie au deuil et à la tristesse par une suite des évènements désagréables qui ont eu lieu dans cette capitale, je reçus comme une véritable consolation pour ma famille et pour moi la très honorée lettre de V.M. en date du 28<sup>me</sup> du mois passé. Je me dispenserai de vous entretenir en détail de nos peines, parce que je vois que V.M. en est suffisamment instruite. En conséquence le Comte de la Garde me remit une copie des instructions qu'il a reçues de la part du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de V.M., instructions qui tendent en substance à obtenir de moi la promesse que je suis disposé de bonne foi à faire le sacrifice d'une partie de l'autorité absolue dont je jouissais en 1814.

Pour donner à V.M. une preuve du prix que j'attache à ses conseils et à l'opinion des Cours Alliées, je ne puis faire davantage que de me remettre entre les mains du ministre de V.M., le Comte de la Garde. Je l'ai donc invité à m'indiquer telle forme de gouvernement qui lui semblerait propre à remplir les vœux de V.M., et ceux des Cours Alliées, en conciliant tout ensemble ma dignité royale et les intérêts du peuple Espagnol. En effet, le dévouement et les lumières du Comte de la Garde ne tardèrent pas à me tirer de ce grand embarras. Entr'autres formes de gouvernement il me suggéra celle du rétablissement des Cortès par États, comme étant la plus conforme à la dignité de ma couronne, à la religion, aux loix, us et coutumes du peuple Espagnol; comme étant la plus utile et la plus favorable aux intérêts de la nation Espagnole, d'après ce que l'expérience a démontré à l'époque où l'Espagne se trouvait gouvernée par un système aussi bienfaisant.

Cette base fondamentale posée quant à la forme de gouvernement que désirent V.M. et ses Alliés, je ferai sans doute avec plaisir le sacrifice de me déposséder d'une grande partie de l'autorité dont je jouissais en 1814, quoique je sois certain de n'en avoir jamais abusé. Il me paraît désormais inutile de fatiguer l'attention de V.M. de tout autre détail qui ne serait que la conséquence du même plan de gouvernement et des loix et principes sur lesquels il se fonde. La seule difficulté qui se présente est celle de fixer l'époque, le mode, et la forme de ce changement, qui devra se concilier avec la sénérité de ma personne et avec celle de la famille royale, en évitant l'effusion de sang. Dans tout cela je compte profiter des lumières, des talents, et de la prudence du Comte de la Garde, dont la conduite me cause toujours la plus vive satisfaction. Je ferai choix aussi de quelque autre personne fidèle, si on m'en laisse une à qui je puisse parler, car on exige que je me sépare même des serviteurs intimes de ma Cour, pour que je reste entièrement isolé. Il y a plus, ma santé, et celle de la Reine surtout, sont fort ébranlées. Nous avons besoin de respirer au frais l'air pur de la campagne; mais les ministres se sont opposés à ce que nous nous rendions à St. Ildephonse, malgré les considérations relatives à notre santé. Ils ont par là manifesté l'état d'emprisonnement où je me trouve. Daignez, Sire, envisager la situation dangereuse où ma famille et moi nous sommes placés; elle exige que sans perte de temps nous recevions des secours qui nous délivrent le mieux que faire se pourra. Je prie V.M. de vouloir bien se donner la peine de m'en passer un avis préalable, afin que je fasse prendre les mesures convenables. V.M. peut assurer les Cours Alliées et les chambres de ma résolution d'effectuer et d'accomplir le changement de gouvernement dont j'ai parlé plus haut. Cette résolution est irrévocable. Tout ce qu'il sera nécessaire de déboursier à cette fin sera exactement bouffé. Je remplirai ces engagements



dès que je serai en liberté; et dans cette vue j'ordonne dès à présent les dispositions qui sont à ma portée, et j'en prévient le Comte de la Garde.

Je saisis l'occasion qui m'est offerte pour exprimer à V.M. les vœux que forme mon cœur, afin que toutes sortes de prospérités la comblent, et que Dieu l'ait toujours sous sa sainte et digne garde.

## V.

*Copie d'une dépêche de M. le Prince de Metternich à M. le Baron de Lebzelter, à St. Pétersbourg.*

Vienne, le 31<sup>me</sup> Juillet, 1822.

La correspondance directe de Paris et Madrid avec St. Pétersbourg doit avoir mis le cabinet de S.M.I. de Toutes les Russies au fait des déplorables évènements qui se sont passés en Espagne au commencement du présent mois.

Ces évènements se présentent à nos yeux à la fois comme un grand malheur et comme une grande leçon.

La catastrophe de Madrid doit être, et elle sera sans doute, considérée par l'Empereur Alexandre sous le même point de vue que par l'Empereur notre auguste maître. Le triomphe du bien, vu la présence de beaucoup de moyens matériels nécessaires pour l'effectuer, n'a peut-être jamais été possible avec moins d'efforts de la part de S.M. Catholique elle-même. Le Roi a été placé pendant plusieurs jours entre sa délivrance et l'asservissement le plus complet. Son manque d'énergie morale a certainement contribué à le précipiter dans un abyme sans fond. En mettant de côté ce qui, dans des circonstances comme celles dans lesquelles se trouvait ce Prince, appartient au courage matériel, il me paraît clair que s'il avait su calculer les chances de sa position, il lui aurait fallu moins de courage d'esprit pour briser ses chaînes, que pour se vouer, lui et son peuple, à une perte infaillible. L'homme en liberté peut craindre les coups de fusil, mais le prisonnier ne devrait pas craindre de sortir d'une prison que lui ouvrent des amis, et les portes du palais de Madrid avaient été ouvertes au Roi.

En lisant les relations ci-jointes de M. de Brunetti, relations fort circonspcues, vu la somme de considérations qui ont dû les lui faire rédiger ainsi, V.E. ne nourrit aucun doute sur la vérité de ce que je viens d'avancer.

Je ne m'arrêterai pas d'avantage sur des résultats qui ne nous sont connus encore que d'une manière incomplète. Les choses étant une fois placées ainsi qu'elles se trouvent l'être, il faut les prendre telles qu'elles sont.

Mais il me serait impossible de me renfermer dans des limites également restreintes relativement à plusieurs questions morales d'une valeur trop positive pour ne point paraître dignes de fixer la pensée de tout homme appelé à s'occuper des premiers intérêts du corps social, dans une époque surtout où ces intérêts sont menacés et attaqués journellement. Je me livre d'autant plus volontiers à ces réflexions, que la solution des problèmes qu'elles regardent ne peut manquer de tourner à l'avantage des principes fondamentaux de l'alliance et à l'honneur de notre propre marche politique qui dans toutes les circonstances n'a eu d'autre boussole que ces mêmes principes.

Il y a longtemps, Monsieur le Baron, que mes dépêches vous ont fourni des traces que nos pressentimens portaient sur des relations occultes entre le gouvernement Français et les différens partis royalistes en Espagne, et sur nos appréhensions que ce travail pourrait conduire facilement à plus de mal que de bien.

Nos appréhensions ont dû nous paraître fondées en réalité par les deux raisons toutes simples, que nous avions vu ce même gouvernement faire fausse route dans les révolutions Italiennes, et que, vu la connaissance de bien des

positions, nous avons dû admettre que plus d'une considération, ou d'intérêt ou de politique *isolée*, devaient nécessairement exercer une influence positive sur la nature du travail secret auquel s'est livré le gouvernement Français en Espagne.

Ce qui de prime abord s'est présenté à nous avec la faible valeur de simples abstractions, n'a point tardé à gagner en évidence. Une effroyable solution vient de compléter celle-ci. Si encore nous ignorons tous les détails de la conduite de l'affaire, ils peuvent être suppléés facilement par des calculs qui ne sauraient manquer de foudroyer.

Un esprit malheureux avait animé les derniers ministères en France. Constamment négatifs dans leur marche dans l'intérieur, ces administrations n'ont point dédaigné de porter une grande activité dans leur politique extérieure; cette marche n'ayant pu prendre un caractère de franchise et de droiture, a dû tourner en intrigues politiques. Il a suffi de ce fait pour placer dans des momens bien majestueux le gouvernement Français sur une ligne autre que celle des Alliés.

L'alliance est fondée, et elle se maintient avec constance, sur la base de la *conservation et de la protection des droits légitimes*.

L'alliance en formant une puissance morale immense, soutenue par des moyens matériels non moins respectables, n'a eu besoin, pour arriver au bien, aussi souvent que son action a pu être réclamée, que de sagesse et de correction dans sa conduite et de modération dans l'emploi de ses moyens. Reunissant dans son sein et représentant ainsi tous les intérêts véritables et permanens de la société, l'alliance a pu écarter de sa route bien des obstacles que des intérêts et des calculs isolés et appliqués à contre-sens ne manquent jamais d'opposer à la marche de ceux qui les choisissent pour guides.

La révolution en Italie s'est présentée. L'Autriche s'est mise en devoir de former une digue contre ses progrès, et elle a fait en même temps un appel à ses Alliés. Leurs conseils se sont rassemblés et l'alliance s'est levée contre la révolution. *Le pouvoir légitime était captif à Naples*; l'alliance a borné ses soins à l'affranchir, et elle a usé de ses droits dans l'intérêt direct de ses peuples.

C'est donc à la révolution, c'est au principe révolutionnaire qu'elle a déclaré la guerre. L'alliance n'a jamais mis en discussion la valeur de la constitution que la révolte avait imposée au royaume de Naples. Il ne pouvait en effet appartenir qu'au Roi rendu à la liberté à anéantir l'œuvre de la révolte. Si le Roi rendu à la liberté a pu faire un appel aux lumières de ses amis et de ses Alliés, il n'a fait qu'user d'un droit qui n'a pu lui être contesté, tout comme n'aurait pu l'être celui des monarques de répondre à l'appel que S.M. Sicilienne a adressé à leur sagesse.

Telle a été la marche du cabinet Autrichien dès la première nouvelle qui lui était parvenue de l'explosion révolutionnaire à Naples, et telle a été la conduite que les Alliés ont dirigée à l'appui de l'autorité légitime opprimée dans ce royaume.

Tout, dans cette manière de poser la question et de guider l'affaire, a été simple, correct, et juste; le résultat a répondu à l'entreprise, et les factieux répandus sur toute la surface de l'Europe, n'ont pu que cacher leur défaite sous l'ombre du silence, ou en dénaturant les faits dans des libelles obscurs, qui n'en ont imposé à personne.

Tandis que les conseils Européens se trouvèrent rassemblés à Laibach, un parti dans le gouvernement Français a suivi une marche différente. C'est alors que nous avons vu ce parti diriger des soins vers le but de faire dériver de la révolution Napolitaine un système constitutionnel semblable à celui qui régit la France. Cette intrigue, aussi mal conçue en principe que dans ses moyens d'exécution, a échoué. Elle n'a dû échouer, car elle ne s'accordait ni

avec le principe de l'alliance, ni avec les pensées véritables des révolutionnaires. Aussi la faction libérale a-t-elle perdu son procès sans retour; le tribunal radical qu'elle avait nanti de sa cause, n'a pu en conscience prononcer en sa faveur.

En retraçant ici ce qui s'est passé à Naples en 1821, je ne crains quo trop d'avoir écrit l'histoire secrète des évènements déastreux desquels nous sommes témoins en Espagne en 1822.

Il nous est prouvé que les hommes qui ont été les premiers moteurs et les guides de ces évènements, n'ont jamais visé à la *contre-révolution*, mais bien à un *changement de constitution*, dans le sens et avec les instrumens mêmes de la révolution. La différence est grande. La *contre-révolution* est un fait simple, incontestablement du ressort des pouvoirs légitimes, réunissant le droit et la faculté de mettre un terme à des usurpations et à des désordres révolutionnaires. La *constitution* qui convient à un peuple dans telle position donnée est au contraire une question complexe et difficile, par laquelle le rétablissement de l'ordre dans un pays livré à l'anarchie peut tout au plus *finir*, mais ne doit jamais commencer.

Que pourrait d'ailleurs valoir une charte donnée par un Roi prisonnier; que ce Roi soit prisonnier des révoltés de l'île de Léon ou des révoltés de Madrid—des révoltés contre toute autorité royale ou de ceux contre le libre exercice de son autorité?

Si le sort du Roi et de la famille royale et le salut d'un grand peuple ne se trouvaient pas aussi cruellement compromis par les évènements qui viennent de se passer à Madrid, l'homme qui ne les considérerait que sous le point de vue d'une leçon salutaire pourrait y voir peut-être avec une certaine satisfaction la preuve nouvelle des deux grandes vérités que les contemporains ne sauraient assez méditer; savoir: que le succès ne peut être assuré dans les grandes comme dans les petites affaires de ce monde, si la base de l'action n'est pas correcte; et que, d'un autre côté, il n'y a pas de plus pitoyables alliés que les doctrinaires.

Ce sont, en effet, d'après notre conviction la plus intime, les doctrinaires Français en politique et en législation qui ont préparé la réaction qui vient d'éclater; et ce sont les doctrinaires Espagnols qui ont usé une somme positive de moyens de salut pour une entreprise qui n'a pas dû réussir, par cela même, que des hommes qui ne vivent que d'abstractions, et qui ne connaissent ni les besoins du monde réel, ni les vrais moyens d'y satisfaire, se sont chargés de la conduite de l'affaire. Ce n'est ni avec des lieux communs ni avec des phrases que l'on gagne des batailles; et les libéraux sont bien pauvres gens en comparaison des radicaux.

Je me flatte, Monsieur le Baron, que la partie de mon expédition du 15<sup>me</sup> de ce mois, relative aux affaires d'Espagne, aura été saisie par l'esprit éclairé et sage de S. M. I. de Toutes les Russies dans celui dans lequel nous avons abordé cette question d'un intérêt si majeur. Je me sais gré en mon particulier d'avoir fourni à notre Ambassadeur à Paris les moyens éventuels de prendre part à tout conseil que pourrait nécessiter tel ou tel évènement imprévu. Il faut espérer que la circonstance heureuse de l'attitude morale du ministère Français actuel, très différente de celle des administrations précédentes, facilitera le bien qu'il nous sera peut-être encore donné de faire.

Toutefois les grandes considérations doivent rester réservées à la réunion des monarques. L'objet est de la plus haute importance, et il nous offre deux écueils opposés, également dangereux. D'un côté l'inaction peut devenir funeste; de l'autre, chaque pas mal-calculé peut conduire à des fautes irréparables, et l'alliance ne doit point en commettre. En attendant la réunion s'approche, et je n'ai pas besoin de vous exprimer, Monsieur le Baron, avec

quels sentimens, sans parler de problèmes que nous présentent encore les affaires de l'Orient, et en fixant seulement mes vœux sur l'état des choses dans l'Occident de l'Europe, je vois écouler les jours qui nous en séparent encore !

Veuillez porter confidentiellement à la connoissance de S.M.I. de Toutes les Russies la présente dépêche, et recevoir, &c.

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PRÉCIS des Communications verbales faites par M. LE VICOMTE DE MONTMORENCY dans la réunion confidentielle de MM. les Ministres d'Autriche, de Grande Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie, à Vérone, le 20<sup>me</sup> Octobre, 1822.\*

L'état d'irritation où se trouve le gouvernement qui régit actuellement l'Espagne, les provocations nombreuses qu'il adresse à la France, ne donnent que trop lieu de craindre que l'état de paix ne puisse se conserver aussi longtemps qu'elle le voudrait. Le gouvernement du Roi a déjà fait des sacrifices à ce désir sincère d'éviter une rupture qui lui imposerait la douloureuse obligation de rallumer le flambeau de la guerre, et de troubler la tranquillité, si chèrement achetée par tous les états de l'Europe. Il continuera de mettre tous ses soins à se préserver d'un tel malheur ; et il sait qu'il a, sur ce point, de nobles exemples à suivre. Mais s'il a pu faire jusqu'ici le sentiment de sa dignité ; s'il a supporté avec patience des attaques, plutôt faites, peut-être, pour lui inspirer un sentiment de douleur et de compassion que pour l'irriter, il ne peut cependant se faire illusion sur le danger qui est inévitablement attaché à un tel état de choses. Un foyer révolutionnaire, établi si près de lui, peut lancer sur son propre sol, et sur toute l'Europe, de fatales étincelles, et menacer le monde d'un embrasement nouveau.

D'ailleurs le gouvernement Espagnol peut se déterminer brusquement à une agression formelle, dans laquelle il croira trouver des moyens de prolonger son existence, en la présentant à l'opinion comme un glorieux effort de la liberté contre la tyrannie. La France doit donc prévoir comme possible, peut-être comme probable, une guerre avec l'Espagne. D'après la nature des choses, et dans les sentimens de modération dont elle veut faire la règle de sa conduite, elle ne peut la considérer que comme une guerre défensive. Elle ne saurait en assigner l'époque ; mais elle est décidée à la soutenir. Pleine de confiance dans la justice de la cause qu'elle aura à défendre, s'honorant d'avoir à préserver l'Europe du fléau révolutionnaire, elle s'appuyera sans hésitation sur la force de ses armes et sur la fidélité de ses troupes, qui souvent et vainement tentées, ont montré devant la séduction un courage plus difficile, peut-être, que celui des combats.

Mais d'ici au moment où la guerre serait devenue inévitable, la France, par une chance qui est commune aux autres cours, peut être dans le cas d'adopter une mesure intermédiaire entre l'état de paix et les hostilités, et de rompre toute relation diplomatique avec la Cour de Madrid. En effet, telle circonstance peut se présenter, telles démarches peuvent être faites par le gouvernement ou par les Cortès, qui mettraient le ministre de France dans la nécessité de demander ses passeports, et qui, malgré tout le désir

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\* See Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Mr. Canning, 22nd Oct., 1822.

d'éviter une rupture, forceraient le Roi à le rappeler formellement. Dans ce cas, qu'il faut prévoir, mais que la France mettra tous ses soins à éloigner, les hautes cours ne jugeront-elles pas que ce serait donner une preuve utile de l'uniformité des principes et des vues de l'Alliance, que de prendre une mesure semblable, et de rappeler, chacune de son côté, leurs légations à Madrid ? On peut croire (et cette pensée a fixé dès 1820 l'attention de l'une des Puissances) que si la nation Espagnole voyait cesser au même instant les rapports qui l'unissent encore aux principaux gouvernemens de l'Europe, si elle se trouvait comme isolée, par le rappel de la plus grande partie du corps diplomatique, et l'interruption des communications dont il est l'organe habituel, elle serait amenée à réfléchir plus mûrement sur sa position, et à profiter des élémens monarchiques, qu'elle renferme dans son sein, et qui prennent depuis trois mois un développement remarquable, pour éteindre le feu révolutionnaire qui éloignerait d'elle les peuples et les gouvernemens.

Cette mesure, qui aurait d'autant plus d'effet qu'elle serait consacrée par un parfait accord des hautes puissances, pourrait (on le sent) avoir des conséquences graves. Elle irriterait probablement les hommes qui gouvernent en ce moment l'Espagne, et pourrait les porter à faire immédiatement une déclaration de guerre à la France ; mais ils en encourraient seuls la responsabilité ; et la France se trouverait dans la ligne où elle veut se maintenir jusqu'à un dernier moment : elle serait prête à se défendre, et n'aurait point à attaquer.

En prévoyant le cas d'une guerre avec l'Espagne, et en subordonnant aux intérêts communs de la grande Alliance toutes les considérations qui se rattachent à cette grave question, la France (on le répète) a dû croire quelle pouvait compter sur l'appui moral de ses Alliés ; et que même elle pouvait, si les circonstances lui en faisaient la loi, réclamer d'eux un secours matériel. Elle s'est surtout pénétrée de l'idée que dans la circonstance présente, le concours des hautes puissances est nécessaire, comme devant consacrer cette unanimité de vues qui est le caractère fondamental de l'alliance, et qu'il est du plus grand intérêt de maintenir et de signaler pour garantir le repos de l'Europe.

C'est sur la forme de ce concours moral, et sur les mesures propres à lui assurer le secours matériel qui peut être réclamé par la suite, que la France croit, en définitive, nécessaire de fixer l'attention de ses augustes Alliés.

Résumant donc les idées qui viennent d'être exposées, et qu'ils ont désiré connaître, elle soumet à leur haute prudence les trois questions suivantes :

1. Dans le cas où la France se verrait forcée de rappeler de Madrid le ministre qu'elle y a accrédité, et de rompre toute relation diplomatique avec l'Espagne, les hautes cours seraient-elles disposées à prendre une mesure semblable, et à rappeler leurs propres légations ?

2. Si la guerre doit éclater entre la France et l'Espagne, sous quelle forme et par quels actes les hautes puissances prêteront-elles à la France l'appui moral qui doit donner à son action toute la force de l'alliance, et inspirer un salutaire effroi aux révolutionnaires de tous les pays ?

3. Quelle est, enfin, l'intention des hautes puissances, quant au fond et à la forme du secours matériel qu'elles seraient disposées à donner à la France, dans le cas où, sur sa demande, leur intervention active deviendrait nécessaire, en admettant une restriction que la France déclare, et qu'elles reconnaîtront elles-mêmes être absolument exigée par la disposition générale des esprits ?

*Sir William A'Court to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Sir,

Madrid, 20th Oct., 1822.

The Curé Merinos being in complete possession of the road between Burgos and Somosierra, I think it the most prudent course to forward this despatch by the way of Lisbon.

It appears certain that the insurgents have had considerable advantages both in Catalonia and Arragon, many families are consequently flying from Valencia towards the capital, where a considerable degree of alarm begins also to prevail.

After a long and animated discussion the ninth article of the eighteen proposed by the ministers, was yesterday very unexpectedly rejected by a small majority. This has given courage again to the moderate party, and a further struggle will be made before the enormous powers, which have been demanded, are finally granted. If the remaining articles should also be rejected, it will be impossible for the present administration to continue any longer in office; and there are many who think that even should they succeed in carrying them through the result will be equally fatal to them, for that then the more violent of the Exaltados by whom they have hitherto been supported, will turn against and overthrow them, in order to place in more desperate hands the exercise of these despotic powers.

Riego is expected to-day, and the clubs, which have been so long shut up, are to be opened again this evening.

Morillo has been taken in the neighbourhood of Placentia, and is now on his road to Madrid.

Everything looks more gloomy than it is prudent to express in a letter to be forwarded by the common post.

I have, &c.,

W. A'COURT.

*Le Prince Castelcicala to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, ce 21<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

Je prends la liberté, mon cher et respectable Lord, de vous donner la peine de faire passer avec sûreté le paquet ci-joint au Prince Ruffo. Je profiterai des occasions de vos couriers pour lui en envoyer; et je prendrai la même liberté de les mettre sous votre adresse, et je vous serai bien obligé de les lui faire tenir.

J'espère que votre importante santé soit tout-à-fait rétablie. Votre voyage à Vérone m'a fait le plus grand plaisir. Que Dieu vous bénisse, et vous conserve.

Nous sommes ici bien forts et bien tranquilles, et nous ne craignons l'Espagne. On est ici dans une ferme conviction que les Cortès attaqueront, ce qui mettrait fin à toutes les discussions. Le ministère Français se croit parfaitement à même d'y faire face; et je crois que tout ce que l'on demande aux Puissances est d'être garantes des vues droites et intègres de la France.

J'ai été bien aise de la nomination de Sir Henry Wellesley à l'ambassade de Vienne. Je vous en présente mon compliment de félicitation.

Veuillez, mon digne Lord, me continuer les sentimens de bienveillance auxquels j'attache le plus grand prix, et croire en même temps aux sentimens invariables de mon fidèle attachement et respect.

Votre très dévoué serviteur,

CASTELICHALA.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 21st Oct., 1822.

In obedience to your instructions I announced to my colleagues at a conference which took place on Friday, that I was prepared to support, by my good offices, the efforts of the Prussian Cabinet to bring to a termination the discussions which had arisen respecting the limits of that part of the French frontier which borders upon the principality of Leger, by the acknowledgment of the general principle, that the Treaty implies the re-establishment of the frontier of 1792 in every case not affecting the enclaves of either country.

The Prussian chargé d'affaires having received no instructions, it appeared expedient to wait until he should be enabled to take the initiative, before his colleagues could with propriety address any communication to the French government upon this subject. We therefore merely noticed the question in the enclosed Protocol, with a view to hasten the transmission of these instructions.

It is, perhaps, necessary to add, that, with the exception of Austria, none of the Allied Powers having named the Commissioners, who are authorized, under the Treaty, to verify the demarkation; General Mazzuchelli, the Austrian Commissioner, after waiting a considerable time upon the frontier, returned to Vienna.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

[ENCLOSURE.]

PROTOCOLE de la SÉANCE du 19<sup>me</sup> Octobre, 1822.

Les soussignés s'étant, sur l'invitation de M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, réunis aujourd'hui en conférence, son Excellence a communiqué les quatre pièces ci-jointes, qui lui ont été transmises par sa cour, et qui sont relatives à une contestation qui s'est élevée entre les gouvernemens Français et Prussien par rapport à la délimitation définitive entre les deux états conformément au Traité de Paris du 20<sup>me</sup> Novembre, 1815.

Lecture ayant été faite de ces différentes pièces, il a été convenu de les assigner au Protocole de ce jour, et vu que Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires de Prusse n'a point encore reçu des directions de son Cabinet à cet égard, d'attendre les indications ultérieures de la Cour de Berlin pour donner suite à cette affaire.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 21st Oct., 1822.

The return of an agent who had been sent to Urgel has brought the French government accounts of the insurgents, which in some measure explain the unfavourable opinions Monsieur de Villèle has expressed respecting their prospects. The continuation of warlike preparations on the southern frontier is in the mean time indicated by the formation of the corps d'armée, of which the head-quarters will be placed at Bayonne and at Perpignan; the one I understand is to be commanded by M. Autichamp, and the other by General Curial.

M. de St. Chamans and M. de Vance, and several other colonels of the Guard, have been appointed to the command of brigades under these officers.

The sentiments which are entertained by M. de Villèle respecting the discussions between the two governments has in the mean time come to the knowledge of the *extrême droite*, and are severely criticised by the party who have urged the government to adopt a more decisive course with respect to Spain.

Though they admit that the insurgents are by no means in the situation which has been represented, they blame the intention of the minister to wait for a declaration of war on the part of Spain, because they argue that if hostilities do not commence before the insurrection is completely quieted, the court of France will become a principal instead of an auxiliary in any war which may take place, and the defensive system which such a course will necessarily compel them to follow must not only deprive the ministers of all the advantages which would have resulted from a war of invasion, but will justify anxiety respecting the security of the southern province, where such men as Generals Lamarque, Clausel, and Harispe are known to possess an influence which almost counterbalances the power of government.

I have the honour, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 21st Oct., 1822.

The entry of the *extrême droite* against M. de Villèle increases daily, and their disapproval of the system by which all the influence of the government is centered in the President of the Council shows their determination to oppose his measures. It cannot therefore be doubted that the irritation of that party, together with the vanity of those who are offended by his reserve, will lead to combinations after the arrival of the Duke de Blacas unfavourable to the interests of the government that minister directs.

Though the ministers calculate that the elections which are about to take place will give them an increase of ten votes upon the great divisions of the chamber, the above causes are likely to produce so much difference of sentiment among the majority that it is to be feared the humiliation of the



côté gauche will not be followed by any of those causes and effects which the tranquillity of the country requires.

Though the extrême droite, who do not conceal their hatred of the constitutional institutions, pretend to count eighty votes, they have not hitherto been able to find any person sufficiently bold to preach their doctrines in the tribune; they propose to confide the direction of their interests to M. de Marchangy, and to facilitate his election in the Département du Nord, in case he is not returned in the Nièvre, upon the express condition that his conduct in the chamber is conformable to the principles they profess.

Since M. Bellart sent in his resignation, M. Maugin, the Procureur du Roi at Poitiers, is recommended to succeed him in the situation of procureur-general, though other members of the administration are desirous that that office should be given to M. de Martignac of the Bordeaux bar, who manifested considerable talent last year in the Chamber of Deputies.

The wish of the government to maintain the ascendancy they have at length obtained in the provincial tribunals has led to the publication of an ordonnance changing the whole council of administrative discipline of the advocates at Marseilles, which course will, I believe, be followed in every other court where the known sentiments of the council leave no surer mode of checking opposition to the government.

Several material changes have been announced in the University of Strasburg, and in the other institutions for public education throughout the kingdom.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

[ 184. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 22nd Oct., 1822.

The conversation which I had with the Emperor of Russia at Vienna, and which I reported to you in detail in my despatch of the 4th of October, has certainly had the effect of tranquillising the Emperor of Russia; and it appears from a conversation which I had with his Imperial Majesty a few days ago that he has laid aside all notion of an attack upon Spain, and that he was prepared to attend to what the French ministers had to suggest in respect to the relative position of France and Spain. His Imperial Majesty, however, was not free from apprehension of the consequences which might result from any hostile invasion of Spain by a French army, as his Imperial Majesty certainly feels no confidence either in the discipline of that army or in its attachment to the King of France and his dynasty. I don't think his Imperial Majesty sees his way through the difficulties of forming an army of

observation, to be formed in case France should be engaged in hostilities; but it is obvious that his Imperial Majesty has not entirely given up that idea. It appears to me that this idea will be carried into execution by his forming such an army within his own frontier.

We had a conference on Sunday night,\* at which the French minister, Monsicur de Montmorency, read first a paper adverting to all that had passed between France and Spain since the Revolution of 1820, and then that of which I enclose a copy. He refused to leave with us a copy of that first mentioned, and, indeed, desired that both might be considered as merely notes of what he addressed to us.

In respect to the first mentioned, it contained a very incomplete statement of the transactions between the King of Spain and the royalists in Spain on the one part, and the French government on the other. It is obvious, however, that such communications and transactions have taken place unknown to us and to the other Allies. In respect to the second, you will judge for yourself.

I imagine that each of the ministers will answer this paper. In my answer I shall review our line of conduct since April, 1820, and contrast it with theirs; and shall very civilly decline to engage ourselves to adopt any measure beforehand, and till we shall have a full knowledge of all the circumstances which have occurred between the two countries. I propose, besides, to point out to them that, considering the relative position of the two countries, it is not probable that Spain will declare against them if they explain as they ought the meaning and object of their corps of observation, and make some allowance for the effervescence of men's minds in Spain in a state of revolution and civil war.

I have just learnt from Prince Metternich that he has received a very important despatch from the Austrian minister at Madrid, which Sir W. A'Court had desired him to send here by an extraordinary courier. From this despatch it appears that there is a strong desire in Spain of some interference, provided that it is not by France, and that those who should interfere would assure to the country that it should not fall again under the system of 1814. Upon this despatch, which contains like-

\* 20th October.

wise a statement of the probability that war would be declared against France, or that some provocation would be given to France, Prince Metternich feels inclined to found a system of mediation by the other four Allied Courts between France and Spain. I don't think that his notion is quite clear to his own mind, and, of course, I am unable to explain it. At all events, I will take care to understand it clearly before I shall give any opinion upon it or transmit it to England.

I have entered in conversation upon all the other objects adverted to in my instructions, but have not yet made such progress in them as to be able to give you any opinion of their probable result.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR SIR,.

Paris, 24th Oct., 1822.

Dr. Brown Mill, who lately returned to Paris after a tour in the south of Europe, is, as you are probably aware, the physician who attended the King of France during the period of his residence in England, and from his knowledge of his Majesty's constitution and habits is much consulted respecting the state of his health whenever he comes to Paris.

After being admitted to a private audience four days since, he called here and confidentially told me that he observed an unfavourable change since last year; that his Majesty's health appears to be gradually declining, and that he fears there is little chance of improvement if he continues to indulge in a cold vegetable diet, and to drink the wines of the country, which have given rise to violent indigestions upon two or three occasions within the last year.

Dr. Brown Mill saw her Royal Highness the Duchesse d'Angoulême on Tuesday, whose situation he tells me is more immediately alarming; that the personal appearance of her Royal Highness is much changed, that she is extremely thin, and is troubled with a short hectic cough, which if she is not already in the first stage of a consumption induces him to believe that malady will declare itself very shortly.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 24th Oct., 1822.

The importance of the questions at issue with Spain has not distracted the attention of the French government from Italian affairs; and they

omit no effort which can contribute to maintain the ascendancy which the course pursued by the Duke de Blacas had given to France in that country.

A paper drawn up with this view has lately been received from the Count de Serre, the Ambassador at Naples; which, after giving a most deplorable picture of the state of affairs in the kingdom of Naples, points out the advantage which would accrue to the interests of his Court, if the measures which are necessary to change the face of that country are brought about through French agency. With this view he recommends at some length the adoption of a system modelled on the French charter, alleging that the royal authority will be strengthened by the creation of institutions analogous to the prevailing opinions, which he considers to offer the only chance of tranquillity, whenever the Army of Occupation shall be removed.

These notions so nearly coincide with the opinions of M. de Villèle, that if I may draw any reference from his general conversation on the subject, they form the basis of the instructions drawn out for the guidance of the French plenipotentiaries, in recommending a diminution of the burthens attendant upon the occupation of different parts of Italy by foreign troops.

M. de Villèle, with reference to this subject, tells me, that he has reason to believe the Austrian government are desirous to render the reduction of their armies in Italy in some degree dependant upon the measures which will be adopted both in Piedmont and in Naples to prevent the interference of the Prince de Carignan and of the Duke of Calabria in the administration of public affairs, which he thinks prove the desire of Prince Metternich to increase the Austrian influence in Italy by furthering the projects of the reigning sovereign in the former kingdom to change the succession to the crown.

His Excellency said that he cannot contemplate projects so deeply affecting the interests of France without alarm; and that, since every consideration compels them to oppose measures of which the moral and political effect is equally bad, if the subject shall be touched upon in the approaching discussions, the Vicomte de Montmorency is authorised to declare that an interruption in the acknowledged line of succession, or a dismemberment of those States whose political independence so nearly affects the security of the French frontier, will be resisted by his sovereign; that upon such important points no concession can be admitted; and that, if he acts up to the spirit of his instructions, he will endeavour to prevent any reference to such questions at the outset of the negotiation.

Having a very imperfect knowledge of the sentiments entertained by his Majesty's government upon these matters, I regret to have been unprepared to meet M. de Villèle's observations, since he appeared to assume a higher and more decisive tone in the consideration of Italian affairs than I have observed in the discussion of any other subject.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 24th Oct., 1822.

M. de Villèle tells me that the accounts which have been received from Spain during the present week are satisfactory in as far as they show that the government of that country have been able to keep within bounds the irritation which the leading members of the Extraordinary Cortès have manifested against France, and to prevent a declaration of war, which in the present situation of their affairs they have not the means of supporting.

According to the reports of M. de Lagarde, the ministers have determined to suspend their demand for the increase of the army until the financial arrangements for the year have been voted; and he has reason to believe that if this vote is followed by a vote for new levies, they will establish a counter army of observation which will not be removed before the French force at present united in the southern provinces shall be marched to some other destination.

The arrival of the several members of the insurgent government at Perpignan justifies M. de Villèle's suspicion that they will be unable to resist the force which the Spanish government are prepared to bring against them.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Gloucester Lodge, 24th Oct., 1822.

Hill has sent me by this messenger a volume of despatches (not quite so large as that of Sir John Hippisley's letters which I transmitted to you by the last messenger from England, or as another of the same materials which has accumulated here since that time, but large enough of all conscience) touching the question of the Prince de Carignan; of which question I suppose I ought to be ashamed to say I know very little, and have not time before the departure of the present messenger to inform myself sufficiently to give you any opinion, much less instruction, upon it.

As Hill will have transmitted to you duplicates, or (what for your sake I rather hope) extracts of these despatches, I need not say anything of their contents. As to our interference, I presume the less it is the better, but I am quite prepared to acquiesce in the direction in which you may think it most expedient to employ it.

I do not think it would be amiss to give a helping hand to that part of the King of Sardinia's counsels, which is endeavouring to prevail with his Majesty to introduce some salutary amendments into his political and judicial system, taking care always to save the principle of non-interference.

I am glad to find that there is a disposition to get rid of the Austrian troops in Piedmont, and that there is every appearance of that relief being to be obtained without risk to the tranquillity of the country.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Gloucester Lodge, 24th Oct., 1822.

I have received this morning your letter from Verona, dated the 15th inst., which announces your arrival there some days sooner than I had calculated, and, what is of much more importance, in a state of health improved by the journey.

I have not any fresh instructions to send by this opportunity; but I keep you, as usual, informed of everything that has occurred since I last wrote to you, which affects the situation of the world, and consequently may disturb the tenor of your negotiations.

The communication of the event in Brazil, which I announced in my last despatches, will probably excite some surprise and create some consternation among your fellow-negotiators. It renders not, however, any new instructions necessary. You are already in possession of all that need be said upon it, in the double view of recognition and of slave trade.

Every hour brings the former question more forward; but whatever preparatory steps we may be taking, you may depend upon nothing being *done* before your return.

I enclose, partly for your information and partly for your amusement, copies of a correspondence which I have had with Lord Holland upon the subject of Spanish colonial politics. Nothing could be more unexpected (as you may suppose) than to find Sir R. Wilson the negotiator in disguise; nothing more welcome than to discover at the same moment that he had been induced to reveal himself and his mission to the French Prefect of Police.

One thing is pretty clear from the extract of M. Zea's letter communicated to me by Sir R. Wilson (which it is lucky to have fallen upon thus incidentally), that M. Zea is not so much bent upon Colombian independence as he is upon making that question serviceable to the power of the Liberal party in Spain, upon whose *liberality* in respect to colonies I confess I should not be prepared to place much reliance.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

I.

*Lord Holland to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

DEAR CANNING,

Holland House, 7th Oct., 1822.

I have reason to think that before Lord Londonderry's death application was made from the Colombian Republic to send private English gentlemen to negotiate a recognition of their independence with the Spanish Government, and that they undertook the negotiation. At that time they determined to communicate no part of it to Lord Londonderry, from a persuasion, well or ill founded, that he was hostile to both those governments, or at least to any amicable understanding between them. I am not at liberty to mention names, but there does not exist the same objection in their minds of apprizing you of the nature and circumstances of the negotiation. If you expressed a wish to

know them, a frank if not an official communication of them would, I am persuaded, be made to you. It appears to me that the expression of such a wish on your part would, in the judgment of those concerned, pledge neither you nor the government to anything further than one fair inference, viz., that you do not apply for information for the purpose of thwarting the object of the negotiation, which is to bring about an amicable arrangement between the Spanish Government and her late colonies, founded on a recognition of their independence by the mother country.

I should add that I know nothing whatever of the business but what I have here communicated, and the names of the persons, which I suppress. Indeed, I should have declined hearing, much more saying or writing, anything on the subject, but one of the persons writes to me from a *distance*, communicating to me the fact for the first time, and requesting me to ascertain whether you would wish to receive any information upon it, with no other condition expressed or implied but that which I have mentioned.

Gout confines me to my house and my carriage, otherwise I should have abstained from writing on this subject, and trusted to the chance of meeting you some day at C<sup>t</sup>. Ellis's, where I could have executed the main part of my informant's commission in as satisfactory and in a less formal manner than by letter.

Yours very truly,

VASSALL HOLLAND.

## II.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Holland.*

DEAR HOLLAND,

Foreign Office, 9th Oct., 1822.

I have not the smallest indisposition to receive the communications which your correspondents are so obliging as to wish to make to me; on the general understanding, expressed or implied, that I will not make use of those communications to the disadvantage of the party by whom your correspondents have been employed.

But the "inference" which you describe is susceptible of more than one construction, in which I could not concur without much fettering my discretion, and in a way which I should think you would be the first to disapprove.

You say that I "would not apply for the information for the purpose of thwarting the object of the negotiation, which is to bring about an amicable arrangement between the Spanish Government and her late colonies, founded on a recognition of their independence by the mother country."

Now, assuredly I not only would not "apply for," but I would not receive "information for the purpose of thwarting the object" of the informer. It would be most unfair to do so. But should I be therefore held to have obliged myself to *forward* that object? which object, observe, is not the "recognition of the independence" of Colombia, but that recognition to be arrived at *through a particular process*, viz., by amicable arrangement, &c.

Now, suppose I were prepared, without more ado, to acknowledge the independence of Colombia to-morrow? (do not be startled, and do not draw the inference that I am so, but suppose that I were) would not the condition to which you describe me as tacitly pledging myself by receiving your information, stand in the way of such an acknowledgment? For this would not be a "recognition" through "an amicable arrangement," &c., but one quite independent of such "arrangement." Should I not violate the implied condition by thus leaving Spain out of the question?

I put this case as one out of many that might arise to perplex one's conduct, after subscribing to so complicated an "inference."

On the other hand, suppose I were not to be prepared to give any countenance to the "object;" that for reasons which I might not think it right to disclose (such, for instance, as information respecting the individuals, in Colombia, who had made application to the English gentlemen), I were to be unwilling to pursue the opening offered to me, or that I should have encouraged others, in rivalry or in conflict, with those applicants, should I in such cases be held to "thwart" their "object?"

In short, a general condition that I would not seek nor receive information for "the purpose" of turning it to the prejudice (as I understand it) of the clients of my informer, may be and must be considered as involved in my declaration that I am ready to receive the proffered information. But further than that I must not be considered to have pledged my word or fettered my discretion.

If this will satisfy your friends I shall be glad to hear from them, or, if they prefer it, to fix a day for seeing them. In the latter case, however, I hope they will still bring the substance of their information in writing.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

### III.

*Lord Holland to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

DEAR CANNING,

10th Oct., 1822.

I think your distinctions are rather nice and fine-spun; but I have no doubt that your words are better chosen than mine, and shall therefore use them, and them only, in my answer to my informant, saying thus:—

"Dear Sir,—I have conveyed your wishes to Mr. Canning, without mentioning your name or that of the other person to whom you allude. I have received the following answer:—'I have not the smallest indisposition to receive the communications which your correspondents are so obliging as to wish to make to me, on the general understanding, expressed or implied, that I will not make use of their communications to the disadvantage of the party by whom your correspondents have been employed;' and Mr. C. adds that he 'would not apply for, nor even receive information for the purpose of thwarting the object of the informant,' that is, as he understands it, of turning the information to the prejudice of those from whom he is to derive it, or those who employ them. But further than that, he very prudently and naturally states that he does not pledge his word or fetter his discretion."

I have preserved your words except that of *informer*, which to my correspondent's ear would not be agreeable.

Now after all this writing upon the matter, you must not be surprised if you hear nothing more for some time, because my correspondent is *abroad*, has omitted to give me his direction, and has not authorised me to speak to the South American gentleman (though in England) on the subject. In this embarrassment I am in some doubt how to proceed, but if I can ascertain precisely where my informant is, shall apply without scruple to you to convey my letter to him without subjecting it to the inspection of foreign posts.

Yours ever,

VASSALL HOLLAND.

P.S.—I add a recommendation to my correspondent to communicate (if he communicates with you at all) directly with you in both senses of the word, that is, from himself to you, and without delay.



## IV.

*Sir Robert Wilson to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

DEAR SIR,

Paris, 14th Oct., 1822.

From a letter which I have just received I am authorised to presume the present communication will not be unexpected or misunderstood.

On leaving England, M. Zea, understanding that I was likely to proceed to Spain, addressed me a letter, from which I send you an extract, and to which I returned an affirmative answer.

On my arrival here I took the necessary steps to open a communication with the Spanish Government; and I am now daily expecting a confidential intimation of its feelings and wishes with regard to the proposed negotiation. As soon, however, as I heard of your appointment to the station you now occupy, I felt desirous you should be made acquainted with the object of my commission, in confidence of your friendly policy towards South America and Spain, and with the view of preventing all collision between myself and the British agents employed under your authority.

Having no sinister motive, and being anxious to combine the interests of my own country with those of the parties in whose common behalf I engaged to act, concealment ceased to be necessary when a change occurred in England that promised the adoption of an enlightened and conciliatory system, and in taking the present step I am persuaded that I cannot prejudice, but promote, the great object which the Colombian Minister had in view when he entrusted me with his powers.

I have given the Spanish government reason to infer that the immediate recognition may procure to Spain direct pecuniary advantages. On recommending that sacrifice to M. Zea, I kept in view the instructions given by the U.S. of America to Mr. B. Franklin in the proposed negotiations with Great Britain, after the honour of the American arms had been established, and also that commercial privileges would be not only very difficult to obtain after the recognition of Colombia by North America, but that such privileges might be detrimental to the commercial interests of my own country. The longer the recognition of Spain is delayed, the more difficult the negotiation becomes, even on this basis; but still there is time to profit by the disposition of the Colombian Minister, and I have received all but official assurances that the opportunity will not be neglected by Spain.

I shall not fail to make you acquainted with the answer of the Spanish ministry when it arrives, and I remain,

Dear Sir, your obedient servant,

R. WILSON.

## V.

*M. Zea to Sir Robert Wilson.*

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

Londres, ce 15<sup>me</sup> Août, 1822.

Vous partez pour Madrid; mes vœux vous accompagnent; votre présence est nécessaire partout où la liberté court des dangers. Il est juste que vous figuriez sur tous les théâtres où il y a de la gloire à acquérir. Vous avez déjà donné à l'Espagne des preuves d'une affection généreuse dans la dernière guerre; vous l'avez constamment défendue dans votre Parlement, et vous n'avez cessé de mêler à nos conversations amicales l'expression du plus vif intérêt pour son bonheur, et son triomphe dans la lutte qu'elle soutient aujourd'hui.

C'est après ces données incontestables sur la fermeté de votre caractère et la noblesse de vos sentiments que je crois devoir vous écrire cette lettre; vous en ferez tel usage que vous dictera votre sagesse.

Désaignez-vous d'être le négociateur d'un rapprochement que serait à la fois utile et glorieux pour l'Espagne et l'Amérique?

J'oserais, donc, vous conjurer de saisir la moindre circonstance pour entamer, soit officiellement soit confidentiellement, une discussion de laquelle il me suffit de vous indiquer les bases.

*D'abord, et avant tout, il faut que notre indépendance soit reconnue.* Nous l'avons conquise sans doute.

Nous aimerons pourtant à devoir à la générosité de l'ancienne métropole une *concession* qui met à l'instant tout le monde à son aise, et chacun à sa place. Cette concession nous est assurée par la bénédiction du temps, par la force irrésistible des choses, mais obtenue seulement à ce double titre, nous serions dispensés de toute reconnaissance. Il n'existerait plus de liens entre les républiques nouvelles et la mère patrie; tous y perdraient; nos rivaux communs pourraient seuls applaudir à une aussi fatale mésintelligence.

Cependant les Américains, les peuples de Colombie, et moi en particulier, nous conservons au fond du cœur un véritable attachement à l'Espagne. A l'instant où les Cortès de Cadix adoptèrent des institutions libérales, les colonies partagèrent l'enthousiasme des patriotes du Péninsule; elles s'empressent de venir à son secours.

Malheureusement des hommes exclusifs ambitieux donnèrent une fausse direction à la politique Espagnole; tous les cœurs furent aigris; une guerre impie s'alluma; je vous épargne les affreux détails de toutes les horreurs qui s'en suivirent. En 1820, lorsque les véritables rédempteurs de l'Espagne renversèrent le despotisme, l'immortel Riego, les San Miguel, les Alcala, Gallano, et ses braves amis, proclamèrent en même temps la liberté de leur pays et l'indépendance des colonies comme une conséquence nécessaire du même principe. Par quelle suite des erreurs incompréhensibles cet élan généreux fut-il paralysé dans les Cortès de cette mémorable année de 1820? Il est vrai qu'à cette époque aussi les services les plus éclatans furent méconnus par ceux-là même qui ne seraient jamais sortis des cachots sans le dévouement héroïque des soldats citoyens de l'Isle de Leon!

Vous trouverez encore, mon cher Général, ces généreuses dispositions dans les hommes à qui la Péninsule est redevable de sa nouvelle restauration. En accordant leur appui à la cause de l'Amérique, ils demeurèrent fidèles à leur premier engagement, ils sont d'accord avec eux-mêmes, ils sauvent encore une fois leur patrie en la réconciliant avec nous, en faisant cesser une lutte sanglante, et qui n'offre aucun espoir de succès à la métropole. Après des immenses efforts, qu'il n'est plus possible de renouveler en Europe, nous sommes restés les maîtres du terrain. C'est dans cette position que je ne balance point à vous donner la mission de reproduire, avec la mesure et la dignité qu'exige une pareille démarche, les avances que le gouvernement de Colombie a déjà faites plus d'une fois. L'Espagne constitutionnelle ne saurait être notre ennemie; l'Espagne souffrante, menacée de nouveau par les étrangers, déchirée par les intrigues de la politique extérieure, reprend tous ses droits à la sympathie de ses enfants d'entre mer. Ceux-ci ne peuvent voir avec indifférence que la liberté soit étouffée en Europe; notre existence actuelle et future est basée sur le triomphe des idées libérales.

Vous concevez, mon cher Général, toute l'étendue qu'il serait aisé de donner à ces réflexions, que je me borne à vous indiquer, que *notre indépendance* ou *notre émancipation politique* soit prise pour base d'un traité, et que l'Espagne compte sur nous—tous les secours qui dépendent de nous lui seront prodigués.

Nous réglerons sans peine les conditions ultérieures d'une négociation où les sentiments d'une ancienne fraternité seront seuls écoutés.

Élevé moi-même pour ainsi dire en Espagne, où je m'honore de conserver une foule d'amis, j'ai mille fois prouvé dans le cours de la funeste guerre de Colombie, combien j'avais à cœur de mériter l'estime et reconnaissance des Espagnols. Ils me rendent certainement cette justice! C'est par une suite naturelle de cette disposition innée chez moi que je me fais un devoir de vous adresser cette communication confidentielle. Vous m'obligerez essentiellement et vous servirez aussi l'Espagne en daignant accepter la tâche que mon amitié vous impose. Revêtu de la confiance du gouvernement que je représente, et des pouvoirs les plus illimités, il est en outre certain que je puis mieux que tout autre me féliciter d'avoir tous les moyens de terminer cette grande affaire à la satisfaction de toutes les parties. Vous sentez qu'il importe toutefois à mettre immédiatement la main à l'œuvre. Les événements se pressent de tous côtés. Deux Puissances nous ont reconnus; d'autres se disposent à nous reconnaître. Toutes veulent former avec nous des rapports commerciaux. L'Espagne n'a plus de tems à perdre si elle veut conserver une part de ses anciens avantages et le mérite d'une condescendance volontaire.

Je vous laisse le choix des moyens d'exécution. Vous ne proposerez rien qui ne serez digne et honorable pour tous. Soyez, mon cher Général, le plénipotentiaire de la liberté, de l'humanité! Ces deux grandes puissances ne vous rayeront jamais de la liste de leurs défenseurs.

Recevez, mon cher Général, l'hommage de mon sincère et respectueux dévouement.

ZEA.

## VI.

### *The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Holland.*

DEAR HOLLAND,

Foreign Office, 21st Oct., 1822.

The enclosed extract of an enclosure in a despatch from Sir Charles Stuart, which I have received this morning, will show you that if Sir Robert Wilson's negotiation is known, it is not my fault.

The same mail has brought me a letter from Sir R. W. himself, of precisely the same date with that of his communication with the French Prefect of Police.

I will religiously perform the engagement which I made with you, not to turn the information which I have received to the disadvantage of those who have employed Sir R. W. But I think you will hardly expect me, after the disclosure which has been made, to continue a negotiation through that channel, and you will not consider me as answerable for secrecy upon a matter of which, though it comes to me by the same post from Sir R. Wilson, I become possessed independently of his confidence, through the ordinary channel of official correspondence.

I am, dear Holland, ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

## VII.

Extract of a letter from Sir R. Wilson to Sir C. Stuart, dated Paris, 14th Oct., 1822:—

"I stated (to the Préfet de Police) that my intention had been to go to Spain, being charged to negotiate the independence of Colombia, by the Colombian Minister, and that I was awaiting some advices from Spain and England."

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 25th Oct., 1822.

I have received his Majesty's commands to call the attention of your Grace to a subject which gave rise to a correspondence in the beginning of this year between his Majesty's Ambassador in the Netherlands and this office, copies of which correspondence are herewith transmitted for your Grace's information.

Subsequently to this correspondence, the tariff of Netherland duties and prohibitions, therein alluded to, has been enacted into a law, and published; and a copy thereof has been recently transmitted to his Majesty's government by Mr. Chad, the King's minister in Holland.

The enclosed extract of that tariff points out the several articles, the transit of which to the interior of the continent by the rivers of the Netherlands has been thus prohibited. This prohibition on the part of his Netherland Majesty appears to the King's government to militate directly against that part of the act of the congress of Vienna, which establishes the free navigation of rivers passing through more than one State. The arrangement provided in that act had for its object the entire freedom of commerce; this object is distinctly expressed in the second article of the general regulations for the free navigation of rivers, and in the first article of the annexe "concerning the navigation of the Rhine."

Your Grace will readily perceive that, if it shall be permitted to the maritime power having control over the mouth of a river, to shut that mouth against certain articles, there can be no reason why the exercise of this power should not be carried to any extent; and thus the object of the act of Congress in this respect be completely frustrated.

His Majesty's government, therefore, deem it requisite that your Grace should represent to the Powers now assembled at Verona—parties to the act of Congress of Vienna—the opinion which they entertain on the subject of the prohibitions of this tariff; and urge the expediency of taking steps to remedy the evil already existing, and to prevent the recurrence of similar enactments in future.

It is left to your Grace to decide in what manner this object can best be obtained: whether by a joint declaration on the part of the principal Powers who signed the act of Congress, or otherwise.

Your Grace is well aware of the peculiar interest which the Crown of Prussia must take in this affair, from the position of a considerable part of its territory, and consequently you will best be able to judge of the expediency of previous communication upon it with the ministers of that Court at Verona, as well as, possibly, with those of France and the other States whose territories border upon the Rhine.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

## [ENCLOSURES.]

## I.

COPY of a DESPATCH from LORD CLANCARTY, dated the Hague,  
8th January, 1822.

MY LORD,

By the last mail, in my despatch No. I, a provisional answer was given to Mr. Planta's, No. 22, of the 27th December ultimo.

I have since learned that a petition was presented to the second chamber on the 23rd November last, by the owners of iron-mines and foundries in the province of Namur, for a further protecting duty on the importation of foreign iron, and this is probably the fact to which the despatch already cited alludes.

What may be the course intended to be pursued on this particular subject by the executive government, with whom it rests to propose all new matter to the legislature, it is difficult to say, because the new tariff of duties under the proposed finance system is not yet arranged, but is actually in secret discussion before the Council of State, and between the King and his ministers; a subject upon which, as I have some reason to believe, all the members of the King's council are not quite of the same opinion.

I am far from thinking it unlikely that upon this very subject of iron it may ultimately be determined to put a further protecting duty in favour of the home manufacturer, or perhaps even to go further, even to prohibitory duty, or prohibition altogether. For though by the principle of the law of the 12th July last, (the foundation upon which the whole fabric of the new finance system is to rest), 6 per cent. is generally laid down as the maximum of protecting duty, yet your Lordship is aware that an exception is reserved upon some (and unspecified) articles, which may very well be made to cover any excess of duty on the import of foreign iron, even to prohibition. And if this last effect is to be worked out by this government through the medium of high duty, however questionable the policy, I am not aware that we could directly make any effectual remonstrance against it, it being certainly open to them to afford a monopoly to their own wares in their own markets, if they shall be so disposed; and with that jealousy common to all lesser States, and which more or less exists even here with reference to us, particularly in commercial concerns, I should fear that any direct remonstrance on our part in an event of this kind would have the effect of confirming the adoption, and accelerating rather than retarding the execution of measures of this sort.

But a matter of much more serious consequence than the opening or closing of the Netherland markets to our commodities appears to me to be eventually involved in this, and to be directly connected with the consideration of the new finance system of this country, and that is, the transit trade (by the rivers passing through the Netherlands) as referable to us and to other nations.

Your Lordship has already been made acquainted with the principle laid down in the law of the 12th July last, that a prohibition shall be laid upon the passage of all such foreign goods in transit as shall or may be prohibited from the markets of the Netherlands.

A proposal has lately (18th December, 1821) been made by the King to the second chamber, in execution of the new finance system, entitled "*Projet de loi concernant la réception des droits d'entrée, de sortie, et de transit, et du droit de tonnage des navires de mer.*"

This project comprises all the regulations for the custom-house under the new system; it is divided into 22 chapters and 241 articles.

In the chapter upon transit the above principle is again affirmed and acted upon. To understand how the adoption of this principle would particularly

affect our trade and manufactures, we must wait till the tariff of duties and prohibitions, which I have already said is still undecided, shall be made known.

Under the old law (still in force till the details of the new system shall be completed by the Legislature) the foreign articles prohibited from *importation* inwards were few, though some of them of material importance, if this prohibition from import should be extended to prevent their transit, which, except in three apparently immaterial instances, has not been the case.

These articles thus prohibited from importation inwards under the law now still in operation, are :—

Casks (new empty of all sorts).

Barrels (herring) and staves adapted to herring barrels or half barrels.

Barrels (empty herring).

Cattle, swine, during August, September, October, November, December, January, February, March, and April.

Copper (blanks).

Earthenware.—Foreign *tobacco-pipes*, with the marks of "inland manufacture."

Fish.—Foreign herrings, either fresh, cured, or salted.

Red herrings (foreign).

Paper (foreign) with the names or marks of the manufactories of this country.

N.B.—The transit of this article is likewise prohibited.

Spices.—Cloves\*, mother cloves, dust of spices\*. N.B.—The transit of the spices marked \* is prohibited.

Wood.—Willows fit to make hoops of, ozier hoops (bundles of), dye wood (ground).

Supposing the addition of no other articles than those above enumerated to the list of prohibitions inwards, yet the operation of the new system will be equally to prohibit them all in transit by the rivers passing through this country.

When it is considered that to these any other articles may be added by which the transit of these will also be prohibited, and the likelihood which may arise of this government, either from mistaken policy or from being urged thereto by its subjects, being induced to lean to the side of prohibition, and with a view to monopolize markets for its own fabrics, to place iron and hardware, or other heavy articles, among the number of those prohibited, the great and undue advantage (however in other respects of doubtful policy) which might be thus afforded to the manufacturers of this country, and detriment of ours, seems to me to call for the serious and immediate attention of his Majesty's government.

I had always considered that that part of the Act of Congress, with its several annexes incorporated therewith, which treats of the navigation of rivers passing into or through more than one State, had for its object the entire freedom of commerce; and indeed it seems so expressed in the general context, as also in the 2nd article of the general regulations for the free navigation of rivers, and in the 1st article of the annexe, "concerning the navigation of the Rhine," and consequently that the prohibition of free passage to any particular species of goods in transit cannot be legally effected by any one of the river States, and it may even be doubted whether *all* the bordering States together would be competent under these stipulations (in that form at least, however they might be able practically to effect the same result) to decree prohibition, because such an act would be manifestly *unfavourable to the commerce of other nations*.

It may, indeed, and I doubt not will be said by this government that this reasoning would equally militate against the exaction of transit duties, but

this is not so; a free port does not conclude the perception of duties; the duty arises on the sea, not on the river, and to declare that such and such articles shall be prohibited from entering the river with a view to passing into another State is to arrogate a control over the internal affairs of that State, which however admitted in similar cases prior to the Act of Congress, it was one of the special objects of that great treaty to prevent in future. But then it will be said that if the right of exacting a transit duty is recognised, it follows as of course that the prohibitory power exists through the medium of a prohibitory duty. But neither is this so. To argue from the use to the abuse of a right is not admissible; the maxim that a right pushed to the extreme becomes an injury is a maxim of the law of nations. If the King of Denmark, for instance, should attempt directly to prohibit the entry of particular articles through the Sound into the Baltic, or to raise the Sound duties so as to operate the same effect, is it to be argued that all other nations, as well without as within that sea, are to acquiesce in such an assumption of power? Since the Act of Congress the reasoning appears to me to be generally the same with respect to the navigation of the rivers relative to which it stipulates.

If your Lordship should see this matter in the light in which I confess it strikes me, I should humbly take the liberty of recommending it to your earliest and most serious consideration. Upon a point of such magnitude it would be impossible for me to stir without being authorised so to do by instructions from his Majesty.

The present is the time most fitting for acting on this subject, if to be acted upon at all. After the laws for the execution of the new system shall have passed the Legislature here, it might be highly embarrassing to this government (even with the best inclinations) to propose others in contradiction to its original propositions.

As the tariff of duties and prohibitions has not yet been arranged, but is at this moment, as I have already observed, under discussion, it would indeed be highly desirable, if his Majesty's Government shall be of opinion that any representations should be made to this Court upon the principles they have put forward with respect to the transit trade, that I should be honoured with your Lordship's instructions thereon immediately,—if possible, even before the decision and consequent publication shall have taken place here of the details of duties and prohibitions.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CLANCARTY.

## II.

COPY of a DESPATCH from the MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY to the  
EARL OF CLANCARTY.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 12th Feb., 1822.

Your Excellency's despatches to No. 11 inclusive have been received, and laid before the King.

The project of law (since generally enacted) for the new system of finance in the Netherlands, and the explanatory papers which were transmitted in your Lordship's despatches of 4th of May and 3rd of July, 1821, have been attentively considered by his Majesty's government.

Without entering into details upon this measure, as referable to its interior operation, and which, of course, are foreign to this country, there are nevertheless, some observations which relate to the interests of foreign countries, and particularly of Great Britain, which seem to be called for by this measure.

I particularly allude to the principles laid down :—

1st. Upon the subject of duties on foreign articles imported into the Netherlands for internal consumption.

2dly. Upon the transit trade, or passage of foreign goods through the Netherlands, with an ulterior destination.

Upon the first of these points, the maximum of 6 per cent. appears to afford a fair protection to the internal manufacturer of the country, without altogether preventing articles of a similar description from entering into a reasonable competition with them; and we are not entitled as a matter of right to complain of the exception by which, in specific cases, the power is reserved of exceeding this maximum. It is, however, hoped that the exercise of this power will be rarely and most cautiously resorted to, and in no event so as to prevent the operation of a fair and reasonable competition. The commercial views of his Majesty's government as referable to foreign States, seconded as they have already been by parliament, being sincerely liberal, nothing would be so likely to defeat their object as the adoption of a contrary system by friendly States; and nothing would be so much regretted by the King's government as that, while endeavouring to give more freedom to trade, they should find themselves driven into petty contentions respecting counteracting duties with other governments, by which all must be ultimately sufferers.

Upon the second point, that of the transit duty of 3 per cent., I am glad to observe that it has not escaped the notice of the Netherlands government; indeed, it is so expressed in the explanatory paper that but few articles would well bear so high a duty, and it has doubtless been felt that the trade by transit, with the employment it affords and the expenditure it occasions, is an absolute and clear gain to a country so fortunate as to possess the channels through which it is conducted.

But there is one thing connected with this trade, as laid down in the new system, which appears to his Majesty's government open to objection, and that is, the prohibition of the passage of such foreign goods in transit as are or may be prohibited from the interior consumption of the country.

The policy of establishing such a prohibition, even if the right itself were as clear as it appears dubious, may well be questioned. This, however, is a part of the subject upon which it is not for his Majesty's government, but for that of the King of the Netherlands, to decide. I shall therefore merely observe that the force of the alleged reason upon which such a suggestion seems to have been entertained (*viz.*, that of the difficulty stated to exist of preventing a contraband trade into the interior by the re-lading of such articles for internal use), appears to be greatly overrated; and that it is to be apprehended that the only results of an attempt to establish a prohibition would be an increased activity in attempts to evade it.

But the power itself, as I have suggested, may be deemed more than doubtful, at least as far as relates to the principles of that part of the Act of Congress which regards the free navigation of rivers passing through more than one State, and particularly where the other States have not been consulted. At all events, it would be highly desirable to avoid, if possible, the stirring of this question at present; and as it is manifestly to the advantage of the King of the Netherlands by every means to encourage the transit trade through his kingdom, and most especially when, from circumstances perhaps unavoidable, it has for so long a period been directed into other channels, it is hoped that his Majesty will reconsider this point prior to the enactment of those laws which are to give force and efficiency to his new finance system.

I have thought it advisable to state these observations to your Excellency at this time. There may perhaps be others with which it does not appear to me to be necessary at present to trouble you; but the principal object I have had



in view is that you should use your discretion in communicating these remarks confidentially to the King of the Netherlands, who will, no doubt, with that liberality for which H.M. is distinguished, do justice to the motives by which they have been dictated. Your Excellency is likewise authorised to make a similar confidential communication, with his Majesty's permission, to the Baron de Nagel, and to such of the other ministers of the Netherlands government as H.M. may think proper to point.

I have, &c.,

LONDONDERRY.

### III.

LIST of ARTICLES of which the IMPORT, EXPORT, or TRANSIT is PROHIBITED by the late TARIFF in the NETHERLANDS.

	Import.	Export.	Transit.
Bois fenillard, préparé en tout ou en partie en cerceaux, échalats, gaules, perches, et autres plants de bois feuillard de toute espèce .. .. .	Prohibés.	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Saules propres à être travaillés en cerceaux	Prohibés.	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Cerces et cerceaux d'osier rouge, longs de 22 palmes à 26 palmes 7 pouces .. ..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Cerces et cerceaux de saules .. .. .	Prohibés.	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Donves préparées pour barils à harengs ..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Bois de teiture moulu .. .. .	Prohibé.	Prohibés.	Prohibé.
Cendres de savonneries et de saleries ..	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Cordages, vieux et usés, ne pouvant plus servir à la navigation, ainsi que ceux coupés en pièces ou réduits en filasse ..	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Rognures de cuir et de peaux .. .. .	Prohibé.	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Cuivre en flacon pour les monnoies .. ..	Prohibé.	..	Prohibé.
Drilles et chiffons, matière première du papier. Cet article comprend également vieux papier mis au rebut; vieux linge et vêtements de toile usés, qui se vendent au poids quand ils sont d'une livre pesant ou au-dessus; cordages vieux et usés (comme dessus); filets vieux et usés .. .. .	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Engrais, non compris le cendre des foyers ..	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Fer (mineral de) .. .. .	..	Prohibé.	Prohibé.
Vieux fer, ou ferraille .. .. .	Prohibé.	..	Prohibé.
Fil pour filets à harengs .. .. .	..	Prohibé.	Prohibé.
Filets, vieux et usés .. .. .	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Futailles neuves et vides de toute espèce ..	Prohibés.	..	Prohibés.
Barils à harengs, vides .. .. .	Prohibés.	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Garance. Rôsin séché et broyé, pourvu qu'il ait subi l'opération dans les fours à garance, et que pour preuve de cela les ballots ou barils portent les marques de ces fours .. .. .	..	Prohibé.	Prohibé.
— non séché, ou séché et broyé hors les fours à garance .. .. .	..	Prohibé.	Prohibé.
Oreillons ou orillons .. .. .	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Os de bœufs, de vaches, et d'autres animaux .. .. .	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Pifus de terre à fumer .. .. .	Prohibés.	..	Prohibés.
Paille .. .. .	..	Prohibé.	..

LIST OF ARTICLES—continued.

	Import.	Export.	Transit.
Papier portant les noms ou les marques caractéristiques des papeteries du royaume des Pays-Bas .. .. .	Prohibé.	..	Prohibé.
Vieux papier mis au rebut, et rognures de papier .. .. .	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Parchemin (rognures de) .. .. .	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Marne ou pierres à chaux, blanches ou bleues .. .. .	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.
Poisson non provenant de la pêche nationale .. .. .	Prohibé.	..	Prohibé.
Poisson fumé ou séché .. .. .	Prohibé.	..	Prohibé.
Hareng sec ou fumé .. .. .	Prohibé.	..	Prohibé.
Saumure .. .. .	..	..	Prohibé.
Sel brut, par les frontières maritimes .. .. .	..	..	Prohibé.
Sel brut, par les frontières de terre .. .. .	..	Prohibé.	Prohibé.
Sel raffiné .. .. .	..	..	Prohibé.
Sirup mélasse brute, importée des pays de l'Europe et par des vaisseaux étrangers .. .. .	Prohibé.	..	Prohibé.
Mélasse épurée .. .. .	Prohibé.	..	Prohibé.
Sirup de sucre et de toute autre espèce .. .. .	Prohibé.	..	Prohibé.
Thé, &c., de toute espèce .. .. .	..	..	Prohibés.
Verres cassés ou groisil .. .. .	..	Prohibés.	Prohibés.

*Mr. Hill to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

Turin, 25th Oct., 1822.

His Majesty's secretary of legation at this court, Mr. Percy, has just arrived from England with a bag for your Grace, from the Foreign Office.

As Mr. Percy appears much fatigued after his journey, having travelled night and day, I forward the bag by Mr. Hamilton (Lord Boyne's only son), who is attached to this mission. Mr. Hamilton returns immediately, in case your Grace should have any commands for Milan or this place, but will of course wait for orders.

I take this opportunity of conveying extracts or duplicates of my latest despatches, the greater part of the contents of which are not known to the bearer, as I have been obliged to be under more than usual caution respecting the subject of Prince Carignan. They were prepared to be carried by Count Palorme, his Sardinian Majesty's Envoy at Vienna, who sets off for Verona to-night, and to whom I shall give a letter of introduction to your Grace, as I have done already to Count la Tour, who sets off to-morrow. The King leaves this place on Monday, but will be four days on the road. It is not impossible that I may follow the King, and I believe Mr. Canning thought I was at Verona, yet I am obliged to wait, on account of some instructions I have just received regarding the Vaudois, or Protestants of this country, and for whom it is hoped your Grace will interest yourself, before the conclusion of the conferences, with the Sardinian Ministers.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, my Lord,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

WILLIAM HILL.

## [ENCLOSURES.]

## I.

*William Hill, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.*

(Extract.)

MY LORD,

Turin, 18th Sept., 1822.

One of the greatest grievances in this country, arising from the nature of the government, has been the influence of the Palace, as it is called, or of some personal favourite of the Sovereign. Count Roburent, although a very honest man, and much attached to his royal master, was not a man of talent, and by his continual interference with the ministers did incredible mischief in the reign of King Victor. The Marquis Villermosa, the present favourite, is a Sardinian of considerable abilities, and it was from the first expected that he would interfere and entirely govern the King. He had long acted as minister to his Majesty, when Duke of Genevois and Viceroy of Sardinia, but there were some hopes when the Marquis retired to his native island, several months since, that he would confine himself to the interests of that country alone. These hopes were strengthened when during his absence King Victor suddenly arrived, and Count de la Tour was named minister for Foreign Affairs, as it appeared evident he had not been consulted on these two important events. Since his late return, nevertheless, his influence is become decidedly manifest, and the Piedmontese are proportionally alarmed and disgusted.

I will not trouble your Lordship with the many details which are offered in proof of this influence, but confine myself to the assertion that he attempts to thwart General La Tour in all his views, and is in such open rupture with the father-in-law of the general, who is now Viceroy in Sardinia, that the latter had demanded his recall; but the quarrel has subsided, through the intervention of his Majesty. The Marquis Villermosa is the chief of those persons to whom I alluded in my despatch No. 21 of last year as being of haughty and despotic tempers.

General La Tour, previous to his present conviction of the Marquis's disposition towards him, had, with the view to defeat for ever the influence of the Palace, attempted to submit to the King some liberal plans and modifications, the most extensive of which would have been only the adoption of a council of state; and when the Count wished to present his memoir on that subject, his Majesty stopped him by saying that if there was anything in it which contributed to make the slightest alteration in the manner of government pursued by his ancestors, it would not be worth his while to read it, being determined not to make the smallest change. It was in vain that M. de la Tour urged that there were only some slight ameliorations proposed, and occasioning no greater innovations in the government than had been wisely conceded in the laws and courts of justice. His Majesty replied, he was the last of the main branch of his house; that those who came after him might do as they pleased, but that it never should be said of him that he had been the first to give consent to such institutions.

M. de la Tour certainly thinks that his Majesty's opinion would be against a council of state, even without exterior influence. But he is equally convinced that the Marquis Villermosa, who, it is supposed, will accompany the King to the congress, is against the plan, which would completely defeat his power.

If this great measure of a council of state could be carried, and which M. de la Tour wished to be on an extensive scale, the Marquis Villermosa, from his high rank as Captain of the Royal Guards, and Knight of the Supreme Order

of the Annonciade, would certainly be of the number; but he would have but one voice, and be continually outvoted by the King's ministers and other members; and your Lordship will readily conceive, M. de la Tour is not less ardent in his plan from these considerations, and what has lately passed, as I have above related.

After the events which have occurred in this country, and the great moderation shown by the principal part of the nobility, it is painful to reflect that so small a boon as this should be refused, except at the congress his Majesty's illustrious Allies should succeed in their advice upon this subject. I am aware of no institution, except of a still more liberal nature, which would conduce so much to the pacification of the country. With this, together with the promulgation of new laws, the departure of the Austrians, the diminution of taxes, and occasional extensions to the amnesty, the whole country would be calmed, the liberals even satisfied, and the ultra-liberals disarmed.

I do most anxiously hope the congress will be more successful than General de la Tour, who will not be even allowed to utter his own wishes regarding the council of state.

Upon the former occasion of a congress at Laybach, it will be perceived by my despatches that the King created embarrassment by the threat of abdication. It is not thought now that his Majesty would repeat such a threat; but I confess, sooner than not carry the point of this council (trifling as the concession seems to be when the great control his Majesty would still have over it is considered), I should be almost prepared for the alternative, however deplorable, as the great question of Prince Carignan, on which certainly much would depend, must now, at all events, be settled; and in fact, I cannot but be of opinion that the council, as a permanent establishment, is of equal weight and importance.

According to your Lordship's instructions, I shall forward duplicates or extracts of this despatch to his Grace the Duke of Wellington, at Vienna or Verona, particularly as it appeared to me, that although Count La Tour did not venture to say as much, he would not be sorry to find himself pressed upon the subject of a council of state by his Majesty's august Allies at the Congress.

WILLIAM HILL.

## II.

*William Hill, Esq., to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

(Extract.)

SIR,

Turin, 12th Oct., 1822.

In my last despatch from Genoa I mentioned that Count La Tour was one of the few distinguished persons who were favourable to the cause of Prince Carignan. Accordingly, I found his Excellency under the persuasion that he had made some impression upon the King's mind in favour of the Prince's return. He has exercised his good sense and judgment in not endeavouring to exculpate his Serene Highness, but had argued upon the case solely as a question of policy. The King's answer was simply to the effect that he should discard all personal feeling, and leave the question as it related to the advantage or disadvantage of Piedmont, Italy, and Europe, to be discussed and decided by the Congress; but I have to remark that even this reply of H.M. was an admission much more freely given than during the time of M. Laval, whom I have also seen, and who appears now to be of opinion that the whole extent of the King's wishes, as described in my former despatches, has not much chance of being fully gratified. This opinion of M. de Laval arises merely from the cir-

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cumstance of the negotiation having fallen into the hands of M. de La Tour, and he concludes of course that any exertions against the Prince will be conducted with less energy, or, to use his own term, "mollement." In fact, in my earliest despatches of last year, I made the remark that a change of ministers might not be unfavourable to H.S.H. There are many who believe that the King will still refuse the immediate return of the Prince; but probably after having asserted his independence in this respect, introduce H.S.H. suddenly, when it may appear his Majesty's own act, as in the case of King Victor. I am assured, however, by Count Roburent, who (from his hourly opportunities of knowing, through the latter Sovereign, as well as from King Charles himself the sentiments of their Majesties) I think still better authority, that the inveteracy, or animosity, remained as strong as ever on the part of the King, which nothing but the overruling influence of the Congress could control; and H.M. has been heard to say that if ever the Prince obtains his pardon there, it will not be owing to General La Tour's exertions now, but to the advice and manner by which the General engaged H.S.H. to join the army at Novara, and where so much was done to recover the Prince's character.

The Pope was induced some time ago to write to the King, and to enclose a letter from the Prince to his Holiness, in which H.S.H. humbly begs for his powerful intercession. It was by a very long intrigue that the Pope was prevailed upon to send this letter. . . . The Prince has also made every effort to induce the Court of St. Petersburg to sustain his cause, but M. de La Tour says that although he knows such efforts have been made, he was ignorant in what manner, except it might have been through the Russian legation at Florence. M. de Laval declares his conviction that the replies have not been satisfactory to H.S.H. I must, however, conclude, both from my conversations with MM. de Laval and La Tour, that the Prince's interests are rather in a better train than they were. M. de La Tour has expressed great alarm to me at the probable effect any discussion at the Congress might have upon the subject. He seemed to think it not impossible that the Prince might, by some indirect means to secure his succession, offer the Austrians the relinquishment of the Simplon or the Novarese, or some other bribe; and I am told in some societies where there is any suspicion of these transactions, the Piedmontese noblemen complain that their monarchy is likely to be at auction, from the chance of the King's offering so much to keep the Prince out, and the Prince offering more to remain in the succession. It will be recollected that M. de Laval's great reliance was that ultimately Austria would be the first of the Allies who would support the King's views against the Prince. M. de La Tour seems to be of the same opinion, conceiving it to be rather for the interest of that Power; but he says, apparently rejoicing at the circumstance, that the Austrian Government has latterly expressed itself as being placed in a very delicate situation, on account of the former reports of their desiring the succession of the Archduke of Modena, and that they should find great difficulty in initiating any proceedings against H.S.H. But I wait with impatience for the arrival of Count Pralorne, who is to accompany General La Tour to Verona, and is now daily expected here from Vienna, when much more will be learnt upon the subject.

WILLIAM HILL.

### III.

*William Hill, Esq., to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

(Extract)

SIR,

Turin, 17th Oct., 1822.

Since I wrote my despatch this morning, the Count Pralorne has informed me confidentially that his royal master in person will be under the necessity of

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initiating the proceedings against Prince Carignan before his angust Allies, and that Prince Metternich will support his Sardinian Majesty's views as efficaciously as the delicate situation regarding the Archduke of Modena will permit.

This, in the Count's opinion, is the most that can be done, and moreover, he is persuaded that the best chance the Allied Sovereigns would have, should they agree with his Sardinian Majesty, would be to induce his Serene Highness Prince Carignan voluntarily to renounce his pretensions in favour of his son; otherwise the question of legitimacy, as Prince Carignan has never undergone the form of a trial, will entirely defeat the King's purpose, more particularly as Prince Metternich has latterly so much supported that question; nevertheless, Count Pralorme is decidedly of opinion with Count La Tour, that Prince Metternich will either directly or indirectly give as much support as possible to his Sardinian Majesty, but nothing will induce the King to suffer the Prince's return during his Majesty's life.

As this appears to me the clearest view of the intended transaction, I have hastened to add it to my despatches. The Count is also of opinion that no communication could have been made to the English embassy at Vienna. M. de Pralorme confirmed Count La Tour's account of the interest attempted to be made by the Prince at St. Petersburg, with the addition that his Serene Highness had addressed a letter directly to his Imperial Majesty, and received a cold reply.

M. de Pralorme informed me that the report mentioned in my despatch No. 21, of a subsidy being paid to Austria in case her troops were withdrawn, was not true as far as this government was concerned, but that in passing through Milan he had heard the question discussed by some high Austrian authorities of that place, and did not wonder at its being believed here.

The Count also most confidentially expressed his anxiety about a council of state, and did not doubt that if the Allies should succeed in convincing his royal master that his prerogative would be scarcely affected by it, that his Majesty would not hesitate to sanction the institution.

The Count was under no alarm as to there being any attempts made to induce Austria by any offer to be favourable or unfavourable to the interests of Prince Carignan. He is himself, though he has doubts of his royal master's success, entirely against the Prince and his party.

WILLIAM HILL.

#### IV.

*William Hill, Esq., to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

(Extract.)

SIR,

Turin, 17th Oct., 1822.

The Count de Pralorme, the Sardinian envoy at Vienna mentioned in my last despatch, arrived here a few days since, and M. de La Tour has informed me, though with much hesitation and apparent reluctance, that it is not impossible Prince Metternich may assist the King's views at Verona against Prince Carignan. M. de La Tour, however, begged to observe that such only was the impression left upon Count de Pralorme's mind when he quitted Vienna, for he had nothing of an official and decided nature, and his Excellency mentioned that the only reason why he coincided with M. de Pralorme's opinion was that it appeared to the former decidedly for Austrian interests to do so. The General added that he was proportionally alarmed on this account, as it might lead to a system of continual interference of that Power in Piedmontese affairs, the very

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object, with a view to a friendly intelligence between the two governments, most to be avoided, and against which the Piedmontese have so long contended.

The Count Laval informed me most confidentially that when at last, after resigning his office, and leaving the Archives in possession of Count La Tour, he was ordered by his royal master also to give him the bag containing the instructions to the Piedmontese Foreign ministers against Prince Carignan, and their despatches upon that subject, Count La Tour's astonishment was overwhelming. I have therefore to repeat that whatever suspicion prevails, no person yet positively knows the full extent of his Majesty's exertions on this question; although my colleagues are aware that the King will make every effort against the Prince's return during his Majesty's life, and conclude his wishes are carried to a greater length, still they have no idea of the progress his ambassadors and envoys are making at different courts, or that they have decided instructions for the purpose; and I have reason to believe, though M. de Laval never distinctly avowed it, that his Sardinian Majesty is informed that I am the only one entrusted upon this subject.

The Marquis Villermosa, mentioned in my despatch No. 25, certainly accompanies the King to the Congress, and this is the more remarkable as he is not now on service at the Palace. As it is well known by my colleagues that he has the confidence of the King, it is not impossible, when his Majesty and the Marquis have different opinions from Count La Tour, such as the question upon Prince Carignan, that some Foreign ministers at the Congress may address themselves directly to the favourite, which would occasion much confusion and intrigue.

The Marquis St. Marsan does not accompany the King; if he had done so M. de La Tour would certainly have been placed in a false position, as from former habits the ministers of the Allies might naturally have consulted the Marquis upon any difficult emergency. M. de La Tour was so well convinced of this that he told me, if the Marquis had gone with the King, he should undoubtedly have begged that he might at once be joined with him in the negotiation. But his Excellency, who has so lately been at open enmity with the Marquis Villermosa, is on terms of friendship with the Marquis St. Marsan, and has the greatest respect for his abilities. Nevertheless, Count Pralorne, who is son-in-law of the Marquis St. Marsan, I have already said accompanies the General. . . .

I must not conclude this despatch without mentioning Count La Tour's admission, that if Prince Carignan had a more numerous family, and the male heirs of a more advanced age, he should not have such apprehensions upon the question; but under the present circumstances, setting aside his personal feelings for his Serene Highness, he felt that the formation of a Regency, in the event of the King's demise, would open the road to every species of intrigue and be attended with much danger to the country. On the other hand, the Court, M. de Laval, and the great majority of the nobility, would be willing to risk any alternative, under the conviction that the return of Prince Carignan would be a much more serious evil than any other which could be contemplated.

In addition to the voluminous despatches I have already written upon this subject, I cannot illustrate the extravagant view entertained by the Court better than by mentioning that Count Roburent, who has just left my room, after having spoken in the most violent terms against Count Revel (although one of the greatest enemies of his Serene Highness) for not having taken upon himself the responsibility of the strongest measures against the Prince, said he had betrayed his King and country by such forbearance, but nevertheless, if the Prince returned, he would certainly be assassinated by some of the Ultra-Liberals

he had abandoned to their fate. The examinations of the State prisoners at Milan still continue, and it is repeated that more evidence has appeared against his Serene Highness. Count La Tour and M. de Pralorme being ignorant whether Prince Metternich has communicated to the English embassy at Vienna his intentions regarding Prince Carignan, although they may be known by this time to his Grace the Duke of Wellington, I have thought it my duty, upon a matter of such importance, and which will make so great a sensation in Italy, if not in Europe, to forward a courier, in case his Majesty's government should not have already given a decided opinion upon this question, from the uncertainty of its being promoted by any Power, which now seems removed. Under the impression that I should have been earlier obliged to send a courier upon this subject, and not to compromise M. de La Tour by risking the despatch No. 25 through the post-office, I retained it for this occasion, as the institution of the Council of State is another important object upon which his Majesty's government might also desire to give an opinion, through the Duke of Wellington, at Verona.

WILLIAM HILL.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 25th Oct., 1822.

I am not without an apprehension that you may think the instruction to Lord Strangford, which I enclose in my separate despatch, something too unyielding to Russia. But in truth the demand is a preposterous one, and one which, if the Emperor is justified in making it (which I doubt), I do not see with what face we could support, at least with the earnestness and sincerity which alone could make our support efficacious.

Is it not obviously an afterthought? Is it not a suggestion of their counsellors, whom the success of our previous mediation at Constantinople has disappointed of a war? And yet is it possible for the Emperor, who quarrelled upon the ground of treaties, and professed himself to be satisfied if treaties were fulfilled, to quarrel again, and proceed to extremities, on a point on which he has neither treaties nor right on his side?

I have been much perplexed on this matter by the apparent leaning of your opinion as compared with Lord Strangford's, and I confess my own: and the rather as I have nobody at hand with whom I could consult upon it. I have, however, written to Lord Liverpool, and I send you his answer; and Robinson has called in to-day, whose view I find in complete concurrence with mine.

After all, however, if there are any forcible reasons which you know, and I do not, for suspending the instruction to Lord Strangford, I put it in your power to do so, by enclosing it to you under flying seal; and I will of course sanction your use of that power. But I cannot imagine any circumstances under which it would be advisable to give him now an instruction of a contrary tendency.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.



## [ENCLOSURE.]

*Lord Liverpool to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR CANNING,

Walmer Castle, 24th Oct., 1822.

½ p. 11. P.M.

I have just received your letter, with the despatches from Lord Strangford. I had written to you, by the post, the impressions of my mind in consequence of the letter which I received from you on the navigation of the Black Sea. Strangford's despatch, No. 151, has certainly shaken the opinion I then gave particularly as it appears by it that the commerce of Russia is not *obstructed*, that it is actually carried on by British and other ships, and that the question is, whether it shall be carried on by us or by the ships of other powers. I have no doubt, likewise, that the object of Russia is to protect the Greek navigation; and the Porte, under existing circumstances, may naturally resist any such endeavour.

Strangford's despatch, No. 152, betrays, I think, a considerable degree of temper, provoked, I admit; by the injustice of the accusation against him. I think, however, he reasons the whole matter too much as if the difference in the Russian politics was between the Emperor and a party in the Russian government. I believe that what the Emperor has to contend against is not a party in his government only, but the general feeling of the Russian nation.

If you are upon the whole of opinion, however, that we had better not interfere in favour of Russia, in this question of navigation in the Black Sea, I see sufficiently now all the difficulties to which such interference may expose us with our own subjects to concur in your opinion.

We must only look seriously, in this case, to the probability of a war between Russia and the Porte, and to the consequences of such war; and I am, perhaps, more deeply impressed with this consideration from entertaining the opinion that the success of Russia in such a war is as certain as success can be in any war.

I do not look to the result of this success with the same apprehensions as many do, as far as British interests are concerned; but it will open an entire new scene and create entirely new interests, and indirectly may operate unfavourably at this time upon other continental interests.

I hope I have made myself intelligible. I would not detain the messenger.

Ever yours,

LIVERPOOL.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 25th Oct., 1822.

Lord Strangford will have communicated to your Grace his late despatches from Vienna.

I lose no time in signifying to Lord Strangford the impression produced on the mind of his Majesty's government by his Excellency's despatch, No. 151, on the subject of the new demand of Russia respecting the navigation of the Black Sea.

I enclose my despatch to Lord Strangford under flying seal to your Grace, to be delivered or forwarded to him by your Grace, both that you may be apprised of the instructions under which Lord Strangford will

have to act, and that your Grace may be enabled to prepare the Russian ministers for a course which may not be altogether agreeable to them.

The more one considers the proposition for our interference to obtain for the Russian flag in the Black Sea the authorised protection of unprivileged navigation, the more hopeless and embarrassing it appears for us to urge it as an object of negotiation, and the more unjustifiable on the part of Russia as a cause of war.

It is therefore most earnestly hoped that your Grace will be able to divert the Emperor of Russia from the desire to impose upon the British Embassy a task at once so unpromising and so inconsistent with the high tone of right which has pervaded our former negotiations, and from the design which there seems too much reason to believe his Imperial Majesty's councillors entertain, of founding a new cause of war on a question so inferior both in political magnitude and in moral impression to those which have been, through our intervention, happily arranged.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 25th Oct., 1822.

Since I had the honour of addressing your Grace on the 15th instant on the subject of the affairs of Brazil, despatches have been received from Mr. Chamberlain, transmitting further documents published by the Prince Regent, declaring the absolute independence of that colony, copies of which are herewith enclosed for your Grace's information.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Mr. Henry Chamberlain to the Marquess of Londonderry.*

MY LORD, Rio de Janeiro, 19th Aug., 1822.

It has just been communicated to me from a quarter on which I can depend that this government transmits by this packet letters of credence as Minister Extraordinary to the Court of London to the Marechal Felisberto Caldeira Brant, who has for many months been a refugee in England from Bahia, whence he escaped in his Majesty's ship *Icarus*, a few days after the first revolution in that city. He is instructed to ascertain the feelings of his Majesty's Government respecting his reception in this character previous to taking any steps towards the delivery of his credentials, and should he find the present moment inauspicious, he is to retain them until a more favourable one is arrived, remaining in England during the mean time and corresponding with this government as its confidential agent.

— This gentleman is the first person and possessed the greatest influence in the

province and city of Bahia, where he was governor of the bank and commander-in-chief of the troops before the revolution. He is of ancient family and large fortune and estates, and had he come out to Rio, as was expected, the Prince Regent intended to have made him Secretary at War. The post is even still kept open in the uncertainty whether he may have left England before the despatches now sent reach him.

His eldest son, Captain Brant, who came from Falmouth in the *Lady Mary Pelham* packet, returned by her, charged with the despatches for his father, and will probably be authorised to act as agent for this government in case of the Marshal's absence.

Having known both these gentlemen intimately for some time, the Marshal during many years, I can speak to their political bias, and am happy to inform your Lordship that they are from principle attached to Great Britain. Such, indeed, was the warm inclination of the latter towards the English at Bahia, that he was occasionally in disgrace with the old government on that account.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HENRY CHAMBERLAIN.

## II.

*Mr. Henry Chamberlain to the Marquess of Londonderry.*

MY LORD,

Rio de Janeiro, 19th Aug., 1822.

The last great step towards the political independence of Brazil is at length taken. The Prince Regent's Manifesto to governments and friendly nations, dated the 6th instant, was made known to the world on the 15th, and has been received by the public with great satisfaction.

On the 17th I received, in common with the chargé d'affaires of Austria and France, and the consuls-general and consuls of the other Powers, the official note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which the enclosures (Nos. 1 and 2) are copy\* and translation, transmitting the printed manifesto, which, with its translation\* (Nos. 3 and 4), I have the honour likewise to enclose together with a few notes of explanation to throw light on some passages in the former. The papers mentioned in the official note, as relating to the manifesto and serving as illustrations thereof, consisted of the printed decrees, speeches, and proclamations, of all which I have already had the honour to forward translations in previous despatches.

The factious opposition to the orders of the Prince Regent, recalling the Governor of St. Paul's, turns out not to be of a political nature at all, but merely arising out of the disinclination on his part to quit a place of abode he liked, and the private views of some of the inferior officers of the government, whose family projects and conveniences would be deranged by his removal.

Everything is now quiet there; but the Prince Regent has, nevertheless, thought his presence might do good, and he accordingly left this city in the morning of the 15th, intending to perform the journey thither on horseback.

In the afternoon of that day there appeared a decree, dated the 13th, nominating the Princess Royal to preside over the state councils during his absence from the capital, which will last above a month. Another object of his journey, though this is not generally known, being to avoid celebrating the anniversaries of the revolution of Porto and Lisbon (24th August and 15th September), which, by a decree of the Cortes at Lisbon, are grand gala days at Court.

Enclosures Nos. 5 and 6 are copy\* and translation of the last-mentioned decree.

\* The translations only are given.

The Baron de Laguna and officers forming the military council of that detachment of the army, have lately transmitted to the Secretary at War a copy of their proclamation to the troops at Montevideo, accompanied by a letter explaining their motives for issuing it; of both which documents I beg permission to forward translations, enclosures Nos. 7 and 8.

This government either is or pretends to be much displeased with the proceeding, and has given orders not to pay the last nor any future drafts upon it for the supply and pay of the troops; and have further, it is said, renewed their orders to them to withdraw to Europe without delay. I have some doubts whether this anger be real, so far as regards the Baron de Laguna himself, and should not be surprised if it were put on, the more effectually to shield him against the Cortes of Lisbon; for, unless the general opinion be unfounded, he is wholly inclined towards the Brazilian cause, and only wishes so to manage affairs as not to embroil himself with that body.

The Syndic General of the Cis-Platine province has subsequently, on the 13th July, published what is called a Manifesto, showing a determination to adhere to the Prince Regent, of which, though unofficial, I beg leave to send a translation, enclosure No. 9, as being curious in itself and important under the present circumstances.

The Provisional Junta of Pernambuco has been forced by the people to declare officially its obedience and adhesion to the Prince Regent, and has sent an agent to Rio with the "Vera Acão," or Act of Proceedings on the occasion, from which it is unquestionably evident with what reluctance the President and members acquiesced in their wishes. This has, of course, given umbrage to the government here, and I learn that it is intended to procure the removal of the President Gervasio Perez Paria, and the nomination of some member of the noble and leading families of that province, the Cabalgantes or Albuquerque, to replace him in office.

Every exertion is at present making to put the army on a respectable footing, and the Prince Regent whilst here was indefatigable in his attentions to their improvement, being himself present almost every morning at their place of exercise, and taking an active part in their instruction.

The *Carolina* frigate and a line-of-battle ship are also in a state of preparation, and unusual efforts are making to get them both ready for sea without delay.

Your Lordship will readily conceive that these exertions of the Prince Regent and his government to support their independence, being entirely consonant to the inclinations of the Brazilians, meet with their loudest approbation, and that his Royal Highness's popularity continues unabated.

The 'Official Gazette' teems with addresses from all parts of the country filled with the expressions of gratitude to him for having remained in Brazil, and for having convoked a general legislative assembly: and I am bound in duty to assure your Lordship that these feelings, so far as I am able to judge, are genuine and spontaneous.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. CHAMBERLAIN.

### III.

TRANSLATION of the Manifesto of the Syndic Procurator General of Montevideo. Dated 13th July, 1822.

The General Syndic of this State to all the inhabitants.

To prevent the influence of the conspiring and seditious calumnies and alarms which are scandalously printed in No. 27 of the paper, entitled 'Pacifico

Oriental,' the Syndic Procurator-General of this State conceives it his duty to make known to all the inhabitants:—

That, judging it to be the first interest of this province to procure the sanction of her incorporation with the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and Algarves, on the basis agreed upon to avoid the dangers of delay and the contingencies of uncertainty, using the faculties inherent in the general Syndicate vested in him by the Congress Extraordinary, and in the fulfilment of his duties, he proposed in the superior Junta of the Royal Treasury the most excellent Baron de Laguna, the president and governor political chief of the State being present, the necessity for sending a deputy to the King and General Constituent Cortes of the monarchy for the interesting purpose of procuring a solemn decision upon such an important point; and that this proposal being unanimously approved, D. Lucas José Obes was appointed to the mission, and authorised by the General Syndic with powers and instructions.

That the corvette *General Lecor*, with the Deputy on board, having put into Rio de Janeiro, he there received orders from his Royal Highness the Prince Royal of the United Kingdom and Regent of Brazil to suspend his voyage to Lisbon and to communicate with the Minister Secretary of State respecting the object of his mission, that his Royal Highness might determine thereon in virtue of his powers.

That the Syndic General, being informed of this circumstance by advice from his delegate, authorised him to carry on his mission at that Court.

That his Royal Highness the Prince Royal of the United Kingdom and Regent of Brazil having manifested in all his decrees and proclamations the most solemn and firm resolution to preserve the unity of the monarchy, in which he is the first person interested, as the immediate successor to the Crown, and it appearing from the representation of the Deputies of the provinces of Brazil that the general wish of the people is directed to the constant preservation of that unity, upon honourable grounds, there is neither foundation nor motive for proposing or promoting dangerous innovations, which might compromise the dignity of the Prince, the decorum of the provinces of Brazil, and the tranquillity of this State; that, when the case happens, now unexpected, of an absolute emancipation of the kingdom of Brazil, it belongs to the Cisplatine State itself to decide upon its lot and fix its future destinies.

Finally, that the General Syndic of the State protests, in the most solemn manner, that so long as he is in possession of the people's powers, he will never again consent to their political and civil rights being attacked, nor the basis of the pact of incorporation violated, nor the public order disturbed.

THOMAS GARCIA DE ZENIGA.

Taken from the 'Correio do Rio,' No. 98, of the 10th August, 1822.

CHAMBERLAIN.

#### IV.

#### DECREE.

Being obliged to absent myself from this capital for more than a week, on a visit to the province of St. Paul's, and it behoving me, for the good of its inhabitants and of the individual and public security and tranquillity, that the ordinary course of business should not suffer from this my temporary absence, I am pleased that my ministers and secretaries of state continue, on the fixed days and at the Palace, as heretofore, under the presidency of my much-beloved and prized consort, the despatch of the ordinary business of the different departments of State and public offices, which shall be carried on in my name, as

if I were present; and I am further pleased that my Council of State also continue their sittings on the established days, or whenever necessary, under the presidency of the said Princess Royal, who is from this moment authorized, together with the said ministers and secretaries of state, to take all measures necessary and urgent for the good and the salvation of the State - an account of all which shall be sent to me for my approbation and ratification; for I hope that nothing will be done that is not conformable to the existing laws and to the solid interests of the State. The ministers and secretary of state of the kingdom and Foreign Affairs will so understand it, and cause it to be executed with the necessary instructions.

Palace of Rio de Janeiro, 13th August, 1822.

JOZÉ BONIFACIO DE ANDRADA E SILVA.

V.

TRANSLATION of letter to the Secretary at War.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

The Military Council of the division of the Royal Volunteers of the King send to your Excellency the accompanying Proclamation, in order that, reaching your Excellency's knowledge, it may be worthily and respectfully made known to his Royal Highness; and at the same time your Excellency will explain, for the satisfaction of the said august Lord, that motives of honour and delicacy alone, as children of the army of Portugal and subjects of his Majesty Lord Don John the Sixth, and the desire for the good and advantage of the division, induced it to take this step on the 28th June; and the more because, having to return shortly to Europe, in conformity with the Royal orders, it could not be agreeable to them to be there accused of little affection for the mother country, and of having seen with indifference the discussions of domestic policy, from whence may follow prejudice to the fraternity of the United Kingdom; wherefore they hope that your Excellency, condescending to persuade himself of these considerations, these may, with the loyal sentiments by which they are animated, be laid with respect and submission before his Royal Highness, requesting your Excellency will be pleased to assure the said august Lord of their faithful and unalterable protestations of love, respect, and due obedience to his Royal Person, for whom they desire many years of life, for the happiness of the great Portuguese family.

God preserve your Excellency.

Montevideo, in Military Council, 10th July, 1822.

To the Most Illustrious and Most Excellent Señor Joaquim de Oliveira Alves.

BARON of LAGUNA, *President*.

DON ALVARO DA COSTA DE SOUZA MACEDO,

*Brigadier, Vice-President.*

JOÃO MO. DE MACEDO, *Major, Vocal.*

JOZÉ DE BARROS ABREU, *Major, Vocal.*

ML. JEREMIAS PINTO, *Captain, Vocal.*

VINCENTE JOZÉ D'ALMEIDA, *Captain, Vocal.*

CLAUDIO PEREIRA PEDROSO, *Lt. and Adj., Vocal.*

ANTO. JOZÉ PEIXOTO, *1st Lieut., Vocal.*

JOZÉ MARIA DE SA CAMELLO, *Secretary.*

## VI.

## TRANSLATION of the Proclamation of the Military Council at Montevideo to the Troops, respecting the affairs of Brazil.

Officers of all corps and departments, civil officers with military rank, subaltern officers and soldiers of the division of the Royal Volunteers of the King: the Military Council, pained to the bottom of the soul by the late determination of four of the provinces of Brazil, and approved by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of the United Kingdom, sees itself in the distressing necessity of making known to you the situation in which we find ourselves; and even although you may have already learnt it from the public papers of Rio de Janeiro, this does not absolve them from their duty towards you.

Companions in arms! the province that you, together with the troops of the kingdom of Brazil, pacified, and that you keep—the province of Montevideo! declares itself leagued with the other four, for the new system that Brazil proposes for herself. This kingdom, which could not call the province hers if your fatigues, if your services, had not placed it in a situation to choose—if the blood you have spilt, and your noble conduct, worthy of Portuguese, had not restored it to its rights; this kingdom, or better speaking, the government of Rio de Janeiro, has accepted to form a cause separate from our Portugal, the league of a province which you garrison and which you occupy; and, without considering our firm adhesion and due respect to the sovereign Congress of the nation, to the King, and to our honour, counts, that those who authorised powers to Doctor Obes can, in the like manner, name representatives to prosecute the plan of separating Brazil from Portugal, and that we, tranquil spectators, mite guards, and pusillanimous Portuguese, will allow ourselves to be led away and mixed in the medley of innovations! Companions in arms, our silence must finish. Much are our Brazilian brethren mistaken if they think they have a right to choose a new government; to the nation it belongs to decide this; but the United Kingdom, Europe, the whole world, ought to know that we do not participate in such ruinous projects. That our opinions are the same as in the midst of transports of joy we manifested and swore to on the memorable 20th of March last year; that we respect the nation, that we love the King, and that we know how to be what we ought.

Royal Volunteers, this it is for which the Military Council calls you. It is convinced that you all hold the same sentiments, and that boldly and solemnly you can declare it; but it wishes to consult the corporations—it wishes to be assisted by the lights of all, and to hear from all the means that ought to be adopted.

At the Military Council in Montevideo, the 28th June, 1822.

BARON DE LAGUNA, *President.*

Brigadier D. ALVARO DA CA. DE SA. MACEDO, *Vice-President.*

Major J. NEFOM. DE MACEDO, *Vocal.*

Major JOSÉ DE BARROS ABREU, *Vocal.*

Captain MANL. JER. PINTO, *Vocal.*

Captain VINCENTE JOZÉ D'ALMEIDA, *Vocal.*

Lieut. and Adj. CLAUD. CALD. PEDROZO, *Vocal.*

Lieut. ANT. JOZÉ PLEXOTO, *Vocal.*

JOZÉ MARIA DE SA. CAMELLO, *Vocal, Secretary.*

VII.

*Mr. Henry Chamberlain to the Marquess of Londonderry.*

MY LORD,

Rio de Janeiro, 19th Aug., 1822.

Advices have been received from Buenos Ayres to the 27th July, at which date I am happy to have the honour to inform your Lordship everything was tranquil there, and commerce bore an improving appearance.

It appears that Lord Cochrane anchored in the port of Valparaiso on the 2nd of June, from Callao, with the frigates *O'Higgins* and *Valdivia*, consequently the wild projects attributed to his Lordship were wholly unfounded.

The elections of Deputies for the Convention of Chili were still going on, but drew near their conclusion, and the government was going on well and quietly.

It is said that the Protector San Martin was still preparing to attack the Royalists to the southward of Lima; but the accounts from Peru appear to be neither very clear nor circumstantial.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. CHAMBERLAIN,

VIII.

TRANSLATION of the MANIFESTO of the Prince Regent of Brasil to Friendly Governments and Nations.

I, and the people who recognise me as their Prince Regent, wishing to preserve the political and commercial relations subsisting with the governments and nations in friendship with this kingdom, and to secure the continuance of that approbation and esteem which is due to the Brazilian character, it behoves me to state succinctly, but truly, the series of facts and motives which have induced me to accede to the general will of the people of Brazil, who have proclaimed in the face of the universe their political independence, and who desire, as forming a sister kingdom and a great and powerful nation, to maintain, unimpaired and in vigour, their imprescriptible rights, which Portugal has always sought to infringe, and which she now more than ever, since the celebrated political regeneration of the monarchy by the Cortes of Lisbon, endeavours to assail.

Soon after the rich and vast regions of Brazil first presented themselves by accident to the eye of the adventurous Cabral, avarice and religious proselytism, the great motives to modern discoveries and colonisation, took possession of them by means of conquest; and laws of blood, dictated by furious passions and sordid interests, confirmed the tyranny of Portugal. The uncivilised native and the European colonist were compelled to drag out a like existence of misery and servitude. The mountains were excavated and gold extracted; but absurd laws and the Quinto\* impeded labours which were but just commenced. While the Portuguese government, with insatiable voracity, devoured the treasures which beneficent nature so liberally supplied, it oppressed the unfortunate provinces whence the wealth was drawn by the most odious of all imposts—the capitation tax. It was wished to make the Brazilians pay for the air they breathed, and for liberty to tread the soil of their native land. If the industry of some active man was directed to the giving a new form to

\* A tax, called the quinto, or fifth; frequently a fourth.



certain native productions,\* in order that Brazil might clothe the nakedness of her own children, tyrannical laws soon prohibited and punished these praiseworthy efforts. The object of the Europeans has constantly been to retain this fine country in the most rigid and abject dependence on the mother country, because they judged it necessary to the security of their dominion that the perennial sources of our riches should be obstructed or impoverished. If an enterprising colonist held out to his fellow-citizens the flattering prospect of the cultivation of some new branch of rural economy by the introduction of useful and valuable exotics, burdensome imposts soon put an end to commencements made under the most favourable auspices. If men boldly attempted to turn the course of rivers in order to rescue from the waters the diamonds deposited in their beds, they were quickly stopped by the agents of monopoly, and punished by inexorable laws.† If the superfluity of her productions invited and demanded their barter for other foreign productions, Brazil was shut out from the general market of nations, and consequently from all commercial competition: thus no other course was left than to confine her trade to the ports of the mother country, and thereby to stimulate more powerfully the cupidity and add to the undue preponderance of her tyrants. Finally, when the Brazilian, on whom bountiful nature had bestowed talents, wished, for the better knowledge of his rights and duties, to obtain instruction in science or in arts, or to improve the excellent qualities with which Providence has endowed his native land, he was obliged to go to Portugal to beg what little scraps of information were to be found there, and from that country was often not permitted to return.‡

Such has been the fate of Brazil for about three centuries—such the wretched policy by which Portugal, always unjust in her views, always greedy and tyrannical, endeavoured to confirm her dominion and her factitious splendour. The colonists and the Indians—the conquerors and the conquered—their children and their children's children—have all, without distinction, been made subject to one general anathema. And, forasmuch as the ambition of power and the thirst of gold are always unsatiable and unbridled, Portugal never ceased to send hither merciless bashaws, corrupt magistrates, and swarms of fiscal agents of every description, who, in the delirium of their passion and avarice, tore asunder all moral ties, both public and private. Thus did they lacerate the bowels of Brazil, which supported and enriched them, in order that its people, reduced to the last state of desperation, might, like submissive Mussulmans, make pilgrimage to the new Mecca, to purchase, with rich gifts and offerings, an existence which was only supportable in proportion as it was obscure and languid. If Brazil resisted this torrent of evils—if she improved under such shameful oppressions—she was indebted for her success to her animated and vigorous sons, whom Nature has formed gigantic. She owes it to that kind mother, who has always given them renovating strength to overcome the physical and moral obstacles which her ungrateful parents and brothers have spitefully opposed to her growth and prosperity.

Brazil being naturally good and generous, though still filled with anguish at the recollection of her past misfortunes, did not fail to receive the angust person of Don John VI. and all the Royal Family with the greatest joy. She did more—she opened her hospitable arms to the nobles and people who emi-

\* No manufactories were permitted in Brazil before the emigration of the Royal Family in 1808.

† All diamonds found in Brazil belong to the Crown. Persons caught with rough diamonds upon them are punished with transportation for life to the coast of Africa, and confiscation of their property.

‡ There were neither public schools nor colleges in Brazil.

grated, in consequence of the invasion of Portugal by the despot of Europe. She contentedly took on her shoulders all the weight of the throne of my august father—she preserved in splendour the diadem which encircled his forehead—she generously and profusely supplied the expenses of a prodigal Court; and what is still more, without any particular interest, but merely on account of the simple ties of fraternity. She also contributed to the expenses of the war which Portugal so gloriously maintained against her invaders.\* What has Brazil gained for all those sacrifices? The continuation of old abuses, and the addition of new ones, introduced partly by weakness, partly by immorality and crimes. Such a state of things loudly called for a prompt reform of the government—a reform fully authorised by the increase of knowledge, the violated rights of a country which forms the greater and the richer portion of the Portuguese nation, which nature has peculiarly favoured by its geographical and central position in the midst of the globe, by its vast ports and maritime stations, and by the natural riches of its soil. But sentiments of excessive loyalty and an extreme love for Portugal stifled the complaints of Brazil, made her suppress her anxious wish, and yield the glorious palm to her brethren of Europe.

When the cry of the political regeneration arose in Portugal, the people of Brazil, confident in the inviolability of their rights, and incapable of suspecting different sentiments and less generosity in their brethren, they abandoned to those ungrateful brethren the defence of their most sacred interests and the care of their complete reconstitution. In the most perfect good faith they slumbered tranquilly on the brink of a dreadful precipice. Trusting entirely to the wisdom and justice of the Lisbon Congress, Brazil expected to receive from it all that was by right her due. How far was she then from presuming that that very Congress would be capable of basely betraying her hopes and her interests—interests closely entwined with the general interests of the nation!

Brazil now knows the error into which she has fallen; and had not the Brazilians partaken of that generous enthusiasm which often confounds transient phosphoric sparks with the true lights of reason, they would have seen in the first Manifesto which Portugal addressed to the Powers of Europe, that one of the concealed objects of the proclaimed regeneration consisted in artfully re-establishing the old colonial system, without which Portugal always believed, and still believes, that she cannot be rich and powerful. Brazil did not perceive that her Deputies, in passing to a foreign and remote country, would have to struggle against inveterate prejudices and caprices, and, destitute of the support of friends and relatives, would inevitably sink into the state of nullity in which we have seen them. But these severe lessons of experience were necessary to make Brazil recognise the delusive nature of her ill-founded hopes.

But the Brazilians deserve to be excused; for it would have been extremely difficult for candid and generous minds to conceive that the boasted regeneration of the monarchy was to commence by the re-establishment of the odious colonial system. No less difficult, and indeed almost impossible, was it to reconcile this absurd and tyrannical plan with the philosophy and liberalism so loudly proclaimed by the Portuguese Cortes! And still more incredible was it that there should be men sufficiently insolent and insane to dare to attribute to the wish and orders of my august father, Don John VI., to whom Brazil owes her rank of kingdom, the wish to demolish at one blow the finest monument which the history of the universe has to record. It is doubtless incredible

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\* The Minister, M. de Andrada e Silva, was at that time Vice-President of the University of Coimbra, and headed the scholars against the French.

that so great a delusion should have been attempted; but facts speak for themselves, and sophisms cannot prevail against obvious truth.

While my august father still remained on the plains of the river Janeiro, from which he has been unfortunately drawn by secret and perfidious manoeuvres, to inhabit again the banks of the Old Tagus, the Congress of Lisbon affected to entertain sentiments of fraternal equality and enlightened principles of reciprocal justice towards Brazil, declaring formally, by Article 21 of the basis of the Constitution, that the fundamental law which was about to be made and promulgated should only have application in this kingdom in the case of its assembled deputies, declaring such to be the will of the people whom they represented. But how shocked were those people when they found, in contradiction of this article and in contempt of their inalienable rights, a fractional portion of the general Congress deciding on their dearest interests; when they saw the dominant party in that incomplete and imperfect Congress legislating on subjects which were of transcendent importance, and peculiarly referable to Brazil, in the absence of about two-thirds of her representatives!

The dominant party, which still unblushingly insults the knowledge and probity of the worthy and judicious men who have seats in the Cortes, has tried all the means of a dark and infernal policy to deceive Brazil by an apparent fraternity which never resided in their hearts, and secretly took advantage of the errors of the governing Junta of Bahia (which they secretly promoted) to break the sacred bonds which unite all the provinces of Brazil under my legitimate and paternal Regency. How could the Congress recognise in that factions Junta a legitimate authority capable of undoing the political ties of the province and separating it from the centre of the system to which it was bound? and this, too, after the oath of my august father to the Constitution promised to the whole monarchy! What right had that Congress, whose national representation was then solely limited to Portugal, to sanction acts so illegal, criminal, and fatal in their consequences to the whole united kingdom? What were the advantages which Bahia was to obtain? The vain and ridiculous name of a province of Portugal, and, what is worse, the evils of civil war and anarchy in which that province is now plunged, in consequence of the guilt of its former government, sold as it was to the demagogues of Lisbon, and some other men misled by anarcical and republican ideas. Were it possible for Bahia to be preserved as a province of the poor and broken down kingdom of Portugal, would it be better so than by being one of the first provinces of the vast and powerful empire of Brazil? But the Congress had other views—Brazil was to be no longer a kingdom—it was to be deprived of its throne, to be stripped of the royal mantle of its majesty, to be compelled to lay down its crown and sceptre, and retrograde in the political order of the universe—to receive new fetters, and humble itself like a slave at the feet of Portugal.

But we must not stop here. Let us examine the progressive march of the Cortes. They authorised and established anarchical provincial governments, independent of each other, but subject to Portugal.\* They destroyed the responsibility and the mutual harmony of the civil, military, and financial powers, leaving to the people no resource for their inevitable evils, unless they sought it across the vast ocean—a vain and delusive resource. A happy idea, indeed it was of the Congress to break to pieces the majestic architecture, to separate

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\* Its province was to have its own provisional government, consisting of a Junta Gubernativa, chosen by the people; Conselho da Fazenda, or Treasury, appointed by the Crown; and General das Armas, also appointed by the Crown. Each was to be supreme in its own department, and wholly independent of the others. They were not to correspond with Rio de Janeiro, but directly with the government in Portugal.

its parts and place them in a state of continual contest, to annihilate the strength of the provinces and to convert them into so many hostile republics. But little do the Cortes regard the misfortunes of Brazil. It is sufficient for them that opportunities may arise for taking advantage of the disasters they create. Like the savages of Louisiana, they would cut down the trees to get at the fruit rather than gather it regularly from the branches.

The representations and efforts of the governing Junta and the Deputies of Pernambuco to rid themselves of the European bayonets, to which that province was indebted for its melancholy intestine dissensions, were unavailing. Meanwhile Brazil began to tear aside the thick veil which covered her eyes; she perceived the purpose for which these troops were destined; she inquired into the causes of the reception that had been given to the proposals of the few deputies she had in Portugal, and was gradually losing all hope of improvement and reform in the deliberations of the Congress, and she at length found that the justice of her claims and the patriotic voices of her Deputies were disregarded.

But this was not all. The Cortes of Portugal well know that Brazil was oppressed by the enormous debt of the Treasury to her National Bank, and that, if the latter should fail, numberless families would be reduced to ruin and total indigence. This was a subject of the utmost importance, yet not the least attention was bestowed on the credit of that bank: it rather appeared that they were carefully labouring to give it a final blow, taking from Brazil the surplus of the provincial revenues, which ought to have been paid into her public and central Treasury; and they even deprived the Bank of the management of the contracts which the King, my august father, had conceded to it for mortgaging that debt.

Finally, there arrived at Brazil the fatal decree of my recall to Portugal, and the total exclusion of the Tribunals of Rio de Janeiro, while at the same time those of Portugal continued in existence. Every hope instantly vanished even of preserving a delegation of the executive power which forms the common centre of union and strength of all the provinces of this vast nation; for without this common centre, which gives regularity and impulse to all the movements of the social machine, in vain would nature have bestowed all that she has profusely expended for the rapid development of the power and future prosperity of Brazil. A vigorous and constitutional government can alone smooth the way for augmenting the civilisation and progressive riches of Brazil, defend her against her external enemies, and repress the plots of ambitious and evil-disposed men, who presume to make attempts on individual liberty and prosperity, and on the peace and public security of the State in general and of each of her provinces in particular. Without this common centre, I once more repeat, all the relations of mutual amity and commerce between this kingdom and Portugal and foreign countries will encounter a thousand collisions and obstacles; and instead of augmenting our wealth, under a solid and adequate system of public economy, we shall see it stagnate, decline, and perhaps totally vanish. Finally, without this centre of power and union, the Brazilians cannot preserve their natural limits and frontiers, and will lose by the present machinations of the Congress all that they have gained at the expense of so much blood and treasure;\* and, what is worse, with the loss of their national honour and glory, and their great and legitimate political and commercial interests. But, happily for us, outraged justice and policy will raise a universal cry, and suspend the execution of these mischievous decrees.

The indignation of the people of this kingdom was again roused by the con-

\* Montevideo and the Banda Oriental—or, as it is now called, the Estado Cisplatino, or Cis-platine State.

temptuous treatment offered to the worthy citizens of Brazil; for in the numerous lists of diplomatists, ministers of state, councillors, and military governors, there appeared not a single Brazilian name. The sinister purposes for which these new bashaws were appointed under the title of Governors-General is now apparent. It is sufficient to observe the uniform conduct which they held in our provinces, in opposition to the dignity and liberty of Brazil—it is sufficient to remark the consideration with which the Cortes attended to their despatches, and the influence which they exercised in civil and political affairs, totally unconnected with military employments. The condescension with which the Cortes received the congratulations of the fratricide troops expelled from Pernambuco—the late approbation bestowed by the Congress on the proceedings of General Avilez, who occasioned the premature death of my lamented son, the Prince Don John—the disregard paid to the sanguinary scenes of Bahia, perpetrated by the infamous Madeira, who was supplied with fresh troops in spite of the protests of the Deputies of Brazil: all this proves that after overthrowing the liberty of the provinces, stifling the cries of their just demand, denouncing as anti-constitutional the patriotism and honour of the citizens—these disorganisers seek only to establish, under the deceitful title of union and fraternity, a complete military despotism, by which they hope to crush us.

No just government, no civilised nation, can fail to comprehend that Brazil, deprived of an executive power, bereft of the necessary tribunals, and obliged to go through distance and dangers to seek favour and justice from Portugal—her provinces drained of their revenues by Lisbon—her rank as a kingdom annihilated and herself subjected to the bayonets sent by Portugal—it would only remain for her to be erased for ever from the list of nations and free States, and to be once more reduced to her old state of a colony and exclusive commerce. But it does not suit the Congress to publish in the face of the civilised world their occult and abominable projects, and they endeavour to disguise them by the appointment of Commissioners charged to treat of the political and mercantile affairs of this kingdom. The opinions of these Commissioners spread over the world, and evince all the Machiavelism and hypocrisy of the Cortes of Lisbon, which can impose only on the ignorant, and give new arms to the secret enemies who exist between us.

These false and wicked politicians now tell us that the Congress desires to be made acquainted with the wishes of Brazil, and that it always endeavours to be just in its deliberations: if this be true, why have the Cortes of Lisbon hitherto rejected everything that has been proposed by the few Deputies whom we have sent them?

The special commission charged with the political affairs of the kingdom has already before it the representations of many of our provinces and magisterial councils, in which the abrogation of the decree for the organisation of provincial governments, and my continuance in this kingdom as Prince Regent, are sought. But what did the commission do? Nothing was to be expected from it, and it was with difficulty that it proposed that I should remain temporarily at Rio de Janeiro, without entering into the attributes which should belong to me as delegate of the executive power. The people call for a single centre of that power, in order to avoid the dismemberment of Brazil into isolated and rival parts. What did the commission do? It was Machiavelian enough to propose that two or more centres should be granted to Brazil, and that only till such time as those provinces which desired it should correspond directly with Portugal.

Repeatedly did our Deputies raise their voices in favour of Brazil; but they were drowned in the clamours of the hired rabble in the galleries of the Cortes.

To all their outcries it was always answered, either that they were contrary to the articles already decreed by the constitution, or contrary to the internal regulations of the Cortes, or that it was impossible to repeal what was already decided; or, finally, it was contemptuously urged that no provincial Deputies could there be acknowledged, that they were all the Deputies of the nation, and that the majority could alone avail—a false and unheard of principle of public right, though extremely useful to the usurpers of it, in as far as they could make it a pretext, under cover of the majority of their European votes, for enslaving Brazil at their pleasure. The letter addressed to me by the government of S. Paulo was present at the Congress, and consequently they were acquainted with the unanimous wish of the deputations which was sent to me by the government, the magistracy, and the clergy of its capital. It was all without effect. The Junta of that government was insulted, taxed with rebellion, and threatened with a criminal process. Finally, through the organ of a free press, the Brazilian writers made known to the world the injustice and errors of the Congress; and as a reward for their loyalty and patriotism they were upbraided with venality, and considered to be inspired only by the genius of evil, in the Machiavelian opinion of the commission.\*

It is impossible that Brazil can throw a veil of eternal oblivion over such insults and atrocities; and it is equally impossible that she can ever again place confidence in the Cortes of Lisbon, trifled with as she is by them on every occasion, lacerated by a civil war commenced by that iniquitous people, and still menaced with the horrible scenes of Hayti, which our furious enemies long to see revived.

Is not the act of that government, too, in prohibiting foreign nations with whom we trade freely from supplying us with military and naval ammunition, a real commencement of hostilities? Should we suffer Portugal to offer to yield to France a part of the province of Para† on condition that that power would furnish her with troops and vessels sufficient to enable her more effectually to tie up our hands and shut us out from our just rights? Can the brave Brazilians forget that similar proposals, and for the same purpose, were made to England,‡ accompanied by an offer to perpetuate the Treaty of Commerce of 1810, and even with greater advantages? To such an extent has the malice and bad policy of the Cortes proceeded!

Moreover the Congress of Lisbon, sparing no endeavour to oppress and enslave us, have scattered abroad a cohort of secret emissaries, who employ all the resources of cunning and perfidy to mislead the public spirit, to disturb good order, and to foment disunion and anarchy in Brazil.§ Assured of the just hatred which the people entertain towards despotism, these perfidious emissaries do not cease to pervert the public opinion, to asperse the most pure and just actions of my government, and even to dare to impute to me the desire of completely separating Brazil from Portugal, and of reviving the old

\* Hypolito José da Costa, native of Rio de Janeiro, editor of the Portuguese pamphlet '*Correio Brasiliense*,' published monthly in London, known as the most venal of the Portuguese writers, and who, to my knowledge, received a large bribe to turn his pen against the Cortes in Lisbon.

† This is said to have come to the knowledge of the Prince Regent's government from the Marquess of Marialva, in Paris, who had it from the French Ministry.

‡ Doctor João Francisco d'Oliveira, late Portuguese chargé d'affaires in London, made this disclosure to a Brazilian, who brought the account to Rio a short time ago.

§ Alluding to the editor of the '*Correio do Rio de Janeiro*,' lately tried for a libel on the Prince Regent, and acquitted. His paper generally opposes government, and is supposed to be attached to the Republican party.

system of arbitrary power. In vain they endeavour to disunite the inhabitants of this kingdom; our honoured European fellow-countrymen will never prove ungrateful to the country which has adopted them for sons, and from which they have derived honour and riches.

Not content with this series of perfidies and atrocities, the factions emissaries of the Cortes have dared to insinuate that a great part of these disastrous measures has emanated from the executive power: as if the character of the King, of the benefactor of Brazil, were capable of such Machiavellian perfidy; as if it were not known to Brazil, to the whole world, that the *Señor Don John VI.*, my august father, is actually a state prisoner, completely incapable of action, and deprived of that free will which should be possessed by a true monarch, enjoying those attributes which any legitimate constitution, however careful and suspicious it might be, would never deny him. It is known to all Europe and to the whole world, that of his ministers some are in the same circumstances with himself, and others are the creatures and partisans of the predominant faction.

Doubtless the provocations and injustices of the Congress, with regard to Brazil, are the offspring of parties divided among themselves, but united against us. Some seek to force Brazil to separate herself from Portugal, in order that the Constitutional system may be then more effectually stifled. Others desire it too, because they wish to unite themselves to Spain. Thus everything in Portugal is turned to the prejudice of Brazil.

Blinded by pride, or impelled by revenge and conceit, the Cortes would decide with two strokes of the pen a question of the greatest importance to the great Portuguese family, establishing, without consulting the general wish of the Portuguese of both hemispheres, the seat of the monarchy in Portugal; as if this smallest part of the Portuguese territory, and its stationary and timorous population, should be the political and commercial centre of the whole nation. In effect, if it is requisite for States naturally divided, but united under one sole chief, that the vital principle of their movements and energy should exist in the most central and powerful part of the great social machine, in order that the impulse may communicate itself to the whole periphery with the greater readiness and vigour, certainly Brazil possesses the incontestible right of holding within herself the seat of executive power. This vast and rich country, whose lengthened coasts stretch from 2° on the other side of the Equator down to the River Plata, and are washed by the Atlantic, stands as it were in the centre of the globe, on the borders of the great ocean over which the trade of nations is conveyed, and which forms the link which connects the four quarters of the globe. Brazil has Europe and the most considerable part of America on her left; Africa in front; on the right the remainder of America and Asia, with the immense archipelago of Australasia, and the Pacific Ocean washing her sides, while the Straits of Magellan and Cape Horn lie within reach.

Who does not know that it is almost impossible to impart new strength and vigour to people enfeebled and exhausted? Who does not know that the good days of Portugal are past, and that it is only from Brazil that that little portion of the monarchy can hope for certain support, and the power of recovering her former energy? But Brazil will certainly be unable to afford that support, should the Portuguese government succeed in the mad project of enfeebling, disuniting, and destroying her.

In so long and systematic a series of folly and atrocity, what should be the conduct of Brazil? Must she suppose the Cortes of Lisbon to be ignorant of her rights and necessities? Certainly not; for in that Cortes there are, even among the factious party, men, who, though wicked, are not ignorant. Ought Brazil to suffer, and merely content herself with humbly soliciting the remedy

of her misfortunes from merciless and egotistical men? Does she not see, that though the despots might be changed, the despotism would continue? Such conduct, besides being unwise and dishonourable, would plunge Brazil into an unfathomable gulf of misery; and Brazil being lost, the perdition of the monarchy is certain.

Placed by Providence in the midst of this vast and blessed country, as the heir and lawful delegate of the King, my august father, my first duties are not only to labour for the welfare of the Brazilian people, but also of those of the whole nation which I shall one day be called to govern. In order to fulfil these sacred duties, I assented to the wishes of the provinces which entreated me not to abandon them; and wishing to execute my resolutions to the utmost point, I consulted the public opinion of my subjects, and nominated and convoked Procurators-General of all the provinces, to advise me how to act for the common welfare of the State. Next, to afford a new proof of my sincerity and love, I accepted the title and duties of Perpetual Defender of this kingdom, confided to me by the people; and finally, seeing the urgency of affairs, and hearing the universal voice of the people who wished to be secure, I convoked a Constituent and Legislative Assembly, to labour for the permanent happiness of the country. Thus I conformed with the wishes of the people who consider my august father and King as deprived of his liberty, and subject to the caprice of that band of factious who rule the Cortes of Lisbon, from whom it would be absurd to expect just measures suited to the situation of Brazil, or tending to the real welfare of the whole Portuguese nation.

I should be ungrateful to the Brazilians—I should be false to my promises, and unworthy the name of Prince Royal of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and Algarves, if I had acted otherwise. But I protest before God, and in the face of all friendly and allied nations, that I by no means wish to separate the bonds of unity and fraternity, which are calculated to render the Portuguese nation one single political and well organised whole. I also protest, that saving the due and just union of all the parts of the monarchy under one single sovereign, as Supreme Chief of the Executive Power of the whole nation, I will defend the lawful rights and future Constitution of Brazil (which I hope will be good and prudent) with all my power, and even at the expense of my blood, if such should be necessary.

I have explained with sincerity and conciseness to the governments and nations to whom I have addressed this manifesto, the causes of the final resolution of the people of this kingdom. If King Don John VI., my august father, were now in Brazil, enjoying his liberty and lawful authority, he would doubtless concur in the wishes of this loyal and generous people; and the immortal founder of this kingdom, who, in February, 1821, convoked Brazilian Cortes at Rio de Janeiro, would not fail to convoke them in the same manner as I now do. But our King being a prisoner and a captive, it behoves me to rescue him from the degraded situation to which he is reduced by the factious of Lisbon—it is my duty, as his delegate and heir, to save not only Brazil, but the whole Portuguese nation.

My firm resolution, and that of the two nations which I govern, being lawfully promulgated, I hope that sensible and impartial men, all over the world, and that the governments and nations friendly to Brazil, will render justice to such honest and noble sentiments. I invite them to continue to maintain relations of mutual interest and amity. I shall be ready to receive their ministers and diplomatic agents, and to send them mine, so long as the King my august father shall remain in captivity. The ports of Brazil shall continue open to all pacific and friendly nations for lawful trade not prohibited by the laws. European colonists who emigrate hither, may rely on being protected in



this rich and hospitable country. Philosophers, artists, capitalists, and speculators will also experience a friendly reception. And as Brazil will respect the rights of other legitimate governments, she hopes, as a just return, that her unalienable rights will be by them respected and acknowledged, and that she may not, in the opposite case, be placed under the painful necessity of acting contrary to the dictates of her generous heart.

THE PRINCE REGENT.

Palace of Rio de Janeiro, 6th Aug., 1822.

# IX.

TRANSLATION of the NOTE of M. d'Andrada e Silva to Mr. Chamberlain,  
Rio de Janeiro, 14th August, 1822.

Brazil, who considers herself as free as the kingdom of Portugal, having shaken off the yoke of subjection and inferiority, with which the sister kingdom intended to enslave her, and proceeding solemnly to proclaim her independence and to require a Legislative Assembly within her own territory, with the same attributes as that of Lisbon, preserving however the due and decorous union between all the parts of the great Portuguese family and under one sole Supreme Chief, the Lord Don John VI., now oppressed in Lisbon by a disorganising faction, and in a state of captivity, which would be of itself sufficient for Brazil no longer to acknowledge the Cortes of Lisbon, nor the orders of its Executive, because they are forced and null of right: and because to avoid the fall of the monarchy and the confusion of an interregnum, it is fitting that all the authority and plenitude of action should devolve upon his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of the kingdom of Brazil, the heir to the throne, and legitimate delegate of his Majesty: who has in fact, at the solicitation of the people, reassumed the whole authority of his regency, to use it constitutionally, as is fully explained in the Manifesto the said august Lord has just addressed to friendly Powers: it is my duty, by the order of his Royal Highness, who desires to give all publicity to the purity and justice of his proceedings, to transmit to you the said Manifesto, to carry it to the knowledge of your respective Court, as well as some other publications relative thereto, and which will serve as illustrations.

His Royal Highness trusts that legitimate governments and civilised nations, who prize themselves as liberal, will duly appreciate the sacred cause that Brazil proclaims, and the same Lord protects, and will defend for the good of the Portuguese nation.

I profit of this opportunity to offer to you the assurance of my particular esteem. God preserve you many years.

Your very assured servant,

JOZÉ BONIFACIO DE ANDRADE E SILVA.

Palace of Rio de Janeiro, 14th August, 1822.

[ 185. ]

*To Lord Londonderry.*

MY DEAR CHARLES,

Verona, 28th Oct., 1822.

I have received your note and letter, and quite approve of your decision. I am quite sure that you are right, and that in

proportion as you may think you have cause to complain, in the same proportion ought you to take a high line in relation to all your public duties.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 186. ]

SIR,

Verona, 28th Oct., 1822.

As our discussions here have not been, up to this moment, in regular conferences, I have not yet been able to draw the attention of the ministers collectively to the subject of the slave trade. I have conversed upon that subject, however, with the Emperor of Russia and Count Nesselrode, as well as with Monsieur de Montmorency and Prince Metternich.

I found the Emperor and his minister as much interested as ever in the abolition; and upon my describing the existing state of the trade, they expressed an anxious desire to be able to adopt some measure which should, upon consideration, be found practicable and which should tend to check the evil; and the Emperor in particular begged me to consider the subject in these views, and not to bring under their consideration measures which the maritime powers would refuse to adopt, and the adoption of which the continental powers could not enforce.

The French minister contended that his government had done everything in their power, in the way of law and execution of the law, to prevent the slave trade; and he adverted to the several trials and convictions which have taken place recently in France. But he professed his readiness to consider of any measure which I could suggest for augmenting the means of prevention, short of exposing French ships on the high seas to search by foreign ships of war, to which he declared that France could never consent.

Prince Metternich, in the conversation I had with him, took nearly the same line as the Emperor of Russia, and expressed a great anxiety that we should find some mode of effecting our object which should be of a nature that the three continental powers could effectually support.

Under these circumstances, I confess that I entertain great

doubts of the success of any attempt to obtain an opinion by the continental powers in favour of a declaration that the act of trading in slaves ought to be piracy. The French ministers will certainly oppose the declaration of such an opinion and pledge themselves against it; and their example will probably be followed by other maritime powers, even by those who have conceded by treaty the right of search. It must be observed that the right of search which would be conceded by declaring slave trading, piracy, would be much more extensive than that conceded by any of the treaties; and as pirates are liable to be tried by the common admiralty jurisdiction of any country, the precautions provided by the several treaties, by *Commissions Mixtes, Arbitrations*, &c., to secure an impartial trial, would no longer be of any avail. All this machinery would be abolished, and I have much misunderstood the sentiments of the maritime powers upon this subject if they are any of them really willing to afford any facilities to the abolition which they can refuse, and if they would not consider the positive refusal of France to make slave trading, piracy, as an example to be followed and not to be departed from. Then I doubt the expediency of a law declaring slave trading by British subjects piracy till such shall become the general law of nations. Your despatch does not discuss that subject; but the notion of others appears to be that slave trading by British subjects is to be piracy cognizable only by those nations, or by their ships, vessels, or jurisdictions, whose legislatures have declared slave trading by their subjects to be piracy. I should think that it would be difficult to frame such a law, or to make it binding upon foreign States, and, at all events, it would be an anomaly. But if a British Act of Parliament enacting that slave trading by British subjects is piracy cannot prevent foreign countries from taking cognizance of such an act of piracy, nor from proceeding upon it, the consequences in respect to our existing relations, and our efforts to induce other powers to concede a mutual right of search must be, that we shall immediately deprive the government of the only boon it has to grant in return for the concessions made by the several powers who have agreed or who may agree to grant such right. I apprehend that any vessel of any nation may stop and search a vessel suspected of piracy, and may bring to trial before the competent jurisdiction of any country the pirate and his crew. Thus, then, unless a British

Act of Parliament can guard against the exercise of this right by foreign powers, every British merchantman that sails would be liable to search by any vessel of any description belonging to any power; and those on whom we should hereafter have to press the concession of the mutual right of search and the other provisions of our treaties with the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, would only have to show us that they enjoy, under our own Act of Parliament, a much larger power than that proposed to be conceded by treaty.

This is the result of my reflections upon this question of declaring by Act of Parliament slave trading by British subjects to be piracy. I really don't believe that I shall be able to induce the continental Powers to come to any declaration upon the subject. I will, however, try what they will do by bringing under the consideration of the Emperor of Russia the specified proposition contained in your instructions, and if that should not succeed I will try something else.

The argument always brought forward by the French ministers on this subject is, that everything that is possible has been done by the King and his government; to which the obvious answer is an appeal to the facts, which will prove clearly that all that has been done is nugatory; as, notwithstanding the stated efforts of the French cruisers on the coasts of Africa, and the stated efforts of the governors of the colonies both in Africa and the West Indies, under H. M. C. Majesty's ordonnance of \* , and the stated convictions under the law of \* , the profits of the trade are such that the trade in slaves is still carried on by French subjects and by all nations under cover of the French flag. I think, therefore, that we are entitled by this state of the facts to call upon H. M. C. Majesty to perform his treaty, and upon our Allies, parties to the treaty, to join with us in the measures which we shall adopt upon this subject. I am not certain that, when we place the question on this ground, it would not be best to leave to the French government to discover the measures which would be the most advisable. But the concession of the mutual right of search being, as I conceive, out of the question, and the declaration of an opinion that slave trading ought to be made piracy hopeless, the following are the measures which I would recommend to the French government:

\* Blanks in manuscript.

1st. The adoption of a strict registry of slaves in their colonies, which would prevent farther importations.

2nd. The grant of the ship and cargo of vessels having slaves on board as prize to the captain of the King's ship which should capture such vessel.

3rd. The grant of head-money to the captain, in the same manner as is granted in the British service.

These measures can be adopted in France without any appeal to the legislature; but, in addition, the legislature should be applied to, to attach a *peine infamante* to the act of slave-trading, of which the proof might be made to consist not alone in having slaves on board, but likewise in having on board those implements of coercion and the other means of equipment and of fitting up the vessel which are the certain evidence of slave trading. Ships captured under such circumstances might, as well as those captured having slaves on board, be granted to the captain.

I think the Allied ministers will not only consent to renew their general declaration of 1815 against the slave trade, but they will likewise join with us in pressing France either generally to perform her treaty or to adopt the specified measures above referred to.

You will observe that the registry of slaves proposed is not required on our part, and is not to be controlled by the presence and superintendence of any Commissioners of ours residing in the French colony. When I, in conversation, suggested to you a measure of this kind as a substitute for the right of mutual search, I did it in the certainty that that right would not be conceded by France; and as something in lieu of it which should manifest the intention of the King to carry into execution his ordonnance, his treaty, and the law of the country, and in hopes that this example on his part might have some effect on the public functionaries in the colonies, and might even tend to create in France a public opinion against the slave trade.

I am aware that even if the registry could be made effectual in the French colonies, it would affect not a tenth of the existing evil, and that we should impose a hardship upon our own colonies which is neither required nor deserved. But I suggested the idea because I could find nothing better, and I had certainly no communication with any other person on the

subject. The registry in the French colonies will not be so effectual, if not watched by a Commissioner on our part. But it may be of some use, and its establishment will, at least, show the governors of colonies, the colonists, and the public who will have the knowledge of its establishment, that the King is in earnest. The other proposed measures speak for themselves.

In respect to Portugal and the Brazils, you are aware that, excepting France, which power still maintains a *chargé d'affaires* at Lisbon, the other powers whose ministers are at this congress, have no diplomatic relations with Portugal, and I don't think I shall be able to induce them to join in any remonstrance to be made to the King of Portugal.

I must likewise mention to you that, having recently conversed with Count Nesselrode and another Russian minister upon this part of the subject, and urged the adoption of the measure of excluding the colonial produce belonging to slaveholding countries from the ports of the Allies, and particularly the colonial produce of Portugal and her colonies after the year 1823, although no answer was given to the notion, I could observe those symptoms of disapprobation and dissent which convince me not only that it will not be adopted, but that the suggestion of it is attributed to interested motives not connected with the humane desire of abolishing the slave trade!

Such is the prejudice with which all that we do upon this subject is viewed by those who profess to be, and I really believe are, the best friends of the cause of abolition!

P.S. Since writing this despatch I have discovered that there has been for some time a discussion depending with the Russian government respecting the preference given in the ports of Russia to Brazilian over British sugar, and it is not improbable that this discussion occurred to the Russian ministers when I was talking to them of the expediency of excluding Portuguese colonial produce from the ports of the Allies, as a means of putting down the slave trade.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 187. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 28th Oct., 1822.

I did not see Lord Strangford's despatch to you, No. 151, of the 5th October, although written from Vienna, till some days after his Lordship arrived here; and as I found that it contained a statement of the commercial objects of the Emperor of Russia, in his disputes with the Porte, quite different from what I had understood them to be, and had stated them in my despatch, No. 6, of the 4th instant, I have thought it proper to inquire from Prince Metternich what he understood of these objects, and he states them exactly as I did to you.

He says he knows that the Emperor is aware of the inconveniences which have been experienced by his diplomatic servants at the Porte, in having to defend the frauds practised by Greek captains and others under the Russian flag, and that his Imperial Majesty is anxious to be able to carry on the commerce of his southern territories without their aid.

I have stated this to Lord Strangford; but he is certain that Count Nesselrode mentioned the subject to him in the form in which he wrote it to you; but as Prince Metternich is quite certain that I am right, and as, by reference to the Russian note of the 26th August, it appears that the Emperor considers either of the following alternatives to be satisfactory, viz.—that the Porte should allow the passage of Spanish, Portuguese, Sicilian vessels, and those of other nations, or that the Porte should respect the flag by which those vessels had been in the habit of covering themselves—I do not think that it would be desirable that I should, by mentioning the subject, give Count Nesselrode reason to believe that I had ever thought that the Porte would allow the Russian flag to give protection to Greek vessels.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with great truth and regard,  
your most obedient humble servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 28th Oct., 1822.

The unfavourable accounts which are daily received respecting the prospects of the insurgents in Spain have increased the desire of the

Royalist party to bring the questions, which have for some time occupied the French and Spanish governments, to a final issue; and although their endeavours to determine Monsieur de Villèle to take a decisive part, have completely failed, they have persuaded the Minister for the War Department to increase the military establishment on the Pyrenees, by placing a third corps d'armée, under the command of General Ligier Belair, at Toulouse, and to push the regiments, stationed in the first line, close to the extreme frontier.

Monsieur Berthier de Sauvigny, who commands a brigade, and who enjoys the confidence of the Royalist party, arrived at Paris some days since, and his communications with Monsieur Polignao, Bruges, and others, who unceasingly represent the mischief which may result from the temporising system of the government, as I am credibly informed, have led to a determination to bring on a crisis by measures of local hostility, independent of the will of either government; and if it be true that the execution of such a project is confided to Monsieur de Sauvigny, the sudden fall, which has taken place in the value of all Spanish securities within these few days, is fully accounted for.

The agents of the Spanish insurgents, who had hitherto endeavoured, without success, to raise a loan for their service in Paris, have in the mean time received a communication from the contractors for the last Spanish loan, intimating an inclination to listen to their proposals, provided they would engage to ratify the several loans raised for the service of the constitutional government, in case a change of affairs should take place in that country. Although I believe this demand has been referred to Spain, it is probable that the proposal, which cannot be considered more unreasonable than the loan which the Greek authorities of Hydra have been enabled to raise in the market at Genoa, will be admitted.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

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*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 28th Oct., 1822.

The Duke de Blacas arrived rather unexpectedly at Paris on Thursday evening, bringing with him the bulls fixing the circumscription of the Bishoprics established by the late Concordat.

The re-establishment of M. de Corbière has at the same time enabled him to resume the direction of the department of the interior.

M. de Villèle being fully aware that his opponents will avail themselves to attack him, is desirous to press forward the convocation of the Chambers, which he calculates with reason must place him in a situation to meet every combination to which that event can possibly give rise; since no one in the present situation of affairs can look forward to the possibility of opposing him in the Chambers with any chance of success, and the complaints to which the uncertain conduct of the government with respect to Spain, will lead, on the part of the country gentlemen, and of the Côté Droite, will be answered by the outcry of the Demagogues of the Côté Gauche,



against the measures by which they pretend the civil war has been fomented in that country, though the measures of the President are generally supported by his Royal Highness Monsieur. I fear, however, that he will have to encounter the whole of his Royal Highness's influence upon every point touching the relations of the government with Spain.

It is remarkable that in this state of things M. de Villèle has not thought it necessary to avail himself of the press to support his measures, and has not at the present moment a single paper written decidedly in support of his interests.

Among the measures which are calculated to gain the good will of the Royalists, a complete change is meditated in the choice of the Councillors of State in active employment, by which means the government will meet the expectations of Messrs. Bouville, Dudon, Kergorlay, Lalot, and others of the same description, while several persons who are obnoxious to that party, among whom particularly is Baron Mounier, will be removed.

The difficulties which impede the re-election of General Lafayette have been in some degree removed by the production of an Act, dated some years back, annulling the donation of his estate of Le Grange in favour of his children, though the omission to enregister this paper will subject him to a fine of 30,000 francs. To prevent any question arising upon the subject, he will be brought forward as a candidate for the arrondissement where his principal property is situated, near Meaux.

The King has been pleased to make over the Château of St. Ouen to Madame du Cayla, after expending near a million and a half of francs in the improvement of that property.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

[ 188.]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 29th Oct., 1822.

I enclose a paper which has been put into my hands confidentially by Prince Metternich, which contains a very able and satisfactory statement of the case of the Prince de Carignan. Although I believe that there is no doubt that the Prince de Carignan did play a principal part, as well in bringing about, as in the transactions of the late revolt in Piedmont, I do not think that there is any legal proof of his conduct which could convict him if the King of Sardinia could bring him to trial; and it would therefore be desirable that his Majesty should consider him as the heir to his throne, and receive him at his court and treat him accordingly.

I shall express this opinion to the Sardinian minister when I see him.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 189. ]

SIR,

Verona, 29th Oct., 1822.

We have had no conference since I had the honour of addressing you last ; and I do not think that we are yet ripe for a discussion of the French propositions transmitted to you in my despatch No. 11, of the 22nd instant.

The Emperor of Russia, immediately upon the receipt of the French paper, declared himself ready to consent to all the demands of the French ministers, and to conclude a treaty with them, stipulating for the succours which he should give ; and he declared his intention of marching an army of 150,000 men through Germany, which he should post in Piedmont, in readiness to fall either upon France, if the Jacobin party in France should take advantage of the absence of the army, or of its possible disaster in Spain, to make any attempt upon the government ; or upon Spain, if the French government should require its assistance.

I made no secret of the view which I intended to take of, and of the answer which I should give to, the French propositions, as explained to you in my despatch, No. 11, of the 22nd instant ; and Prince Metternich and myself have each had more than one interview with the Emperor for the purpose of endeavouring to make him feel the danger to which he was about to expose the French government, and the inconveniences and difficulties in which he would involve himself by the adoption of a plan to which all Europe would be opposed.

I do not think that either of us have yet succeeded in making him feel all the consequences of his plan.

We have both tried to awaken the French ministers to a sense of its danger to them ; and whether Monsieur de Montmorency is of the war party in the French ministry or not, I cannot tell ; but it is certain that, to me at least, he expressed his sense of the advantages they should derive in their discussions with Spain from the presence of 150,000 Russians in Piedmont, and his admiration of the chivalrous spirit with which the Emperor of Russia was ready to step forward for their defence.

Prince Metternich has informed me, however, that he thinks he has brought Monsieur de Montmorency to feel the danger in which the Emperor would place the French government ; and

that he (M. de Montmorency) will oppose the movement of any troops by any of the Allies, till they shall be positively called for by France.

Thus then it may be hoped that there will be an end to this scheme without bringing forward either of the other Continental Powers to object to it.

The difficulties of the question brought forward by France will not, however, be got the better of when this scheme shall be defeated; and I think that both the Austrian and Prussian cabinets feel with me, that the best and most respectable way for France to proceed, in order to preserve peace with Spain, if peace alone is the object, and not revolution or interference in the interior of Spain, is to come to a frank explanation with Spain on her plans and objects through the good offices of England alone, if necessary; and that the Allies should remain quiet, and neither say nor do anything till that measure shall have been tried.

I have stated frankly to the Emperor and all the ministers that we can give no opinion till fully informed of what has passed already between France and Spain, nor say what we shall do, till we shall know exactly what the case is upon which we shall be called upon to act.

The ministers of Austria and Prussia do not deny that this line of conduct is the only reasonable one; and that if peace is the object, it is, with the addition of good offices, the only one likely to lead to that result. But they appear to think that if called upon by France and Russia to agree to the demands of France, in case France should be obliged to cease her diplomatic relations with Spain, or is menaced or attacked, they will not be able to refuse to enter into such an agreement, taking care, however, to define the case as closely as possible.

I think the ministers of both Powers feel the injustice that would be done to Spain in at once deciding a case against her without any knowledge of facts; but their consciences are satisfied by the fact that Spain is a revolutionary Power, and has shown herself but too much disposed to insult other Powers.

I have then endeavoured to make them feel how little probable it is that any proceeding on the part of the Alliance without England will maintain peace, in the hypothesis that Spain is determined upon war on the revolutionary principle,

and in the hope of revolutionising France; and on the other hand, how much it will lower the French government in the eyes of the French nation, on the revolutionary principle that France should have gone to seek for allies, in consequence of the menace of attack from Spain, and should not have dared to meet Spain, excepting with three continental Powers as allies at her back. I have also pointed out to them the danger that France, or the war party in France, feeling the Alliance at their back, may force Spain to war; and all the risks which may thereby be incurred, which risks all admit to exist in any operation by French troops in Spain.

I think they feel the truth of these observations, but they are not willing to resist the demand of Russia and France; and we shall probably go into a conference to give our several answers to the French paper, and then to consider of the line to be adopted.

I shall object to everything excepting that the Allies should call upon France to explain herself; and then that they should recommend to her, if peace is her object, as it must be that of the others, that she should ask for the good offices of one of her Allies to explain to Spain her desire to remain at peace.

If the Allies should agree to recommend this line, and should enter into no treaty, nor make any declaration hostile to Spain, and France should then desire the good offices of England, I shall consent to give them. But if there should be any defensive treaty, or even declaration, against Spain on the part of the Allies, I shall consider it my duty to decline to become a party to either, and shall endeavour to make them feel collectively that the treaty or declaration will only render useless the efforts of the Power who is to use its good offices to maintain peace; and I shall decline to consent on the part of my government to use such good offices; but if pressed to do so I shall take the demand *ad referendum*.

I have endeavoured to explain to you the position in which we stand, and the different questions we shall have to consider, the part which each power will take, and particularly the line which I am bound by the instructions and intentions of his Majesty to take in each.

In the different meetings of the same kind with this which I have attended I have never yet been witness to so much difficulty and embarrassment as there has been in the discussion

of this Spanish question. These difficulties are to be attributed, 1st, to the false position in which France stands owing to the transactions of the French government in Spain since April, 1820, of which they are now ashamed, and therefore deny; 2nd, to the false position in which the Emperor of Russia stands in this question owing to his embarrassments with his army; and 3rd, to the necessity under which the two German governments find themselves of managing in some degree the Emperor of Russia, and of endeavouring to assist him through his difficulties at home, in order that he may not be obliged to carry on a war in the East.

I hope that we shall get through these difficulties in a creditable manner, and that we may be able to maintain the peace of the world.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 190. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 29th Oct., 1822.

Since I wrote to you my despatch of this day, No. 18, marked secret and confidential, I have learnt that the Emperor of Russia had this morning sent General Pozzo di Borgo to Monsieur de Montmorency to talk to him on his plan for moving a body of troops into Piedmont; and that Monsieur de Montmorency had declared in positive terms that it would be highly injurious to France, not only that any troops should be moved in consequence of what should pass here, but that any orders should be given for the formation of any army with a view to its being moved forward hereafter.

I understand that Monsieur de Montmorency is to see the Emperor to-morrow, and will explain himself in equally positive terms to his Imperial Majesty.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 29th Oct., 1822.

Your Grace's despatches, Nos. 9 and 40, were received here on Sunday and have been laid before the King.

Your Grace is perfectly correct in your understanding of the nature and effect of our engagements with Portugal, which subsist not in any recent treaty, nor so much indeed in any single obligatory instrument, as in the general language of ancient treaties and in the tenour of your connection with that kingdom for the last century and a half.

A specific guarantee of the Portuguese dominions in Europe was, indeed, contracted on the emigration of the Royal Family to the Brazils, but on the express supposition of the "establishment" of the seat of the Portuguese monarchy in Brazil. This guarantee, therefore, was repeated in the treaty of the year 1810, but distinctly repealed and annulled by the treaty of Vienna.

If such a guarantee did not exist previously, nothing like it has been given by the answer returned to the Portuguese *chargé d'affaires*, a copy of which was enclosed to your Grace in my despatch No. 8.

The object of that note was to point out to the government of Portugal —1st. The absence of any case to justify the contracting such an alliance with Spain, as Monsieur de Sarmiento had been instructed to threaten. 2ndly. The infallible tendency of such an alliance, if contracted, to loosen the claim of Portugal upon Great Britain for that general aid and protection to which ancient alliance and long subsisting friendship might entitle her on an adequate emergency.

The intended treaty between Portugal and Spain having been described as *offensive* as well as defensive, greater stress is laid in my answer to M. Sarmiento's note upon the obnoxious nature of the former qualification. But the arguments, though specifically directed against an engagement avowedly *offensive*, are equally applicable, and were intended equally to apply to any case in which Portugal should, by new and special obligation, place herself at the call of another Power to act against a third, and should thereby incur the risk of *provoking* an attack from that third Power. It is in the case of an unprovoked attack upon her territory, and in that only, that Portugal would have a claim upon British assistance.

Lower than this we could hardly state our obligations towards Portugal without appearing to have varied or extenuated it, in consequence of the internal changes of the Portuguese monarchy. That the Portuguese government does not rate that obligation higher than I have stated it, your Grace may collect from the enclosed copy of a note which I have received this day from the Portuguese *chargé d'affaires*.

I had learned some time ago from other sources of intelligence that M. Sarmiento, in qualifying the intended treaty with Spain as *offensive*, had outgone the instructions of his government, and I was in daily expectation of a voluntary communication from M. Sarmiento to that effect when your Grace's despatch reached me. Upon receipt of that despatch, I thought it expedient to quicken M. de Sarmiento's communication, I therefore yesterday desired to see him, and inquired whether he had not some explanation to make to me on the subject of our late correspondence,

recapitulating at the same time the reasoning of my note of the 1st instant, and showing the bearing of that reasoning upon any engagement, though nominally defensive, by which Portugal should without previous direct provocation be brought into hostile collision with France.

The note which I now transmit to your Grace is the result of yesterday's conference.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

M. de MORAES SARMENTO on the relations between PORTUGAL and GREAT BRITAIN and SPAIN.

Londres, ce 28<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

Le soussigné, Chargé d'Affaires du Royaume Uni de Portugal, Brésil, et Algarves, par sa Majesté Très Fidèle, ayant annoncé à son Excellence M. Canning, Ministre et Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de sa Majesté Britannique, dans sa note verbale du 25<sup>me</sup> Septembre, les différens motifs par lesquels le gouvernement de sa Majesté Très Fidèle désirait savoir si, selon les rapports d'une intime et très ancienne alliance entre les couronnes de Portugal et de la Grande Bretagne, sa Majesté Très Fidèle pouvait compter sur les mêmes secours de la part de son Allié, en cas d'une invasion étrangère contre le Portugal, par quelque motif que ce soit ; mais particulièrement avec le dessein d'attaquer et de détruire les nouvelles institutions politiques admises dans ce royaume ; parce que les préparatifs du côté de la France inspirait des intentions hostiles envers la Péninsule ; et le gouvernement Portugais, en cas d'un refus de la part du gouvernement Britannique, en prendrait des mesures accommodées à ses circonstances, et alors le Portugal quittant avec regret son ancien allié, chercherait en Espagne, moyennant une alliance offensive et défensive, les secours nécessaires pour défendre les deux pays.

Le soussigné eut l'honneur de recevoir ce même jour pendant la conférence une réponse de la part de son Excellence, dans laquelle on lui assura que non seulement les craintes du Portugal n'avaient à présent aucun fondement, mais que probablement elles n'en auraient pas pour l'avenir.

Le soussigné s'empressa de rendre compte tout de suite à son gouvernement d'une communication qui lui fut si agréable ; et en même temps il reçut la note de son Excellence du 1<sup>er</sup> de ce mois, dans laquelle son Excellence Mr. Canning lui répéta les mêmes assurances de la part du gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique, et que sa dite Majesté ne serait jamais indifférent à quelque atteinte contre l'indépendance et la sécurité du Portugal. Cependant, comme dans la même note son Excellence lui présenta quelques observations à l'égard d'une alliance purement défensive, ou d'une alliance en même temps défensive et offensive, le soussigné s'empressa de déclarer maintenant à son Excellence qu'il reçut un ordre de lui annoncer, que non seulement le Portugal ne s'engagerait par ce Traité avec l'Espagne à des obligations qui nuiraient à ses relations intimes avec la Grande Bretagne, mais que les ordres et les pouvoirs du ministre Portu-

gais maintenant à Madrid ont pour but, négocier un *Traité d'Alliance défensive et de garantie mutuelle par rapport au système constitutionnel des deux royaumes, contre l'agression de quelque puissance contre le même système.*

Par conséquence ce *Traité* étant circonscrit à un seul objet, il y devient éventuel ; et pour prouver encore plus les bonnes intentions et les égards du gouvernement du Portugal envers celui de la Grande Bretagne, le sous-signé doit ajouter, qu'ayant reçu l'ordre de faire cette communication, datée du 11<sup>me</sup> de ce mois ; le ministère Portugais ignorait alors le contenu de la note de son Excellence du 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre, et savait à peine la réponse verbale du 25<sup>me</sup> Septembre.

Le sous-signé se flatte que cette explication sera satisfaisante au gouvernement Britannique, autant qu'elle ne tend qu'à resserrer les liens d'une amitié intime et naturelle entre les deux nations ; et en même temps il prie à son Excellence Mr. Canning de vouloir bien agréer les sentimens de sa considération la plus distinguée.

C. P. DE MORAES SARMENTO.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 29th Oct., 1822.

As I said in a former letter, you may depend upon nothing being done in relation to Spanish America before your return. If I said this before I was aware of the extent of your objections to doing *anything*—or, at least, doing what we must come to sooner or later—soon ; I certainly feel the propriety of delay much more strongly after the receipt of your letter of the 18th. But I must frankly confess, at the same time, that I do not feel the force of the objections themselves.

It is now twelve years since we offered to Spain our mediation between the mother country and her colonies. It cannot be necessary to remind you how that offer was declined, or how frequently and pertinaciously similar offers, repeated in the same spirit of amity, have been either directly refused or evaded. Every successive government in Spain has vied with its predecessor in setting our interference aside ; and, if there be any difference between them, it seems to have been this, that the more popular the government the more obstinately has it refused all good offices with the colonies, and discountenanced all notion of a compromise unaccompanied with their submission. We bound ourselves to a neutrality in the contest, and took pretty strong steps (strong, I mean, in reference to our internal legislation) to enforce the observance of that neutrality. There was, however, a distinct understanding that commercial intercourse with the colonies was not to be deemed a breach of our obligation. That our engagements, have been fulfilled as strictly as it was in our power cannot be denied : but even within the last twelve months our innocent commerce has been interrupted, and British merchant vessels trading with Buenos Ayres (a colony in which, whatever may be the case with respect to the others, there is not a vestige of Spanish authority) have been captured by Spanish ships of war, carried into the ports of the colonies still under Spanish



allegiance, and there condemned as good prize, for trading with the insurgent colonies. Is this to be borne? or can you believe that it is possible to justify the putting up with it in Parliament? As to applications for redress to the Spanish government, the utter uselessness of all such appeals was proverbial even in older and better times; but within the period to which this retrospect is confined the carelessness of that government on such subjects has amounted to insolence, and their delays and shufflings to an absolute denial of justice.

I have now before me a despatch of your brother's, dated in March, 1819, which contains an enumeration of unredressed grievances, and of complaints either neglected or rejected, which in any other age, and under any other circumstances, would have afforded cause of war; and it is needless to say, not only that they continue still unredressed, but that the list is grievously augmented since that time.

In that year, I think, it was that Sir H. Wellesley was instructed, in case of a continued refusal to do justice on the part of the Spanish government, to threaten reprisals. I mention this, not as indicating the mode in which our resentment could most properly, or would most efficaciously, be shown (because I think, on the contrary, that it would be a mode full of inconveniences), but as a proof of the patience and long-suffering which we have exercised, not only since injustice *began* to be perpetrated, but since we felt and proclaimed that injustice to be so intolerable as to warrant a measure hardly short of war, or rather of war itself; for the capture of a vessel on grounds of retaliation is essentially nothing but an act of hostility.

Let it not be said that this menace was intended merely as a menace, and let it not be urged that Sir H. W. did (as undoubtedly, perhaps unluckily, he did) abstain from the bringing forward this menace as distinctly as he was authorised to do. He might be restrained from so bringing it forward by a notion that he saw a juster feeling on the point of growing up in the Spanish Cabinet; but if that were his hope, the hope has been disappointed: and the sense entertained by the British government of the injustice inflicted by that of Spain so long ago as in 1819 lives in the records of the correspondence, and surely, after the lapse of three years of aggravation, makes an apology for further forbearance very difficult.

It is no apology for such forbearance (as it appears to me) that the government of Spain is unsettled and distracted, and thereby rendered incompetent to attend to any other than her own immediately self-interesting concerns. For, first, how long has that excuse existed? and for how long is it to avail? But, secondly (what is much more important in principle), how are we to justify to ourselves, as well as to our Allies, our doctrine of non-interference, if we admit the state of Spain to be such as to disqualify her for the performance of her international obligations? Our doctrine—and the true one—is that we have no right to interfere with another country on account of distractions purely internal, so long as no external detriment arises from them to other nations or to ourselves. But such distractions, if they confer no right of interference on other nations, confer no privilege on the nation in which they prevail. They do not authorise other nations to interfere with her: good; but they surely do not authorise her to injure other nations with impunity. The converse of the

doctrine—that there is no right of interference except from external injury, is—that external injury does give the right of interference upon the government to whose subjects the injury is done; perhaps there is not only a right conferred, but a duty imposed. That duty may be performed, indeed, otherwise than by the exercise of the right of direct interference; and if it may be so, we, who have the right, may waive its exercise, and content ourselves with resorting to a milder alternative, especially if that alternative be one which meets directly one class of our grievances, and the other in some degree compensates. We cannot, indeed, obtain specific redress for the numerous cases of individual hardship on which Sir H. Wellesley remonstrated in vain, or which have occurred since, by a recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies in South America. Neither, however, could we do so by war. But such a recognition, if it opens new channels of trade, compensates the nation, though not the individuals, for commercial grievance with commercial benefit; and so far as our grievance arises from an unjust interruption and penal visitation by Spain of our intercourse with the Spanish colonies, the redress is exactly fitted to the grievance.

So much as to Spain: as to the colonies themselves, I admit that their different degrees of forwardness may justly and reasonably be discriminated in our time and mode of treating with them. But that is matter of detail. The question of principle is as to recognising any one; and as to recognising ever without the previous consent of Spain. After the consent of Spain, indeed, recognition is hardly the term to be used, or the measure to be considered; for I know not how we could be so ultra-colonial as to continue to treat those as provinces which the mother-country had acknowledged to be States. That such a time, and such a state of things, will arrive sooner or later you do not doubt any more than I. Yet the origin of Colombian independence will not be a hit altered by the delay; and if on the one hand, we shall contribute (as perhaps it must be admitted that we may) to “constitute” the colonies into States by our recognition; on the other hand, it must be recollected that our abstinence will not necessarily much retard that constitution, if other Powers do not hesitate as long as we; that it cannot, in all human probability, defeat that constitution, and that if it could—the alternative being what?—the re-establishment of the predominancy of Spain? or the erection of a set of wild hucaneering piratical republics?—it may be doubted whether the world would gain by the bargain—or rather whether England would gain, that being in this particular question, above all others, the *world* for which we are bound to provide.

Your last objection is drawn from this very consideration of what would be the benefit to England? and you seem to think that one great interest in this country, already severely and (I agree with you in fearing) irrecoverably depressed—the West Indian—would feel the recognition of the American States, and the free opening of their trade with England, as a misfortune. I really do not apprehend this to be the case. I have never heard any such apprehension expressed by West Indians. As to the navigation of the West Indian Seas, the gain would be clear, from the erection of any responsible forms of government on the Spanish American continent, and from the abolition of a conflict of maritime pretensions and jurisdictions.

And as to commerce—we already import, or allow to be imported, into this country every ounce of the sugars, every flock of the cotton of Brazil: the former, it is true, not for home consumption, but for rivalry in the markets of foreign Europe. Nor do I know of any other article in which the competition is to be dreaded, nor of any other part of South America from which this article would arrive in an alarming quantity, if at all.

I have requested Robinson to prepare, at the Board of Trade, a sketch of such commercial engagements as would in their opinion, and in that of the mercantile interest of London (whose thoughts have been long turned to the subject), be advisable, in the event of a recognition of the Spanish American colonies. I enclose to you a copy of his Memorandum; which he has compared, I know, with the suggestions, not only of a merchant of the first eminence, but a West India merchant and agent for a West India colony. There is nothing startling, and seems to be nothing difficult in these articles. The political articles to be added to them are as simple, and yet, I really believe, as sufficient. And it is hardly necessary to say that there is nothing in them to which Spain can object, except to the general principle of recognition at all; nothing that impairs her rights, if she has any remaining, or prejudices her arrangements, if she has any still in contemplation.

But, after all, what choice have we? Is it possible to stop the progress of events, and to soothe the growing impatience of our whole mercantile and manufacturing interests—standing still and doing nothing? What choice have we then but between—1st, the recognition, towards which, be it remembered, our whole course has been tending, not designedly, for the last six months at least; or, 2ndly, some vindication against Spain herself of the injuries which we have suffered either from her hostility or from her helplessness; or, 3rdly, a continued acquiescence in such injuries without vindication and without redress—an acquiescence which I know not whether it would be more difficult to reconcile to ourselves or to preach successfully to Parliament?

I conclude, however, as I began this long dissertation, with the assurance that the question shall be kept entire till your return. It is, however, I think, a question of our own. France, who might have claimed to be taken into a common consideration of it, has in this, as she did some years ago in the instance of Buenos Ayres, gone before us, though she now pretends to wait till we come up. And to Austria, Russia, and Prussia, the matter is one of mere speculation.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

HEADS OF COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL ARTICLES to be proposed in any agreement with the STATES OF SOUTH AMERICA.

The first question that arises upon the subject of our commercial relations with South America is, whether we should endeavour to obtain for ourselves exclusive or specific advantages as the condition of acknowledging their independence.

It is conceived that this course would be neither just nor politic; it would undoubtedly be quite at variance with the principle upon which we

have hitherto proceeded during the whole of the contest in that quarter, and which has led us uniformly to disclaim any interested views, and any desire to obtain either from old Spain or from the colonies, exclusive advantages for ourselves at their expense. A commercial treaty founded upon the opposite principle to that which we have hitherto professed would be impolitic, because it would proceed upon the untenable position that the trade could be beneficial to us and at the same time injurious, because restrictive, to the other party; and yet such would necessarily be the object sought after if we were to claim advantages from them for which we were not disposed to grant a reciprocity. It may be doubted, indeed, whether they would consent to any such hard conditions; but, even if they did, the consequence would in all probability be an incessant struggle on their part to evade the onerous part of the treaty; incessant representations and remonstrances from us; much mutual ill-will; and after all an unprofitable and diminishing trade. Of these results of apparently advantageous bargains we have already had, and still have, numberless proofs in the unsatisfactory and contentious nature of our relations with Portugal. I think therefore that it would be unwise to make commercial arrangements with South America upon any other basis than that of a fair reciprocity.

Let us take as a principle that which now regulates our trade (a most profitable one) with the United States.

1st. Both parties to be at liberty, generally speaking, to admit or prohibit the produce of each other, with high or low duties, as may suit the varying nature of their respective interests.

2ndly. All duties upon the tonnage of ships to be equalized; that is to say, that British ships shall not pay more in South American ports than South American ships; and *vice versa* in British ports. No difference of duties on account of the produce of either country being imported or exported in a ship of the other.

The same equality as to bounties upon exports and drawbacks.

3rdly. The South American States to allow the trade with our colonies as established by the Act of the last session.

4thly. The usual privileges of consuls.

5thly. The British merchants and traders not to be subject to more restrictions or imposts than may correspond with any which in this country may apply to South Americans.

6thly. As the South American States cannot for some years to come have any commercial marine strictly answerable to the custom-house definition in England of a national ship, Great Britain to admit for a term of years vessels under the independent flags without requiring a compliance with those rules, either as to the build of the ship or as to the crew.

7thly. In consideration of this concession, particular articles of British produce (such as woollens and cottons) to be admitted into the South American ports upon specific moderate duties, say 10 or 15 per cent., the value to be calculated in the same manner as is practised in this country in respect to *ad valorem* duties.

So each party to be placed by the other upon the footing of the most favoured nation.

A commercial treaty upon these principles would probably be very

acceptable to the independents, and being founded upon a fair reciprocity would probably be equally beneficial to both parties. It is possible, however, that, upon consulting those who have some practical knowledge of the South American trade, some modification or extension of the proposed arrangements might be deemed advisable. To these commercial articles should be added stipulations for—

1. The toleration of religion—and right of worship.
2. The exemption from military service.
3. The inheritance of property.

[ 191. ]

*M. S.A.S. le Prince de Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

À Verone, ce 29<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

Voilà un mois qui se passe depuis que je suis arrivé à Vienne, et vous ne m'avez pas dit ni écrit un seul mot qui puisse mener à l'arrangement de notre question pécuniaire, sans lequel je ne peux pas retourner en Angleterre.

Je vous envoie une note à ce sujet.

Je vous serai bien obligé si vous vouliez bien m'envoyer les papiers sur le Prince de Carignan, et la dépêche de Mr. Brunetti.

Croyez moi, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 192. ]

*To His Highness Prince Metternich.*

Verona, 29th Oct., 1822.

More than a year has elapsed since the attention of the Austrian government has been drawn to the consideration of the loans contracted in England, in the years 1795 and 1797, on account of his Majesty the Emperor; and that in various discussions, verbal as well as written, between his Highness Prince Metternich and the late Marquis of Londonderry, the principle has been admitted by both, that it is essential for the honour and interest of the two countries that a pecuniary arrangement should be made between their governments, by which the debt on the part of his Majesty the Emperor should be cancelled, and the Austrian securities which are in the hands of the British government should be returned to the government of his Imperial Majesty.

The undersigned having been directed and authorized by his Sovereign to discuss and conclude with the Austrian government an arrangement to provide for these objects, has commu-

nicated upon the subject confidentially with his Highness Prince Metternich, verbally and in writing, upon more than one occasion, as well at Vienna as Verona; but having as yet received no answer, he adopts this mode of drawing the attention of the government of his Imperial Majesty to an object highly important to the honour and interest of both governments; and he earnestly requests an answer from Prince Metternich to the confidential communications upon the subject which he has made to his Highness under date of the 2nd and 19th October.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to his Highness the assurance of his highest consideration.

WELLINGTON.

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*Lord Strangford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Verona, Tuesday evening, 29th Oct., 1822.

I have learned this evening with considerable pain that your Grace has been offended at my having addressed a despatch to his Majesty's Government, in which my opinion as to the pretensions of Russia respecting the navigation of the Black Sea differs from that of your Grace; and I have felt yet deeper concern on being told that your Grace considers me to have acted in an irregular and improper manner in having transmitted that despatch without having previously submitted it to your inspection.

I endure sufficient pain and mortification in this place without the additional infliction of your Grace's displeasure. I have met with more injustice already than I can well tolerate, and the measure of my sufferings will, indeed, be ample, if I should have the misfortune of appearing to merit your Grace's censure.

My opinion on the commercial treaties has always been the same. I have never doubted the possibility of opening the Black Sea to all Powers, and I think that I had the honour of expressing myself in that sense to your Grace. But my official correspondence since May last will prove that I always thought (as I do now) that such a measure would involve the ruin of our Levant trade. I again expressed that opinion in my last despatch upon the subject because it was my duty to do so, and to it I must still adhere. I have been too long charged with our commercial interests in the Levant not to have some notion of their present state, and of the danger which will accrue to them from the admission of other Powers to the navigation of the Black Sea.

With respect to the transmission of my despatch without your Grace's knowledge, I must rest my justification upon plain facts. On the day previous to the departure of the messenger, I had the honour of calling three or four times for the purpose of showing you the draft of my despatch. It was my misfortune that your Grace was either absent or unavoidably occupied. I kept back my despatch. I did not forward it by your Grace's messenger; and it did not go till the week following, when it was trans-

mitted by the ordinary post. Nor should I have then sent it, had I not thought that it would have been a breach of my duty to have longer withheld my opinion as the King's Ambassador on a point so essentially affecting the interests of his subjects, merely because I had not been so fortunate as to have an opportunity of previously showing it to your Grace, on whose indulgence I fully counted. On my arrival here I immediately communicated the despatch to you, and I admit that I ought instantly to have furnished you with a copy of it—a piece of neglect for which I now entreat your Grace's pardon—and for which I hardly know how to apologise, except by candidly owning that I inexcusably put it off from day to day, because my secretary was engaged in the transcribing of a literary work which took up the most of his time, and perhaps of mine.

I trust and hope that this frank explanation will suffice to clear me in the opinion of your Grace; that you will give credit to the feelings of deep and sincere regret with which I contemplate the possibility of appearing to you in an unfavourable light, and that you will believe those feelings to be in exact proportion to the English pride and satisfaction which I derive from being placed under your Grace's orders, and from being honoured with that degree of confidence which you may be pleased to accord to me. My only wish is to act in such a manner as to merit your Grace's approbation, and I shall indeed be unhappy if my humble efforts to deserve it should be misunderstood.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most faithful and most obedient humble servant,  
STRANGFORD.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Sir,

Paris, 31st Oct., 1822.

M. de Villèle informs me that he lately received communications from Lisbon, representing the hope which the Portuguese ministers entertain that their differences with the Trans-Atlantic possessions of that crown may be adjusted by the joint mediation of Great Britain and France; but that before he had been able to receive the King's orders upon the subject of this communication, the arrival of despatches from Rio Janeiro had evinced the desire of the Prince Royal to solicit the recognition of the Independence of the local government of the Brazils on the part of France; that since he cannot doubt the opinion of his Majesty's government upon this subject he had not listened to either overture, though he admits that the advantage which might result to French commerce had been strongly urged to induce his compliance with their respective requests.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Sir,

Paris, 31st Oct., 1822.

The French ministers have lately adverted in several conversations, to the tendency of the official communications which had been addressed to

the Allied ministers by the Count de Nesselrode before their departure from Vienna, and to the observations which they are calculated to provoke on the part of the different ministers who have been employed in the late negotiations at Constantinople.

M. de Villèle says that the information which has reached him from various sources left no doubt that the Emperor of Russia has been grossly imposed upon, and that proofs can be produced that the Russian agents in Turkey have encouraged the Greek revolt by every means in their power; that the perseverance of the negotiators at Constantinople in their endeavours to prevent the disclosure of these facts is the more desirable since an imputation which the Russian cabinet is unable to repulse may compel the Emperor to have recourse to alternatives it is equally the interest of all parties to avoid; that it is not to be supposed that the Austrian government could be ignorant of the delays which impeded the evacuation of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and that the Emperor was therefore justified in complaining that the negotiation had not been conducted by the Court of Vienna with that due attention to the interests of Russia which he cannot but think his Imperial Majesty is entitled to expect; that under these circumstances, if the Emperor's complaints are answered in a tone of recrimination supported by unanswerable proofs of misconduct on the part of the servants of the Russian government, the consequence to be apprehended from the discussion will induce his Excellency to look forward with great anxiety to the course which the several cabinets will think it expedient to pursue.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*Sir Charles Stuart to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 31st. Oct., 1822.

The accounts which have been received from Spain within these few days show that the insurrection has extended itself to the province of Arragon; that the greater part of the corps under General Zarco del Valle having quitted the standard of the government, General Mina has been unable to effect his junction with that officer, or to proceed against the Baron d'Eroles.

The Spanish government, alarmed by this unfavourable intelligence, appears to have embarked in a system of violence which menaces the worst consequences in Madrid.

They are, however, so fully sensible of the misfortunes which must result from an hostile declaration against this country in the present state of their affairs, that they begin to manifest sincere anxiety to prevent any hostile demonstration on the frontier.

M. de Villèle hinted that this change is the more important as it would enable him to prevent the bad effects which may result from an excess of zeal on the part of the officers in command on both sides of the frontier; adding, in a tone which evidently referred to the circumstances stated in the report I lately had the honour to address you upon this subject, that the military movements which have lately taken place have materially changed the state of affairs, by removing the seat of war so far from the frontiers that the insurgents can only communicate with France by the



points of Ax and Puycerda; every other part of the Spanish line upon the Pyrenees being occupied by the troops of that government.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 31st Oct., 1822.

The enclosed Memorandum was put into my hands yesterday by Mr. Wilmot, Under-Secretary of State in the Colonial Office; Lord Bathurst, for whom it was intended, being out of town.

I have thought that the best way of acting upon it was to write, not to Mr. Parke, but to Cardinal Consalvi himself.

I enclose to you a copy of my letter to him. You will see that I have taken advantage of the opportunity to press him upon another subject—that of the Slave-trade, upon which Wilberforce had been strongly soliciting me to find some way of inducing the Court of Rome to bestir itself. I really think the separation of Brazil offers a fair occasion, and, good Protestant as you are, you will not object to the bribe which I hold out to Consalvi, for his assistance.

If he should be at the Congress, you will, I am sure, help on both points—the Irish Archbishopric and the Slave-trade. If not, may I request of you to find some way of forwarding my letter safely and speedily to Rome?

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Foreign Office, Nov. 1.

P.S.—I was going to trouble your Grace with a long letter upon Slave-trade, upon which I have been in constant correspondence with Wilberforce, though I have not thought it necessary to transmit to you all his observations. Upon looking, however, at a copy of a letter which I had occasion to write to him yesterday, I find that it touches all the points upon which I had anything to say to you, and I enclose that copy, therefore, as a summary of the whole, and as a companion for that to the Cardinal.

G. C.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MEMORANDUM.

30th Oct., 1822.

The Roman Catholic Bishops of Munster, in Ireland, having elected unanimously the Rev. Dr. Collins to be their Metropolitan at Cashel, have sent so far back as the 25th of August their postulation to the Holy See, to obtain the usual confirmation and forms. The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and the Earl of Liverpool have expressed their satisfaction at the choice of Dr. Collins for a station of such importance to the good order and peace of that province, and wished that some channel might be pointed out, through which their sentiments might be made known to Cardinal Consalvi, to whose department the business belongs, his Majesty having no accredited Minister at the Court of Rome; while such a channel was inquired after, Mr. Anthony Richard Blake, at present Counsel for the Lord Lieutenant in Dublin, with his knowledge and

approbation, has written to the Cardinal and stated the wishes of his Majesty's government in Ireland, that no delay might take place in expediting the usual documents.

But the Roman Catholic Bishops are apprehensive that Mr. Blake's letter will be considered only as a private letter, and not invested with any sufficient character to produce effect. They therefore, knowing that Lord Bathurst has, in forming the Roman Catholic sees in Canada and the West Indies, used some channel of communication with the Roman See, solicit that his Lordship may support their act by his influence, against the act of some turbulent parish priest, who would wish to bring the appointment of Roman Catholic Bishops to the forms and confusion of a popular election, than which, they conceive, nothing would be more destructive of the peace of their respective districts.

A letter from his Lordship to Mr. Parke, Consul for the Papal States, or to the Duke of Wellington, who will have opportunities of seeing Cardinal Consalvi, or some other Minister from Rome, at the Congress, stating the satisfaction of his Majesty's government and wishing that no delay may intervene, would be effectual.

## II.

### *To Cardinal Consalvi.*

Au Bureau des Affaires Etrangères, à Londres, ce 1<sup>er</sup> Nov., 1822.

MON CHER CARDINAL CONSALVI,

Si je n'hésite pas à m'exposer aux peines de la haute trahison en ouvrant une correspondance avec votre Eminence, non comme Secrétaire d'Etat de sa Majesté Britannique avec le Cardinal Secrétaire du Pape, mais comme d'ami en ami, voici au moins une preuve bien éclatante de la force de l'amitié que je ressens pour M. de Consalvi, et de la confiance qu'il a su m'inspirer.

Mais je puis aussi trouver des excuses dans la nature même des communications que je veux faire au Ministre du St. Père, et dont je ne doute nullement que votre Eminence n'apprecie toute l'importance.

Premièrement: Les évêques Catholiques de la province de Munster, en Irlande, ont élu à l'unanimité le Docteur Collins au siège métropolitain de Cuskel; et depuis le 25 du mois d'Août, leur postulation est adressée au St. Siège pour obtenir la confirmation formelle de cette élection.

Ils ne sauraient avoir fait un choix plus agréable au Lord Lieutenant d'Irlande et au Ministre Britannique.

Dans des tems aussi orageux que ceux d'à présent la confirmation d'un tel choix est d'une importance majeure pour la tranquillité du pays; et on serait charmé si cette confirmation pouvait s'accorder tout de suite.

Oserais-je prier votre Eminence de vouloir bien l'expédier avec le moins de délai possible?

Voilà, à ce que je crois, une raison suffisante pour la transgression de la loi du treize d'Elizabeth.

En voici une autre:—Parmi les partisans les plus zélés dans la lutte annuelle pour les Catholiques sont ceux qui, après tant d'années de travail et de persévérance, ont enfin réussi à abolir le traite des nègres: abolir c'est-à-dire quant à l'Angleterre, mais non, malheureusement, quant à d'autres pays, qui ont des colonies dans la Mer Occidentale; et ces pays sont sans exception *Catholiques*.

Je vous assure, mon cher Cardinal, que cela produit un mauvais, très mauvais, effet; cela nourrit les préjugés les plus formidables, en resserrant l'association des idées de Catholicité et de l'Esclavage; idées qui ne se trouvent que trop liées dans les premières lectures de notre jeunesse.

Pourquoi le St. Père n'interdirait-il pas ce trafic horrible qui pendant des siècles a fait la honte de l'Europe et de la Chrétienté? Et dont il ne dépend que du chef de la Chrétienté Catholique de faire cesser l'existence. Je ne sau-

mais vous dire combien de maux une telle interdiction au nom et par l'autorité du St. Père empêcherait, combien elle soulagerait l'humanité outragée, et combien de forces elle donnerait ici à vos amis.

Pardonnez, mon cher Cardinal, à un avis (je n'ose dire un conseil) qui n'a pour motif que mon extrême désir de voir soulager les maux de l'Afrique, et fortifier en même temps la cause intéressante des Catholiques, sous le règne du Pontif actuel, et par l'entremise du Cardinal Consalvi.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec des sentimens aussi respectueux qu'amicaux, de votre Eminence,

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

GEORGE CANNING.

### III.

MY DEAR WILKESPOURCE,

Gloucester Lodge, 31st October, 1822.

I have adopted your last suggestion, and have availed myself of an occasion which very luckily arose at the moment, to write myself to Cardinal Consalvi, on the subject of the Slave-trade.

I send you for perusal a copy of my letter which will go enclosed to the Duke of Wellington, by the courier of to-morrow.

Upon other suggestions in your former letter I have more doubts.

I will take any steps which you wish, and that appear practicable, to obtain access for you to the press in France; but I must first know what shuts you out from it. As to any good to be done that way, I confess I am very sceptical.

The moral feeling is wanting as much in the people as in the government. Nay, more; they hate the abolition as Frenchmen, because they know that the measure was forced upon them by us; they dread the enforcement of it, because they believe it to be advantageous to us. If you can reason them out of these prejudices, out of these feelings I should rather say (for the facts are true), I shall be heartily glad of it; but I look, for my own part, for some sense of interest (if it can be created) rather than for any compunctious sentiment for the conversion of the French mob as well as ministry.

With a view to this mode of operation, I mean that of interest, I have no objection at all to reconsider the question of the Mauritius. Indeed, I was personally and still am rather inclined to it. The objections are colonial; I think they may possibly be overcome, and I am sure I am disposed to give that question a fair trial.

As to your project of an interchange of Consular residences, which I did not know to be yours, and which I never happened to see in writing (for the Duke of Wellington, who I suppose has it with him, left town the day after I took the seals), I find I was quite mistaken about it. I certainly thought that

Copy missing.

Colonies. In its limited application I see no harm in it, except the probability of our Consuls being pretty rapidly *killed off*. However, this is not a question for Congress, but simply for Portugal, or rather Brazil; if we allow Brazil to continue the Slave-trade, which I am very unwilling to do, if we can see the way to prevent it.

You argue against the acknowledgment of Brazil, unpurged of Slave-trade, as if you had understood me to be for it; whereas, in being against it you are only returning to me my own proposition. But, then, I cannot look at that proposition without seeing the difficulties that surround it. Perhaps there never was a more complicated case, or one for which it was so difficult to find or to make a rule that the law of nations will either furnish or sanction. Be assured, however, that the Slave-trade shall not be established by a new compact, even if it cannot be extinguished by one.

Lastly, you are surprised that the Duke of Wellington has not been instructed to say that we will give up the trade with Brazil (for that is, I am afraid, the amount of giving up the import and re-export of her sugar and cotton), if Austria, Russia, and Prussia will prohibit her produce. In fair reasoning you have a right to be surprised, for we ought to be ready to make sacrifices when we ask them, and I am for making them; but who would dare to promise such a one as this, without a full knowledge of the opinions of the commercial part of the nation.

Ever, my dear Wilberforce, very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

*Lord Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Verona, 31st Oct., 1822.

I have hastily put to paper Metternich's conversation with me. It may be curious to you to see the language he talks. If it is the least interesting to you, I shall derive much satisfaction.

Ever yours most sincerely,

V. L.

If I can be of the least use in any way, I need not add how much you command me.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM BY LORD LONDONDERRY. "No. 1.

29th October, 1822.

It may not be uninteresting to follow the mode in which Prince Metternich seems to be working the Spanish question; and in placing upon paper the conversation he held with Lord Londonderry yesterday, there may be some grounds hereafter for reflection upon this particular proceeding.

His Highness began by assuring Lord Londonderry, he now saw daylight through his operations, and he thought he could commit to paper, and seal it up to be opened at the close of the Congress, and it would be found to be correct; the true proceeding and line which all the five powers would take upon the most interesting subject of this meeting: you will remember, added he, my anxiety to launch France by a paper into the field, as soon as M. de Montmorency came to Vienna. My reason was simply that I wished her to be committed to state what she wished and what she aimed at. Whether I had a good or a bad France! I wished to be certain that there was no disunion among the French Ministers here, and that M. de Montmorency and M. de Villèle were fairly on the same line, which Chateaubriand's arrival rendered doubtful, as it was rumoured he came to play a great game, as the avowed confident of the acknowledged first minister of France.

Having succeeded in ascertaining the position of France here, I committed her to certain views, and declared propositions. I was next desirous to bring the exact station of all the other four Powers forward on those general French demands which had been circulated. As the true principle is generally to be found in the middle course, my labour was directed to bring each of the Allies to their maximum and minimum of action, before I went into conference. It was not necessary for me to ask England what she could or would do; I knew her position: but in having her opposed to the mad notions and pretensions of the Emperor of Russia, whom it was necessary to calm, and bring down from

impolitic and impossible fancies, I derived the greatest assistance from the ability and talents of the Duke of Wellington.

The difficulty of elucidating the Emperor, as to the exact line of France, was not a duty that devolved upon me. I was more anxious that he should undeceive himself in his notions relative to France.

Having first fully ascertained from the French Ministers that they did not go so far as an offensive line against Spain, but were content with a strict defensive; I did not fail to bring M. de Montmorency to a categorical explanation upon this point, and I would not allow him to shelter himself under the notion of a defensive position for any overt warfare.

The Emperor of Russia, however, was yet an unbeliever as to France being against an attack upon Spain, and against his marching an army through Europe, and into Piedmont. But how much better is it that he should discover this from France, than from Austria or England?

I stand then now, continued Prince Metternich, with the knowledge of what France wishes and desires. It is fair and reasonable to a certain extent only: I also know, that Russia looks to a view of the question, which the most interested power, France, herself will never arrive at. She will come therefore to my aid in stemming the great torrent of Russia which England opposes more diametrically than any of us; and, having thus ascertained where each stands, it will be for Austria to shape her course in such a manner as to bring the whole as near as possible to one focus; or at least that all should fully understand what aid in morale or material can be afforded by any, or each, and how we shall all take up our ground in rear of the advance, which is France.

I do not mean, added the Prince, to compare the question of Spain with that of Naples, but I wish to act upon it, in a certain degree, upon the same principles we succeeded against Naples. We shall equally succeed against Spain, if we are cautious, persevering, and play our game with ability.

France cannot take the part or conduct against Spain that Austria did against Naples. And yet France is called upon as most implicated and concerned to take the prominent situation.

The Emperor of Russia, however, would desire that France should pour her *Grangrene* armies into Spain, in order that he might bring his 200 000 or 300 000 Russians into France. But this is exactly establishing that revolution which it is our business to guard against. To such a proposition "my Emperor would say 'No; so long as France with a regular government, good or bad, demands from Russia assistance, and wishes for her army in her capital, I am content; but when France is unwilling to have this aid, I, as Austria, will never submit to its being forced upon her, whatever may be the affection and the understanding between me and the Emperor of Russia.'"

Well then, continued the Prince, if France and Austria are agreed upon this point, nay, if all Europe would rise in arms, rather than see, without the most dire necessity, a Russian army in Europe, have I not discovered the means, with management, of paralyzing the Emperor of Russia's eagerness without offending that chivalrous and moral spirit and action which it is so much all our interests to preserve?

The state, indeed, of the Allies and Spain may be compared to a patient (who has the appearance of the yellow fever) at Barcelona, and that five physicians are summoned to consider his situation. It is desirable for all interested in the sick man's case, as for himself, to know, 1st, if his malady is contagious or not; 2nd, to what extent it is contagious; and 3rd, if it cannot be cured, what are the best means to adopt towards lessening it, or diminishing the ravages it might create. In every situation or position, there is a remedy and a principle of action. It is the duty of the physicians to discover and proceed upon this notion. One physician (England), for example, declares there is no danger at all, and that the fever is not infec-

tions. Another says, the plague will extend its fatal consequences far and wide. The physician in the next house to the patient cries out to apply rapidly some treatment, as he fears for his own family; and the other remaining men of the faculty take into their grave deliberation to save the patient, especially attending to their friend and colleague in the first instance; and all endeavour to apply that ingredient into the remedy which, upon a joint consultation, the medicines in their immediate power can afford.

In admitting all Prince Metternich's ingenuity, and giving him credit for all that he saw he could accomplish, Lord Londonderry, in rejoinder, suggested that England might be the physician, that would not be quite prepared to admit the patient to have this contagious fever, and might wish to apply no remedy at all. He also said that confining France to the defensive, he thought it might be difficult to get even the Continental Powers to agree to any one system of conduct that could suit all, or that all were in a state equally to afford in morale and material.

His Highness replied that he thought he was in a position to go into conference: he had the arrangement before him in his brain. For several nights he had not slept in consequence of it, but now he felt secure, and he thought the foundation stone was laid.

This was the purport of his communication on the 28th of October, which it may be interesting hereafter to look back to.

#### NOTE to be presented by Mr. WARD to the PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT.

Nov., 1822.

The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, has received instructions from his Court to make to the government of his Most Faithful Majesty the following communication:—

Connected as his Britannic Majesty and his Royal predecessors have been, for so long a series of years, by the ties both of habit and of treaty, with the Royal House of Braganza, the King cannot have looked with indifference upon events which have divided that House against itself, and which menace, if they have not accomplished, the separation of its European and American dominions.

Recollecting the share which belonged to the councils of Great Britain in the transplantation of the seat of the Portuguese monarchy to Brazil, upon the invasion of its European dominions, and the share which belonged to British arms in the subsequent deliverance of Portugal from its invaders, the King doubts not that his Most Faithful Majesty will give credit to his ally for the equal and impartial interest which he must feel in the prosperity of the two kingdoms of Portugal and Brazil: an interest common to both during their union, and divided, but not impaired, by their separation.

Faithful to the principles which his Majesty has proclaimed to Europe and to the world, his Majesty has not only abstained from any interference in the internal concerns of Portugal or of Brazil respectively, but he even now declines declaring any opinion upon the conflicting claims and the reciprocal accusations of the Portuguese and Brazilian governments, &c. With the same frankness with which his Majesty has disavowed all pretension to interfere with either of them, he feels it incumbent upon him spontaneously to declare the course which he shall think it right to pursue in a crisis of so much delicacy.

In the unfortunate event of a war between Portugal and Brazil, an event which his Majesty earnestly deprecates, and from which he foresees no

consequences but mutual injury, and an exhaustion of the resources of both kingdoms—his Majesty would observe the most exact and scrupulous neutrality; but, whether in war or in peace with each other, it will be his Majesty's anxious desire and determination to maintain his existing relations of amity alike with Portugal and with Brazil.

If in pursuance of this determination the King shall think it expedient to acknowledge more or less formally the *de facto* establishment of the new Brazilian government, his Majesty, in consenting to that acknowledgment must be understood as in no degree prejudging, much less intending to preclude (what on the contrary it would be his Majesty's wish, by all means in his power, to promote), an amicable adjustment by which the rights and the interests of both nations may be reconciled, and which may preserve the crowns of both kingdoms to the illustrious family of Braganza.

PAPER FROM COUNT LIEVEN ON THE NOTE ON TURKISH AFFAIRS.

Nov., 1822.

Il serait à désirer que l'Angleterre déclare qu'elle est prête à se joindre aux démarches que feront les autres Cours Alliées à Constantinople, à l'effet de conserver à la Russie les avantages dont son commerce jouissait avant la rupture de ses relations avec la Porte; qu'entre les deux moyens proposés par la Russie pour atteindre ce but, l'Angleterre pense que celui qui tend à obtenir la libre navigation de la Mer Noire aux Puissances qui n'ont point ce privilège, offrirait plus de chances de succès, et qu'en conséquence S.M.B. serait disposée à employer ses bons offices pour engager la Porte à entrer en négociation avec toute Puissance Européenne qui réclamerait cette concession; que déjà l'Angleterre avait accordé son appui aux vœux que le gouvernement de Sardaigne lui avait exprimés, et qu'elle était prête à se joindre à ses Alliés pour appuyer de même les demandes semblables que les autres Cours pouvaient faire.

*Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON CHER DUC,

Verona, Nov., 1822.

Quelque délicat que soit le sujet du Mémoire Confidential que vous m'avez remis, je n'hésite pas de vous donner les renseignements suivans.

Une conspiration s'est formée en 1821 pour le renversement des droits de souveraineté de l'Empereur sur ses pays en deça des Alpes; cette conspiration s'est trouvée en rapport direct avec la révolte du Piémont, et l'une et l'autre ont reçu leur impulsion et leur direction du foyer révolutionnaire à Paris.

La révolution en Piémont n'a pas besoin d'être prouvée. Elle a eu lieu.

La conspiration en Lombardie se trouve à peu près dans le même cas. Il a paru à Turin une *députation Milanaise*; un corps de troupes Piémontaises sous la conduite de St. Marsan était en marche sur Milan. Le premier de ces faits est constaté par les actes publics du temps; le second a dû faire supposer l'existence d'un aide que devait trouver un corps de troupes faible et mal organisé; la démente révolutionnaire ne vas pas jusqu'à ad-

mettre que deux ou trois mille hommes suffiraient à eux seuls pour faire la conquête de la Lombardie.

Le temps n'a point tardé à réunir une somme d'indices suffisans pour former un corps de délits assez fort pour nécessiter la vigilance de l'autorité. Un tribunal régulier a été nanti de l'affaire.

C'est ce tribunal qui a réquis l'arrestation de plusieurs individus, parmi lesquels se trouvent les Comtes Confalonieri et Trecchi. Nos tribunaux sont placés dans une indépendance entière du gouvernement ; les procès criminels passent par trois instances. Le droit de grâce est le seul qui soit réservé au Souverain. Si donc les inculpés se plaignent de lenteur, ils doivent s'en prendre à des formes tutélaires. Je sais que celles révolutionnaires sont plus courtes ; aussi si plusieurs des prévenus avaient à juger leurs juges actuels, le procès de ces derniers irait plus vite.

Il ne m'est pas donné de connaître la position individuelle de MM. Confalonieri et Trecchi ; elle est le secret de leur procès ; c'est-à-dire, de leur propre conscience, et de celles de leurs juges. Ce que je sais sur leur compte, c'est qu'entr'eux il doit exister des recriminations bien plus graves à la charge du Comte Confalonieri qu'à celle de M. de Trecchi. Les antécédens de la vie de ces deux individus et l'importance que la partie saine, ainsi que celle que la partie factieuse du public, attachent à l'un et à l'autre, me servent ici de garant.

Mon vœu, mon cher Duc, et certes celui de l'Empereur, est que parmi les prévenus il ne se trouve point de coupable. Si tel est le cas vous les verrez tous acquittés très incessamment ; car le procès est entre les mains de la troisième et dernière instance. S'il existe des coupables l'Empereur se trouvera placé en face de sa conscience, et dès lors S.M.I. n'aura plus à considérer que ce qu'elle doit à Dieu et à ses peuples. Vous connaissez trop l'Empereur pour ne point savoir qu'il est heureux aussi souvent qu'il peut exercer le plus beau des attributs de la souveraineté sans devoir craindre de compromettre le premier des biens de ses sujets, leur repos.

Voilà tout ce que je sais, et tout ce que par conséquent je puis vous dire.

Agréez mes bien sincères hommages.

METTERNICH.

DÉPÊCHE OSTENSIBLE AU COMTE DE BULGARY, Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Madrid.

Verona, Nov., 1822.

Les Souverains et les Plénipotentiaires réunis à Vérone dans la ferme intention de consolider de plus en plus la paix dont jouit l'Europe, et de prévenir tout ce qui pourrait compromettre cet état de tranquillité générale, devaient dès le moment où ils se sont assemblés porter un regard inquiet et attentif sur un antique monarchie, que des troubles intérieurs agitent depuis deux ans, et qui ne peut qu'exciter à un égal degré la sollicitude, l'intérêt, et les appréhensions des autres Puissances.

Lorsqu'au mois de Mars, 1820, quelques soldats parjures tournèrent leurs armes contre le souverain et la patrie, pour imposer à l'Espagne des lois que la raison publique de l'Europe, éclairée par l'expérience de tous les siècles, frappait de la plus haute improbation, les Cabinets Alliés, et nommé-



nient celui de St. Pétersbourg, se hâtèrent de signaler les malheurs qu'entraîneraient après elles des institutions qui consacraient la révolte militaire par le mode de leur établissement.

Ces craintes ne furent que trop tôt et trop complètement justifiées. Ce ne sont plus des théories ni des principes qu'il s'agit ici d'examiner et d'approfondir. Les faits parlent, et quel sentiment leur témoignage ne doit-il pas faire éprouver à tout Espagnol qui conserve encore l'amour de son Roi et de son pays? Que de regrets s'attachent à la victoire des hommes qui ont opéré la révolution d'Espagne?

A l'époque où un déplorable succès couronna leur entreprise, l'intégrité de la monarchie Espagnole formait l'objet des soins de son gouvernement. Toute la nation partageait les vœux de S.M.C.; toute l'Europe lui avait offert une intervention amicale pour rasseoir sur des bases solides l'autorité de la métropole dans les contrées lointaines qui avaient jadis fait sa richesse et sa force. Encouragées par un fineste exemple à persévérer dans la révolte, les provinces où elle avait déjà éclaté trouvèrent dans les événements du mois de Mars la meilleure apologie de la désobéissance, et celles qui restaient encore fidèles se séparèrent aussitôt de la mère-patrie, justement effrayées du despotisme qui allait peser sur son infortuné Souverain et sur un peuple que d'imprévoyantes innovations condamnaient à parcourir tout le cercle des calamités révolutionnaires.

Au déchirement de l'Amérique ne tardèrent pas à se joindre les maux inséparables d'un état de choses où tous les principes constitutifs de l'ordre social avaient été mis en oubli.

L'anarchie parut à la suite de la révolution, le désordre à la suite de l'anarchie; de longues années d'une possession tranquille cessèrent bientôt d'être un titre suffisant de propriété; bientôt les droits les plus solennels furent révoqués en doute; bientôt des emprunts ruineux et des contributions sans cesse renouvelées attaquèrent à la fois la fortune publique et les fortunes particulières. Comme aux jours dont l'idée seule fait encore frissonner l'Europe, la religion fut dépoillée de son patrimoine, le trône du respect des peuples, la majesté royale outragée, l'autorité transportée dans des réunions où les passions aveugles de la multitude s'arrachaient les rênes de l'état. Enfin, comme à ces mêmes jours de deuil si malheureusement reproduits en Espagne, on vit, le 7 Juillet, le sang couler dans la demeure des rois, et une guerre civile embraser la Péninsule.

Depuis près de trois ans les Puissances Alliées s'étaient toujours flattées que le caractère Espagnol, ce caractère si constant et si généreux, dès qu'il s'agit du salut de la patrie, et naguères si héroïque, quand il luttait contre un pouvoir enfanté par la révolution, se reveillerait enfin jusque dans les hommes qui avaient eu le malheur d'être infidèles aux nobles souvenirs que l'Espagne peut citer avec orgueil à tous les peuples de l'Europe; elles s'étaient flattées que le Gouvernement de S.M.C., détrompé par les premières leçons d'une expérience fatale, prendrait des mesures, si non pour arrêter d'un seul effort tant de maux qui déjà se débordaient de toutes parts, au moins pour jeter les fondemens d'un système réparateur, et pour assurer graduellement au trône ses droits légitimes et ses prérogatives nécessaires, aux sujets une juste protection, aux propriétés d'indispensables garanties. Mais cet espoir a été complètement déçu. Le tems n'a fait qu'amener de nouvelles injustices, les violences se sont multipliées, le nombre des victimes

a grossi dans une effrayante proportion, et l'Espagne a déjà vu plus d'un guerrier, plus d'un citoyen fidèle, porter sa tête sur l'échafaud.

C'est ainsi que la révolution du 9 Mars avançait de jour en jour la ruine de la monarchie Espagnole, lorsque deux circonstances particulières vinrent appeler sur elle la plus sérieuse attention des gouvernemens étrangers.

Au milieu d'un peuple pour qui le dévouement à ses rois est un besoin et un sentiment héréditaire, qui pendant six années consécutives a versé le sang le plus pur pour reconquérir son monarque légitime, ce monarque et son auguste famille viennent d'être réduits à un état de captivité notoire et presque absolu. Ses frères, contraints de se justifier, sont menacés journellement du cachot ou du glaive, et d'impérieuses représentations lui ont interdit, avec son épouse mourante, la sortie de la capitale.

D'autre part, après les révolutions de Naples et du Piémont, que les conspirateurs Espagnols ne cessent de représenter comme leur ouvrage, on les entend annoncer que leurs plans de bouleversement n'ont pas de limites. Dans un pays voisin ils s'efforcent avec une persévérance que rien ne décourage à faire naître les troubles et la rebellion. Dans des états plus éloignés ils travaillent à se créer des complices; l'activité de leur prosélytisme s'étend partout, et partout elle prépare les mêmes désastres.

Une telle conduite devait forcément exciter l'animadversion générale. Les Cabinets qui désirent sincèrement le bien de l'Espagne, lui manifestent depuis deux ans leur pensée par la nature des rapports qu'ils entretiennent avec son gouvernement. La France serait obligée de confier à une armée la garde de ses frontières, et peut-être faudra-t-il qu'elle lui confie également le soin de faire cesser les provocations dont elle est l'objet. L'Espagne elle-même se soulève en partie contre un régime que repoussent ses mœurs, la loyauté connue de ses habitans, et ses traditions toute monarchiques.

Dans cet état de choses l'Empereur notre auguste maître s'est décidé à faire une démarche qui ne pourra laisser à la nation Espagnole aucune doute sur ses véritables intentions, ni sur la sincérité des vœux qu'il forme pour son bonheur.

Il est à craindre que les dangers toujours plus réels du voisinage, ceux qui planent sur la famille royale, et les justes griefs d'une puissance limitrophe, ne finissent par amener entre elle et l'Espagne les plus graves complications.

C'est là l'extrémité fâcheuse que S.M.I. voudrait prévenir, s'il est possible; mais tant que le Roi sera hors d'état de témoigner librement sa volonté, tant qu'à la faveur d'un ordre de choses déplorable des artisans de révolutions, liés par un pacte commun à ceux des autres contrées de l'Europe, chercheront à troubler son repos, est-il au pouvoir de l'Empereur, est-il au pouvoir d'aucun monarque d'améliorer les relations du gouvernement Espagnol avec les puissances étrangères?

D'un autre côté, combien ce but essentiel ne serait-il pas facile à atteindre, si le Roi recouvrait avec son entière liberté les moyens de mettre un terme à la guerre civile, de prévenir la guerre étrangère, et de s'entourer des plus éclairés et des plus fidèles de ses sujets, pour donner à l'Espagne des institutions que demandent ses besoins et ses vœux légitimes. Alors, affranchie et calmée, elle ne pourrait qu'inspirer à l'Europe la sécurité dont elle jouirait elle-même, et alors aussi les Puissances qui réclament aujourd'hui contre la conduite de son gouvernement s'empresseraient de rétablir avec elle des rapports d'amitié véritable et de mutuelle bienveillance.

Il y a longtems que la Russie signale ces grandes vérités à l'attention des Espagnols ; jamais leur patriotisme n'ent de plus hautes destinées à remplir. Quelle gloire pour eux que de vaincre une seconde fois la révolution, et de prouver qu'elle ne saurait exercer d'empire durable sur cette terre où d'anciennes vertus, un fonds indélébile d'attachement aux principes qui garantissent la durée des sociétés et le respect d'une sainte religion, finiront toujours par triompher des doctrines subversives et des séductions mises en œuvre pour étendre leur fatale influence. Déjà une partie de la nation s'est prononcée. Il ne tient qu'à l'autre de s'unir dès à présent à son Roi pour délivrer l'Espagne, pour la sauver, pour lui assigner dans la famille Européenne une place d'autant plus honorable qu'elle aurait été arrachée, comme en 1814, au triomphe désastreux d'une usurpation militaire.

En vous chargeant, M. le Comte, de faire part aux Ministres de S.M.C. des considérations développées dans cette dépêche, l'Empereur se plaît à croire que ses intentions et celles de ses Alliés ne seront pas méconnues. En vain la malveillance essayerait-elle de les présenter sous les couleurs d'une ingérence étrangère qui prétendrait dicter des lois à l'Espagne. Exprimer le désir de voir cesser une longue tourmente, de soustraire au même joug un monarque malheureux et un des premiers peuples de l'Europe, d'arrêter l'effusion du sang, de favoriser le rétablissement d'une administration tout à la fois sage et nationale, certes, ce n'est point attenter à l'indépendance d'un pays, ni établir un droit d'intervention contre lequel une puissance quelconque ait raison de s'élever. Si S.M.I. nourrissait d'autres vues, il ne dépendrait que d'elle et de ses Alliés de laisser la révolution d'Espagne achever son ouvrage. Bientôt tous les germes de prospérité, de richesse, et de force, seraient détruits dans la Péninsule ; et si la nation Espagnole pouvait aujourd'hui supposer des desseins hostiles, ce serait dans l'indifférence et dans l'immobilité seules qu'elle devrait en trouver la preuve.

La réponse qui sera faite à la présente déclaration va résoudre des questions de la plus haute importance. Vos instructions de ce jour vous indiquent la détermination que vous aurez à prendre si les dépositaires de l'autorité publique à Madrid rejettent le moyen que vous leur offrirez d'assurer à l'Espagne un avenir tranquille et une gloire impérissable.

Recevez, etc.

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*Lord Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Verona, 1st Nov., 1822.

From Pozzo's conversation I do not think the Russians, will either let France or Metternich retire their *précis* in the mode you have in view. They seem to be resolved to persevere, allowing you to place your protest as you like. It seems to me they think the business finished without us, and do not mind our position, knowing we can never arm with revolutionary Spain against them. I think you ought to know Pozzo's firm tone going to conference.

Accept, &c.,

V. L.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 1st Nov., 1822.

I have the honour herewith to transmit to your Grace the copy of a despatch from Sir William A'Court, detailing his conversation with the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid, on the subject of the desire which the latter conceived to exist in Spain, for the interference of the Allies in the internal affairs of that country.

I make this communication forthwith to your Grace, upon the receipt of your despatch, stating the effect which the reports of the Austrian chargé d'affaires, as received at Verona, had produced on the Cabinets there assembled.

I think your Grace will perceive that there is some doubt on Sir William A'Court's mind, as to the sufficiency of the grounds on which the Austrian chargé d'affaires has founded an opinion so decided as that which he appears to have transmitted to Verona.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Sir William A'Court to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Madrid, 8th Oct., 1822.

I have been informed by the Austrian chargé d'affaires, that he knows from undoubted authority that the ministers have submitted to the Council of State a mass of papers proving the interference of France in the affairs of this country, and the encouragement and aid afforded by her to the insurgents.

The Council is invited to decide whether such proceedings do not justify some hostile measure on the part of this country. It is supposed that the Council will endeavour to shift the responsibility of this decision from themselves to the ministry, by evading to give a direct answer to the question.

The courier who will bear this despatch is sent off by the Austrian chargé d'affaires, with answers to a series of questions proposed to him by General Vincent respecting the state of parties in this kingdom, and the general feeling with respect to foreign interference.

He informed me that he considered himself justified in stating that the principal leaders of the moderate party, and the great mass of the nation, very anxiously desire such interference, provided it be in a manner not to shock the national vanity or national prejudices, and provided a guarantee be offered against the resumption of despotic power by the King.

It is also desired, he said, that the interference should be European, and the Allies should support, or even direct the operation of the insurgents, removing from the direction of affairs such men as Egüía and Matalorda, and putting forward others of greater popularity and ability; to make use, in short, of the insurrection as a stepping-stone to further interference, and as the readiest means of driving the Jacobins from the possession of the government.

I transmit this information exactly as I received it; how far the Austrian

chargé d'affaires may be authorised in giving such opinion it is not for me to decide, new as I am in this country.

He quotes a number of very respectable names in support of it.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WILLIAM A'COURT.

*Sir William Hamilton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Naples, 2nd Nov., 1822.

Since I closed my packet, addressed to Clanwilliam, I have received the accompanying letter for your Grace from Colonel Ponsonby, at Corfu.

The same post brought me accounts, under date 24th ultimo, that the Turkish Mehemet had penetrated into Acarnania, and was in possession of its capital; and Omer Pasha, of Jannina, was on his march to the same place from Asta.

The letter bringing this intelligence left Povera on the 21st. The plague was still at Asta and at Yanina, but much subdued.

Several of the Greek Captains in Acarnania had submitted to the Turks; but notwithstanding it was not expected that they would be able to gain entire possession of the Morea this winter. Such is the want of means, energy, and conduct in both the parties engaged in hostility with each other, that their operations are most uncertain, and you can never count upon their following up any success.

Sir Thomas Maitland expresses himself very well satisfied with the state in which he found his islands, and was going to Malta on the 25th, visiting Cephalonia and Zante on his way.

I have the honour to be, my dear Duke,

Your very obedient humble servant,

W. HAMILTON.

#### MEMORANDUM FROM LORD LONDONDERRY. No. 2.

2nd Nov., 1822.

It is evident that the position of Great Britain becomes more difficult at the present reunion than it has ever been on any former occasion, not only from the mode in which Austria is playing her game, which is evidently directed to keep up her assumed power over Russia, but also from France, which, as the power threatened most, demands the assistance of the Allies, having surrendered herself entirely to the direction of the Holy Alliance.

There appear to be two grounds on the part of France for their line of conduct. The one, their want of confidence, as exhibited in all their late silence towards England with regard to Spain, which their jealousy of Great Britain may have produced; the other the certainty that the Emperor Alexander, and the continental triumvirate of potentates, would sound the tocsin of revolutionary danger, and come sooner to the aid of a Bourbon throne, than England might find herself either enabled or disposed to do.

No doubt can now exist that the three powers are at present upon one line with France. They have all answered France's propositions in the affirmative; and the last Austrian paper places England in the embarrassing position of declaring herself in opposition to the Alliance in their determinations upon the Spanish question.

This is a distressing predicament, of an entirely isolated nature, which has never yet occurred upon any former meeting. Even at Laybach France leaned to a constitutional view of the transactions, and some aid was derived from her having a different position from the other three powers, arising from her having a government, neither so ultra, nor so hot in the cause of the *Chef des Bourbons*, as the present one. But at this moment there seems to be no possible ground by which the Duke of Wellington can approach the position of the Alliance, preserving those principles which have been declared by Great Britain to Europe.

Prince Metternich in reading to me his paper argued that the Duke of Wellington should not consider "*les phrases*," nor should his Grace, he said, if he could not agree to one consideration in it, reject another, which he felt himself able to entertain. The point was to determine if England could aid the general decision of the other powers of the Alliance in any manner, and to what extent, or, if she could not aid them, if she would remain neutral and not thwart them. It is in vain for me to conceal, said the Prince, that if it had not been for my power over the Emperor of Russia, and my bringing France, as I have done, to decisions against all offensive action, a Russian army would have inundated Europe, and having accroché myself with the Emperor of Russia, and remembering how he acted towards Austria, in the Italian business, how can I depart from *les mesures préventives* which it behoves the continental powers to adopt? Besides, added he, France has a right, under our treaties, to demand our discussion of her danger created by the revolutionary state of Spain.

She reckons upon the continental powers, and not upon England, and the proof of this is, that when the Duke of Wellington offered the good offices of England with Spain, to M. de Montmorency,\* he refused them for France,

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[Note by the Duke of Wellington.]

\* I did not offer the good offices of England. I suggested to Mons. de Montmorency, if peace was her object, to ask the good offices of England, and I particularly desired him to observe that they were not offered, but must be asked for. It is extraordinary that Prince Metternich should disapprove of this measure, as it was adopted at his suggestion, made in the presence of M. de Bernstorff. The object was to put an end to the whole question if M. de Montmorency should consent to ask for our good offices. It was thought that if he said he would not ask for them, he was for war. We were not then certain whether he was of the war party, or spoke M. de Villèle's language.

and I knew, continued the Prince, that he would do so, as France had placed herself in the hands of the Allies; and unless the Allies in common, deputed England to act, France could not withdraw her cause from them.\*

Without detailing further the long arguments the Prince adduced, or my own replies, it is sufficient to observe that I could distinctly trace that the other four powers had made up their determination to act without us, if they could not have us with them. This same sentiment has been repeated to me by the French Plenipotentiaries. It certainly is a responsible and trying moment for him who is charged with these great transactions here, to witness on the one hand, that England by the force of her power with the Alliance, has preserved peace in the east, and to see on the other, that these very Allies whom England has so befriended, are forcing this power from them, which is the only one that can effectually be of service, or render any decisions of the four others of substantial and real avail.

The consideration also of what would grow out of any schism in the Alliance is so stupendous, and the consequences so little to be foreseen, that I urged Prince Metternich to try to put upon paper what he conceived England could do with her acknowledged principles, and her declared system, as promulgated to Europe upon the paper presented by Austria to the conference. The Prince has promised to do this, whether he will or not, I cannot pretend to determine; but the crisis is a most important and difficult one, and God only knows how it can end.

#### MEMORANDUM FROM LORD LONDONDERRY. No. 3.

Verona, 3rd Nov., 1822.

Prince Metternich has not yet furnished, according to promise, his ideas as stated at the conclusion of my last Memorandum, but he is in progress of writing a paper upon "*Les points de vue de l'Autriche*," which I think he will produce in a day or two. In the mean time the conversations I have had this morning with several persons, may a little serve to show in what state things stand. I feel it my duty also particularly to observe the course of the proceedings of Austria; and, in trying to develope them, if I am at all right in my judgment, I consider it is the key of the whole concern.

I have humbly endeavoured to describe in my Memorandum, No. 1. what I believe to have been the course of Prince Metternich's conduct, and in several interviews with his Highness I have heard his details in the same strain. He has repeatedly asked me, if he could serve England and Austria more, than by placing in the mouth of France the task of putting an "arrêt" upon all the offensive operations of the Emperor Alexander.

It is quite certain, at Vienna the Emperor held language of *marching*. He wanted to fix with Prince Metternich, the number of troops, the epochs of moving, and their possible concentration. To all this the Prince replied, adroitly, "The *order* for marching, if ultimately decided

\* I remarked here, that the Prince seemed to have alluded to this very measure of Great Britain's mediation in his paper. He said, Oh, yes, but then it means a negotiation under the direction of the whole Alliance; and I evidently drew from his manner, this notion is rather held out as a trap to our position.

upon by the alliance, might create the same moral effect as the march itself: whereas, the latter requires great preparation and arrangement which might happily prove unnecessary." The Prince, however, never positively opposed the Emperor "*en front*," because it must always be remembered, that the Austrian minister has an Austrian game to play; and so long as he can retain his power over the councils and mind of the Emperor of Russia, by a fair diplomatic train of conduct, it is evidently his interest to do so.

The most natural and effective alliance to prevent the too intimate connection of France and Russia, would undoubtedly be England and Austria; and Prince Metternich, on his arrival at Verona, feared that M. de Montmorency and the Russian cabinet might draw too close together. This was an additional reason for him to press France to decline *herself* Russian aid, to the extent it was not only proffered, but which, in order to employ the Russian troops, it would be convenient to the Emperor to afford.

Prince Metternich continually assured me, in this position of affairs, that he was most desirous to consult England, bringing her forward as far as she could go in the general sentiments taken up by the Allies with regard to Spain, always considering England's particular position, and established principle not to interfere in the interior concerns of another independent State.

The Emperor of Russia, by Prince Metternich's management, was evidently reduced from the idea of an immediate march of troops, to the consideration of an "*appui moral et matériel*" if it became necessary.

With this point gained, Prince Metternich goes into conference, having exacted a promise from the French to decline all Russian force, except on their own requisition, and this declaration, Pozzo di Borgo was the messenger of, from M. de Montmorency to the Emperor Alexander.

The paper from France with her demands having been circulated, and the Russians and Prussians having answered it in the affirmative, the Duke of Wellington and Prince Metternich now produce their sentiments upon the French question.

It is agreed by all parties that France, under the Alliance, has a right to ask council and refer, if she pleases, to her Allies. In the present case, by the previous management, Russia, Prussia, and Austria all express themselves in the same strain. Great Britain alone cannot acquiesce. The diplomatic papers given in are reciprocally found fault with. We with just reason complain of parts of the Austrian, which force us to a more distinct avowal, and even a protest upon parts of it. Austria on the other hand, as well as Russia and France, quarrels with the style and tone of some of the sentiments in our document.\*

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[Note by the Duke of Wellington.]

\* Not a word of complaint from Austria. Prince Metternich saw my paper three times before it was given in. No particular complaint from Russia. All that France complains of is, that we charge them with not giving us information of their proceedings, and actions in relation to Spain; whereas they say, that they have nothing to tell us.



To obviate such differences, the Duke of Wellington proposes the withdrawing of the different notes of each power, limiting the state of the business to the simple demands of France, and the several answers.\* To this, however, there appears to be an insurmountable objection, nor will the Emperor of Russia, I humbly conceive, ever consent to give up the official notes presented, until he has in his possession the fixed results of the four Powers. Prince Metternich, however, proposes before any decision is taken upon the above point, to adopt one of the notions put forward, viz., that each power should separately address their note to Spain conceived in the same sense, and that when the ideas of each are thus brought forward, Great Britain can place herself in such a manner, or take such a line, as is called for from the general tenor of the decisions.

It is too evident, from the moment the four Powers have been agreed, that they have become more indifferent about England. The Antigallican feelings of M. de Tatischeff, and the ultra feeling of the French ministers, have done us immense injury. France was infinitely more constitutional at Laybaeh. I humbly maintain, therefore, that it is in vain for England to attempt now to move the four Powers from their present *démarche*, nor can we expect to regulate it. The time is gone by, if such a proceeding was ever practicable, of which I have great doubt.

What has grown, therefore, out of the Duke of Wellington's proposition if producing the results, at which the powers may arrive in their separate notes, may have the advantage of putting aside objectionable papers, hitherto in circulation, and may bring the important question nearer to a point, viz., Are there any means by which Great Britain can approach the proceedings the Allies are adopting? or if not, Can we submit to it in silence? Or must we protest against it?

We have already seen that practically we cannot always go along with the continental Powers. We have already witnessed, that differing on many points, we are still enabled to preserve the spirit of our union, and though we may take a separate action, as at Troppan and Laybaeh, we have still at Constantinople acted in such concert as to have secured peace.

On the present occasion Great Britain has used every amicable effort, and if not listened to, in pursuing her own course, she does not lessen the bond of the Alliance. The other Powers are prepared that she should resort to a separate and independent line, rather than acquiesce in her turning them from their purpose.

Upon the whole then, I question much whether our position is not more easy in abandoning them to their own conceptions, and reserving ours to ourselves, always being persuaded that their moral intentions are really good, and that the union between us will still exist, than to endeavour to fetter them in a manner, which I question if they will now endure, or to stick ourselves on to a part of an undigested system of remonstrance, and action, which if they get into, and it fails, they may possibly come to us ultimately to help them out.

The Emperor of Russia, at my house last night, expressed that all the Italian Princes and Ministers had, one and all, appealed to him to persevere in his efforts to conquer the Spanish revolution, as he had done the Neapo-

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\* This was not my object.—W.

litan. He said also that Mr. Salmon had been detected in spreading revolutionary doctrines in Russia; adding also, that he was quite determined upon his course, but that he should be very sorry if England opposed him.

V. LONDONDERBY.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 193. ]

SIR,

Verona, 5th Nov., 1822.

I have had the honour of receiving your despatch of the 25th of October, enclosing one for Lord Strangford, in answer to that from his Lordship, No. 151, dated the 5th of October.

I wrote to you on the 29th of October (No. 15), and stated to you the mistake under which Lord Strangford had written that despatch; and as you have in your private letter of the  
• authorized me to detain the despatch to Lord Strangford, which was evidently written under the erroneous impression conveyed by that from Lord Strangford, No. 151, I think it best to detain it till I shall receive your answer to this.

The mode in which the commerce of the Black Sea was heretofore carried, was for the Russian and other powers who had by treaty the permission of the Porte to pass, to give the protection of their flag to the vessels of those powers who had no such permission; and the Russian flag was generally used by Greek vessels. During the late disputes the Turkish government have by custom-house regulation declared that such cover or protection shall not be given in future.

The Emperor of Russia complains of this regulation, as being directed, as it certainly is, against the commerce of his subjects on the Black Sea. But he does not desire that this regulation shall be recalled, or that he shall be permitted to give the protection of his flag to Greek or other vessels. On the contrary, I believe that he is desirous of avoiding the disputes in which this protection constantly involved his diplomatic servants at the Porte. That which he desires is, that his Allies, considering the difficulties in which the commerce of his subjects will be involved, in consequence of this regulation, evidently calculated to impede it, should exert their good offices to facilitate the negotiations with the Porte of the kings of

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• Blank in manuscript.

Sardinia, Spain, Naples and Denmark, for permission for vessels under their flag respectively to pass, they paying for the same.

It must be observed that Lord Strangford was, by order of his Majesty's government, engaged in good offices of this description in favour of the Sardinian government, when the existing disturbances in the Levant commenced.

This object, or its alternative, that of a revival of the protection as existing previous to the late regulation, is stated by the Russian government as a condition of the resumption of their diplomatic relations with the Porte in their note of the 26th of September, and it is certainly one point beyond what existing treaties give them a right to demand. But it must be observed that custom had sanctioned a bad practice, under which the commerce of the Russian territories on the Black Sea had flourished; and that it is not reasonable to expect that they will sit down quietly, having some good grounds to complain of the Turks, under the inconvenience which they must suffer from a discontinuance of the former bad practice, without having anything to show as gain to their subjects in lieu of it.

I confess that if I had not referred this subject to<sup>e</sup> you before I received your despatch, No. 3, of the 27th of September, knowing that Lord Strangford had before, by order of Government, been engaged in giving his good offices for the negotiation between the King of Sardinia and the Ottoman Porte of a treaty giving permission to vessels under his Sardinian Majesty's flag to pass, I should have considered myself authorised, under the last paragraph of these instructions, to promise those good offices on the part of his Majesty's government.

Since writing the above I have understood from Prince Metternich that he proposes immediately to give the good offices of the Emperor of Austria for the negotiation of a treaty between the Kings of Naples and of Denmark respectively, and the Porte, for permission to pass.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 104. ]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Verona, 5th Nov., 1822.

You may rely upon my doing exactly as you wish respecting the independence of the Colonies. I have prepared a note on the subject, which I will circulate as soon as I can get any thing attended to, excepting war with Spain. I have spoken to the French and Russian ministers about it, and neither make any difficulty. The others have no feeling upon the subject; nor is there any feeling here about anything excepting Spain. Everything else is considered unworthy of attention.

I have seen the Emperor this night, and this was the conversation.

"There are eight sovereigns here with their ministers, and they all concur in the absolute necessity of putting down this evil. The sovereigns of Italy are not safe so long as it lasts, nor is France, nor Prussia, nor even I. The late Spanish minister in Russia laid out large sums of money to corrupt my officers and troops; I was obliged to send him away. Sir! you can do nothing against the Spaniards. Let the sovereigns of Italy take care of themselves, and govern their people well, and they have nothing to fear from Spain.

"I have a report which I will show, made by the minister of war to the Cortes, in a secret committee, showing the state of their army. Nothing can be more miserable, or more destitute of resources than *ces gens là*. Sir, if you think your cause is just, and think you have the means of attacking Spain, do so. But whatever may be the strength of the Spanish army, or the state of the Spanish resources, do not suppose that you have to deal with such a country as Naples. The country is strong, immense in extent, thinly peopled, and with but few resources, and many strong-holds to be taken and kept from a people capable of defending them. I would attack them with the French army, and move mine and others to their support if wanted."

"If your Majesty will give me leave, I will tell you what I would do, if I were the Spanish general opposed to the invading force, and I think you will be convinced that there is but little chance of military success, and none of any political result."

"Well, I'll call upon you some of these mornings and we'll go to the bottom of the subject."

From this conversation you see that the idea of the war is

just as strong as ever. However, I think that if I can come to close quarters with him upon the operations I shall put them out of his mind altogether. I think he is too clear-sighted to go wrong if he can't obtain his object—which is an operation, if possible; if not, a treaty.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ 195. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 5th Nov., 1822.

We have passed but a stormy week since I wrote to you last; and although I have not quite such sanguine hopes that we shall separate on good terms as I had when I wrote on the 29th, I do not yet lose all hopes of such a result as may be satisfactory.

Prince Metternich being satisfied that the French ministers would oppose any arrangement for the assembly of a Russian army in Germany or Italy till they should require such assistance, called together a conference of the five cabinet ministers on Wednesday evening, at which were delivered in the enclosed answers to the demands of the French minister of the 20th ultimo,\* from the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian ministers, and from myself.† We had another general conference on the 31st, at which all the plenipotentiaries of all the powers attended; at which the enclosed paper marked 5 was read by the Austrian minister. This paper was communicated to me only on the morning of the 31st, and I stated to Prince Metternich all the objections I felt to it; and the probable consequences of the course which he was about to pursue. When it was read at the conference, I gave notice that I should state the objections I felt to concur in it, when it should be discussed and entered upon the Protocol.

On the following day I begged Prince Metternich to call together a conference of the five cabinet ministers. My object was to explain to them all, as I had done to each separately, the position in which his Majesty's government stood in the ques-

\* See page 496.

† Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4.

tion; and to communicate to them the purport of the paper, No. 6, herewith enclosed, which I intended to enter upon the Protocol of the first general conference, when that of the Austrian minister should be discussed.

The only discussions of any consequence which took place were at the first and third of these conferences. At the second (which was the general conference) the only discussions were on points of form; excepting that the Russian minister stated that the Emperor his master expected that before the plenipotentiaries should quit Verona a treaty should be signed, specifying the *casus fœderis*, the force which each power was to furnish, its line of march, its place of assembling, &c.

I enclose my Memorandums \* of what passed at these three conferences, which although only a *précis*, and made out principally to assist my own memory, will, together with the papers which have passed, show you in what manner the false position in which the four continental Powers have each placed themselves is operating against the general interest.

On the morning after the last conference, I waited upon Monsieur de Montmorency, in order to ascertain what he really felt about a treaty, and finding that he was still of the same opinion which he had expressed on the preceding night, I thought there was still a chance of preserving peace, if I could prevent the insertion on the Protocols of the Russian paper, No. 1, and the Austrian paper, No. 5; and knowing that they were all anxious that my paper, No. 4, should not appear upon the Protocol, I proposed to each of the cabinet ministers that nothing should appear upon the Protocol excepting the three demands of France, and the direct answers which the paper of each Power contained to the demands of France, and the propositions of Prince Metternich in No. 5, without any of the reasoning, and that upon these alone we should proceed to consider what measures should be adopted to prevent a possible rupture between France and Spain.

This proposition was so far agreed to as that it has been determined that there shall be no Protocol settled till it shall be seen what measure each power will adopt upon Prince Metternich's paper; and I enclose you a paper† showing how

\* Nos. 7, 8, 9.

† No. 10 (missing).

the whole question will stand if what I proposed should be finally agreed to.

In that case, and if there should be no treaty, our line will be determined in a great measure by the tenor of what the several powers shall address to the Spanish government.

It is obvious that they are all very little at their ease on this question. The French ministers feel that they can do nothing without us if peace is their object ; and they are sensible of the force of the reasoning against a treaty if they are to go to war. Their jealousy of England, the ultra principles in their cabinet at Paris, and in their councils here, and their fear of offending the Emperor of Russia, prevent them from looking to us, and from adopting any simple measure to explain themselves to, or to reconcile Spain ; and on the other hand, the difficulty in which they will find themselves in their chambers if they separate themselves entirely from us, or make any declaration against the Spanish constitution, or show any inclination to interfere in the internal concerns of Spain, their doubts of the result of war, and their fear of the effects in France of their making any treaty with the Allies stipulating for succour, will prevent them from taking any decided line on which the Emperor of Russia or the other two continental powers would wish to act.

It is a curious fact that after I had proposed that nothing should be entered upon the Protocols but the dry propositions and direct answers, Monsieur de Montmorency showed me a note which he had intended to enter, in which he would have adopted generally all the principles of non-interference professed by us and recommended to the Allies.

The Emperor of Russia is more than ever anxious for war, and I know that a few days ago he had not given up the notion of an operation by the Russian army, as he sent Count Lieven to me on Saturday to go through the whole question, with a view to the consideration and getting the better of its military difficulties.

In respect to the German powers Prince Metternich is, as usual, looking principally to the difficulties which press upon him at the moment. He feels that if he cannot give the Emperor of Russia an appearance at least of occupation in the west of Europe, till the feelings of the Russian public shall be in some degree softened, if not forgotten, upon the Turkish and Greek questions, the Emperor will return to his capital in very bad

temper with the Alliance, of which the first effects will be felt by Austria. I think likewise that Prince Metternich is in a great degree influenced by the despatch which he has recently received from the Austrian minister at Madrid, of which I sent you a copy in my despatch No. 16; and he thinks that it is possible to effect some good in Spain by the influence of the Allies, even though they should not show a force. You will observe that this is not the opinion of Monsieur Brunetti. I must inform you, however, that there is a very general feeling in the corps diplomatique assembled here, that England separated herself from the Allies during the affair of Naples very unnecessarily. That they experienced no inconvenience from such separation, and that they will probably experience none from that which it is possible may take place in this question of Spain. I don't think that is now Prince Metternich's opinion; nor is it that of the Emperor of Austria I am certain. But it is not the habit of the Prince's mind to look very far before him, and it is not impossible that he may, when pressed to a decision, adopt that line which will relieve him from the most immediate and pressing difficulty, notwithstanding that the consequence may be to separate him for a time from England. Of all those with whom I have conversed, the Prussian minister, Count Bernstorff, is the one who appears really anxious respecting the solution of our existing difficulties, but when I pressed him upon the folly of their holding a language to Spain which would be menacing or offensive, when they knew they had no power to strike a blow against Spain, and that the use of such language must not only separate them from England again, but be injurious to their object of maintaining peace between France and Spain, he made me an answer which does not add to my hopes that I shall be able to bring this discussion to a satisfactory conclusion. He said that he wished it was possible for the continental Powers not to approach Spain at all upon this subject; but that if they did they must in consistency hold the same language they had held to Naples.

You have now before you a view of the state of this question. Since Saturday the 2nd, nothing has been done, and Prince Metternich says he is waiting to see in what language the French ministers will approach Spain, in order that he may frame his accordingly. I understand that the French ministers are now very desirous of being moderate, and that it has already



been determined to make the communication to Spain in the form of a despatch from each court to its minister at Madrid, rather than in the form of a note.

I suggested to the Prince on Sunday the expediency of his putting in activity the Turkish negotiation, in order that, if possible, we may bring that to a conclusion, at least as far as it can be concluded here, before we come to extremities upon the Spanish question, as a measure which will tend to put the German courts more at their ease, and render them more independent in their views and actions on the Spanish question. He has already commenced these Turkish negotiations, and he told me last night that he hoped to send me some papers this day, that will enable us to make considerable progress. I think, likewise, that when the Emperor of Russia shall find that the French ministers object to make any treaty,—which is what he aims at principally,—he will be very likely to revise the whole subject, and to take that line upon it which is most likely to conciliate, and to keep him united in councils with the British government. The perusal of the paper, No. 10, will show you that the whole question of withdrawing ministers from Spain, and of assistance to France, depends upon the negotiation of a treaty. Without a treaty neither Russia nor Austria have promised anything, nor have they stated anything excepting a favourable disposition. Prussia has spoken more plainly, but certainly means less than either of the other Powers.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

I.

RÉPONSE CONFIDENTIELLE du Cabinet de Russie au Précis des Communications Verbales faites par M. le Vicomte de MONTMORENCY à la Conférence du 20<sup>me</sup> Octobre.

Vérone, le 30<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

Le Plénipotentiaire de Russie a porté à la connaissance de l'Empereur son maître le précis des Communications Verbales faites par Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne à la Conférence du 20<sup>me</sup> Octobre.

Sa Majesté Impériale a lu avec un vif intérêt le résumé de ces importantes ouvertures, et leur objet a fixé sa plus sérieuse attention.

Dès le mois d'Avril de l'année 1820, la Russie avait signalé les consé-

quences du triomphe de la révolution en Espagne. Plus elle désirait sincèrement que la nation Espagnole pût jouir enfin du bonheur auquel sa noble persévérance dans une lutte glorieuse lui avait assuré tant de titres, plus elle s'était empressée de se joindre à ses Alliés pour donner à cette nation des preuves d'une bienveillante sollicitude, et plus elle devait improuver un attentat qui présageait à l'Espagne les malheurs inséparables des concessions que la violence arrache à l'autorité légitime.

Les craintes de sa Majesté Impériale ne se sont que trop justifiées depuis,

Peu de pays ont eu plus de maux à souffrir que l'Espagne. Peu de pays ont attiré plus de désastres sur le reste de l'Europe.

Au dedans, l'anarchie réduite en principe, le pouvoir devenu le prix des insultes faites au trône et à la religion, le désordre livrant à l'action d'un fléau destructeur des populations tout entières, la perte des riches possessions du Nouveau Monde presque consommée, la fortune publique dissipée, les doctrines les plus subversives ouvertement prêchées, quelques sujets fidèles s'armant pour la défense de leur Souverain, et ce Souverain forcé de les proscrire.

Au dehors, le triste spectacle qui se présente dans les contrées, que les artisans des troubles de l'Europe avaient destinées à être la proie des révolutions. L'année dernière, les Siciles en feu, et les Puissances Alliées contraintes à y placer le pouvoir légitime sous l'égide de leurs armes; le Piémont soulevé, essayant de propager la révolte dans le Nord de l'Italie, et provoquant la même intervention, la même assistance. Aujourd'hui une des plus belles parties de l'Europe désolée par une guerre terrible; des sectes qui conspirent contre la tranquillité de tous les états, les gouvernements obligés par la loi même du salut des peuples à une surveillance rigoureuse, et arrêtés dans l'accomplissement des plus utiles améliorations : tels sont pour l'Espagne, tels sont pour l'Europe, les résultats à jamais funestes de l'insurrection dont Cadix a donné le déplorable exemple.

Assurément il est impossible qu'un pareil état de choses n'excite les regrets et les inquiétudes de toutes les Puissances Européennes; elles ne peuvent y voir, particulièrement pour la France, que les dangers auxquels les évènements de Naples et de Turin avaient exposé l'Autriche; et la Russie est fermement convaincue que tous les intérêts se réunissent pour faire désirer que l'incendie révolutionnaire soit comprimée en Espagne.

L'Empereur a vu avec une vraie satisfaction la France reconnaître cette importante vérité. Elle convient que le voisinage de la révolution d'Espagne l'expose à un péril imminent; elle appréhende que de fatales étincelles n'allument sur son propre sol un feu difficile à éteindre. La Russie compte donc avec une entière certitude que le gouvernement Français saisira sans balancer la première occasion de rendre à la France elle-même et aux autres états de l'Europe le service qu'ils attendent de ses lumières, de ses principes, de sa position, et des mesures qu'elle lui permet d'exécuter avec le plus de succès.

De son côté l'Empereur n'hésitera pas à prêter son plus sincère appui au gouvernement de sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne pour tous les cas que Monsieur le Vicomte de Montmorency a indiqués aux Cabinets Alliés dans la conférence du 20<sup>me</sup> Octobre, et le Plénipotentiaire de Russie a ordre de déclarer que sa Majesté Impériale l'autorise à accéder aux propositions faites

ce même jour par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, et à se concerter, tant avec lui qu'avec les Plénipotentiaires des autres Cours Alliées :—

1<sup>o</sup>. Sur la rupture de toute relation diplomatique avec le gouvernement Espagnol ;

2<sup>o</sup>. Sur les actes par lesquels serait définie l'assistance morale que la France réclame dès à présent ;

3<sup>o</sup>. Sur les secours matériels qui pourraient lui devenir indispensables, si elle se trouvait dans la nécessité d'employer la force des armes contre les révolutionnaires d'Espagne ;

4<sup>o</sup>. Sur les restrictions dont elle croira devoir accompagner les stipulations relatives à ces secours.

## II.

RÉPONSE Confidentielle du CABINET DE VIENNE, au Précis des Communications Verbales faites par M. le VICOMTE DE MONTMORENCY dans la Conférence du 20 Octobre, 1822.

Ayant soumis à l'Empereur le précis des communications verbales de Monsieur le Vicomte de Montmorency, le ministre d'Autriche a été autorisé par sa Majesté Impériale à faire la réponse également verbale, que voici :

Dans ces communications, Monsieur le Vicomte de Montmorency a déclaré " que la France est prête à se défendre, et à ne point avoir à attaquer ;" elle déclare être pénétrée surtout de l'idée, " que dans les circonstances présentes le concours des hautes puissances lui semble nécessaire comme devant consacrer cette unité de vues qui est le caractère fondamental de l'Alliance, et qu'il est du plus grand intérêt de maintenir et de signaler pour garantir le repos de l'Europe."

Résumant ses idées, Monsieur le Ministre de France a porté à la prise en considération des cabinets trois questions, sur lesquelles sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique a autorisé son ministre à s'exprimer dans les termes suivans :—

*Ad 1<sup>re</sup>* Dans le cas que la France se verrait forcée de rappeler de Madrid la mission qu'elle y a accréditée, et de rompre toute relation diplomatique avec l'Espagne, sa Majesté Impériale, toujours prête à manifester de sa part l'union existante entre les augustes Alliés, serait entièrement disposée à prendre une mesure semblable et à rappeler sa mission de Madrid.

*Ad 2<sup>me</sup>* Si la guerre devait éclater entre la France et l'Espagne, sa Majesté Impériale et Royale, en partant du principe ci-dessus énoncé par Monsieur le Vicomte de Montmorency, n'hésiterait pas à prêter à la France l'appui moral, lequel avec celui des autres augustes Alliés, donnerait à l'action de cette puissance toute la force de l'alliance ; sauf à convenir, le cas échéant, des actes et des formes qui seraient jugées les plus propres à rendre cet appui moral utile et efficace.

*Ad 3<sup>me</sup>* Dans le cas que l'intervention plus active des Alliés serait réclamée par la France, et reconnue nécessaire par les augustes Alliés, sa Majesté Impériale, en partant toujours du principe énoncé par Monsieur le Vicomte de Montmorency, serait également disposée à prêter à la France un secours matériel, sauf à régler, le cas échéant, par une délibération commune des cours Alliées, l'étendue, la qualité, et la direction de ce secours.

S'étant ainsi acquitté des ordres de l'Empereur son auguste maître, le ministre d'Autriche se réserve de s'occuper avec Monsieur le Vicomte de Montmorency, et avec Messieurs les ministres des autres cabinets, de la forme diplomatique la plus apte à constater les engagements préalables ci-dessus spécifiés, et de convenir en même temps des dispositions nécessaires pour développer et compléter ces engagements.

## III.

RÉFÉRENCE CONFIDENTIELLE DU CABINET DE BERLIN AU PRÉCIS DES COMMUNICATIONS VERBALES FAITES PAR M. LE VICOMTE DE MONTMORENCY À LA CONFÉRENCE DU 20<sup>me</sup> OCTOBRE. VÉRONE, LE 30 OCTOBRE, 1822.

Le précis des communications verbales de M. le Vicomte de Montmorency ayant été mis sous les yeux du Roi, sa Majesté, après avoir pris les rapports actuels entre la France et l'Espagne en mûre considération, et voulant donner à la première de ces puissances une preuve d'intérêt et de confiance, a autorisé son cabinet à déclarer en son nom :

Que si la conduite du gouvernement Espagnol à l'égard de la France, ou de son envoyé à Madrid, était de nature à forcer cette dernière à rompre ses relations diplomatiques avec l'Espagne, sa Majesté n'hésiterait pas à en faire autant de son côté ;

Que si, en dépit des soins que le gouvernement Français s'engage à prendre pour éviter la guerre avec l'Espagne, cette guerre venait à éclater, sa Majesté est prête à se joindre aux Monarques ses Alliés pour prêter à la France tout l'appui moral qui pourrait servir à renforcer sa position ; et

Que si les événemens ou les conséquences de la guerre faisaient éprouver à la France le besoin d'un secours plus actif, le Roi consentirait encore à concourir aux mesures que l'on voudrait concerter à l'effet d'assurer au gouvernement Français également ce genre d'appui, en autant que les nécessités de la position de sa Majesté et les soins dûs à l'intérieur de son royaume pourraient lui en laisser la faculté.

## IV.

MEMOIR on the OBSERVATIONS of the FRENCH MINISTER respecting Spain.

Verona, 30th Oct., 1822.

Since the month of April, 1820, the British government have availed themselves of every opportunity of recommending to his Majesty's Allies to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of Spain.

Without adverting to those principles which his Majesty's government must always consider the rule of their conduct in relation to the internal affairs of other countries, they considered that, to whatever degree either the origin of the Spanish revolution, the system then established, or the conduct of those who have since had the management of the internal affairs of Spain might be disapproved of, any amelioration, which might be desired in the Spanish system, for the sake of Spain herself, ought to be sought for in measures to be adopted in Spain rather than abroad, and particularly in the confidence which the people should be taught to feel in the character and measures of the King. They considered that an interference, with a

view to assist the monarch on the throne to overturn that which had been settled, and which he had guaranteed, or to promote the establishment of any other form of government or constitution, particularly by force, would only place that monarch in a false position, and prevent him from looking to the internal means of amelioration which might be within his reach.

Such an interference always appeared to the British government an unnecessary assumption of responsibility which, considering all the circumstances, must expose the King of Spain to danger, and the Power or Powers which should interfere, to obloquy, certain risks, and possible disasters; to enormous expences, and final disappointment in producing any result. Upon these principles his Majesty has advised his Allies, and has acted himself from the month of April 1820 to the present day.

The Protocols, and other acts of the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, which established the union at present existing between the Five Powers, so happily for the world, require the most unlimited confidence and communication on the part of each; and accordingly his Majesty has never failed to communicate to his Allies, and particularly to France, every instruction which he has sent to his minister at Madrid, and all the communications made by his Majesty's commands to the minister of Spain residing in London, all in the same spirit of good will towards the King of Spain and the Spanish nation. It is impossible to look at the existing relations between France and Spain without adverting to what has passed from the commencement of the year 1820 to the present moment, without being sensible of the unfortunately false position in which the King of Spain is placed, and that the spirit of party in both countries having aggravated the national antipathy which antecedent circumstances had occasioned, is in a great measure the cause of the unfortunate irritation in Spain against France, to which his Excellency the minister of France had adverted.

The great object of his Majesty's foreign policy is to preserve peace among nations, and he feels the most anxious interest for the happiness of his Most Christian Majesty, and the honour of his government; and it would be his sincere desire to allay that irritation, but his government cannot but feel that to make any declaration on any of the three points referred to by his Excellency without a previous accurate knowledge of all the circumstances which have occurred between the two countries, would be not only premature and unjust, but would probably be unavailing, and would in fact deprive his Majesty of the power of discussing and deciding upon the measures of his own government in this affair hereafter, when he should be better informed.

His Majesty must either place himself in this painful and inconsistent position for an independent Sovereign, or he must do what would be equally painful to his feelings, require from his august friend and Ally, the King of France, that he should submit his conduct to the advice and control of his Majesty.

His Majesty's government cannot think either alternative to be necessary, but are of opinion that a review of the obvious circumstances of the situation of France as well as of Spain will show that whatever may be the tone assumed towards France by the ruling powers in Spain, they are not in a state to carry into execution any plan of real hostility or injury.

Considering that a civil war exists in the whole extent of the frontier

which separates the two kingdoms, that hostile armies are in movement and in operation on every part of it, and that there is not a town or village on the French frontier which is not liable to insult and injury, there is no person who must not approve of the precaution which his Most Christian Majesty has taken in forming a corps of observation for the protection of his frontier and for the preservation of the tranquillity of his people.

His Britannic Majesty sincerely wishes that this measure may be effectual in attaining the objects for which it is calculated, and that the wisdom of the French government will have induced them to explain it at Madrid in such terms as will satisfy the government of his Catholic Majesty of its necessity.

Such an explanation will, it is hoped, tend to allay in some degree the irritation against France, and, on the other hand, it may be hoped that some allowance will be made in France for the state of effervescence of men's minds in Spain, in the very crisis of a revolution and civil war.

A moment's reflection upon the relative power of the two States will show that the real evil to which his Most Christian Majesty is exposed is that resulting from the operations of the civil war on the neighbouring frontier of Spain, against which the measure, which his government have adopted, is best calculated to preserve him.

Even revolutionary madness could not calculate upon the success of a serious attack by Spain upon France under any circumstances which it is possible to suppose to exist at present in the latter kingdom. But the attention of the Spanish government is now occupied by a civil war, the operations of which certainly justify the formation of a corps of observation in France, and it is not very probable that they would at this moment desire to break with France. Neither is it to be believed that, in their present situation, they would not desire still to enjoy the advantage of that countenance to their system which the presence of the French ambassador at the seat of government must afford them.

His Majesty therefore considers any rupture by Spain, or any measure on her part which may render necessary the immediate discontinuance of diplomatic relations by France, very improbable, and as his Majesty is quite unacquainted with what has passed between France and Spain since the month of April, 1820, and as his government cannot know upon what grounds his Most Christian Majesty's government may think proper to discontinue the diplomatic relations of France with Spain, or upon what grounds war may break out between the two countries, it is impossible for them now to pronounce what advice they should consider it their duty to give to his Majesty in case either or both of those events should occur.

His Majesty most anxiously wishes that such extremities may be avoided, and he feels convinced that the government of his Most Christian Majesty will find means of avoiding them.

WELLINGTON.

# V.

## PROPOSITIONS du CABINET AUTRICHIEN dans la Conférence du 31<sup>me</sup> Octobre, 1822.

La première question qui a dû occuper le Congrès est celle de l'Espagne. Cette grave question a réclamé l'attention et la sollicitude des Puissances

Alliées sous deux rapports différens ; sous celui du danger général et commun à l'Europe entière du triomphe du système révolutionnaire, et sous celui de la crise survenne dans les rapports politiques entre la France et l'Espagne.

Le gouvernement Français, convaincu que la position dans laquelle il se trouve vis-à-vis de l'Espagne, présentait plusieurs considérations importantes, s'est adressé confidentiellement à ses Alliés.

Il leur a expliqué ses vœux et ses déterminations.

Ses vœux sont la conservation de la paix ; mais il admet que l'Espagne révolutionnaire pourrait le mettre dans le cas de repousser une agression.

Le gouvernement Français est parti de ces données pour demander, si dans le cas d'une juste et nécessaire défense, il pouvait compter sur l'appui moral et sur des secours matériels de la part des Cours Alliées. Les Cours d'Autriche, de Russie, et de Prusse ont en principe répondu affirmativement à cette demande.

Portant toutefois sur des applications éventuelles, leur adhésion doit être précisée par une définition exacte des *Causa Fœderis*, ainsi que par l'énoncé des obligations réciproques qui en dériveraient. Ces différens points seront réservés aux transactions diplomatiques que les Cabinets jugeront à propos d'entamer à la suite des explications présentes.

Cependant l'anarchie révolutionnaire qui déchire l'Espagne, qui a allumé et nourrit dans ce malheureux Royaume le feu de la guerre civile, portant impunément le défi aux efforts salutaires des Souverains Alliés pour la conservation de l'ordre social, ne doit pas moins fixer la sollicitude des Cours ; et celles-ci rempliraient mal leur tâche, si elles ne se réunissaient pas sincèrement pour délibérer sur les moyens de sauver l'Europe des dangers dont la menacerait le triomphe de la révolution.

Existe-t-il des moyens d'influer sur le rétablissement de l'ordre dans la Péninsule ?—Et où faut-il les chercher ?—Telles sont les premières questions qu'il est de la dignité et du devoir des Alliés de soumettre à la discussion la plus approfondie.

L'attitude nouvelle qui résultera pour la France et pour l'Europe des engagements qui vont s'établir entre les Alliés, ne pourrait-elle pas prêter au double but, d'aborder la question révolutionnaire en Espagne même, et de fournir aux hommes de bien de ces pays les moyens de se serrer sur une ligne de salut commun ?

Le nombre des ennemis et des victimes de la révolution s'est accru dans le sein de l'Espagne au point, que peut-être il ne faudrait plus qu'une pareille mesure, pour donner à la partie saine de la nation le courage et la force de briser le joug de la faction que la domine et l'avilit.

D'un autre côté, l'attitude et le langage du gouvernement Espagnol à l'égard des pays étrangers sont devenus tellement provocans que les Puissances Alliées ne sauraient plus guères y opposer la longanimité du silence.

Ces considérations sont de nature à offrir aux Cours Alliées et le droit de s'expliquer franchement envers le gouvernement Espagnol et la chance de ne pas se porter sans succès à cette démarche.

L'état de captivité où le Roi d'Espagne, seul organe authentique et légitime entre son pays et les états étrangers, se trouve notoirement réduit, peut fournir un nouveau titre en faveur d'une tentative, qui aurait pour

objet de décider des rapports futurs entre l'Espagne et les Puissances Alliées et qui d'ailleurs, amenée par le désir de maintenir la paix entre l'Espagne et la France, ne présenterait d'autre caractère que celui d'une intervention pacifique.

Une démarche pareille est susceptible d'être faite dans des formes différentes, dont chacune peut avoir ses avantages et ses inconvéniens particuliers.

La première forme serait celle que les cinq Puissances s'accordassent à tenir un langage commun, soit par le moyen d'une déclaration collective, soit par des notes séparées, mais uniformes dans leur principe et leur but.

Une seconde forme serait celle que la France abandonnât à ses quatre Alliés le soin d'une démarche destinée à aplanir des difficultés dans lesquelles on pourrait l'envisager comme étant partie elle-même.

Une troisième forme pourrait se trouver dans une ouverture faite au gouvernement Espagnol par une seule des Puissances Alliées, qui serait regardée d'un commun accord comme étant la plus avantageusement placée pour porter la parole.

Le Cabinet d'Autriche, en soumettant ces points de vue à la Conférence, n'a d'autre but que celui de seconder les nobles pensées et les efforts constans de ses augustes alliés dans tout ce qui peut conduire au bien général de l'Europe.

## VI.

## To the AMBASSADORS—the KING'S DECLARATION.

Verona, Nov., 1822.

The real question before us is to consider of the means of preventing a possible rupture between France and Spain; and I have already stated to the cabinet ministers of the four Courts, that the king my master is desirous of allaying the irritation against France, which is stated to prevail in Spain.

His Majesty is, equally with his Allies, sensible of the misfortunes and miseries under which Spain is suffering. He equally laments their existence, and equally with his Allies desires to see their termination, and that country in the enjoyment of tranquillity and happiness. But his government entertain the same opinions which they have before given to the Allied governments respecting any interference in the internal affairs of Spain; and in entering upon the discussion of the measures proper to be adopted to prevent a possible rupture between France and Spain, I must declare that I do so with none of the views, objects, or considerations adverted to by his Excellency the Austrian minister, excepting that alone of preventing a possible rupture between France and Spain. With this reserve, I am ready to enter into the consideration of the subject.

WELLINGTON.

## VII.

## MINUTE of the CONFERENCE of the 30th October.

We had this evening a conference of the Cabinet Ministers of the five Powers, at which were read, 1st, the answer of the Emperor of Russia; 2nd, that of the Austrian government; 3rd, that of the Prussian govern-



ment; and lastly, my own, to the paper given in by M. de Montmorency on the 20th October.

M. de Montmorency, in answer to my paper, then discussed the causes of complaint which existed on the part of France against the Spanish government; which consisted principally in paragraphs of newspapers, speeches in the Cortes, the placards of chefs politiques, or of officers in command, but nothing proceeding direct from the government. He then expressed his conviction that so long as there was a revolutionary party in Spain connected with that in France, it was not to be expected that any civility or kindness on the part of France would make them otherwise than hostile towards the King of France, and that nothing but a strong position on the part of France, such as an agreement among the Allies would give, could keep the revolutionary party in order in both countries; and that it was much to be regretted that this matter was not viewed in England as it was on the Continent.

I said in reply, that I really believed that at present the King of France had nothing to fear from the revolutionary party in either country. I then explained in what manner, in my opinion, the King would lose ground in the expectation of a revolutionary war by calling for the aid of his Allies. He had already a larger army on the frontier than the Spanish government had asked the Cortes to grant a supply for; and the King of France might, by asking for them, have five times the number when he pleased. Now the King trusted to the fidelity and gallantry of these troops for his defence, or he did not. If he did not, there was no question; if he did, there was no occasion for bringing forward his Allies, and his doing so would be unpopular in France. The ground of the revolutionary attack upon him must be a notion that he cannot trust his troops, and what can give stronger ground for such a notion than the King calling for the aid of his Allies in a war with such a power as Spain?

But I said that, whether the aid was necessary or not, I could not consent to give it, till I should know what had passed, the exact ground of complaint and the exact cause of war.

I regretted that the other powers did not see the subject in the same light as we did, and that we did not all give the same answer. I said that I was perfectly aware, and would not conceal the fact from the conference, that the concurrence of Great Britain was important in this affair; and probably so important as that, without her, the others could not only do nothing, but that her efforts to maintain peace, peace being the object, would fail entirely. I said that, for this reason, I had been very explicit in showing exactly what our opinions and intentions were in order that the Allies, and France in particular, might shape their course in such a manner as to carry us with them, and that they might make us useful to her cause.

M. de Montmorency denied the truth of my notion, that the certainty of the support of the Allies in a revolutionary war would not give strength to the King of France. But he did not approach the position which I had laid down.

A desultory conversation then occurred upon good offices by England, in which I declared that we could not give them, as they would be useless, if there was either treaty or declaration against Spain.

In the course of this conversation M. de Metternich expressed a hope that there might be some intervention to check or correct the progress of the revolution, to which I answered that we could never stipulate to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain in any manner. That if our good offices were solicited with a view to preserve peace we might give them, but that we could give them for no other object.

WELLINGTON.

#### VIII.

Verona, 31st Oct., 1822.

There was a Conference this evening, consisting of the persons mentioned in the margin \* at which Prince Metternich read the accompanying paper.†

Some desultory conversation followed in respect to the circulation of copies of this paper, and the futuro discussions upon it; and I said that I should take the opportunity, when it should be discussed and put upon the Protocol, of stating some observations upon it.

A conversation then occurred upon the formation of the Protocol, and whether the papers which had passed at the preceding meetings should be inserted in it. M. de Montmorency desired that no more of his paper than the three demands with which it closed, should be entered. I said that whether my paper was entered, as having been delivered at a former meeting, or not, I was quite indifferent; but that, if it was not, I concluded it important that it should be entered upon the first Protocol that was drawn up.

There was then a conversation respecting the mode of signing the Protocols, and as it appeared to be the general wish that the signature should bind, unless a dissent was entered, I stated that I preferred the mode adopted at Laybach, that of signing only to the accuracy of the entry; but, that if the other mode were preferred, I could only state my dissent when I should find it necessary.

M. de Nesselrode stated the wish of the Emperor that before the Plenipotentiaries of the different Powers should separate, a treaty or treaties should be signed stipulating, as far as possible, the *Causa Fœderis*, the number, and description of troops to be furnished by each power, the line of march, and place of assembly of each corps, &c.

WELLINGTON.

#### IX.

##### MINUTE of the CONFERENCE of the 1st instant.

Verona, 2nd Nov., 1822.

There was a conference last night of the five Cabinet Ministers, called together by my desire with a view to explain to them the situation in which I stood in respect to their proceedings, and to concert with them the

\* Prince Metternich, M. Lebzeltern, Count Nesselrode, Gen. Pozzo di Borgo, M. Tatistcheff, Count Lieven, Visct. Montmorency, Visct. Chateaubriand, Count de la Ferronaye, Count Caraman, Count Bernstorff, Prince Hatsfeldt, the Duke of Wellington.

† Enclosure 5 to No. 20.

measures which I should adopt with a view to aid them, if possible, consistently with the principles on which my government acted, or if that were not possible, at least not to do them any injury.

I then observed that upon former occasions when I had attended meetings of this description, much had been done by confidential communications, and that till now I had always found a disposition in the Allies to attend to our peculiar situation, and to refrain from holding a language and from committing themselves to a proceeding or line of action which we could not approve, in which not only we could not go along with them, but against which we might be under the necessity of protesting. That the advantage of such a mode of proceeding on former occasions had been obvious, in a variety of instances which all could recollect, and that I was afraid we were about to experience the evil consequences of a different mode of proceeding. I then informed them that I was under the necessity of protesting against the objects, views, and considerations set forth in Prince Metternich's paper, delivered to the Conference of the night before, and that I wished to apprise them of this necessity and of my intention of entering this protest in the manner least injurious to their objects.

A long conversation ensued, in which Prince Metternich denied that his paper bore the meaning which I affixed to it, viz., a determination to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain, but only the expression of a wish that the interference of the Allies to prevent a rupture between France and Spain might lead to a better order of things in Spain.

After a good deal of discussion upon the terms of my protest, which I stated my determination to make, as stated in the annexed paper [No. 6 in despatch No. 20], we went to the consideration of the best measures to be adopted to prevent the possible rupture between France and Spain.

I stated my opinion to be that any treaty, or anything like menace ought to be avoided, particularly after what the Austrian minister had stated at the conference of the preceding evening, and that the best mode of proceeding would be for the four Allies to recommend to France to apply to one of the Allies to communicate to Spain for her. A discussion then took place which of them it should be, and the Austrian minister expressed his opinion that this task might be undertaken with most advantage by Great Britain.

The French minister objected to the mode of proceeding in the way of good offices, as, in fact, there was no positive ground of dispute, and to the employment of the British government to speak for them in Spain, as we had so many reserves and our position was so peculiar that we might not be able to say for them what they wished.

I said that we were not at all ambitious of being charged with such a business, and that I thought it was quite impossible for us to undertake it, if we had not the entire confidence of France that we should do our best.

The Austrian minister then said that he felt the advantage of England speaking and acting alone at Madrid, but not the same respecting the single action of any other Power, and he thought, therefore, that the best mode of proceeding would be *tenir un langage commun par des notes séparées mais uniformes dans leurs principes et leur but*.

This was the mode preferred by the other three Powers; but I stated that, before I could answer for the measure which my government would adopt I must first know whether the other four Powers made any treaty or

declaration against Spain, and then what language each would hold in its note.

The conference then broke up, having lasted above three hours. As we were going out of the room, upon my asking Monsieur de Montmorency whether he should insist upon any treaty, he said he thought the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle sufficient. Prince Metternich took up the expression, and explained that the Protocols of Aix la Chapelle stipulated nothing but *union*. But still M. de Montmorency said he should be satisfied without any treaty.

WELLINGTON.

*Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Verona, 5th Nov., 1822.

Le soussigné Chancelier de Cour et d'Etat de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique a l'honneur de communiquer à son Excellence Monsieur le Duc de Wellington la copie d'une lettre, signée au nom de la Régence d'Urgel, par M. l'Archévêque de Tarragone et M. le Marquis de Mattafiorida, qui vient de lui parvenir; et il saisit avec empressement cette occasion pour lui renouveler l'assurance de sa haute considération.

METTERNICH.

[A copy of this must go to England by the next messenger with a covering despatch.

WELLINGTON.]

[ENCLOSURE.]

COPIE d'une Lettre de la Régence de SEO D'URGEL à M. le Prince de METTERNICH.

Urgel, 14<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

Les progrès de la régence qui doit gouverner l'Espagne durant la captivité de son Roi Ferdinand VII. doivent être connus du ministre distingué dont elle a imploré la haute influence pour obtenir des augustes souverains réunis en congrès des secours indispensables dans la lutte obstinée qu'elle soutient contre toutes les forces et les intrigues de la secte démagogue, qui épuisera sans doute les efforts de ce gouvernement naissant s'il n'est bientôt secouru, mais que jamais n'épuisera ni son courage ni sa constance.

La Régence a été reconnue et a reçu le serment d'obéissance et de fidélité de toutes les Juntas, qui dans les différentes provinces du royaume se sont déclarées en faveur de leur religion et de leur Roi: celle de Navarre ainsi que son président, le Général Eguia, vient de la reconnaître, après avoir corroboré son opinion à celle de l'Evêque de Tarragone, Conseiller d'Etat; du Général de l'Ordre des Capucins, Grand d'Espagne de Première Classe; du Lieutenant-Général Charles O'Donel, et de l'Evêque de Pampelune, qui se trouvaient alors à Bayonne. Elle a été aussi reconnue des Provinces Basques, de la majeure partie du Haut Arragon et de la Catalogne, de plusieurs généraux et de beaucoup d'officiers de tous grades; de manière que tous les Espagnols libres se sont réunis à un gouvernement central qui, soutenu par la haute influence de V.A., pourrait devenir en peu de temps l'espoir de la paix de ce malheureux

royaume, le salut de son Roi captif, et un moyen qui pourrait contribuer à délivrer notre infortunée patrie des chaînes qui l'oppriment.

V.A. n'ignore pas que la secte démagogue déchainée contre nous met en usage toute son astuce et toutes ses forces pour nous compromettre et nous anéantir; résolus d'employer tous les moyens pour détruire ses perfides projets, peut-être nos efforts nous mériteront-ils la reconnaissance de l'Europe; mais si, abandonnés à nous-mêmes, nous ne sommes bientôt secourus, il ne nous restera que notre constance et notre courage à opposer à ses astucieuses intrigues. Peut-être mettra-t-elle en usage celle de faire paraître plusieurs individus chargés de solliciter des secours, dans l'intention de fatiguer les personnes de qui nous devons en attendre, et éloigner par ce moyen ceux dont nous avons un extrême besoin. Si par hasard Mr. Joseph Alvarez de Tolédo se présentait à V.A. sous ce prétexte, elle peut être convaincue qu'il n'a pour cet objet aucun pouvoir de la Régence, et qu'il est convenable qu'il soit renvoyé.

V.A., qui sent toute l'importance de nos opérations et l'abîme sans fond où nous sommes engagés dans l'unique but de sauver notre Roi et notre patrie, ne trouvera pas étonnant que nous nous adressions à elle pour de si justes motifs.

Les Régens du royaume, le Général en chef Baron d'Eroles étant absent et à la tête des troupes, saisissent cette occasion de renouveler à V.A. le plus sincère témoignage de leur respect.

LE MARQUIS DE MATAFLORIDA.

L'ARCHÉVÊQUE PRÉCUNISÉ DE TARRAGONE.

[ 196. ]

*À S. A. le Prince de Metternich.*

MON PRINCE,

À Vérone, le 7<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

J'espère que V.A. aurait pu se trouver dans le cas de me donner une réponse à mes diverses communications au sujet de l'arrangement pécuniaire, dont il a été question depuis plus d'une année entre le gouvernement de S.M. et le gouvernement de S.M.I.

Comme il paraît que les discussions sur les affaires majeures qui ont occupé votre attention vont finir bientôt, et j'espère me trouver dans le cas de partir, je prie V.A. de fixer le jour et l'heure quand vous voudrez bien me donner une audience à ce sujet.

J'ai l'honneur, d'être, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Prince Metternich,*

[ 197. ] MON PRINCE,

Verona, 8th Nov., 1822.

I have had the honour of receiving your Highness's letter of yesterday; and as some days have elapsed since, under ordinary circumstances, it might have been expected that I should have

quitted Verona, my government will be in some degree surprised that the money arrangement upon which I have been under the necessity of troubling you has not only not yet been submitted to his Imperial Majesty, but that the minister of finance has not yet given his opinion upon it ; and it is necessary for my own justification that I should trouble your Highness again.

On my arrival at Vienna I spoke to your Highness and to his Imperial Majesty on this subject on the 30th of September ; and your Highness expressed your desire that I should talk on the subject to the Count Stadion, the minister of finance, and communicate to him the plan on which I proposed to settle the affair.

I did in consequence mention the subject to Count Stadion, who at once told me that he had nothing to say to it, and that I must settle it with the Prince Metternich ; and having waited upon him twice afterwards during my stay at Vienna, I was not so fortunate as to find him at home.

On the 2nd of October I had the honour of addressing your Highness on this subject from Vienna, and requested your Highness either to appoint Count Stadion or some other person to confer with me upon it at Vienna ; or if it should be determined that I should go to Verona, that your Highness would be pleased to have brought to that place the documents relating to this affair, in order that I might arrange it with your Highness.

On the 3rd I informed you that I should set out for Verona on the 5th.

After my arrival here I spoke to your Highness on this subject, and by your desire submitted to you, on the 19th of October, confidentially, a plan for settling the affair. Not having received any answer to this communication in writing, or verbally, I addressed your Highness, on the 29th of October, in an official note ; and again yesterday ; and I am certainly concerned to find that an affair which it is admitted involves the honour and interest of both governments is not more advanced towards a settlement than, by your Highness's letter of yesterday, it appears to be at present.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

## MEMORANDUM FROM LORD LONDONDERRY. No. 4.

Verona, 8th Nov., 1822.

The intelligence which I procured yesterday deserves to be noted. Monsieur de Tatitscheff, Count Nesselrode, and Count Lieven, all called upon me; the object of their visit appeared to be to discover, if possible, whether, in the event of the Duke of Wellington's not approving, or not being able to support the "*démarche*" made by the Allies by their separate despatches to their ministers at Madrid, his Grace would nevertheless send such instructions to Sir William A'Court, as to induce that minister in an indirect, if not in an open manner, to sustain the object set forth in representations to the Spanish government.

It is worthy of remark, that the Allies seem to be pursuing exactly a similar course as at Laybach, and it is singular that Sir William A'Court should stand at Madrid much in the same position as he formerly did at Naples. The Allies at Laybach, in like manner, addressed separate despatches, conveying the same sentiments on the Neapolitan revolution, to their ministers at Naples, and these were to make a united declaration on the receipt of them, while at the same time, I was solicited to encourage Sir William A'Court in every way, to "*appuyer secrètement*" the common effort.

It was my duty of course, to profess to the ministers above alluded to, my perfect ignorance of what the Duke of Wellington would be disposed to do. This led to a consideration of what the probable sentiments would be, which were to be conveyed in the despatches; and although I was not able to ascertain much from the Russian ministers, I learned in the course of the day, from other channels amongst the Austrians and Prussians, that the French despatch had been given in to Prince Metternich, that he approved generally of its contents, considering it moderate, but that he had made some alterations. The Prussians also, had produced their document, and Count Nesselrode and the Austrians, were to have theirs ready on Sunday, or Monday next.

When I asked, if it was a very usual course, in the spirit of the Alliance, for the four Powers to settle their accounts, as it were, and then bring their vote made up to England, instead of carrying Great Britain along with them in considering and comparing each particular paper, I was replied to "that it appeared evident there was such a wide difference between the course intended to be pursued by the four Powers, and the sentiments announced by the Duke of Wellington, that there would be no use in consulting his Grace on details which he would feel it necessary perhaps to decline entering into, and then the course would be more difficult, than if the Duke was presented with the whole result."

I then asked, for my own information, candidly to be informed what the Allies promised themselves as the course of their *démarche*, and to what they ultimately looked. I was replied to, that the rupture of diplomatic relations, in the recall of their ministers, was the extreme of what could, or would be done, (especially by Austria and Prussia). These powers felt themselves bound to the Emperor Alexander to do something. His sacrifices in the east imperatively demanded an effort in the west. They could not separate from this meeting, without pronouncing themselves in the

same language as at Laybach, and having done this, the rest must be in the hands of Providence.

I inquired, if the four Powers really supposed that they would be in a better situation, or the revolutionary system in Spain nearer its annihilation, when they had perfected their measure of recalling their ministers (and that the English mission still remained at Madrid), than as they at present stood, without a proclaimed difference in the system of the Alliance and the spirit of it ready to be put in force, in case of extreme difficulty, or a just ground of war arising. The answer was, "that they did not conceive their position would be better, but they were committed to persevere in the same course as heretofore, and they were aided in it by the moderation of France. The tone of that Power had been that of offensive warfare. Austria and Prussia would have found themselves opposed both to the Emperor Alexander, and to France, and then nothing but confusion and broil could have resulted from this meeting; but, as it happily turned out, the councils of France were directed by the sage principles of the Alliance, and they looked to everything reasonable; and it was the duty of the continental powers to support them."

I should also observe, that in the course of what passed with my Austrian and Prussian friends, I pressed them distinctly to reply to me, that in the event of the recall of their missions leading to war between France and Spain, were they prepared to take a line, or look to this result?

They stated in answer, "that it was quite impossible for Spain to be the aggressor, or make war on France: that in like manner, France knew her position now too well to attack Spain; but, if such a case should possibly arise, no consideration should induce them to take part in such a war, as neither their finances nor their position, considering all other abundant circumstances belonging to it, would allow them."

I did not press my observations further.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning, to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 8th Nov., 1822.

My single despatch of this day says all that I have to say to you on public matters; and I will not tax your patience by repeating and enlarging upon the topics of that despatch in a private letter. Only this: every day convinces me more and more, that in the present state of the world, in the present state of the Peninsula, and in the present state of this country, the American questions are out of all proportion more important to us than the European, and that if we do not seize and turn them to our advantage in time, we shall rue the loss of an opportunity never, never to be recovered.

I enclose a paper which will show you how the Yankees deal with royal Spanish privateers which take liberties with their commerce. This *La Panchita*, you will observe, is the captor of our *Lord Collingwood*, and of another ship of ours (I forget its name) condemned at Porto Rico.

I hope I may not have to tell you, before your return, that the Yankees have occupied Cuba:—a blow which I do not know how we can prevent, but



which, as a government, I hardly know how we should survive, if we do nothing to compensate it to ourselves.

I enclose also a private letter from A'Court to Planta, which Planta allows me to send for your perusal. Being an original, you will be good enough to return it.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*Sir William A'Court to Joseph Planta, Esq.*

MY DEAR PLANTA,

Madrid, 24th Oct., 1822.

I have just been informed that a commercial courier will start in half an hour for Paris. I avail myself of the opportunity to write you a few lines, and to forward to you a duplicate of my last despatch.

If I were in any other country I should not have the least difficulty in predicting an immediate crisis; but I am told that in this, on whatever side the apparent probabilities lie, the real probability lies not, and that we must rather reason, because such and such things seem likely to occur, they therefore will not occur. It may be so. I know not enough of the country to give an opinion either way.

It must be allowed, however, that the general aspect of affairs is sufficiently discouraging. A government without force, either in opinion or reality, the members of which are for the most part the mere tools of a faction ready to proceed to any extremity; an army insignificant in point of numbers, animated by a very doubtful spirit, ill paid, ill clothed, and ill disciplined; an insurrection gaining ground on all sides, and solidly established in three of the finest provinces of the monarchy; the spirit of the rural population (if I may be allowed the expression) decidedly hostile, though that of the towns may still be friendly to the constitutional system; no revenue; the current expenses of the State, and the interest of the debt only met by new loans and occasional sales of national property; the higher classes incapable of an exertion, and in a state of apathy bordering upon idiotism; not an effort to be looked for even from those who sincerely wish a change, nor a chance of any party arising with energy and strength sufficient to put down the Jacobins on one side, or to curb the absurd pretensions of the Ultra-Royalists on the other.

It must not, however, be supposed that the violent party is without its inquietudes and fears. The measures now under discussion were dictated by a feeling of despair, and the re-opening of the clubs may be traced to something of a similar feeling. It is indeed impossible to shut one's eyes to the dangers that menace on either side.

How long this struggle may continue it is wholly impossible to foresee, and I fear it will be hopeless to expect any answer to my notes inviting the acquiescence of the Spanish Government in the two articles proposed to be added to the Slave-trade Treaty, till things are a little more quiet, or an administration be formed having a better prospect of permanency than this. I shall not, however, lose sight of Mr. Canning's instructions, but continue to urge the conclusion of the business by every argument I think likely to produce any effect.

I hear no more of all that was to be done for England and for English

claimants. Till something be actually brought forward upon the subject in the Cortes, I shall still continue to entertain a doubt of the sincerity of the professions with which I was greeted on my arrival. I suspect there was an *arrière pensée* in the anxiety that was expressed that these professions should immediately be brought to the knowledge of the British Government.

It is astonishing how little I have found everything here, both men and things. There is nothing great in the country but its *souvenirs* and its pretensions.

I have, &c.

WILLIAM A' COURT.

## II.

EXTRACT of a Letter received by MR. WILMOT, from ST. THOMAS,  
August 6th, 1822.

Whilst here, the American national vessel, the *Grampus*, man-of-war schooner, came into St. Thomas. She is a beautiful vessel of 300 tons burthen, armed with twelve 18-pounder carronades, with about 100 fine men, and commanded by a Captain Gregory, of the United States Navy. The Lieutenant, whom I saw at Colvan Schottens, stated they had come in to take the depositions of the crew of an American merchant vessel, who had been plundered by a Spanish armed vessel, supposed to be the *Panchita* privateer, from Porto Rico. He stated it was the intention of Captain Gregory, if he fell in with the Spanish privateer, to capture her and to send her to America. In the true spirit of the manner of speaking which is engendered by scenes of actual war, he expressed his anxious hopes that it would lead to a Spanish war, and the capture of Cuba and Porto Rico, when the United States would have colonies of their own to trade with.

I should not have recorded the remark except to observe that all the Americans whom I have met with in St. Thomas, from the Consul downwards, entertain the same wish. If the people in America entertain the same thoughts, it is quite in the ordinary course of things, with a government like the United States, and the situation of Spain, that the events will be nearly in conformity with the wishes of the people.

The tone of mind of the officers is also not unworthy of remark. Just on closing my despatches for the mail, which has come a day before her time, I have received from St. Thomas the following information from a friend whom I begged to inform me of the result of the American officer's determination.

The United States sloop-of-war, Captain Gregory, fell in with the Spanish privateer *Panchita* off Las Rocas, to windward of Cumcœa, and captured her after a short engagement. The *Panchita* is a brigantine, with eight 9-pounder carronades, and a long brass 18-pounder mounted on a pivot amidships. She had 87 men on board, but her complement was 150. She is owned by a Spanish merchant of Porto Rico, and commanded by an European Spaniard. The American captain has taken the *Panchita* with him to America, but sent the wounded men to Porto Rico. On their arrival the Spanish Government is said to have laid an embargo on all American vessels, and ordered their cruizers to capture them. On the 2nd instant, near St. Thomas, the American ship *Alfred*, Captain Znell, of New York, was taken, and carried into Porto Rico. A passenger on board, named Cline, a creole of St. Thomas, has returned from Porto Rico since he was taken in the *Alfred*.

I have no time to make a comment on this intelligence, which you will be the first to receive.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 8th Nov., 1822.

Your Grace's despatches of the 28th and 29th ult. have been received and laid before the King.

I am to signify to your Grace his Majesty's entire approbation of your conduct and language in respect to the affairs of Spain; and particularly of the determination not to promise the good offices of his Majesty between that country and France in any other case than that of a simple and specific request to that effect on the part of France, unaccompanied by "any treaty or any declaration of the Allies hostile to Spain."

Even in that case, though perhaps it would be ungracious to withhold a desired mediation, the task of undertaking it will not be free from difficulties;—some of them growing not only out of the past intrigues of the French government in Spain, but out of the uncertainty which we cannot but feel whether that government will be willing to refrain from a repetition of those intrigues, or able effectually to prevent it. Others (and those not the least perplexing) from the position in which we ourselves stand towards Spain;—a position becoming every day more delicate and critical. The internal state of Spain will perhaps be better explained to your Grace by the enclosed despatches from Sir William A'Court (received here since my last despatches to your Grace were written) than by any other information which may have reached Verona.

But independent of the obstacles presented by such a state of things in the interior of Spain, the duties of mediation in our hands will be most inconveniently crossed by the causes of complaint which we have against her external policy.

Every day brings some fresh report of wrong inflicted on our commerce by vessels bearing the flag of Spain and acting under Spanish authorities.

Accounts have been received at the Admiralty only to day (which I have not time to obtain in detail for your Grace's information by this messenger,) by which it appears that the Spanish Governor of Porto Cabello (the only place of which the Royalist forces are in possession in the whole extent of the province of Colombia) has commissioned several ships of war to cruise against the merchant ships of every country presuming to trade with the insurgent provinces; thus enforcing in all its rigour the old colonial system of Spain, in spite of the understanding which, as your Grace is aware, has so long prevailed between Great Britain and Spain, as to the connivance of Spain at our trade with the colonies, while we abstained from recognizing their independence.

Similar violences have long been exercised under the authority of the government of Porto Rico, if we may judge from the instances of capture which have already been made the subject of remonstrance, but it is only now that the fact of such capture having been authorised by the royalist commander on the continent of Colombia, has been distinctly ascertained.

It is impossible that this country should much longer put up with such outrageous injury.

The coincidence of such measures as we may find necessary in defence of British commerce, and in vindication of the honour of the British flag

with the acceptance of the office of mediators between Spain and France, would be not less embarrassing in fact, than awkward in appearance.

Your Grace will derive from the knowledge of these circumstances an additional motive for not acceding to a proposal for such a mediation under any circumstances, in which it can be declined, without giving just cause of offence to the Allies, or incurring the risk of a warlike combination against Spain.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant.

GEORGE CANNING.

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*A M. le Vicomte de Montmorency.*

[ 198. ]

MONSIEUR LE VICOMTE,

À Vérone, ce 9<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

Il y a une réflexion sur la Minute que V.E. m'a communiquée avant hier, que je ne vous ai pas énoncée alors, mais qui me paraît si importante que je prends la liberté de vous en écrire. C'est celle-ci :

Supposons que le gouvernement Espagnol a le bon esprit, ou est assez bien conseillé, pour répondre à votre ministre dans le sens et avec le ton de respect avec lequel il devrait se servir vis-à-vis d'une puissance comme la France, en tout ce qui regarderait la question extérieure, mais que sur la question intérieure il vous dit que c'est son affaire, et qu'il n'a rien à en dire à qui que ce soit ; ce qui est possible, si non probable, s'il est bien conseillé ; où sera votre ministre ? où sera le gouvernement de sa Majesté ? où sera le congrès ? Pourriez-vous dans ce cas-là retirer votre ministre ? Les Trois Puissances le pourraient ; mais le pourra-t-elle la France ?

Observez que tout ce qui se passera à cette occasion sera de la plus complète publicité.

Je vous fais mille excuses de vous molester avec cette réflexion ; mais il m'a paru important de vous la faire ; et j'ai préféré de vous en écrire que de vous aller voir, ce qui aurait pu occuper un peu plus de votre temps que de lire cette lettre.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec la considération la plus distinguée, de votre Excellence le très obéissant et très fidèle serviteur,

WELLINGTON.

[ 199. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Verona, 10th Nov., 1822.

I have received your letter of the 29th October regarding the recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies. I consider it a point of honour that we should not be in a hurry to recognise that independence, and that the measure should be forced upon us by circumstances rather than we should seek for occasions to adopt it. My reasons are to be found, first, in the origin of the disputes with the colonies; secondly, in our various offers of mediation; thirdly, in our intercourse with them; fourthly, in our treaties with Spain; and lastly, in the assistance which British subjects have given to establish their independence. In all these circumstances I can find reasons for wishing that the recognition of their independence *de facto* by a treaty, which is a stage beyond that of recognition by sending agents to them, should be delayed till some circumstances should occur to render it necessary.

I don't think that any one of these circumstances would render necessary such forbearance; but all taken together do make up a case which renders it very doubtful that we can in honour go further in the instance of any colony than is necessary. I will not now trouble you or myself with proving this case; but I confess that I should be ashamed of showing my face, even upon the present occasion, if the piracy did not give me something to say besides the argument of commercial advantage and the clamours of our people.

I confess that I don't see in what manner the recognition of the independence of any colony will at all relieve us from our difficulties in our questions with Spain. These questions will still depend upon peace or war. Indeed they will come to be questions of war. Spain may fairly say, "We allowed you to trade with our rebellious colonies, and, as far as was in our power, we did not molest your commerce; but now that you have by treaty recognised the independence of Colombia, we withdraw that permission; and we give you notice that we will capture all ships which trade with our dominions in South America. You are then at war; and for what? I am convinced that if those who consider the subject will look at this view of it, and all that has passed, they will see that it is not worth while to risk our character for such objects.

But it will be said that Spain will not now dare to quarrel with us upon such a subject. I would not recommend to any government to calculate upon Spain's not daring anything. The prospect of the plunder by privateers of our now defenceless commerce would induce the Spanish government to take any step in which they could carry with them the public opinion, as they certainly would in case of the recognition of the independence of a Spanish colony by Great Britain, by a treaty for which there should be no necessity.

I therefore have always been for going as far as was necessary, and never further; and for justifying to Spain and the Allies each particular case. By so doing, we shall stand as we ought to do in the eyes of the world. If we go further, we shall lose our character for justice and forbearance, which after all is what constitutes our power.

I will not trouble you further upon this subject. I believe that when it comes to be thoroughly discussed, our opinions will not be very different; and you will see that I have laid here the ground for your doing exactly what you please.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Earl Bathurst.*

[ 200. ]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

Verona, 11th Nov., 1822.

Sir Hudson Lowe has sent me a letter on the subject of a pension for the sisters of the late Sir William Delancey, upon which I have written to Lord Liverpool; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will do so likewise.

I hope that government propose to do something upon this outrage committed upon Sir Hudson. If Sir Hudson treated De las Cases ill, which I don't believe he did, government ought to disapprove of his conduct. If he did not treat him ill, if, on the contrary, government either approved of his conduct, or took no notice of it at the time, they ought to protect Sir Hudson; and at all events ought not to allow a blackguard to insult him with impunity in the streets for his conduct in the performance of his duty.

Officers in command are but too willing to seek for popu-

larity ; and you may rely upon it that if you don't take some steps to mark the sense of the government upon this occasion, there is no well-thinking man in either of the military professions who will not feel it ; and you will not easily find another who will brave the popular cry to serve you.

At this distance, and not knowing whether De las Cases is still in England or not, I cannot say what ought to be done. If he be in England, I should be for the Attorney-General prosecuting him ; or a reward should be offered for his apprehension ; or something done to show that government will not allow those who serve the public to be assaulted with impunity.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ 201. ]

*To Sir Charles Stuart.*

MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,

Verona, 12th Nov., 1822.

I enclose you a Memorandum which will explain to you the exact state of the Spanish question here. I am informed, but not by M. de Montmorency, that as soon as he and the other ministers here shall have prepared the despatches to be written to the ministers of the several courts at Madrid, he will go to Paris, to lay these documents before the King's government, and will consult them upon the expediency of making use of them. I have seen M. de Montmorency's despatch, which I certainly think very little calculated to answer his purpose of maintaining the peace with Spain : the others I have not seen ; and I do not believe they are yet drawn.

However, as I know what were the sentiments of M. de Villèle, and as I entertain the highest respect for him, and as it appears that M. de Montmorency is not quite certain of the opinion of his government, I have no objection to your making M. de Villèle acquainted with the contents of the enclosed paper, as containing my opinion of facts here, and of their probable consequences at Paris, and on the interests of France. I cannot allow any copy to be taken of this paper, or any other use to be made of it than that above pointed out ; but I beg you to take care that M. de Villèle clearly understands it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

## MEMORANDUM ON THE STATE OF THE SPANISH QUESTION.

Verona, 12th Nov., 1822.

On the 20th of October the French minister gave in a paper\* requiring from the ministers of the Allies to know whether, if France should be under the necessity of withdrawing her minister from Spain, the other Allied Powers would do the same; and in case France should be involved in war with Spain, what countenance the Allies would give the former; and in case France should require it, what assistance. To these questions the three continental Allies answered, on the 30th October, that they would act as France should in respect to their ministers in Spain; and would give that country every countenance and assistance she could require; the cause of calling for such assistance, and the period and mode of giving it, being reserved to be specified in a treaty.

The minister of Great Britain answered, that having no knowledge of the cause of dispute, and not being able to form a judgment upon a hypothetical case, he could give no answer to any of the questions.

The mode of communicating with Spain was considered on the 31st, with a view to prevent a rupture between France and Spain; and it was agreed that the minister of each Court at Madrid should present a separate note of the same tenor, and drawn up on the same principles; and on the 1st of November it was settled that the four continental Courts should draw up their notes, and communicate them to the British minister, who should, upon seeing these notes, make known the line which his Court should take.

Since that meeting, it is understood that the plan of proceeding proposed and agreed to has been altered; and instead of official notes, to be presented by the several ministers at Madrid to the Spanish government, it is now intended that despatches shall be written to those ministers respectively, in which the several Courts will express their wishes and intentions; and this mode of proceeding is adopted as affording greater latitude for discussion and explanation than that by official notes. Accordingly, M. de Montmorency has prepared the draft of his

\* See page 409.



despatch; and it is understood that the ministers of the continental powers are preparing theirs.

These are the facts which have occurred at the existing congress.

In the course of the discussions which have taken place upon this occasion a marked difference of opinion, as to the mode of action, has appeared between the continental Courts on the one hand, and England on the other. The minister of the latter power has recommended that France, and the powers which should interfere in this case, should confine themselves to what may properly be called the external quarrel between France and Spain; should not menace; and above all should not approach Spain in the form of enemies bound in a treaty of defensive alliance against her. He contended that such a treaty would be particularly prejudicial to France in a contest which might be considered revolutionary; and was useless to France, inasmuch as France was certain that she would have the countenance and assistance of the continental powers, if required. The English minister looks to the peace and honour of France as the great object in any negotiation in Spain, and not any counter-revolutionary projects. He has declared openly, that if there is any general declaration by the Allies against Spain, his Court cannot join in it; nor can his Court be a party to any representations to the Spanish government, accompanied by menaces, or regarding the internal affairs of Spain; or if there should be any defensive treaty between the Powers making it.

The Emperor of Russia considers counter-revolution in Spain as the object to be effected, and war and military operations upon Spain as the only means of attaining it. He wishes to carry them on by his own troops; but rather than not have them, he would have them carried on by French troops, eventually to be supported, if necessary, by those of the Allies. For this purpose he insists upon having a treaty signed among the Allies before their ministers shall quit Verona; and he wishes the Spanish government should be informed that the continuance of the Spanish system is inconsistent with the happiness or prosperity of Spain, and the safety of France, or of any other country in Europe.

The two German Courts are sincerely desirous of maintaining peace, and in reality dread war, and are determined to

avoid it, if possible. They regret to be obliged to hold any language to Spain on this occasion; but they cannot separate themselves from the Emperor of Russia; and they further conceive that if they hold any language to Spain upon this occasion, it must be consistent with that held by the three Powers to Naples in the years 1820-21.

They wish to be able to withdraw their ministers from Spain, as far as they are themselves concerned in the question; but it appears that upon this point they are not unwilling, if possible, to shape their course in such manner as to accommodate themselves to the wishes and feelings of the French government.

These are the opinions of the four Allies of France upon this occasion, and their probable conduct in any representation to be made to Spain.

Let us now take the liberty of considering what line it is the interest of France to take upon this occasion.

Her interest is to get out of these difficulties with honour, but without contest. No contest in Spain can answer any purpose. For France a contest in Spain always partakes of the nature of a civil war; and it can produce no political result unless by incurring an enormous expense, and by an occupation at the expense of France, which, to be of any utility, must last for years.

France then should look for peace; and, looking for peace, should, in her communications with Spain, insert nothing which can irritate or can provoke to a contest, or even to a discussion which might occasion the necessity of withdrawing her minister from Madrid.

This is so obvious that it is useless to reason upon the subject. The question is, what will irritate and provoke? Menaces; observations upon the internal system of Spain; urging Spain to change it for any other; holding out a compliance as the only mode of preserving peace; and apprehensions expressed of the safety of the King and Royal Family, or of his being deposed; approaching Spain in an alliance or in concert with other powers who menace, or who approach Spain with such observations or language.

From what has been observed of revolutionary governments in general, and of Spain in particular, such menaces, observations, &c., can produce no effect excepting to irritate and provoke, and to unite all parties against France, and probably to

create the necessity for the contest which it is supposed to be the object of France to avoid. But suppose that the Spanish government should be well advised upon this occasion, and not only should avoid any hostile language towards France in regard to the external quarrel, but should express a wish to conciliate all differences, and to live upon terms of good neighbourhood, and at the same time should protest and talk boldly upon internal subjects, can France go to war? Can she even recall her minister? The Allies may and will recall theirs; but can France? considering that every word that passes in this negotiation will be published, and be known to the whole world. How then will France stand after such a negotiation, whether she does or not recall her minister? If she does not, she will have adventured into a course of proceeding from which it will appear that she is obliged to recede; and the French government will be exposed to the taunts of the revolutionists in all countries. If she does recall him, it can scarcely be expected that war will not soon follow. The French government will then be placed between three parties all driving to the same object, viz. war, which I have already shown is inconsistent with its best interests.

First, there are the Revolutionists both in Spain and in France. Those in the former country will do everything to provoke war; and those in the latter everything to disgrace the government if they should not declare war; in hopes that war may afford some chance for executing their plans.

Secondly, the Royalists in Spain and in France. The former to acquire some support in money and arms to their cause; for of men they require none. The latter to carry on war against any revolution.

Thirdly, the Allied Powers, through their ministers, sitting in conference at Paris; and this conference, the French government may rely upon it, must be the consequence of any treaty with the Allies, and of any course of action at Madrid combined with theirs. This conference will act with the ultra-Royalists, and at the same time be an instrument in the hands of the Jacobins; and its effect will be to force the French government forward to war.

The influence of the opinions and wishes of the Emperor of Russia has been manifested in the conferences at Verona, even against the prejudices, and certainly against the opinions of the

two German Courts. Can it be believed that the ministers of those Courts at Paris (for the English ambassador, it may be relied upon, will not attend this conference) will be able to resist the Russian ambassador, backed as he will be by the clamours of the ultra-Royalists and Jacobins in France, and urged by the cries of the Spanish Royalists for assistance, and provoked, as France will be, by the Jacobin party in Spain?

A change of ministry, or war, must be the consequence of such a state of things; but it is scarcely possible that any wise minister, having to choose between war and such a state of things, would not prefer an attack upon Spain at once. But this is not the only alternative. A moderate but firm language held to Spain on the questions relating to France will preserve peace, without incurring all these risks and inconveniences.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 202. ]

SIR,

Verona, 12th Nov., 1822.

We had a conference on Friday, the 8th instant, on the Turkish question, at which were present Prince Metternich, Marquis Caraman, Prince Hatzfeldt, M. de Tatistcheff, and myself; and I enclose the notes read by the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor of Russia and of the Emperor of Austria.\*

To the latter the plenipotentiaries of France and Prussia declared their entire adherence; and I stated that I should at a future conference give in my answer. I enclose the answer which I have prepared, and I have shown it to Count Nesselrode. I have explained to the Count that it was impossible for Great Britain to adopt or to attempt to enforce upon the Porte the principle of making the Black Sea another Baltic, or of the Bosphorus a Sound, which might be understood to be the principle in contemplation of the Russian plenipotentiary, as stated in his note. That it was quite hopeless to expect that the Porte would listen to such a principle till the conclusion of a successful war; and that it was necessary for us therefore to define what we thought was practicable, and in what form we could undertake the execution of any part of what his Imperial

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\* Nos. 1 and 2.

Majesty demanded; and that I was at present authorized to go no farther than to say that Lord Strangford would continue to do that which he had been authorized to do by the government.

After a long discussion, in which I was reproached with drawing a distinction between demands which were and demands which were not founded on treaty; and our conduct was compared with that of Austria and the other Allies, Count Nesselrode begged that I would delay to put my note on the Protocol till I should know whether my government would consent to give its good offices in concert with the other Powers to prevail upon the Porte to grant firmans for the navigation of those powers severally who should apply for such good offices, and whose flags were not yet permitted to appear in those seas. To this I assented.

I took this opportunity, however, of begging Count Nesselrode to call upon the Austrian, French, and Prussian governments to state what they would do, either in support of the principle which appeared to be laid down in the Russian note, or in favour of the several Powers who should apply for their good offices to obtain permission for vessels under their flags to pass.

I requested him to observe that whenever we spoke our language was cautious and measured because we were determined to perform, and we knew we must perform, what we promised. Other powers were more free both in their words and actions; but I doubted if he would find any one of the three whose ministers had listened to and applauded M. de Tatistcheff's note would adopt the principle of making the Black Sea another Baltic, or go so far to support the Emperor's views in reality as I had been able to go, even uninstructed upon the question.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

PRÉCIS de la CONFÉRENCE tenue à VÉRONE le 9<sup>me</sup> Novembre, 1822.

IV. CONFÉRENCE.

Présens : M. le Prince de Metternich, M. le Marquis de Caraman, M. le Duc de Wellington, M. le Prince de Hatzfeldt, M. le Conseiller intime actuel de Tatistcheff.

Afin de reprendre le fil des conférences qui ont en lieu à Vienne pendant le mois de Juillet, sur les affaires d'Orient, la réunion de ce jour a commencé par la lecture du précis de ce qui s'était passé à la conférence du 27<sup>me</sup> Juillet.

M. le Conseiller intime actuel de Tatistcheff a donné ensuite lecture d'une déclaration que, par ordre de sa Majesté Impériale de Toutes les Russies, il a déposée au procès-verbal, telle qu'elle est ci-jointe, sub. litt. A.

M. le Prince de Metternich a répondu à cette déclaration par celle du cabinet de sa Majesté Impériale Royale Apostolique, laquelle se trouve ci-annexée, sub. litt. B.

M. le Duc de Wellington a demandé communication de ces deux pièces, en se réservant de faire connaître l'opinion de son gouvernement dans une conférence prochaine.

M. le Marquis de Caraman, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté le Roi de France, et M. le Prince de Hatzfeldt, Ministre Plénipotentiaire du Roi de Prusse, ont déclaré que les intentions de leurs cabinets respectifs, relativement aux questions traitées dans les deux susdites pièces, leur étant connues, ils croyaient ne pas pouvoir douter qu'ils ne seraient entièrement satisfaits des communications qui venaient d'avoir lieu.

#### No. 1.

#### DÉCLARATION à insérer au Protocole des CONFÉRENCES qui avaient été ouvertes à Vienne sur les AFFAIRES D'ORIENT.

Vérone, le 9<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

Le Plénipotentiaire de Russie a reçu de l'Empereur son maître l'ordre de faire la déclaration suivante :—

La dernière conférence des Plénipotentiaires réunis à Vienne dans le but de discuter les mesures à prendre pour engager la Porte à faire droit aux demandes de la Russie, avait eu pour résultat un heureux et complet accord sur tous les points indiqués par M. le Prince de Metternich dans sa communication en date du 31 Juillet, comme devant servir de bases au rétablissement des relations diplomatiques entre le cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et le Divan.

Cette pièce, rédigée lorsque les dispositions du gouvernement Turc semblaient autoriser l'espoir d'un prompt rapprochement, ne parvint à sa destination qu'an moment où la Porte eut manifesté l'intention déplorable de persévérer dans le système qui avait obligé l'Empereur à rappeler son ministre, et qui, loin de redresser, ne pouvait qu'aggraver et accroître ses trop légitimes griefs.

La longanimité de sa Majesté Impériale venait encore une fois d'être méconnue par le Divan, et dans la conférence du 26<sup>me</sup> Juillet les ministres Turcs, comme s'ils eussent résolu de venir à un oubli total les faits les plus notoires, avaient avancé des assertions qu'on aura bientôt appréciées à leur juste valeur pour peu qu'on veuille reporter les yeux sur le passé, et se rappeler la véritable conduite de la Russie.

Ils lui avaient prêté des desseins hostiles contre l'empire Ottoman, tandis qu'il n'aurait tenu qu'à elle de se faire rendre, par la force des armes, une justice que la persuasion ne pouvait obtenir.

Ils avaient prétendu, que toutes les obligations que les traités imposent à la Porte envers sa Majesté Impériale étaient complètement remplies, tandis

que des troupes Turques couvraient les Principautés ; tandis qu'elles y commettaient tous les jours d'affreux désordres, que tous les jours la religion et ses ministres avaient à y gémir de nouveaux malheurs, et qu'aujourd'hui même on y voit encore fumer les ruines de la ville de Yassy.

Ils avaient enfin accusé la Russie de vouloir usurper une influence exclusive dans les affaires intérieures de la Porte, tandis que les propositions de sa Majesté Impériale n'avaient jamais eu pour objet que de lui faire adopter sous les auspices de toutes les Puissances Alliées les meilleurs moyens de rentrer dans la possession tranquille de ses provinces Chrétiennes, en leur ôtant toute raison de crainte et par conséquent de résistance.

La Porte ne s'était point au reste bornée à tenir ce langage si affligeant et si injuste. Ses déterminations devaient offrir les mêmes motifs de regret.

La Russie avait fait auprès d'elle une démarche directe depuis un an.

La Porte se refusait à toute réponse, à toute marque de réciprocité. Elle rejetait jusqu'à l'idée d'un envoi de plénipotentiaires.

La Russie, loin d'agir contre les intérêts de l'empire Ottoman à une époque où aucune des réclamations de sa Majesté Impériale n'était écoutée, n'avait cessé d'offrir son appui au Divan, à des conditions où il aurait dû trouver un incontestable témoignage des vues les plus bienfaisantes.

La Porte, au lieu de s'y montrer sensible, adoptait pour la navigation de la Mer Noire des mesures qui allaient fermer au commerce Russe une partie de ses plus importants marchés.

Quelque tristes, quelque décourageans que fussent de tels résultats, l'Empereur s'était plu à croire que l'unanimité qui avait présidé aux délibérations des plénipotentiaires réunis à Vienne, que l'empressement avec lequel toutes les puissances Alliées avaient reconnu encore une fois, et la justice des demandes de la Russie et la nécessité où était la Porte d'y satisfaire ; que l'évidence dont cette justice et cette nécessité avaient été entourées dans la communication ci-dessus mentionnée du cabinet d'Autriche, et les nouvelles démarches qui en seraient la suite, dissiperaient l'aveuglement de la Porte, et amèneraient enfin le terme d'une longue et pénible discussion.

Malheureusement l'attente de sa Majesté Impériale est bien loin de s'être réalisée. Dans la conférence du 27<sup>me</sup> Août les Turcs ont persisté dans leurs erreurs ; ils ont même élevé un grief au sujet duquel la Russie ne saurait donner d'explication trop précise ni trop souvent répétée.

La Porte cherche à faire peser sur le cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, et sur ses agens, un reproche de complicité dans l'insurrection de la Grèce. Mais comment saurait-elle se méprendre sur l'authenticité des preuves dont la réunion démontre que cette insurrection désastreuse est l'œuvre des sectes qui ont attiré le même fléau sur l'Espagne et sur le Portugal, qui l'avaient excitée en Italie l'année dernière, et qui sont prêtes à l'exciter encore partout où on leur laissera apparaître le plus léger espoir de succès. Le Divan peut-il avoir oublié que sa Majesté Impériale avait donné l'ordre de faire marcher ses troupes contre les révolutionnaires de Naples et du Piémont, quand elle apprit par les troubles des Principautés, qu'ils avaient transporté leurs complots en Orient. Les ministres Ottomans ne se rappellent-ils pas la déclaration dont ces troubles et leur auteur ont été l'objet. Ignorent-ils les ouvertures faites à cette époque par le Baron de Strogonoff, et la gratitude que la Porte elle-même en a exprimée. Ignorent-ils que depuis lors l'Empereur n'a cessé de flétrir la cause des révolutions, qu'il souhaite ardemment

le rétablissement de la tranquillité en Grèce, qu'il a offert d'y concourir avec ses Alliés, et que plusieurs des agens que la Porte accuse aujourd'hui ont reçu de la part de ses fonctionnaires des témoignages de reconnaissance pour la conduite qu'ils ont tenue à l'origine de cette même révolution dont elle les dépeint comme les fauteurs? S'il en est un seul qui l'ait favorisée, instrument aveugle des sectaires, il a désobéi aux ordres les plus formels de l'Empereur, et au cas qu'une preuve irréfutable puisse en être fournie, il subira une juste punition.

Le Plénipotentiaire de Russie a ordre d'insister sur ce point, parcequ'il est essentiel qu'à cet égard la Porte sache et apprécie la vérité toute entière. Il ne l'est pas moins qu'elle connaisse les seules conditions auxquelles puisse s'opérer le rétablissement de ses relations diplomatiques avec le cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. Ces conditions, invariablement arrêtées par sa Majesté Impériale, sont celles qui suivent :—

### 1. *Pacification de la Grèce.*

Sa Majesté Impériale propose à cet égard deux alternatives.

Ou bien la Porte consentirait à une négociation directe entre des Plénipotentiaires Russes, Alliés, et Ottomans, relativement aux garanties que recevraient les Grecs en rentrant sous la souveraineté du Grand Seigneur, garanties qui auraient pour but de leur assurer la pleine et paisible jouissance des avantages mentionnés dans le Memorandum Autrichien du 19<sup>me</sup> Avril, 1822 :

Ou bien il faudrait qu'une *série de faits* prouvât que la Porte respecte une religion placée par la lettre des traités sous la protection de la Russie, et qu'elle cherche à rétablir la tranquillité intérieure en Grèce, sur des bases telles que la Russie y trouve l'espérance d'une paix durable, qu'elle puisse être satisfaite du sort de ses co-réligionnaires, et qu'elle les voie obtenir de vrais gages de bonheur et de sécurité.

### 2. *Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie.*

La Porte ferait une démarche directe auprès de la Russie pour lui notifier l'entière évacuation des deux Principautés, et la nomination des Hospodars.

Si cette démarche avait lieu, les agens Russes retourneraient dans ces pays pour y rentrer dans l'exercice des droits que les traités assument à la Russie, et pour vérifier si les mesures prises par la Porte et par les nouveaux Princes répondent aux stipulations de ces traités.

### 3. *Commerce et Navigation.*

La Porte révoquerait toutes les mesures prises contre le commerce et la libre navigation de la Mer Noire. Sous ce rapport elle choisirait également entre deux alternatives :

Ou bien elle admettrait le passage des vaisseaux Espagnols, Portugais, Siciliens, et autres ;

Ou bien elle respecterait le pavillon dont ces navires se convraient auparavant ; cette coutume étant consacrée par une longue pratique, et la Porte s'y opposant aujourd'hui pour la première fois.

Après avoir fait connaître les conditions ci-dessus énoncées, il ne reste au Plénipotentiaire Russe qu'à exprimer les vœux que forme sa Majesté



Impériale pour que ses Alliés parviennent, par la continuation de leurs bons offices, à faire exécuter à la Porte ce que la Russie lui demande, et ce que lui demandent également ses véritables intérêts.

## No. 2.

DÉCLARATION du Cabinet d'AUTRICHE au Protocole de la Conférence du 9 Novembre, 1822, sur les AFFAIRES D'ORIENT.

Le Ministre d'Autriche ayant eu confidentiellement connaissance de la déclaration que M. le Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté Impériale de Toutes les Russies vient de déposer au Protocole, s'empresse de faire connaître l'opinion de sa Cour sur le contenu de cette déclaration.

Les principes de justice et d'une politique saine et généreuse, qui n'ont cessé de caractériser les déterminations de sa Majesté Impériale de Toutes les Russies, se trouvent de nouveau solennellement confirmés par la présente communication de son cabinet.

Si la Porte Ottomane, étrangère aux relations intimes dans lesquelles les Cours Alliées ont le bonheur de se voir placées avec celle de Russie, a pu être induite en erreur sur les causes du fléau qui désole ses provinces; si, entraînée par cette erreur, elle a pu prêter même des armes à ses véritables ennemis, il est du devoir des cabinets Alliés de dissiper un aveuglement aussi funeste par tous les moyens qui peuvent se trouver en leur pouvoir. Le cabinet de Vienne se croit d'autant plus appelé à contribuer à ce que ce but salutaire soit atteint, qu'il a l'avantage particulier de pouvoir lier ses représentations à des démarches qui ont précédé les troubles actuels dans l'empire Ottoman.

Bien antérieurement à l'époque où la révolte a éclaté dans cet empire, la cour de Vienne avait cru devoir éveiller l'attention du gouvernement Turc, sur le jeu coupable que les fauteurs de tous les genres de séduction et de désordres exerçaient dans le sein même de sa capitale, sur leur connexion intime avec les sectaires des différents pays, sur les moyens mêmes qu'ils avaient organisés pour assurer le succès de leurs trames.

Dans son incurie habituelle le Divan fut loin de répondre à des avertissements aussi salutaires par les égards qu'ils méritaient.

Le Reis-Effendi, alors en fonction, interpellé enfin par l'Internonce, se contenta de répondre à ce ministre, que ce qui pouvait offrir des motifs d'inquiétude, peut-être justes, aux puissances Chrétiennes, n'était point de nature à devoir alarmer le ministère de la Porte. La marche des événements ne tarda pas à justifier la prévoyance de la Cour de Vienne, et à démontrer l'étendue des illusions, auxquelles le gouvernement Ottoman s'était abandonné.

Bien décidé à remplir sans réserve un devoir qu'indépendamment de tant d'autres considérations puissantes, la justice et la vérité seules imposeraient à sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, l'Empereur croirait manquer toutefois à ce que lui inspirent sa confiance et son amitié pour son auguste ami et Allié, si, en chargeant son cabinet du soin de détromper et d'éclairer les ministres de la Porte, il ne lui enjoignait en même temps d'éviter que ses paroles pussent être envisagées par ces ministres comme tendant à disculper la marche politique d'un monarque élevé au-dessus de toutes les atteintes même de l'erreur et de la malveillance.

C'est à l'histoire qu'il doit être réservé de retracer la somme des bien-

faits dont l'Europe est redevable à la politique conservatrice de sa Majesté Impériale de Toutes les Russies, dans une crise où le sentiment de sa force n'a pu être contre-balancé que par des calculs d'un ordre supérieur, les seules dignes de son grand et noble caractère!

En exprimant sur ce sujet délicat la véritable pensée de l'Empereur, le Cabinet d'Autriche se déclare en même temps prêt à faire connaître à Constantinople, et à soutenir par ses meilleurs offices, les conditions auxquelles sa Majesté Impériale de Toutes les Russies attache le rétablissement de ses relations diplomatiques ordinaires avec la Porte, et le renvoi de ses agens dans les Principautés sur le Danube.

Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique se flatte que ses augustes Alliés voudront combiner leurs efforts avec les siens, pour amener dans le plus bref délai possible un état de choses qui servira à manifester hautement le triomphe du principe fondamental de leur glorieuse union sur les vaines espérances d'une faction, dont ils ne cessent de combattre les projets, dans le seul intérêt du maintien de la paix en Europe.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 203. ]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Vérone, 12th Nov., 1822.

I have spoken to Cardinal Spina, the Pope's Nuncio here, regarding the confirmation of Dr. Collins's appointment to be Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashell, and respecting the Pope's interference in favour of the abolition of the slave trade, and he has promised me to write to Rome upon both subjects.

I likewise gave him in charge your letter for Cardinal Consalvi.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 204. ]

SIR,

Verona, 12th Nov., 1822.

In consequence of the receipt of your despatch, I have had a conversation with the Prussian and the French ministers on the navigation of the Rhine.

The former complains of the government of the Netherlands, but it is on the ground that that government insists upon vessels coming down the Rhine from Cologne not passing by Rotterdam or any of their seaports, or vessels from sea going up to Cologne. The French minister considers any prohibition of transit as contrary to the Treaty of Vienna. However, both promised to consider the subject, with a view to fix a mode in

which it should be proposed to the Powers assembled here to bring it under the consideration of the King of the Netherlands. It must be observed that the règlement referred to in article 32 of the Annexe has not been agreed to, and till this is fixed the navigation of the Rhine is governed by the law of 1804.

I confess that the examination which I have made of the subject gives me strong doubts that the government of the Netherlands, or any government situated on the Rhine or any other river, has a right, under the Treaty of Vienna, to levy any transit duty on goods passing through their territories by such river. I observe that neither the late Lord Londonderry nor Lord Clancarty entertained such doubts, nor does the Russian minister. But I conclude that the two former meant as long as the règlement is not agreed to. The latter certainly contends that the Powers on the river have a right to transit duties. The levy of transit duties, however, is evidently contrary to the principle of the Treaty; and they are not noticed in the Treaty, and cannot be considered as *douanes*; and very little consideration of the subject will show that on the Rhine, for instance, a very moderate transit duty levied by each Power may amount to a prohibition. We will take, for the instance, Rhine wine from Frankfort coming to England. This article would pay a transit duty to the Grand Duke of Darmstadt, the Grand Duke of Nassau, the King of Prussia, and the King of the Netherlands; and, if it came from the Rhine a little higher up, it might pay to the Grand Duke of Baden and the King of Bavaria, and possibly to France.

I doubt the Powers on the river having the right to agree among themselves to levy a transit duty, even by the new règlement, as all the Powers of Europe are parties to, and interested in the execution of this Treaty, and particularly in the levy of these transit duties.

As the Prussian ministers do not concur in these principles—on the contrary, contend for the right of levying transit duties—I fear that we shall find it very difficult to settle this question, at all events till the règlement shall be agreed to.

I have, &c,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 205. ]

SIR,

Verona, 12th Nov., 1822.

I have but little to report as having occurred on the Spanish question since I wrote you my despatch, No. 20.

Monsieur de Montmorency has been engaged in the preparation of his despatch to the French minister at Madrid, in which form I informed you that it was determined that the several Courts should address the Spanish government. He read me the despatch on Friday last, and, as far as I could understand its meaning through its phrases, it appeared to me to be highly objectionable, and to advert to several topics relating to the origin, cause, and consequences of the Spanish revolution and the internal government of Spain which would greatly irritate the Spanish government. I did not conceal from Monsieur de Montmorency my opinion in a discussion which lasted three hours; and I pointed out to him the consequences which will probably result to France even from the discontinuance of the diplomatical relations between France and Spain, which, however important in its probable consequences, is the least evil which can be expected from the course proposed to be followed.

In discussing this subject, Monsieur de Montmorency informed me that the necessity of conciliating the supporters of the government of the extreme right of the Chambers compelled the government to pursue a course which would not coincide exactly with the views of the subject which I had pressed upon him; and this observation, and his contradiction of the opinion delivered to me by Monsieur de Villèle in the interview which I had had with that minister on the 20th of September, viz. that France had nothing to fear from Spain in the war of revolutionary contagion, convinced me that Monsieur de Montmorency either differs in opinion with Monsieur de Villèle, that he does not know what is the opinion of the French government on these questions, or that he is uncertain of it.

This opinion has been further confirmed by what has passed since.

It appears that before Monsieur de Montmorency had read his despatch to me he had read it to Prince Metternich and to the Emperor of Russia and his minister, and to Count Bernstorff.

The ministers of the four Powers have had two or three meetings, to consider of the terms of the communication to be made to Spain, one of which on Sunday last. At this meeting Monsieur de Montmorency stated that, as soon as he should have decided upon the exact terms of his communication to the French minister in Spain, and the three Continental Powers should have decided upon theirs, he should wish to take the whole to Paris, and consult his government before any further steps should be taken.

It is impossible for me to know all that passed at these meetings, but I understand that Monsieur de Montmorency explained clearly that it was the wish of his government neither to go to war nor to be under the necessity of withdrawing the French minister from Madrid. From this statement, and from the length of time which has elapsed, viz. twelve days, since the ministers determined that they would draw up their communication to be made to Spain, you will see the difficulties into which these Powers have got themselves and France by not opposing themselves stoutly to the desire of the Emperor of Russia to go to war.

Considering what passed between Monsieur de Villèle and me, and the King and me, when I was at Paris, that it is obvious that Monsieur de Montmorency does not take the same view of these questions as Monsieur de Villèle does, and that views of obtaining support from the ultra-Royalists are mixed up with those of Monsieur de Montmorency relating to Spain, I have thought it desirable to let Monsieur de Villèle know, through Sir Charles Stuart, what is passing here; what are the opinions and conduct of the parties; and the inconveniences and dangers which may, in my opinion, be expected from the line which it is probable may be pursued. I enclose you a copy of the letter and the Memorandum which I have sent to Sir Charles Stuart by this occasion.

I have not seen the Emperor of Russia since I wrote to you on the 5th instant, but I understand that he continues of the same way of thinking.

I had a long conversation with Prince Metternich this morning, who admits the truth of every opinion contained in the enclosed Memorandum, which I have frequently repeated to him, and have urged upon him again this morning. But he

declares that if the French government go forward in the proposed course of proceeding he must go with them. The Prussian minister will act as the Austrian will.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 206. ]

SIR,

Verona, 12th Nov., 1822.

I have the honour to inform you that I have taken an opportunity of speaking to General Count de la Tour, the minister of the King of Sardinia, respecting the King's continued interest for the Vaudois, and his Majesty's earnest desire that his Sardinian Majesty would take this interesting portion of his subjects under his special protection.

I begged Count de la Tour to understand that the King's motive for recommending this people to his Sardinian Majesty was his Majesty's anxiety for the reputation of his Sardinian Majesty's government, and his desire that the people of England should feel an interest in its prosperity from knowing that it was tolerant and kind towards their Protestant brethren who were his Sardinian Majesty's subjects. Count de la Tour assured me that every attention would be paid to this recommendation. He was aware that an edict favourable to the Vaudois, which had been signed, had not been published; and he promised that it should be published immediately upon the King's return to Turin, and that everything else should be done which could tend to satisfy the Vaudois of the King his master's paternal affection for them. He was particularly sensible of the delicate manner in which the interest which his Majesty felt for this people had been mentioned to him; and he begged that I would inform Mr. Hill of what had passed, and request Mr. Hill to remind him of the Vaudois in case he should see occasion.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Zachary Macaulay, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

London, 12th Nov., 1822.

I take the liberty of putting a letter for my brother under your Grace's cover. May I request the favour of its being conveyed to him?

I have at present nothing further to communicate on the subject on which I have so frequently had the honour to address your Grace. It is to the result of your Grace's exertions that we are looking with no small solicitude, but with an entire confidence that whatever, under all the untoward circumstances of the case, is by any means to be gained to the cause of humanity, will be obtained by your Grace.

I have the honour to be, with the utmost respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's obliged, obedient, and faithful servant,

ZACHARY MACAULAY.

MEMORANDUM BY LORD LONDONDERRY. No. 5.

Verona, 14th Nov., 1822.

Prince Metternich's conversation with me this morning gives me the impression that he is not entirely so sanguine of the results that may be expected from the councils of the four Powers as he seemed to be some days since.

In the first place, he admitted the positions and *le travail* was inexplicably difficult: next, that to get France exactly to *préciser* her wishes and object, was also far from easy; and thirdly (although there remained no doubt in his mind of the moderation of France and of her positive decision against an offensive warfare, her sentiments being precisely those which the Duke of Wellington stated as M. de Villèle's opinions on his Grace's arrival here), that government did not see very clearly how to proceed.

Beyond these reflections Prince Metternich proceeded in a tone that I think was new to him. He said, Supposing even we should arrive at doing nothing, it appears to me, the Spanish revolution, from the daily accounts we receive, seems to be drawing to its close even by its own acts, and the terror which has been inspired by the meeting of the Congress. In the nation itself there is no popular feeling that rallies round the constitutional government. It is not from Madrid alone you must judge of Spain. From the reports from all sides we know the country is very sick of its revolutionary position, and where a revolution "*ne marche point d'est prête à sa mort.*" The work may possibly be effected therefore without our agency, and merely by the aid of our attitude.

This was rather a new turn for his Highness, and without replying to it I asked him if there was any idea of M. de Montmorency setting out soon for Paris, and being the bearer of his own document, upon which (as I had understood) the others were to be in some measure framed; and if this *Pièce* was first to be approved of by the King's Council at Paris, before the other despatches were to be sent from hence to Madrid.

Prince Metternich answered, that as yet nothing was fixed, nor had these

points been fully considered. He saw no objection himself to this course if M. de Montmorency pressed it, and dreaded the responsibility of acting from himself. It would be satisfactory also to the Allies to be quite sure of the government of France before they actually proceeded in their *démarche*.

I observed, this course would probably delay this meeting (if it should be decided on), longer than was at first conjectured. He answered, No: that he calculated, if M. de Montmorency left this next week, they might have accounts the end of the month from Paris; and the first days of December would bring them to some decisions. In the mean time they had enough to occupy them; and probably by the 15th of December (in his calculation) the Congress would break up; and he reckoned with certainty on passing his *fête de Noël* at Vienna.

Although, from the above observations, Prince Metternich's mind may not be in so high a key of practicability (as it has been) from coming more in contact with the opposing elements which beset him, still I cannot bring myself to believe that the Emperor of Russia will yield to such a proposition, as the delay of any positive *démarche* until M. de Montmorency reaches, and is able to communicate back from Paris; much less can I ever imagine that the Emperor would allow the Congress to break up without some decided expressions, and some positive act on the part of the four Allies towards Spain. Austria and Prussia would possibly embrace an emancipation from any proceeding whatsoever, in proportion as the difficulties become more apparent and the path more thorny. But they are pledged and committed to Russia, and France has taken the initiative. It would be far too sanguine a view of the case then, to suppose for a moment that Russian objects and councils would be completely subdued; and, largely as she has abandoned her ground, to think she would resign every inch of her diplomatic territory.

The more probable reasoning surely is (as I have ventured to premise heretofore), that a result will be arrived at by the four Powers, and that they will not separate before this result has been communicated to Spain.

On the Turkish question Prince Metternich informed me he was to see the Emperor of Russia to-morrow, and that he entertained no doubt he should bring him from the false notion he had in contemplation, of sending an Austrian minister with Lord Strangford back to Constantinople, to superintend more particularly Russian interests in that quarter.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 15th Nov., 1822.

In reply to your Grace's separate despatch of the 5th inst., I enclose to you a copy of one which I this day address to Lord Strangford; and I have only to add that the former one addressed to his Excellency in answer to his No. 151, which was enclosed to your Grace, to be delivered or not at your discretion, is to be withdrawn and returned to me.

Your Grace will consider the instructions of my No 3 (which would have been partially superseded by that instruction to Lord Strangford), as in full force.

The suggestion, however, of Lord Strangford that it would be expedient



to bring the negotiation with the Porte, on behalf of Sardinia, to a conclusion before the interests of any other Power are blended with it, appears to be worthy of attention ; and circumstances wholly independent of Russian and Turkish politics would make it inconvenient, as well as useless, to open such a negotiation at present on behalf of Spain.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,  
my Lord Duke, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
GEORGE CANNING.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Foreign Office, 15th Nov., 1822.

I write only to thank you for your private letter of the 5th, and for the light which it throws upon your public despatch.

I verily believe that, if we escape the Spanish war, it will be owing exclusively to your experience of one ; and that any other negotiator than yourself would have reasoned *politically* and *morally* against it, to no purpose.

I thank you also very much for what you are doing about the South American Colonies. I am just now opening that subject, and Brazil, to the cabinet—who are beginning to assemble in town.

I will send you a paper upon it by the next messenger, to read on your way home.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,  
most sincerely yours,  
GEORGE CANNING.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE, Foreign Office, 15th Nov., 1822.

Your Grace's despatches of the 5th inst. arrived here yesterday, and have been laid before the King.

I have received the King's commands to convey to your Grace his Majesty's entire approbation of the firm, judicious and temperate manner in which your Grace has conducted the conferences, which you report, on the part of his Majesty's government, and the hope which his Majesty entertains that your Grace may reap the best reward of your exertions in this very difficult and intricate negotiation, in the consciousness of having employed to the best advantage the just influence and authority of your country, and of having contributed, in a degree in which no other individual could have had the means of contributing, to reconcile the conflicting interests and prepossessions of the other Powers, and to preserve the peace of the world.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
GEORGE CANNING.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 15th Nov., 1822.

I enclose for your Grace's information a copy of the last despatch (No. 21.) received from his Majesty's minister in Spain.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,  
my Lord Duke, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Sir W. A'Court to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Madrid, 27th Oct., 1822.

With the rejection of one article and the modification of two or three others the ministers have succeeded in carrying through the Cortes the whole of the arrangements detailed in my despatch No. 18; they have also carried two additional articles proposed by the Special Committee, one of which decrees, that all the papers, depositions, &c., throwing any manner of light upon the events which occurred in the month of July last, shall be immediately submitted to the Cortes. This is preparatory to the accusation of the several members of the late administration, and to other stronger measures of the same nature. The Count Santo Manro has already been arrested.

By the passing of the articles above-mentioned, the ministers have now in their hands a power more despotic than ever was exercised by the King in the plenitude of his authority. The arbitrary acts of the King were, in point of fact, an abuse of the powers with which he was invested; whereas, on the contrary, whatever arbitrary acts the existing government may commit, must now be considered as sanctioned and authorised by the united representatives of the nation.

From this moment the constitution must be deemed suspended, if not at an end. A complete despotism is legally established. It is still, however, a matter of doubt whether the government will have sufficient force to exercise the powers, it has thus succeeded in obtaining, through the preponderating influence of a violent faction in the Cortes. Obedience has always been exceedingly lax in this country, and though it may perhaps be enforced in the capital, the general unpopularity of the measures adopted will certainly prevent their due execution in the provinces.

There is also another danger, so obvious that it is impossible to suppose it can have escaped the attention of the authors of these measures, and we must therefore conclude that, knowing the total want of courage and character in those with whom they have to deal, they held it proportionally light; I mean the danger of the King's immediate nomination of other ministers, more devoted to him, who, availing themselves of the powers now legally vested in the government, might very quickly change the whole aspect of affairs.

The ministers were perhaps right in holding such danger cheap; they are more menaced by their friends than foes. If a change take place, under present circumstances, it will be in a Jacobin, not in a Royalist sense. The idea is still very prevalent that having vested these powers in the government, the violent party will not rest satisfied till every official situation be filled by their own leaders; if they succeed in this object, we may look for the adoption of the most violent measures.

Nothing, indeed, can be more gloomy than the situation of the country, nor than its prospects. The ministers, though they endeavour to put a good face upon the matter, are, I am told, in a state of alarm almost amounting to despondency. The only one of them I have had the honour to approach, namely, the minister for Foreign Affairs, certainly talked to me on Saturday in anything but a triumphant strain; he touched but lightly upon the internal state of the country, though it was evidently uppermost in his mind; but he reasoned freely, and for the first time upon the possibility of a foreign invasion. He told me that the Spanish *chargé d'affaires* at Vienna had had an interview with the Duke of Wellington, who had declared to him that England would certainly never be a party to any armed interference in the affairs of Spain; but this declaration did not seem to meet the expectations of M. de San Miguel, who appeared to think that England should also have declared her readiness to throw down the gauntlet against any Power attempting such an interference. I must here be allowed to remark that I found the opinion that she was disposed to do so very generally prevailing upon my arrival at Madrid; and to this, rather than to any sense of justice, I attribute many of the fair professions which have been held out to us.

M. San Miguel further said, whatever might be the result of the deliberations at Verona, that Spain had resources and courage, and the means of resisting any hostile aggression. As far as his own opinion went, a foreign invasion would have a favourable rather than an unfavourable effect; for that then the Spaniards would unite as one man to resist the violation of their rights and territory, and all distinctions of party disappear in the common danger.

To these observations I simply replied that I was not at all aware of what was likely to be determined at Verona, but that I did not believe that any power entertained the idea of an armed interference in the affairs of this country.

I have the honour, &c.,

W. A. COURT.

[ 207. ]

*To Sir Frederick Adam.*

MY DEAR SIR FREDERICK,

Verona, 16th Nov., 1822.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 7th, which I received yesterday morning, and I send back your courier with this. When I wrote to you from Venice, I certainly did not expect that I should have been here so long as I have been. But reckoning upon the duration of one of these Congresses is more like reckoning without one's host than like anything else that I know of. It is very satisfactory, however, to know at this moment what the state of the war is in Greece, and in what state it is likely to be till spring.

I don't think it likely that the operations of the Congress will make much alteration in the situation of the Greeks, unless it be through the Turks.

All that will be done here will be to endeavour to settle the

questions between Russians and Turks, and in these the Greeks will come in only as the objects of an amnesty, and as permitted to exercise the rites of their religion unmolested, to rebuild their churches, and to be free from persecution on account of religion, which are, in fact, the terms of the ancient treaties between Russians and Turks. Further than this I don't think anybody is disposed to go.

Strange to say, I have nothing new to tell you.

My last accounts from England were of the 1st.

Remember me kindly to Ponsonby.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 208. ]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Verona, 18th Nov., 1822.

It is certainly true that I knew nothing of Lord Strangford's despatches to you of the 5th of October till he showed them to me after his arrival here. I had spoken to him regarding the commercial question, and had stated to him my opinion that it was the most important of all to the Russians, and that I thought we had the power of settling it, by means of good offices, in favour of several States whose government should require them from us. He made some objections, principally on the ground of the existing prosperity of the British trade to the Black Sea, which he seemed to think would decrease as the number of Powers should increase whose vessels should receive from the Porte the privilege of passing the Bosphorus. But as I never considered that the Emperor of Russia was disposed to assert the right that his flag should cover Greek vessels, particularly at this moment, or that the Porte should concede at this moment such an abuse of the privilege of passing granted to the Russian flag, that part of the subject, although adverted to, was never discussed as a demand made by the Russian government to be supported and urged by Great Britain. I certainly never understood that Russia intended to press that demand, nor did Prince Metternich, nor did Monsieur Lebzeltern; notwithstanding that, when I told Lord Strangford here that he had quite mistaken the meaning of the Russian demand, he answered that he understood it as Monsieur Lebzeltern did. I regret

exceedingly that he did not show me that despatch, or at least tell me that he intended to write in the view of the question stated in his despatch. I should certainly have endeavoured to convince him that his view was a false one, and, at all events, I should have written to you upon it, and probably should have prevented you from receiving the impression upon the subject which such a despatch as Lord Strangford's was calculated to make, and we should have avoided some inconveniences.

In respect to the reward of Lord Strangford, I have to mention that I believe the Emperor, who was at one time disposed to withdraw from his Lordship's hands the management of the negotiation at Constantinople and to prevail upon Prince Metternich to send there an Austrian Minister to conclude it, is now disposed to leave it entirely to Lord Strangford. I rejoice at this, because I think he is more likely to settle the question than anybody else; and I recommend to you and Lord Liverpool to delay giving him his reward till the peace of that part of the world shall be secured. I mention this, because Lord Strangford has been rather indiscreet in his language here; and I intended, if an Austrian minister had been sent to Constantinople, and still intend when Lord Strangford goes, to hint to him that he must at Constantinople represent the British government, and do everything in his power to forward their views to preserve the peace of the world, and not Lord Strangford and his grievances against the Emperor of Russia.

There is no doubt that Lord Strangford made a *false movement* in coming to Vienna at all, and he was particularly advised by Prince Metternich not to come if he should not be the bearer of good news. Instead of good news he was at most the bearer of the précis of his conference of the 27th of August, which the Russians believe to be a romance from the beginning to the end; and Lord Strangford was very much surprised and disappointed at finding himself received by the Russian note to me of the 26th of September, instead of with congratulations and honour. This feeling has operated upon his mind and conduct ever since, and, I think, in some degree occasioned the despatch to you of the 5th of October. But I think he will now be satisfied, and will return to his post disposed to do his best, and he certainly has influence at Constantinople and

talents to enable him to do a great deal. After having effected the pacification I think he will be fairly entitled to a reward, and I shall be very sorry if his conduct towards me regarding these despatches should either deprive him of it or delay it. I mention the despatches, because I am not certain that I have not at least as much reason to complain of that regarding his own case as I have of that regarding the commerce of the Black Sea. I showed him my note and discussed with him every sentence of it, and he was quite satisfied that I had taken up the true and best ground for him, considering what the Russian note contained, what the Emperor had said to me, and what appeared on the *précis* of his conference with the Ottoman ministers. Yet you will observe that in his despatch to you he not only takes up different ground, but he goes so far as absolutely to contradict my note!

However, I beg to be put entirely out of the question, and I beg that when Lord Strangford shall have performed this great service he may receive his reward for it.

I really believe the Emperor of Russia is anxious to settle this Turkish question if he can. I believe I told you that it was my opinion that if he chose it, and we did not interfere with a fleet in the Black Sea to prevent him, the Emperor had it in his power to make the conquest of Constantinople in one campaign. It is impossible that he should not see the subject in this light, and it is difficult to account for his forbearance without a knowledge of his character and habits. The Emperor would have no objection to a war, but it must be on a stage on which he would have the eyes of all Europe upon him and the applause of the world. He thinks the Turks an enemy unworthy of him. He knows he would lose a great proportion of his fine army in the operation against Constantinople; that the war would be one of peculiar hardship and difficulty rather than of manœuvre and gallantry to those who should carry it on; that many would fall victims to the climate; and that, even supposing the conquest to be complete, the attention of the Russian government would necessarily for many years be directed to the affairs of Asia and the Asiatic frontier rather than to those of Europe, which the Emperor prefers. I think, then, that he wishes to settle his differences with the Turks, if he can get out of them with anything like credit in the eyes of his own people.

This he will not do, if some step is not taken to set up the commerce of his territories on the Black Sea.

In all our correspondence upon this subject you appear to consider that we are involved in the Emperor's quarrel with the Turks as far as his treaties go. If you will look at Lord Londonderry's note to Count Lieven of the 29th of April, you will see that, even for the four points of the ultimatum, we are bound to go no further than a protest if the Turks should not comply. The demands which go beyond treaty, and for which it must be observed that the Turks have by their own act given occasion since the date of Lord Londonderry's note, can be only matter of good offices, and that, in fact, not between the Russian government and the Ottoman Porte, but between the latter and those States respectively which have not yet obtained the privilege of passing the Bosphorus. The question is, whether it is of more importance to us to manifest in this additional instance our desire to preserve the peace of the world by consenting to give our good offices to obtain this privilege for Naples, Denmark, Spain, and Portugal, in conjunction with other Powers, or to manifest our desire to retain for our subjects what we can of this commerce by refusing to join our good offices to those of other Powers.

I entertain no doubt upon this question; and as it is certain that France, Austria, and Russia will grant their good offices, we may consider it almost certain that the Porte will grant the privileges of passage required, and that we shall gain nothing by our refusal to co-operate in good offices to obtain this concession.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S. Upon the subject of Lord Strangford I must remind you that I quitted Vienna on the 5th of October, at about one o'clock, and certainly might have seen the draft, at least, of Lord Strangford's despatches, or have received some intimation of his intention to write them.

*Sir H. Hamilton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Stuttgart, 18th Nov., 1822.

I have the honour to transmit to your Grace an extract from my despatch of this date to Mr. Canning, communicating the decease of the young Prince of Baden, and some other intelligence from the Grand Duchy.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient, and most humble servant,

HAMILTON HAMILTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

I.

EXTRACT of a COMMUNICATION from Carlsruhe, dated 13th November.

It becomes more and more uncertain every sitting whether the present Assembly of the States will meet the wishes entertained by M. de Berslett, and accomplish their labours in concord and reciprocal confidence. The government appears decided to uphold with a vigorous hand the rights and prerogatives to which it considers itself as possessing an indefeasible title, and to oppose a dike to that anti-monarchical and innovating system to which it accuses the States of having a gradually increasing tendency.

The States, on their side, are astonished at a language of firmness and energy to which they have not been accustomed, but seem little disposed to forego the pleasing habitude of reforming and ruling the country conformably to their fancy. The new law of conscription affords the parties the widest field for dispute; the government insisting on divers articles as being exclusively within the province of the executive power; and the second chamber, as coming within the limits of the legislative. These altercations will probably be resumed in the ensuing sittings.

The government has made a most erroneous estimate if it conceives that by granting to the Deputy Liebenstein the rank of Chambellan, Grand Ducal Commissary, and member of the Deliberative Section of the Ministry of State, it has gained him over, and may rely in future on the aid of his eloquence. These different dignities will in no wise prove an impediment to his raising his voice assiduously for the purpose of opposing the mandates of the sovereign.

II.

EXTRACT from a DESPATCH to MR. CANNING of 18th November.

My despatch No. 28 announced the birth of a prince to the Grand Ducal family of Baden. The unpleasant duty now devolves on me of communicating his sudden decease on the morning of the 16th from inflammation of the bowels. This affliction will probably be felt more profoundly throughout the Grand Duchy from the circumstance of his being an only son,—from the very delicate health of the Margravine, which almost forbids the hope of another child,—and from a recollection of the repeated privations of the same kind sustained by the deceased Grand Duke.

The other intelligence from that country which I have the honour to transmit herewith, is part of an official communication from Carlsruhe. It appears to indicate a more stormy session of the States, and advantages to the polity of the Grand Duchy less immediate, although, it is hoped, not less certain than were anticipated from the ministerial changes reported in the despatch above mentioned.



[ 209. ]

*To Sir Charles Stuart.*

MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,

Verona, 19th Nov., 1822.

Affairs here are nearly in the same state as when I wrote to you, excepting that the communications of Austria, Prussia, and France to their ministers at Madrid are prepared, and a *procès-verbal* with the *casus fœderis* agreed to. I have seen all these documents. In a view to the case of France I disapprove highly of the Austrian and Prussian papers, I say nothing of that of France. In respect to the *procès-verbal* I consider it as nothing more nor less than a treaty.

Since I wrote to you last week I think the Austrian minister has expressed more strongly than he did before his sense of the necessity that the three great Military Powers should pronounce against the Spanish revolution, and should withdraw their ministers.

There is one more subject I have to mention to you, and that is Portugal. I hear that M. de Villèle has a report that our government has lately given a guarantee to Portugal, which Portugal had not before. You may assure M. de Villèle that this is not true, as I shall show M. de Montmorency in conference to-morrow morning.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 210. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Verona, 19th Nov., 1822.

In answer to your private letter (No. 15), I can assure you that you will find that I have laid as broadly as possible the grounds of any proceeding the government may think proper to adopt in respect to the Spanish colonies. I don't anticipate any objections, either to what we have done or may propose to do. The only ministers likely to object are the Russian and French, and neither have said a word from which I could suppose that they intended to make any objection. You may rely upon it that nobody here either knows or cares anything about these questions of colonies or colonial policy, excepting as far as they may find in our conduct in them some ground for finding

fault with us, and on which they may detract from our high character, and depreciate us in the opinion of the world.

In respect to Spain, the question for us is one of peace or war if we carry it to extremities. Spain may get out of it by denying that the commanding officers at Puerto Cabello or in Cuba were authorised ; and considering the present state of Spain, we should then have to take some proceedings ourselves against them and their privateers, which would effectually protect the innocent commerce of our merchants. Can we now move in this question in Spain, in the view of bringing it to extremities, without being open to the accusation of doing it either in concert with the Powers here, or to that of taking advantage of what is doing here to forward our own particular views? I dislike the Spanish mutiny, revolution, and everything that has been the consequence as much as anybody, but I dislike still more the conduct of the French government, and I should be sorry that we were supposed to be parties to it. We shall not avoid this imputation if we now proceed to extremities with Spain, and the Spaniards should, with their usual wisdom and foresight, leave us to take our own measures, and their cause to chance. If we only blockade their ports, and particularly Cadiz, when the French shall attack them by land, we may rely upon it that the Spanish revolution will not stand longer than that of Naples did ; and we shall have Spain occupied by a French army. I don't think our colonial case, or the cases of our merchants, would be mended by the Spanish government being in the keeping of France.

In the course of a few days the government will have the whole case before them, and the colonial question in their hands ; they will then be able to decide what it is fit they should do respecting the further recognition *de facto* of any of the colonies, and whether they will take any and what steps in Spain in regard to the privateering carried on by the governors of Puerto Cabello, Cuba, or Porto Rico, or in regard to the actual claims of our merchants upon Spain ; and if not, what steps they will take to check and punish the system of piratical privateering carried on by those governors.

In general, I should say that the American example is one to be avoided rather than followed ; and I am not certain that I would not prefer to forbid them to take Cuba than to follow their example by taking Puerto Rico. But at this distance from home,

and without information of the means existing to do anything, of the opinion of others, or of the public, it is impossible to give a decisive opinion what ought to be done in case the American government should think this a favourable opportunity to pillage Spain, and should act accordingly.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 211. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 19th Nov., 1822.

I observe in the newspapers a report of a conversation which I am supposed to have had at Verona with Monsieur Camereiro, the Spanish chargé d'affaires at Vienna; and as there is here in currency a fresh version of this conversation as circulated at Madrid, and it has been talked of in the Corps Diplomatique here, and it may become the subject of inquiry in England, I think it best to state to you what passed in that conversation, of which I have a perfect recollection.

It took place a day or two after my arrival at Vienna: Monsieur de Camereiro has never been at Verona.

I have known him for some time, and particularly when he was secretary to the Spanish Embassy at Paris, and he called upon me. The conversation immediately turned upon the affairs of Spain, and he said that he was anxious that his country should connect itself cordially with, and follow the example of Great Britain, with some compliments, &c., &c.

To this I answered, that if that was their object, they must refrain from endeavouring to excite revolutionary disturbances in France, and must not interfere in the affairs of other countries. I particularly asked why they should have interfered with the affairs of Naples, and for what reason have laid out their money to excite the mutiny in the Piedmontese army. These were the acts which attracted the notice of the Continental Powers to Spain. They did not wish to interfere with Spain, if Spain would confine herself to her own concerns; and that if she did so, she might really set the world at defiance. This was the whole that passed on my part, almost in the very words I used; and excepting complaints of the conduct of the French government

in encouraging the rebels in Spain, and of the Allied ministers in giving encouragement to a certain Don Carlos d'Espague, who was at Vienna, and supposed to be employed by the King and by the rebels, it is all that passed on his.

But the curiosity and interest excited here by this story, and by another arrived lately from Portugal, in regard to the revival, as it is called, of the guarantee by Great Britain, show how ready my colleagues are to catch at any story which can be construed to our disadvantage. I understand that I am to be called upon in the conference of to-morrow to explain how we stand in respect to this Portuguese guarantee.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 212. ]

SIR,

Verona, 19th Nov., 1822.

I have laid before the Emperor of Russia the Minute which I intend to give in to the conference respecting the abolition of the slave trade, and I have the pleasure to inform you that his Imperial Majesty has sent me word that his ministers will support all the objects which I recommend in that Minute, with the exception of the declaration that the Sovereigns will not receive in their dominions colonial produce from those countries which have not abolished, or shall continue to carry on the slave trade. His Imperial Majesty wishes that this declaration should be confined to those countries which have not abolished the trade by law, and that Portugal and the Brazils should have notice and time. These objects are just the renewal of the declaration of the Congress of Vienna against the slave trade.

2ndly. A recommendation from the Sovereigns to the Maritime Powers to agree among themselves to make trading in slaves piracy.

3rdly. A declaration that the Sovereigns withdraw the protection of their flags from persons not subjects of their crowns respectively, who shall use it for the purpose of covering a trade in slaves.

4thly. A declaration there described regarding the recep-

tion of colonial produce from those countries which have not abolished the slave trade.

5thly. A recommendation to France to establish a registry in the French colonies.

6thly. A recommendation to France to grant the ships and equipments to captains of vessels engaged in the slave trade, and head money for slaves.

These are the points recommended in my note which I contend for, only that the French ministers have begged me to make some slight alterations in it before I shall present it to the conference. But I will transmit it, in the shape in which it will appear, by a messenger, who I propose to send from hence on Friday.

The first will be a general declaration, signed probably by the ministers of the five Powers.

The others will be declarations signed by the three Continental Powers.

I have had no occasion to touch upon the question of the English Brazil trade.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MINUTE UPON THE SLAVE TRADE, BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Les ministres qui ont eu l'honneur de représenter sa Majesté Britannique aux conférences de Vienne, de Paris, et d'Aix-la-Chapelle, ont, à chacune de ces époques, appelé l'attention des Souverains et de leurs ministres sur l'état de la traite des nègres ; mais jamais il n'a été plus important que leurs vues se fixassent sur cette grave question que dans le moment actuel.

Dans l'année 1815, à la suite d'une délibération solennelle, à laquelle les ministres des huit puissances qui avaient signé le traité de Paris du mois de Mai, 1814, prirent part, ces ministres exprimèrent unanimement le désir de voir mettre un terme à *un fléau qui avait si longtemps désolé l'Afrique, dégradé l'Europe, et affligé l'humanité.*

De ces huit puissances sept ont passé des lois dans le but d'empêcher entièrement leurs sujets respectifs de s'engager dans

ce trafic. Une seule (le Portugal) le permet encore dans ses propres possessions et factoreries au midi de l'équateur, mais l'a défendu à ses sujets au nord de l'équateur. Toutes les puissances maritimes de l'Europe, ainsi que les Etats-Unis de l'Amérique et les gouvernemens de l'Amérique Méridionale, à l'exception du Brésil, ont également porté des lois pour le défendre à leurs sujets et eitoyens.

Cependant j'ai les moyens de prouver que depuis l'année 1815, ce trafic a été exercé et s'exerce aujourd'hui dans une plus grande étendue qu'à aucune époque antérieure; que pendant sept mois de l'année 1821, pas moins de trente-huit mille êtres humains ont été enlevés des côtes de l'Afrique, et jetés dans un esclavage sans remède et sans retour; que depuis le mois de Juillet, 1820, jusqu'au mois d'Octobre, 1821, pas moins de trois cents cinquante-deux vaisseaux sont entrés dans les rivières et ports de l'Afrique au nord de l'équateur, pour acheter des esclaves, et que chacun de ces vaisseaux était calculé à pouvoir transporter entre cinq et six cents esclaves.

Certes, il est tems que les Souverains dont les ministres assistent à cette conférence renouvellent l'expression de leur horreur pour ce commerce, et prennent quelques mesures pour faire cesser un scandale tellement révoltant, qu'il suffit d'en indiquer les résultats, sans entrer dans ces détails dégoûtans, parfaitement connus à tous ceux à qui cette pièce est adressée.

Il est clair que ce crime se commet en contravention des lois de tous les pays de l'Europe et de l'Amérique, un seul excepté, et que pour le prévenir il faut quelque chose de plus que l'opération ordinaire des lois.

Le Portugal est le seul état dans le monde qui permette encore légalement la traite, et cela seulement dans ses propres possessions et comptoirs au midi de l'équateur; et comme des esclaves importés dans des batimens de traite ne peuvent être nulle part légalement vendus, excepté dans les colonies Portugaises (presque toutes situées au midi de l'équateur) il s'ensuit que la totalité de ce commerce au nord de l'équateur, soit pour l'achat, soit pour le transport des esclaves, est prohibé par les lois de tous les pays Européens, et, par conséquent, commerce de contrebande.

Toutefois ce commerce ne se fait point avec les précautions habituelles d'un commerce de contrebande. Il se fait généralement sous la protection du pavillon de France. La raison en

est évidente ; la France est la seule des grandes puissances maritimes de l'Europe, qui n'ait pas pris part aux traités conclus avec sa Majesté Britannique dans l'objet de conférer à certains bâtimens de chacune des parties contractantes un droit limité de visite et de confiscation sur les vaisseaux engagés dans cet horrible trafic ; et ceux qui sont employés à ce service respectent trop le pavillon de France pour oser, si ce n'est dans des cas de suspicion flagrante, visiter les vaisseaux qui naviguent sous sa protection.

On a été occupé en dernier lieu à rendre plus efficaces les traités avec l'Espagne, les Pays-Bas, et le Portugal ; mais aucun perfectionnement des mesures dont ces traités devaient assurer l'exécution, quelque bien calculé qu'il serait sous des circonstances différentes, ne saurait remplir son objet aussi longtemps que des contrebandiers d'hommes pourront continuer leur métier, en se servant d'un pavillon étranger, et surtout d'un pavillon aussi respectable que celui de France.

La conséquence de cet état de choses est que ce commerce de contrebande se pratique maintenant dans des formes surpassant en horreur tout ce que l'on a connu auparavant. Il serait inutile de reproduire ici tous les affreux détails portés à la connoissance du public dans les différentes discussions qui ont eu lieu à ce sujet en France et en Angleterre. Mais il est impossible de nier que les mesures par lesquelles on a cru prévenir le mal n'ont pas seulement manqué leur but, mais qu'elles ont augmenté la somme des souffrances humaines, et la destruction des individus dans le transport des esclaves de la côte d'Afrique aux colonies, dans une proportion fort excédante l'augmentation du nombre des victimes. La crainte et la nécessité de cacher leur cargaison ont suggéré aux entrepreneurs des expédiens d'autant plus cruels que ces hommes sans conscience et sans remords ne se sont jamais rappelés que cette cargaison était composée d'êtres sensibles.

Le nombre des malheureux accumulés dans ces expéditions est loin d'être proportionné à la capacité du vaisseau ; et la mortalité surpasse par conséquent tout ce que l'on a vu à cet égard depuis que l'attention des hommes a commencé à se diriger sur ce trafic.

On peut avancer sans hésitation qu'il eût été plus satisfaisant pour l'humanité, et qu'un nombre bien moins grand d'êtres humains eût été livré à la mort par des cruelles souffrances, si le

commerce des nègres n'avait jamais été aboli par les lois d'aucun pays. Dans ce cas des Souverains et des législateurs Chrétiens auraient regardé comme un devoir d'exiger de ceux de leurs sujets qui se vouaient à un trafic de créatures humaines, d'avoir soin au moins de celles qu'ils conduisaient à une captivité perpétuelle—d'avoir soin que l'espace dans lequel ils les renfermaient, soit dans leurs établissemens sur la côte d'Afrique avant de les embarquer, soit dans leurs bâtimens de transport, fût assez grand pour leur laisser la faculté de respirer, et quelque chance de vivre ; que l'eau et la nourriture qu'ils leur fournissaient fussent, si non de qualité à conserver leur santé, au moins en quantité suffisant pour les faire exister ; que des mesures fussent adoptées pour leur sauver la vie, et les rendre à la santé lorsqu'ils partagent le sort commun des hommes d'être attaqués par des maladies ; enfin, que l'affreuse nécessité de détruire des hommes ne fût pas devenue la suite de celle de cacher un trafic proscrit par les lois.

L'e trafic de contrebande s'effectue fréquemment, bien trop fréquemment, dans des navires armés en France, commandés et équipés par des Français. C'est un fait connu que quoique le profit d'un pareil voyage, qui peut se répéter deux ou même trois fois dans une année, monte à trois cents pour cent, les risques en sont si foibles, les chances qui exposent le propriétaire à la punition déterminée par les lois de France si rares, et les peines elles-mêmes infligées après la preuve du délit si peu en proportion avec ce délit, que le prix d'assurance pour chaque course ne s'élève pas au delà de quinze pour cent.

Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne ayant par sa déclaration du \*

1815, librement aboli la traite des nègres, s'étant ensuite engagée par son traité avec les quatre Cours alors alliées à faire cesser ce trafic, ayant depuis invité le corps législatif à porter des lois pour mettre en exécution sa déclaration royale et les stipulations de son traité, ayant en outre fait croiser une escadre sur les côtes d'Afrique pour empêcher l'abus que l'on pouvait se permettre de son pavillon en faveur du commerce de contrebande en esclaves ; il est impossible de supposer que S.M. Très-Chrétienne ne désire pas sincèrement de concourir à l'abolition de ce commerce. Mais le public de France n'attache pas un vif intérêt à cette question, et les calamités réelles qu'in-

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flige à un continent tout entier la poursuite de la traite des nègres, principalement par l'emploi frauduleux du pavillon Français, ainsi que les cruautés qui se commettent à l'abri de cette fraude, sont généralement inconnues dans ce pays. On s'imagine, et certainement bien à tort, que l'Angleterre a eu dans l'abolition de la traite des vues intéressées, et absolument différentes de celles de l'humanité ; et le respectable ministre de France, aujourd'hui défunt, nous informa à Aix-la-Chapelle que l'on nourrissait en France l'opinion erronée que l'abolition de la traite avait été imposée à ce royaume comme condition de la paix.

Ce sont là les circonstances fâcheuses auxquelles on doit attribuer le manque de succès de toutes les mesures qui ont été jusqu'ici adoptées en France, et la répugnance du gouvernement Français à proposer à la législature de nouvelles et plus fortes mesures, malgré ses dispositions favorables pour faire cesser ce mal, et malgré son vœu de fermer une source perpétuelle de discussion avec le gouvernement de S. M. Britannique.

L'Angleterre doit nécessairement sentir qu'en dépit de la déclaration du Congrès de Vienne en 1815, elle soutient seule cette question en Europe, que c'est sur elle que pèse le fardeau de l'exécution de tous les traités conclus avec les puissances maritimes pour l'extinction du commerce d'esclaves, et que c'est également sur elle que tombe l'odieux des sollicitations adressées aux puissances pour les engager à l'exécution des traités qu'elles ont contractés et des lois qu'elles ont portées contre l'exercice de ce commerce par leurs sujets. Ces sollicitations importunes sont encore faussement attribuées à des motifs d'intérêt mercantile, et à un prétendu désir de pousser les colonies des autres puissances vers le même état de détresse dans lequel on croit placées celles de la Grande Bretagne.

Dans ces circonstances je dois énoncer le vœu que MM. les ministres, auxquels s'adresse ce Mémoire, prennent en considération s'il ne serait pas à propos d'adopter quelque mesure propre à manifester au monde que les sentimens de leurs Souverains n'ont pas changés, qu'ils regardent encore la traite des nègres *comme un fléau qui a trop longtems désolé l'Afrique, dégradé l'Europe, et affligé l'humanité*, et qu'ils persévèrent dans leurs efforts pour faire entièrement cesser ce fléau.

Il est évident que le trafic d'esclaves qui a maintenant lieu au nord de la ligne se fait uniquement par contrebande, et en

grande partie sous le pavillon Français, et par l'emploi frauduleux de ce pavillon, nonobstant les mesures adoptées par S.M. Très-Chrétienne pour l'exécution de son traité avec ses Alliés, et des lois de son royaume.

Il n'y a pas d'article ou stipulation dans les traités conclus avec S.M. le Roi de France, ayant rapport aux intérêts politiques ou pécuniaires d'une puissance Européenne, ou même à ceux d'un individu, qui n'ait été strictement accomplie.

Sera-t-il donc dit que les puissances de l'Europe ne sont indifférentes que sur l'entière exécution des stipulations qui embrassent les intérêts de l'humanité? Et que plutôt que de presser S.M. Très-Chrétienne d'adopter les mesures nécessaires pour supprimer efficacement le commerce d'esclaves, elles verront se prolonger un scandale qui déshonore la nature humaine?

L'article additionnel du Traité de Paris du 20<sup>me</sup> Novembre, 1815, ne précise aucune mesure, ni suite de mesures, à adopter pour l'accomplissement du but qu'il désigne; mais il dit que "les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à réunir de nouveau leurs efforts pour en assurer le succès final, et à concerter *les mesures les plus efficaces* pour obtenir l'abolition entière et définitive d'un commerce aussi odieux et aussi hautement réprouvé par les lois de la religion et de la nature."

Il semble que les mesures suivantes, adoptées ou recommandées par les Puissances Alliées, serviraient à restreindre, si non à faire entièrement cesser, la traite de nègres:—

Une déclaration de la part des Puissances, dont les ministres sont maintenant assemblés à Vérone, laquelle, en renouvelant la proscription de ce commerce, prononcée par le Congrès de Vienne, exhorterait les Puissances Maritimes qui l'ont aboli à se concerter entr'elles sur les mesures à prendre pour le déclarer et le traiter comme piraterie; de l'ensemble de ces engagements séparés pris par les différens états les uns envers les autres, il serait formé une loi générale, qui ferait partie du droit public du monde civilisé.

Une déclaration de la part des Puissances, dont les ministres sont réunis ici, portant qu'elles retirent l'usage et la protection de leurs pavillons aux individus nés hors de leurs territoires respectifs qui se serviront de ces pavillons pour couvrir un commerce en esclaves.

Une déclaration à faire par les Souverains Alliés qu'ils dé-

fendront l'entrée de leurs états aux produits des colonies appartenant à des Puissances qui n'auraient pas aboli la traite des nègres. Cette mesure sera applicable au Portugal et au Brésil, sa colonie révoltée ; les seuls pays dans lesquels les loix permettent encore de faire la traite. Ce n'est toutefois qu'au sud de l'équateur qu'ils ont ce droit ; mais il est de notoriété publique que les gouverneurs et les employés dans les établissemens Portugais situés sur les côtes d'Afrique au nord de la ligne encouragent la traite, et assistent de tous les moyens en leur pouvoir les marchands d'esclaves qui, en dépit des traités et des loix, fréquentent cette partie de la côte. Ces marchands, quand ils se voient en danger d'être surpris, ayant des esclaves à bord, arborent le pavillon de France, et échappent ainsi au châtement que leur infligerait la loi.

Supplier, conjointement avec S.M. Britannique, S.M. le Roi de France, d'adopter quelques-unes des mesures dont l'utilité a été éprouvée dans d'autres pays pour détruire la traite des nègres.

Les mesures qui pourraient être prises par le gouvernement de S.M.T.C., indépendamment du concours des branches législatives, seraient :—

1°.—L'enrégistrement exact de tous les esclaves se trouvant dans les colonies : moyennant cette mesure on pourrait, en tout tems, contrôler, si dans les différentes plantations il a été acheté des esclaves nouvellement importés. Cette ordonnance non-seulement mettrait des entraves à l'importation des esclaves, mais elle servirait encore à rendre plus manifeste la détermination du Roi de faire cesser la traite ; elle engagerait enfin les gouverneurs et employés dans les colonies à veiller exactement à l'exécution des lois à ce sujet.

Il faut observer que cette mesure fut suggérée au Congrès d'Aix-la-Chapelle par le ministre de France d'alors ; mais qu'elle n'a pas encore fait l'objet d'une ordonnance royale.

2°.—Que S.M.T.C. voulût encourager la capture des bâtimens qui, sous le pavillon de France, font un commerce frauduleux en esclaves, en accordant au captureur la propriété du vaisseau et de la cargaison, et une indemnité pour le rachat des nègres trouvés à bord.

Cette mesure prouverait aux hommes chargés du soin d'empêcher la traite que S.M.T.C. est toujours déterminée à la faire cesser, et elle animerait ainsi leur zèle à bien s'acquitter des devoirs qui leur sont imposés.

Il est hors de doute que des mesures pareilles, en attirant de nouveau sur cette question l'attention générale de la France, réveilleraient en sa faveur l'esprit public, et que l'on pourrait alors s'occuper avec avantage et avec quelque espoir de succès, d'une troisième mesure ; savoir, que le gouvernement de S.M.T.C. proposât à la législature d'améliorer la loi, et de renforcer sa sévérité à l'égard des personnes prévenues de faire la traite des nègres.

L'amélioration consisterait en premier lieu à ne pas borner la preuve de la participation à la traite, au fait d'avoir des esclaves à bord du vaisseau, mais d'admettre également comme telle que le vaisseau renferme certains instrumens de coercition, et soit équipé et armé de la manière nécessaire, et en même tems exclusivement propre à un bâtiment employé à ce genre de trafic.

Les peines portées par la loi pourraient être converties en *peines infamantes*, ce qui, joint à la perte du vaisseau et de la cargaison, et à une surveillance plus active, donnerait lieu à espérer que la traite serait entièrement supprimée en France.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 213. ]

SIR,

Verona, 19th Nov., 1822.

Affairs in relation to Spain are nearly in the state in which they were when I wrote to you last week ; and so nearly in that in which they were when I wrote to you on the 29th of October, that his Majesty's commands, conveyed in your despatch of the 8th inst., in answer to mine, will apply nearly exactly to the state in which they are now.

The Emperor of Russia called upon me on Thursday, and I had a discussion with him upon the whole subject, which lasted two hours and a half. He avoided, or, more properly, evaded the military part of the question ; and it appeared to me that his Majesty went away as much impressed as ever with the necessity of interference in Spain, and the determination to press the interference upon France.

When I pressed him upon the probable result of a successful military operation against the Spanish revolution—viz., an occupation of Spain by French troops—he answered that it ought not to be by French troops ; and that, if such an occu-

pation were necessary at all, it ought to be by an army composed of troops belonging to all the Allies. This was the only new idea that occurred in the conversation.

The despatches of the several Powers to their ministers at Madrid have been prepared, excepting that of Russia, which was not prepared this day, and I enclose you copies of those of France and Prussia. Prince Metternich has likewise read to me that of Austria, which is more moderate in terms than that of Prussia, but objectionable in principle. That of France is liable to alteration upon Monsieur de Montmorency's arrival at Paris; and he has assured me that as soon as it is fixed he will send a copy to England.

I mark in the enclosed copy of this proposed despatch parts which may be construed as referring to Great Britain as well as to the Allies; which I intend to suggest to Monsieur de Montmorency to alter. If he does not do so I propose to tell him that we shall be under the necessity of contradicting those parts.

We are to have a conference to-morrow upon these papers; and, I will send off a messenger on Friday, with the account of what may have passed, and the final arrangement.

They have agreed to a *procès-verbal*, which they contend is neither a treaty nor a protocol, but it is, in fact, both, defining the *casus fœderis*.

They are, attack of France by Spain; deposition, trial, or death of the King; the same for any of the royal family; provocation to attack by France, by the excitation to insurrection or revolution of the subjects of France, by persons in the government of Spain. Unforeseen cases are provided for by referring them to a conference of the Allied ministers at Paris.

This *procès-verbal*, against which I have urged all the arguments I before urged against any treaty, I have told them renders it impossible for us to take any part that can be useful in the discussions between France and Spain; and that all that we can do is to wish that France may get through her difficulties with honour, and endeavour to calm animosities.

In respect to the instructions to the ministers, I propose in the conference of to-morrow to endeavour to show how the ministers have departed from the intention on which they started three weeks ago; which was at that time to allay the irritation existing in Spain against France, and to prevent a possible rupture.

The object of the Continental Powers at present appears to be to try which of them can make the strongest declaration against the order of things in Spain, without adverting to the consequences to France.

I shall then beg them to declare whether they propose to present their notes and to withdraw their ministers from Madrid, whether France does so or not; or if the note of France is materially altered. I shall likewise beg them now to consider the result of these measures, in case they should lead to war and the destruction of the Spanish revolution, in the following views, viz., Is there to be a military occupation of Spain, and by what troops? Is France to be paid her expenses, and in what manner?

Prince Metternich has within these two days declared to me that his object, and that of the great Military Powers is, and must be, to declare against the Spanish revolution, and withdraw their ministers from Spain.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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COPY OF MEMORANDUM TO THE CONGRESS, SENT TO THE [ 214.]  
RIGHT HON. GEORGE CANNING.

Verona, 20th Nov., 1822.

When the ministers of the five Courts last assembled on the 1st inst., the object of their common solicitude was to allay the irritation existing in Spain against France, and to prevent a possible rupture between the two Powers.

Although his Majesty's government did not consider themselves sufficiently informed either of what had already taken place between France and Spain, or of what might occasion a rupture, to be able to answer in the affirmative to the questions submitted to the conference by his Eminence the Minister of France, yet knowing the anxiety of the King, my master, for the honour of H. M. C. M., and for the preservation of the peace of the world, I was willing to enter into the consideration of the measures proposed with a view to attain our common object.

It was settled that the notes prepared according to the proposition of his Highness the Austrian minister, and to be

presented to the Spanish government on that occasion, should be communicated to me, in order that I might see whether, consistently with the view which the King's government had invariably taken of the affairs of Spain, and with the principles which had governed his Majesty's conduct in relation to the internal concerns of other countries, his Majesty's government could take any part which might forward the common purpose of preserving the general tranquillity.

The ministers of the Allied Courts have thought proper to make known to Spain the sentiments of their respective Sovereigns by despatches addressed to the ministers of their several Courts residing at Madrid, instead of by official notes, as a mode of communication less formal, and affording greater facility of discussion. These despatches, it appears, are to be communicated *in extenso* to the Spanish government.

The existing state of affairs in Spain, the origin, circumstances, and consequences of the Spanish revolution, and the conduct of those who have been at the head of the Spanish government may have endangered the safety of other countries, and may have excited the uneasiness of the governments whose ministers I am now addressing; and these governments may think it necessary to address the Spanish government upon the topics referred to in these despatches. These sentiments and opinions have certainly been entertained by the cabinets of Austria, Prussia, and Russia for a considerable period of time; and his Majesty's government duly appreciates the forbearance and deference for the opinions of other cabinets which has dictated the delay to make these communications to the present moment. But having been delayed till now, I would request these ministers to consider whether this is the exact moment at which such remonstrances ought to be made, whether they are calculated to allay the irritation against France, and to prevent a possible rupture, and whether they might not with advantage be delayed to a later period. They are certainly calculated to irritate the government of Spain, to afford ground for a belief that advantage has been taken of the irritation existing between that country and France to call down upon Spain the power of the Alliance, and thus to embarrass still more the difficult position of the French government. The result of these communications will probably be that the diplomatical relations between the three Allied Courts and Spain will

be determined, whatever may be the state of the question between France and Spain.

This occurrence cannot assist the cause of France. Those questions will still stand upon their own ground, and the government of France must decide them upon their own merits.

But these communications are not only calculated to embarrass the French government, but likewise that of the King, my master. His Majesty feels sincerely for the king and people of Spain, and he is anxious to see a termination of the evils and misfortunes by which that country is afflicted, and that it should be prosperous and happy.

His Majesty likewise really desires that the usual relations of amity and good neighbourhood may be re-established between France and Spain; and his government would have been anxious to co-operate with those of his Allies in allaying the existing irritation, and in preventing a possible rupture; and it is so necessary for his Majesty not to be supposed to participate in a measure of this description, and calculated to produce such consequences, that his government must equally refrain from advising his Majesty to direct that any communication should be made to the Spanish government on the subject of its relations with France.

His Majesty therefore must limit his exertions and good offices to the endeavours of his minister at Madrid to allay the ferment which these communications must occasion, and to do all the good in his power.

But his Majesty's government are of opinion that to animadvert upon the internal transactions of an independent State, unless such transactions affect the essential interests of his Majesty's subjects, is inconsistent with those principles on which his Majesty has invariably acted in all questions relating to the internal concerns of other countries; that such animadversions, if made, must involve his Majesty in serious responsibility if they should produce any effect, and must irritate if they should not; and that if addressed, as proposed, to the Spanish government, are likely to be injurious to her best interests, and to produce the worst consequences upon the probable discussions between France and Spain. The King's government must therefore decline to advise his Majesty to hold a common language with his Allies upon this occasion.

WELLINGTON.



[ 215. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 22nd Nov., 1822.

I have the honour to inform you that in the conference of yesterday, Mons. de Montmorency read an extract of a despatch which he had received from the French chargé d'affaires at Lisbon, stating that Mons. Piccheiro had assured him that you had given to the Portuguese chargé d'affaires in London assurances of the continuance of the existing guarantee in favour of Portugal on the part of Great Britain, notwithstanding that the Portuguese government should enter into defensive engagements with Spain; and that he had particularly stated that the late Lord Londonderry had invariably declined to give them such assurances.

I stated that, in respect to the latter, I could speak only from recollection; but that, as well as I could recollect, the guarantee required from the late Lord Londonderry was of *institutions*, which of course his Lordship had declined to give; and that, as well as I recollected, the question of territorial guarantee had never been put to his Lordship.

On the first point I stated that Mons. Sarmiento had waited upon you and stated the apprehensions of his government of an invasion by France in consequence of the assembly of such a large body of troops on the frontier of Spain; and their intentions to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Spain in case his Majesty's government should decline to assure them of its continued protection according to treaty. That you had pointed out to Mons. Sarmiento the folly of such apprehensions, and particularly that Portugal never had been nor could be invaded by France, excepting in concert with, or by the desire or consent of the government of Spain; and that you had then thought it proper to tell Mons. Sarmiento that his Majesty's government would be ready to afford whatever protection is due from Great Britain to Portugal. That you had discussed the subject, having in view principally the offensive alliance mentioned to which you had objected; but that, in reality, all your reasoning applied equally to a defensive alliance. That, however, in order to clear up all doubts upon the subject, as I was aware that this point would come into discussion here, I had written for an explanation, which I had received; and that there was no doubt that if Portugal, by her new engagements with Spain, or

by her conduct not previously concerted, with his Majesty's government, in any contest between France and Spain brought on herself an attack by France, it was considered that she was not entitled to the guarantee claimed under ancient treaties; and that this had been explained to Mons. Sarmiento. With this explanation all present declared themselves perfectly satisfied.

The examination of the written documents upon this subject with a view to make this explanation, induces me to tell you that I think it very desirable that you should look over them and see how this question stands in writing between the Portuguese minister and yourself; because I believe that no verbal explanation of written documents would be admitted as valid either between the two countries or in Parliament. Mons. de Sarmiento, in his note verbale of the 25th September, after desiring to ascertain whether the Portuguese government can continue to rely on the effective assistance of the British government, and asking for a formal declaration from the British government that they will guarantee Portugal against any foreign attack or invasion, states that if the British government will not accede to the requisition, it is his Majesty's firm and immediate "intention to follow the other course left to him as the only means of providing for the maintenance and defence of the just rights of a nation with whom he is connected by the most sacred ties; and this course will be a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Spain."

In your answer of the 1st October you tell Mons. Sarmiento that "his Majesty would not see with indifference an attempt upon the independence or unity of Portugal by any foreign Power whatever; and his Majesty would be always ready to afford whatever protection is due from Great Britain to Portugal."

Then follows the reasoning upon an *offensive* alliance, upon which it is stated that, "while a defensive alliance between any two Powers is neither matter of suspicion nor of jealousy in a third Power, an offensive alliance such as Mons. Sarmiento is authorised to declare that his Most Imperial Majesty would contract with Spain is a measure of very different character. It is a measure that, by putting the decision of peace or war for Portugal into the breast of her new ally, would necessarily

absolve her old one from engagements contracted only with reference to defensive protection.

"A war declared by Spain after such a treaty had been signed must necessarily involve Portugal; but it is not in a war thus voluntarily incurred that Portugal would have a right to call upon his Majesty for aid."

All this reasoning applies clearly to defensive as well as offensive engagements, although the latter only are mentioned.

On the 28th of October, Mons. de Sarmiento sends another note stating that before the Portuguese government had received your answer in writing of the 1st of October above referred to, but whether before or after the receipt of the verbal answer of the 25th September is not clear, the Portuguese minister at Madrid had been ordered to "*négocier un traité d'alliance défensive et de garantie mutuelle par rapport au système constitutionnel des deux royaumes contre l'agression de quelque Puissance contre le même système.*"

This is, I believe, exactly the state of the case as it stands in writing; and as it is not improbable that any quarrel between France and Spain which may grow out of the existing discussions may not unfairly be attributed to the *constitutional system* of Portugal and Spain, it may be desirable to explain in writing the real meaning of the reasoning in your note of the 1st of October.

I have, &c ,

WELLINGTON.

[ 216. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 22nd Nov., 1822.

I enclose copies of the despatches addressed to the Austrian and Russian ministers at Madrid.

The accompanying paragraph, which I have extracted from the Russian despatch, will show the spirit in which the late discussions have been carried on. I have not taken any notice of it.

I likewise transmit a copy of the *procès-verbal*, which the ministers of the four Courts signed on the night of the 19th instant.

This last-mentioned document was communicated to me on

the 19th, before it was signed; and I enclose the minute of the answer which I gave to the ministers of the four Cabinets upon declining to sign it.

I also enclose the minute of the answer which I gave to the same ministers on the 20th instant,\* when they communicated to me the despatches which they proposed to write to the ministers of their several Courts at Madrid.

These minutes will be transmitted to each of the ministers in a covering official note.

I have already informed you that Mons. de Montmorency's despatch will not be decided upon till he shall arrive at Paris, for which place he set off this morning.

In the conference of yesterday, I asked if the line intended to be taken by the Allies in any degree depended upon that which should be pursued by France. I was answered in the negative, and was informed that the despatches would be sent to Paris, and from thence be forwarded to Madrid as soon as the French government should have decided upon the course of proceeding to be adopted by them.

I then inquired whether the probable result of these transactions had been considered. I observed that they might lead to war, and to successful war; and, in that case, I asked what it was intended should be done, whether to occupy Spain with a French force or with a force composed of the troops of any other nations, and of what nations. The Russian minister took the lead in the answer, and said that this was a matter which must remain undetermined till the King of Spain should be at liberty, and enabled to decide for himself whether he would require such force or not.

I beg you to recollect what the Emperor said to me on this subject, as stated in my despatch of the 19th instant.

The Austrian minister made a flourish about the Emperor of Austria's unwillingness to saddle any Sovereign with an occupation by foreign troops unless at his own desire; and he stated the disadvantage it was to the Austrian government to have to occupy Naples and Piedmont, and urged the impossibility that the French government could wish to occupy Spain with French troops. It must be observed, however, that only on the preceding night Prince Metternich had urged me in the

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\* See page 557.

strongest manner to ask this question, assuring me that the Emperor of Austria would not hear of an occupation of Spain by French troops, and that I should be satisfied with the terms in which he would declare himself.

The Prussian minister adopted the sentiments of his Austrian colleague. Mons. de Montmorency stated upon this subject nearly what Mons. de Villele had in the interview which I had had with him at Paris, and particularly that the French government were desirous of avoiding the occupation of Spain by French troops; but that of course the occupation must depend upon the state of the King of Spain's affairs when the question should come to be decided.

We then discussed the documents which should be framed; and it was settled that there should be no protocol, that everything that had passed should be confidential, and that nothing should be allowed to transpire. I observed that the despatches to the ministers in Spain, if communicated to the Spanish government, would as certainly appear in every newspaper in Europe as that they were written; and in that case something must be communicated to Parliament on the part of my government. It was therefore agreed that there would be no objection to the production of the minute of my observations on the despatches, if his Majesty's government should think it necessary; nor to the production of the minute of my answer upon the *procès-verbal*, if that instrument should ever come before the public in an official form.

Upon reviewing this transaction, you will observe that the French government alone have been in some degree committed throughout. I found Mons. de Villele, at Paris, in September, wavering between the wishes of his ultra supporters and the ultra party in the Cabinet and what his own good sense suggested as most for the interest of his country and the king; and feeling all the inconveniences of the false steps already taken by his government on the subject of Spain, in the encouragement given to Royalists, &c., and also those which must result, in one view at least, from the assembly of the congress, and their doing nothing.

Mons. de Montmorency has throughout these negotiations vibrated between these two courses, and has at last quitted Verona in such a position as that the French government can proceed upon the counter-revolutionary plan in Spain, being

quite certain of the support of the three Continental Courts, at least in opinion, or can take a more moderate course, as they may think proper.

From the moment that this Spanish question has occupied the attention of the Emperor of Russia, Prince Metternich has felt the utmost anxiety about it. He did not think proper to oppose the Emperor's views directly; and he looked to the assistance which he had usually received from the British ministers in these conferences as the best mode of getting out of the difficulty without putting himself very forward in the discussion.

Accordingly, on my arrival at Vienna, he urged me to speak to the Emperor on the military part of the question, and to inform him that the French government would not hear of the passage through France of foreign troops with a view to attack Spain; and this conversation having had its effect, I was employed, on my arrival at Verona, to speak to the Emperor again upon the then new plan of forming an European-Russian army in Piedmont to observe the French operations in Spain; and as I did not succeed in inducing the Emperor to abandon this plan, Mons. de Montmorency was put forward with the same view.

As long as this was going on there was nobody more convinced than Prince Metternich that it was desirable that nothing should be done, and that all should be kept quiet. But having got rid of the great danger of all to the Austrian government, and that which pressed immediately, the march of a Russian army through Germany into Italy, and this upon my failure by the means of the French minister, he then turned short round upon the remainder of the question. He took up the Emperor of Russia's view, of having at least a treaty, in his answer to the French demands, and all the ultra views of the French government in his propositions submitted to the conference of the 31st of October; and then afterwards in that of the 1st of November he proposed that Great Britain should be charged with the negotiation between France and Spain, conceiving that it was the only mode of getting out of the difficulty without war, and without separation from Great Britain.

Finding that the French government would not trust us, he, as well as the ministers of the other Powers, has been for the last three weeks involved in the difficulty of writing his despatch to Madrid, really not knowing what to require, and finding every day his difficulties increase. Nearly up to the last

moment he assured me repeatedly that he concurred in all my opinions and views, and particularly in that of the inconvenience which must result from anything in the shape of a treaty, and from the establishment of a conference at Paris, which must be in the hands of Mons. Pozzo di Borgo. Yet when it came to the point, finding that the Emperor of Russia insisted upon a treaty in some shape or other, and that the French ministers would not object to it, he did not state any objections, notwithstanding that he knew that a treaty must prevent us from co-operating even in the work of peace; and within the last week he has discovered that it was impossible for the Emperor of Austria not to pronounce his opinion upon the Spanish revolution, and against what was passing in Spain.

In respect to the Prussian government, they have followed the line of the Austrians. They would have wished to avoid the question altogether; and Mons. de Bernstorff stated to me his opinion, that if Prince Metternich had at first opposed the Emperor of Russia stoutly, and had not thought it best to wait till he should be assisted at a congress by a British minister, and particularly by the late Lord Londonderry, he might have prevented it from coming to the point at which I found it at Vienna, when I arrived there. But having come to that point, he (Mons. de Bernstorff) thought it was impossible to get out of it without some declaration on the part of the Allies of a description to which the British government could not be a party.

At the same time he has always contended that it was better to do nothing than to co-operate with France in taking a step which might lead to a war.

It is not inconsistent with this moderation that the Prussian despatch is expressed in the strongest and most objectionable terms of any. The Prussian government is of the three that which has had, if it has not at present, the greatest reason to apprehend the consequences of a military mutiny; and Mons. de Bernstorff acknowledged to me that the king was more vehement on that subject than any other; and if called upon to communicate with Spain at all, he would not fail to let it out.

In regard to the Emperor of Russia, I have too often had occasion to refer to his sentiments on this question to render it necessary for me to lengthen this despatch by adverting to them at large. He is, in fact, in his person the whole Russian govern-

ment; and every question into which he thinks proper to enter is decided according to his own personal sentiments and opinions, which, like those of other men, are not unfrequently founded upon views which are not exactly those of the public interest. There is nobody better acquainted than the Emperor with the whole of the French conduct and intrigues in Spain; nobody has a worse opinion of their government and of their army. But he wishes to get out of the Turkish question; and in order to effect this purpose, he has required the aid of some affair in Spain. He is besides very much displeased with the Spaniards; and he does not look with complacency at the military mutiny any more than the King of Prussia.

I believe that he has some reason to complain of the Spaniards on account of the disrespect with which he has been treated personally in Spain; and on account of the conduct of ———, the Spanish Minister at St. Petersburg. The Emperor declares that he possesses proofs that this gentleman had expended money to corrupt his troops. It is not unnatural likewise that a Sovereign at the head of a million of men in arms, among whom there have been some traces of a disposition to mutiny, should feel an inclination to destroy a system founded upon a mutiny which is the daily topic of exultation and boast in the country in which the system is established, and among the Jacobin party all over Europe.

I confess that I flattered myself, up to a very late period, that I should have been able to bring this subject to a close, and which might have given a better chance of preserving the general peace than the moderation of the Spanish government, or the strength of Mons. de Villèle to resist all the factions in France, backed by the force of the Alliance, acting through a conference directed by General Pozzo di Borgo. Mons. de Villèle has nothing to support him but the opinion of the British government, which, after all, is not of great force in France.

I had seen great difficulties overcome in these conferences; and I was in hopes that upon this occasion, as upon former occasions, truth and good sense might at last have prevailed; more particularly as I was certain, on my arrival at Verona, I knew exactly what the views were of each of the Powers about to take part in the deliberations. But there are points of difference in our situation at present compared with that in which we stood before. First, the three great Military Powers,



particularly the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, as well as their ministers, and all their diplomatic servants, and likewise those of the Austrian government, are much more displeased and irritated with the line which the British government took on the Neapolitan question than the occasion calls for. They consider that it was an unnecessary display and publication of a difference of opinion upon a theory. This notion is quite erroneous; but it is entertained generally. Then another opinion prevails upon this same subject, viz., that, having been obliged to separate from England on these revolutionary questions, and having experienced no inconvenience from such separation, their best chance was to proceed on their own line.

But the great difficulty which I have had to contend with upon this occasion, which we never had upon any former occasion of this kind, is the alteration of the relations between the two Imperial Courts. As long as Mons. Capo d'Istria was the Emperor of Russia's minister, that government was opposed to every view of Austria; and the latter was obliged to lean towards Great Britain, as well for support against Russia in its own immediate views as in the questions of general interest; and our principal object was to endeavour to keep the two Imperial Courts on good terms.

Since Prince Metternich has removed Mons. Capo d'Istria from the Emperor's presence, he has become in a great degree himself his Imperial Majesty's principal adviser; but in order to maintain the description of influence which he has acquired over his Imperial Majesty's counsels, he is obliged to bend his own opinions, and to guide the conduct of the Austrian government in a great degree according to the views of Russia.

Thus, although there is no diminution of confidence in the British government, there is no concert nor union of counsel or of action; and, indeed, I must add that there is an obvious restraint in our intercourse, particularly before third persons, which is not denied as being occasioned by the jealousy of the Russians of the intimacy of the Austrian government with that of his Majesty.

Another circumstance which has certainly in some degree occasioned a restraint in our communications, has been the necessity under which I have been of pressing Prince Metternich to settle the money claims of Great Britain, upon which subject I will write to you in detail.

Upon the whole, you will see that the scene has changed since the assembling of the congress at Aix-la-Chapelle; and that when once the Allied governments were determined to shut their eyes to the French intrigues in Spain, of which they have in their hands the most undoubted proofs, and to the danger of allowing the French government to put an army into the field in Spain, of which they have all the strongest sense, there remained nothing on which I could found any opposition to the plan which they had determined to pursue, excepting the general principle on which there is a positive and declared difference of opinion between the three Powers and us.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

AUSTRIA.—PROJET DE DÉPÊCHE au Chargé d'Affaires à Madrid.

La situation dans laquelle se trouve la monarchie Espagnole à la suite des événemens qui s'y sont passés depuis deux ans, était un objet de trop haute importance pour ne pas avoir sérieusement occupé les Cabinets réunis à Verone. L'Empereur notre auguste maître a voulu que vous fussiez informé de sa manière d'envisager cette grave question; et c'est pour cet effet que je vous adresse la présente dépêche.

La révolution d'Espagne a été jugée pour nous dès son origine. Selon les décrets éternels de la Providence, le bien ne peut pas plus naître pour les états que pour les individus de l'oubli des premiers devoirs imposés à l'homme dans l'ordre social; ce n'est pas par de coupables illusions pervertissant l'opinion, égarant la conscience des peuples, que doit commencer l'amélioration de leur sort; et la révolte militaire ne peut jamais former la base d'un gouvernement heureux et durable.

La révolution d'Espagne, considérée sous le seul rapport de l'influence funeste qu'elle a exercée sur le royaume, qui l'a subie, serait un événement digne de toute l'attention et de tout l'intérêt des souverains étrangers; car la prospérité ou la ruine d'un des pays les plus intéressans de l'Europe ne saurait être à leurs yeux une alternative indifférente; les ennemis seuls de ce pays, s'il pouvait en avoir, auraient le droit de regarder avec froideur les convulsions qui le déchirent. Cependant une juste répugnance à toucher aux affaires intérieures d'un État indépendant, déterminerait peut-être ces souverains à ne pas se prononcer sur la situation de l'Espagne, si le mal opéré par sa révolution s'était concentré, et pouvait se concentrer dans son intérieur. Mais tel n'est pas le cas. Cette révolution, avant même d'être parvenue à sa maturité, a provoqué déjà de grands désastres dans d'autres pays; c'est elle qui, par la contagion de ses principes et de ses exemples, et par les intrigues de ses principaux artisans, a créé les révolutions de Naples et du Piémont; c'est elle qui aurait embrasé l'Italie toute entière, menacé la France, compromis l'Allemagne, sans l'intervention des Puissances qui ont préservé l'Europe de ce nouvel incendie. Partout, les funestes moyens em-

ployés en Espagne pour préparer et exécuter la révolution, ont servi de modèle à ceux qui se flattaient de lui ouvrir de nouvelles conquêtes ; partout, la constitution Espagnole est devenue le point de réunion, et le cri de guerre d'une faction conjurée contre la sûreté des trônes et contre le repos des peuples.

Le mouvement dangereux que la révolution d'Espagne avait imprimée à tout le midi de l'Europe, a mis l'Autriche dans la pénible nécessité de recourir à des mesures peu d'accord avec la marche pacifique qu'elle aurait voulu invariablement poursuivre. Elle a vu une partie de ses États entourée de séditions, cernée par des complots incendiaires, à la veille même d'être attaquée par des conspirateurs, dont les premiers essais se dirigeaient contre ses frontières. Ce n'est que par de grands efforts et de grands sacrifices que l'Autriche a pu rétablir la tranquillité en Italie, et déjouer des projets, dont le succès n'eût été rien moins qu'indifférent pour le sort de ses propres provinces.

Sa Majesté Impériale ne peut d'ailleurs que soutenir dans les questions relatives à la révolution d'Espagne, les mêmes principes qu'elle a toujours hautement manifestés. Dans l'absence même de tout danger direct pour les peuples confiés à ses soins, l'Empereur n'hésitera jamais à désavouer et à réprouver ce qu'il croit faux, pernicieux, et condamnable, dans l'intérêt général des sociétés humaines. Fidèle au système de conservation et de paix, pour le maintien duquel elle a contracté avec ses augustes Alliés des engagements inviolables, sa Majesté ne cessera de regarder le désordre et les bouleversemens, quelque partie de l'Europe qui puisse en être la victime, comme un objet de vives sollicitudes pour tous les gouvernemens, et chaque fois que l'Empereur pourra se faire entendre dans le tumulte de ces crises déplorables, il croira avoir rempli un devoir, dont aucune considération ne saurait le dispenser.

Il me serait difficile de croire, Monsieur le Comte, que le jugement énoncé par sa Majesté Impériale sur les événemens qui se passent en Espagne, puisse être mal compris ou mal interprété dans ce pays. Aucun objet d'intérêt particulier, aucun choc de prétentions réciproques, aucun sentiment de méfiance ou de jalousie ne saurait inspirer à notre cabinet une pensée en opposition avec le bien-être de l'Espagne. La maison d'Autriche n'a qu'à remonter à sa propre histoire pour y trouver les plus puissans motifs d'attachement, d'égard, et de bieuveillance, pour une nation qui peut se rappeler avec un juste orgueil ces siècles de glorieuse mémoire, où "le soleil n'avait pas de couchant pour elle ;" pour une nation qui, forte de ses institutions respectables, de ses vertus héréditaires, de ses sentimens religieux, de son amour pour ses rois, s'est illustrée dans tous les temps par un patriotisme toujours loyal, toujours généreux, et bien souvent héroïque. A une époque peu éloignée de nous, cette nation a encore étonné le monde par le courage, le dévouement, et la persévérance qu'elle a opposés à l'ambition usurpatrice, qui prétendait la priver de ses monarques et de ses lois ; et l'Autriche n'oubliera jamais combien la noble résistance du peuple Espagnol lui a été utile dans un moment de grand danger pour elle-même.

Ce n'est donc pas sur l'Espagne, ni comme nation ni comme puissance, que peut porter le langage sévère dicté à sa Majesté Impériale par sa conscience et par la force de la vérité ; il ne s'applique qu'à ceux qui ont ruiné et défiguré l'Espagne, et qui persistent à prolonger ses souffrances.

En se réunissant à Vérone à ses augustes Alliés, sa Majesté Impériale a eu le bonheur de retrouver dans leurs conseils les mêmes dispositions bienveillantes et désintéressées, qui ont constamment guidé les siens. Les paroles qui partiront pour Madrid constateront ce fait, et ne laisseront aucun doute sur l'empressement sincère des Puissances à servir la cause de l'Espagne, en lui démontrant la nécessité de changer de route. Il est certain que les embarras qui l'accablent se sont accrus depuis peu dans une progression effrayante. Les mesures les plus rigoureuses, les expédiens les plus hasardés, ne peuvent plus faire marcher son administration ; la guerre civile est allumée dans plusieurs de ses provinces ; ses rapports avec la plus grande partie de l'Europe sont dérangés ou suspendus ; ses relations même avec la France ont pris un caractère si problématique, qu'il est permis de se livrer à des inquiétudes sérieuses sur les complications qui peuvent en résulter. Un pareil état de choses, ne justifierait-il pas les plus sinistres pressentimens ?

Tout Espagnol éclairé sur la véritable situation de sa patrie doit sentir que pour briser les chaînes, qui pèsent aujourd'hui sur le monarque et sur le peuple, il faut que l'Espagne mette un terme à cet état de séparation du reste de l'Europe dans lequel les derniers événemens l'ont jetée. Il faut que des rapports de confiance et de franchise se rétablissent entre elle et les autres gouvernemens ; rapports qui, en garantissant d'un côté sa ferme intention de s'associer à la cause commune des monarchies Européennes, puissent lui fournir de l'autre côté les moyens de faire valoir sa volonté réelle, et d'écarter tout ce qui peut la dénaturer ou la comprimer. Mais pour arriver à ce but, il faut avant tout que son Roi soit libre ; — non seulement de cette liberté personnelle, quo tout individu peut réclamer sous le règne des lois, mais de celle dont un souverain doit jouir pour remplir sa haute vocation. Le Roi d'Espagne sera libre du moment qu'il aura le pouvoir de faire cesser les malheurs de son peuple ; de ramener l'ordre et la paix dans son royaume, de s'entourer d'hommes également dignes de sa confiance par leurs principes et par leurs lumières ; de substituer enfin à un régime reconnu impraticable par ceux mêmes que l'égoïsme ou l'orgueil y tiennent encore attachés, un ordre de choses dans lequel les droits du monarque seraient heureusement combinés avec les vrais intérêts et les vœux légitimes de toutes les classes de la nation. Lorsque ce moment sera venu, l'Espagne, fatiguée de sa longue tourmente, pourra se flatter de rentrer en pleine possession des avantages que le Ciel lui a départis, et que le noble caractère de ses habitans lui assure ; elle verra renaitre les liens qui l'unissaient à toutes les Puissances Européennes ; et sa Majesté Impériale se félicitera de n'avoir plus à lui offrir que les vœux qu'elle forme pour sa prospérité, et tous les bons services qu'elle sera en état de rendre à un ancien ami et allié.

Vous ferez de la présente dépêche, Monsieur le Comte, l'usage le plus approprié aux circonstances dans lesquelles vous vous trouverez eu la recevant. Vous êtes autorisé à en faire lecture au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, ainsi qu'à lui en donner copie, s'il le demande.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 22nd Nov., 1822.

After thanking you for your private letters, I have nothing more to say to you, by this messenger, than that I will write fully by the next on South American subjects (Spanish and Portuguese), the question of piracy included; upon which last we are taking measures, such as, I hope, you cannot but approve.

I do not wonder that in so hopeless a prospect as you appear to have had before you when you wrote last, you should not say anything of the probable time of your return.

But we all wish that you had explained M. de Montmorency's plans a little more fully. Does he mean that he is to take his note to Paris, and return with it to Verona, and that the Congress, and you with the rest should wait his return there? Or does he mean to send on his note, if approved, or another edition of it, if allowed by his government, direct from Paris? And in that case, what is to be done with respect to the notes of the other powers, which must have been framed upon his such as it was originally, and may not suit with any other edition?

I am glad that you have written as you have done to Villèle. My apprehension is, I confess, that the violent party may contrive some skirmish on the frontier, which may precipitate the fact of war, while you are debating its policy at Verona.

There are two despatches from Sir W. A'Court since those which I last sent to you. Unluckily they are both with the King, and it is too late to get them from him, to take copies. But of one I hear from Planta that there is a duplicate, unluckily indeed for your decyphers it is in cypher, and is too late for ours to set about it. Planta will send it in that state.

The other contained an account of the military successes of the constitutionalists: which are detailed with more particularity, and to a later date in all the newspapers, which (I suppose) you will receive by this messenger.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 22nd Nov., 1822.

I inclose for your Grace's information the copy of a communication which I have received from a Brazilian gentleman who has been for some time resident in England, and to whom the Prince Regent of Brazil has, since the assumption of independence by that country, transmitted credentials as his Royal Highness's Chargé d'Affaires.

These credentials he is not to present until assured of a disposition to receive him in a public character.

That assurance of course has not as yet been given to him; but I have seen him unofficially more than once, and if the professions which he makes may be relied on, there is every desire on the part of the Prince and his

government to conciliate the friendship and support of Great Britain by all means in their power.

I enclose also the account received from Mr. Chamberlain, his Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Rio de Janeiro, of the late events in that country, and a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Mr. Chamberlain.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
GEORGE CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

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*Filisberto Caldeiro Brant to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[TRANSLATION.]

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

MEU SENHOR,

Brunet's Hotel, 14th Nov., 1822.

In compliance with your Excellency's desire I will set down in writing what I had the honour of stating to your Excellency on the present state of Brazil, and I entertain no doubt that the conduct of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and perpetual defender of that kingdom, will merit the complete approbation of his Britannic Majesty, the greatest and most ancient ally of the house of Braganza. When his Most Faithful Majesty, in April, 1821, took the resolution of returning to Portugal, he named the Prince Royal Regent of the kingdom of Brazil with the most ample powers, and not satisfied therewith, had the foresight of recommending to him, in the moment of taking leave, that in no case he would abandon Brazil, lest that better portion of the Portuguese monarchy might become the prey of some adventurer.

The Prince Royal, agreeably to that punctuality and uprightness which form the groundwork of his character, not only fulfilled rigidly the orders and instructions of his Majesty, but even those addressed to him by the Cortes of Lisbon, to whom, however, he represented the inconveniences which could not but ensue from some of their absurd decrees. The Cortes, far from altering their conduct, increased their demands.

Troops were sent out to subjugate some towns; emissaries fomented a civil war in every quarter, and stirred up disobedience to the Prince Regent; a plan of commercial relations for shutting Brazil against foreigners by means of imposts upon their vessels, and exempting therefrom the Portuguese, was discussed and approved; and this relation would have no end were I to enumerate to your Excellency all the acts of injustice and revolting hostility committed by the Cortes against Brazil; still however there is one which I cannot pass over in silence. All the public prints, and particularly the 'Champion,' the favourite journal of the Cortes, designated the rising of the slaves as an indispensable measure, if Brazil failed humbly to receive the chains intended her by the regenerators of the nation.

But as they had proclaimed the sovereignty of the people, and that it was lawful for the latter to change the form of government when and how they chose, the people of Brazil were of opinion that they were as sovereign as those of Portugal, and without the intervention of troops, but with the unanimous concurrence of all the chambers, proclaimed the independence of Brazil and the Prince Regent their perpetual defender. Under these circumstances

the Prince Regent, to gratify the desires of the inhabitants of Brazil, and comply with the orders and councils of his august parent, was compelled to accept that title and to employ all means for acting up to it.

His Royal Highness's first measure was to call a Legislative Assembly at Rio de Janeiro; a measure of the first necessity, as had already been pointed out by his Excellency the Marquis of Londonderry when he stated in parliament the convocation of the Lisbon Cortes.

The second was his Royal Highness's manifesto of August 6th addressed to allied and friendly sovereigns with a view of receiving from them that moral support, which is at this moment so interesting not only to the Prince Regent and to the dynasty of Braganza but to royalty in general, which on the vast American continent is upheld solely by the Brazilian Empire against republican doctrines. The enthusiasm of the inhabitants of Brazil may by some unforeseen accident cool; the intrigues and emissaries of the Cortes no less than their troops and squadrons may excite some disobedience; and how shall, in that case, the Prince, destitute of the recognition of the Allied Sovereigns and principally of his Britannic Majesty, be able to frame a wise constitution, resembling, as much as the difference of our circumstances will permit, that of England?

But if his Britannic Majesty accept a minister from his Royal Highness and send another to Rio de Janeiro, what incalculable benefits will not accrue to the Brazilian monarchy and to British commerce!

The monarchy will be consolidated by wise laws, and its institutions and customs will be uniform, while the British commerce will increase in a ratio composed of the augmentation of the people and products of Brazil. But it is necessary to remove the present obstructions, and as the Cortes have declared the Prince a rebel, and all those that obey him, that is, the whole realm of Brazil, traitors, it is incompatible with the dignity of the Regent and of the nation of Brazil to admit into their custom-houses any document legalised by consuls or ministers appointed by that government which, as I have mentioned above, declared the Prince a rebel and the Brazilians traitors. I am far from suspecting that his Royal Highness will ever act in a manner the least prejudicial to British commerce; since, on the contrary, he is uniformly solicitous of drawing closer the relations of amity and alliance between the two nations, and in regard to commerce he has particularly given a pledge of his intentions by only demanding 15 per cent. on woollen manufactures in spite of the order of the Cortes to exact thirty.

But as English goods cannot be admitted to entry at the custom-houses of Brazil without caskets signed by Brazilian consuls, nor the Brazilians come to England and return hence, without a passport from their respective ministers, it is clear that England must either make war upon Brazil, in deference to the Lisbon faction, or admit the consuls and the ministers from the Prince Regent in order to continue the commerce. Under this pretext, I conceive, the problem might be solved, and his Britannic Majesty, by a single word and without the cooperation of troops or squadrons, would save his august ally from the humiliating predicament in which he is involved by placing the son in a situation to accomplish the work commenced. Such a proceeding on the part of his Britannic Majesty would not only be generous and just but produce in the minds of the Brazilians changes of transcendent advantage; for, finding themselves honoured and favoured by his Britannic Majesty in the moment of afflictions and enthusiasm, they would devise every means to evince their acknowledgment, and none will be so proper as the abolition of the slave trade. At any other period that abolition would be impossible, but under the present circumstances it will perhaps be easy with slight modifications. Neither

the Prince Royal, the ministry, nor the well informed among the Brazilians wish by any means for the continuance of that infamous traffic in human flesh, but the people at large obstinately resist the measure. That resistance, however, has grown less since the Cortes have menaced us with an insurrection of the negroes, and it is presumable that it would cease from motives of gratitude towards his Britannic Majesty if the people of Brazil were to obtain immediately the recognition of their independence. That the latter will take place sooner or later, whatever may be the opposition of Old Portugal, or the neutrality of other nations, no one can entertain a doubt, any more than that the speedy recognition in promoting the prosperity of Brazil and increasing the commerce of Great Britain will operate as a concurrent cause of the re-establishment of order in Portugal. In addition to all these reasons, which appear to me sufficient to decide the British Cabinet in favour of his Royal Highness, it ought to be borne in mind, that, should the Prince Royal find himself deserted by the best and most ancient ally of the House of Braganza, and at the same time attacked by troops, squadrons, and emissaries of the Lisbon factions, he will be reduced to the disagreeable, but unavoidable necessity of throwing himself into the arms of the United States government; who assuredly will not refuse him an early recognition and even succours, on the sole condition of being afforded commercial advantages that perhaps may at some future period prejudice the mercantile relations subsisting between Brazil and Great Britain.

Such, most excellent Sir, are the powerful reasons which have prompted me to request your Excellency's attention in favour of my country, and availing myself, &c.,

I am, most illustrious and most excellent Senhor George Canning,  
your Excellency's most humble and most obedient,

FILIPBERTO CALDEIRO BRANT.

## II.

*II. Chamberlain, Esq., to the Marquis of Londonderry.*

MY LORD,

Rio de Janeiro, 11th Sept., 1822.

I beg leave to send your Lordship herewith a copy of my reply to the note of his Excellency the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 14th ult., containing the manifesto of the Prince Regent, with the printed papers relative thereto; and acquainting him that I had forwarded them to his Majesty's government.

I have the honour to be,

HENRY CHAMBERLAIN,

Consul-General.

Rio de Janeiro, 20th August, 1822.

The undersigned Consul-General of his Britannic Majesty had the honour to receive on the 17th inst. the official note of his Excellency M. de Andrada e Silva, Councillor, Minister and Secretary of State for the kingdom of Brazil and Foreign Affairs, dated the 14th preceding, stating that, in obedience to the orders of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, who is desirous to give all publicity to the purity and justice of his proceedings, his Excellency transmitted to the undersigned, for the purpose of being forwarded to his court, the manifesto of his Royal Highness, addressed to the governments and friendly nations, together with some other publications relative to, and serving as illustrations of the said manifesto,



The undersigned has the honour to acquaint his Excellency M. de Andrada e Silva that he forwarded these important communications to his government accordingly by the Lady Mary Pelham packet, which sailed this morning, and he profits of the occasion to renew, &c.

HENRY CHAMBERLIN.

### III.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Mr. Henry Chamberlain.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, 18th Nov., 1822.

Your several despatches to No. 43 inclusive, detailing the very important events which have lately occurred in Brazil, have been duly received and laid before the King.

The question as to the line of conduct which Great Britain will pursue in consequence of these events, is one of too extensive and complicated a nature to be solved and decided upon in the short space of time which has elapsed since the receipt of those despatches.

I therefore let this packet (the further detention of which would be attended with considerable inconvenience) depart without any more precise instructions on the subject, than that you will take the first opportunity of assuring the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that his Majesty's Government have contemplated the proceedings of the Prince Regent with the deepest interest; that it is earnestly hoped that they may not lead to a protracted war between the two branches of the Portuguese monarchy, and that in any case the Prince Regent has not to apprehend any hostile act or unfriendly feeling on the part of his Majesty's government.

I am, Sir, &c.,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 22nd Nov., 1822.

Your Grace's despatches Nos. 21 to 24 inclusive were received here yesterday, and have been laid before the King.

There is nothing in these despatches which appears to call for fresh instructions to your Grace; but I am commanded by the King to repeat to you his Majesty's gracious approbation of the whole of your Grace's conduct in the difficult and complicated discussions in which you are engaged.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,

my Lord Duke, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

*Le Comte de Nesselrode to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MÉMOIR CONFIDENTIEL.

Verone, le 11me Nov., 1822.

Le Cabinet de Russie a pris en mûre considération le Mémoire Confidentiel que M. le Duc de Wellington lui a remis le 17 Octobre dernier, rela-

tivement aux mesures adoptées par sa Majesté l'Empereur, sous la date du (4) 16 Septembre, 1821, pour déterminer l'étendue des possessions Russes sur la côte N.O. de l'Amérique, et pour interdire aux vaisseaux étrangers l'approche de ces possessions jusqu'à la distance de cent milles d'Italie.

Les ouvertures faites à ce sujet au gouvernement de S.M. Britannique par le Comte de Lieven au moment où cet ambassadeur allait quitter Londres doivent déjà avoir prouvé que l'opinion que le Cabinet de St. James avait conçue des mesures dont il s'agit n'était point fondée sur une appréciation entièrement exacte des vues de sa Majesté Impériale.

La Russie est loin de méconnaître que l'usage et l'occupation constituent le plus solide des titres d'après lesquels un état puisse réclamer des droits de souveraineté sur une portion quelconque du continent. La Russie est plus loin encore d'avoir voulu outrepasser arbitrairement les limites que ce titre assigne à ses domaines sur la côte N.O. de l'Amérique, ou ériger en principe général de droit maritime les règles qu'une nécessité purement locale l'avait obligée de poser pour la navigation étrangère dans le voisinage de la partie de cette côte qui lui appartient.

C'était au contraire parce qu'elle regardait ces droits de souveraineté comme légitimes, et parce que des considérations impérieuses tenant à l'existence même du commerce qu'elle fait dans les parages de la côte N.O. de l'Amérique, la forçait à établir un système de précautions devenues indispensables, qu'elle a fait paraître l'oukase du (4) 16 Septembre, 1821.

La Russie serait toujours prête à faire part des motifs qui en justifient les dispositions ; mais pour le moment elle se bornera aux observations suivantes :

M. le Duc de Wellington affirme, dans son Mémoire Confidentiel du 17 Octobre, que des établissemens Anglais, appartenant à deux compagnies, celle de la Baye de Hudson et celle du N.O., se sont formés dans une contrée appelée la Nouvelle Calédonie, qui s'étend le long de la côte de l'Océan Pacifique, depuis le 49 jusqu'au 60 degré de latitude septentrionale.

La Russie ne parlera point des établissemens qui peuvent exister entre le 49 et le 51 parallèle ; mais quant aux autres, elle n'hésite pas de convenir, qu'elle en ignore jusqu'à présent l'existence, pour autant au moins qu'ils toucheraient l'Océan Pacifique.

Les cartes Anglaises même les plus récentes et les plus détaillées n'indiquent absolument aucune des stations de commerce mentionnées dans le Mémoire du 17<sup>me</sup> Octobre, sur la côte même de l'Amérique, entre le 51 et 60 degré de latitude septentrionale.

D'ailleurs, depuis les expéditions de Behring et de Tchirikoff, c'est-à-dire depuis près d'un siècle, des établissemens Russes ont pris, à partir du 60 degré, une extension progressive, qui dès l'année 1799 les avait fait parvenir jusqu'au 55 parallèle, comme le porte la première charte de la Compagnie Russe-Américaine, charte qui a reçu dans le temps une publicité officielle, et qui n'a motivé aucune protestation de la part de l'Angleterre.

Cette même charte accordait à la compagnie Russe le droit de porter ses établissemens vers le midi au delà du 55 degré de latitude septentrionale, pourvu que de tels accroissemens de territoire ne pussent donner motif de réclamation à aucune puissance étrangère.

L'Angleterre n'a pas non plus protesté contre cette disposition : elle n'a pas même réclamé contre les nouveaux établissemens que la Compagnie

Russe-Américaine a pu former au sud du 55 degré, en vertu de ce privilège.

La Russie était donc pleinement autorisée à profiter d'un consentement qui, pour être tacite, n'en était pas moins solennel, et à déterminer pour bornes de ses domaines le degré de latitude, jusqu'auquel la Compagnie Russe avait étendu ses opérations depuis 1799.

Quoiqu'il en soit, et quelque force que ces circonstances prêtent aux titres de la Russie, sa Majesté Impériale ne déviara point dans cette conjoncture du système habituel de sa politique.

Le premier de ses vœux sera toujours de prévenir toute discussion, et de consolider de plus en plus les rapports d'amitié et de parfaite intelligence qu'elle se félicite d'entretenir avec la Grande Bretagne.

En conséquence l'Empereur a chargé son Cabinet de déclarer à M. le Duc de Wellington (sans que cette déclaration puisse préjudicier en rien à ses droits, si elle n'était point acceptée) qu'il est prêt à fixer, au moyen d'une négociation amicale, et sur la base des convenances mutuelles, les degrés de latitude et de longitude que les deux Puissances regarderont comme dernières limites de leurs possessions et de leurs établissemens sur la côte N.O. de l'Amérique.

Sa Majesté Impériale se plaît à croire que cette négociation pourra se terminer sans difficulté à la satisfaction réciproque des deux Etats; et le Cabinet de Russie peut assurer dès à présent M. le Duc de Wellington que les mesures de précaution et de surveillance qui seront prises alors sur la partie Russe de la côte d'Amérique se trouveront entièrement conformes aux droits dérivant de la souveraineté, ainsi qu'aux usages établis entre nations, et qu'aucune plainte légitime ne pourra s'élever contre elles.

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*A S. A. le Prince de Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

Vérone, le 24<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

Votre Altesse m'ayant fait connaître aujourd'hui qu'elle avait l'intention de m'envoyer une note au sujet de l'*Austrian loan*, dans laquelle le principe serait adopté d'un paiement en argent par S.M.I., je vous prie d'avoir la bonté de me l'envoyer avant le départ du courrier de Mardi, parce que je désire aussitôt que possible que le gouvernement de S.M.B. puisse savoir où cette affaire reste.

Croyez moi, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*M. de Goulitz to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Vérone, le 24<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

Pour répondre, aussi bien que je le pouvais, aux intentions de Votre Excellence, j'ai rédigé un Projet de Déclaration, que j'ai l'honneur de lui pré-

senter ci-joint. Si Votre Excellence y désire quelque changement, addition, ou suppression, je n'attends que ses ordres pour arranger la rédaction absolument à son gré.

Il y a dans le dernier paragraphe un passage, marqué de crayon, que j'ai cru devoir intercaler, pour désarmer les objections qui pourraient s'élever de certain côté. Si Votre Excellence ne juge pas la précaution nécessaire, ces lignes seront effacées, sans que le reste de la passage en soit altéré.

Agréez, Monsieur le Duc, mes très respectueux hommages,

GOULTZ.

*Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 24th Nov., 1822.

I cannot better explain to you the language and feelings of the violent party here than by sending you the accompanying copy of a Memoir drawn up by a M. Gouffray, at Verona, and which is very extensively circulated in Paris.

Faithfully yours,

C. STUART.

[ENCLOSURE.]

[NOTE.—Remise le matin de Dimanche, 23<sup>me</sup> Septembre, à M. de Montmorency. Observations verbales que m'a faites le ministre le lundi matin.]

Votre Excellence a approuvé mon voyage à Vienne. Elle a été témoin depuis mon arrivée du degré de confiance que les principaux Cabinets de l'Europe m'accordent. La première considération m'oblige comme Français, et protégé par votre Excellence, de lui parler avec une entière franchise. La seconde considération me fait espérer que mes réflexions lui paraîtront de quelque poids. Le système qui unit les Cours de Russie, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et les Puissances secondaires qui en dépendent, n'a fait que se fortifier depuis le dernier Congrès. Ce système est une détermination invariable de s'opposer non seulement à la propagation des principes révolutionnaires, mais encore à celle des principes qui seraient favorables, directement ou indirectement, à la cause des révolutionnaires.

Depuis son arrivée à Vienne V.E. a pu reconnaître que le tableau que je lui avais tracé dès l'instant de son avènement au ministère, des dispositions des Cabinets et du caractère des hommes qui les composent, était exact sous tous les rapports. V.E. avait saisi avec perspicacité l'ensemble de ce tableau; plut à Dieu que tous les ministres, ses collègues, eussent apprécié également leur situation et mon écrit. Les instructions que V.E. a reçues pourront lui faire juger si mes craintes sont fondées.

Une grande question, celle du sort de l'Espagne, va être agitée au Congrès. C'est la question principale; et le voyage de V.E. a eu principalement cet objet en vue; car les intérêts des Etats d'Italie, le maintien des troupes dans cette péninsule, et les transactions qui pourront concerner quelques économies dans l'occupation, sont des objets trop secondaires pour mériter de la part de la France des mesures diplomatiques extraordinaires, telles que la présence de

V.E. au Congrès. Je ne parle pas des affaires de l'Orient, qui sont décidées par le fait.

La France se trouve en ce moment, par rapport à l'Espagne, à peu près dans la même position où se trouvait l'Autriche par rapport au royaume de Naples révolté. La situation géographique et les dangers du voisinage sont les mêmes. C'est évidemment à la France, qui appartient aujourd'hui le rôle que l'Autriche a joué avec tant de succès il y a dix-huit mois. Je dirai plus; il faut que la France, sous peine de compromettre sa dignité et ses intérêts, prenne l'initiative dans cette affaire, et provoque auprès du Congrès la discussion sur les moyens à prendre pour mettre un terme aux malheurs de l'Espagne. Ces moyens doivent être pris d'un commun accord; les Cabinets, et particulièrement le Cabinet Autrichien, auquel on doit la justice de dire qu'il est le mieux informé de tout ce qui se passe en Europe, n'ignorent point les tentatives infructueuses que la France a faites depuis l'origine de la révolution Espagnole jusqu'aux tristes évènements du 7 Juillet dernier, pour intervenir dans cette révolution, pour la diriger, la modifier, ou transiger avec elle. L'Europe sait que ces tentatives ont eu pour but d'imposer à la nation Espagnole la Charte Française, ou une Constitution analogue, calquée sur celle qui nous régit. J'ai dit, *imposer*, car, bien que quelques Espagnols appartenant soit à la classe des révolutionnaires, soit à celles des \* à leur suite, aient appuyé auprès du gouvernement Français un tel projet, on sait que la masse du peuple Espagnol la repousse et réclame ses anciennes institutions, ses anciennes lois, ses anciennes mœurs. La proclamation de la Junte de Catalogne est, à cet égard, l'expression du vœu national, du vœu de tous ceux qui à travers la révolution d'Espagne ont conservé le noble, le véritable caractère Espagnol; et je dois dire à V.E. avec la plus profonde conviction que le manifeste de la Junte provisoire a été jugé ainsi par les Cabinets réunis.

La situation de V.E. est donc assez délicate (elle me permettra dans le zèle qui m'anime de hazarder cette expression); on croit que le gouvernement Français, par une conséquence de sa propre situation, inquiète et incertaine, a une tendance naturelle au proclatisme constitutionnel, à la propagation des chartes, et à s'isoler par là des monarchies fondées sur un principe différent. Ce système reproché à la France a été soutenu avec fureur par MM. B. Constant, Foy, et Bignon; et nul ministre à l'exception de V.E. n'a entrepris de la combattre à la tribune. Les opinions de vos collègues, Monseigneur, sont loin d'être manifestées à ce sujet. Or, bien que la Charte Française soit respectée et garantie par les dispositions des Puissances Alliées envers la France, il est dans l'ordre établi par cette Charte quelques dispositions déjà reconnues dangereuses, inutiles, et inapplicables à tout autre pays. Par exemple, on ce qui concerne l'Espagne, il est démontré à tous les hommes d'état avec lesquels V.E. aura à traiter, que l'abolition des ordres, la destruction des privilèges, l'institution d'une Chambre Législative, basée sur l'élection populaire, et sur une turbulente égalité de droits, la formation d'une Chambre de Pairs, qui serait au profit de quelques intrigans parvenus et de quelques nobles corrompus, une tolérance religieuse, illimitée au détriment de la religion Catholique nationale, la publicité de la tribune et la liberté incendiaire de la presse, il est démontré, dis-je, que ces innovations et plusieurs autres seraient irréconciliables, non seulement avec les vœux et les besoins de l'Espagne, mais encore avec la tranquillité de l'Europe, déjà trop longtemps troublée par les essais réitérés de ces théories modernes dont nous subissons nous-mêmes si souvent les inconvéniens.

Je sais, Monseigneur, que la Charte Française est sacrée pour les ministres

\* This word is left out in the original.

qui gouvernent par elle, et qui en ont juré l'observation. Moi-même, simple sujet, bien que je considère quelques-unes de ses dispositions comme imparfaites, et d'autres comme incommodes au pouvoir souverain, je m'y soumetts comme à l'œuvre du Roi; et je ne vois pas d'ailleurs par quoi l'on pourait la remplacer en France. Mais ce respect pour la Charte n'entraîne pas l'obligation de la proposer au dehors. Si nous voulons que l'Europe ne se mêle jamais de nos affaires, évitons de troubler son repos, et de lui inspirer des inquiétudes, en nous faisant les apôtres d'un système déjà condamné par le bon sens des principaux Cabinets.

C'est d'ailleurs dans l'intérêt de notre propre Charte qu'il est essentiel de ne faire aucune concession à la révolution d'Espagne. Dans ce pays les anciennes institutions ne sont que suspendues, les intérêts qu'on nomme ici imprudemment révolutionnaires n'y sont point encore consolidés. Une Charte quelconque n'y serait agréée que par cette faction Européenne qui en veut directement à l'existence des trônes, et qui en désespoir de cause accepterait une charte comme un moyen de discorde favorable à ses vues. Aussitôt qu'on aurait donné en Espagne quelque consistance à cette faction, en lui accordant au moyen d'une transaction *constitutionnelle* la facilité de se placer dans le gouvernement lui-même, ainsi qu'elle l'a fait chez nous, elle conspirerait avec nos propres révolutionnaires, avec ces hommes qui au nom de la Charte attaquent chez nous l'autorité Royale, soit à la tribune, soit à main armée. Riego, Quiroga, et les autres parjures de l'armée, n'ont-ils pas été surnommés héroïques par des députés de la Charte Française? Berton, n'a-t-il pas comploté son attentat avec assez de justesse à celui des immortels de l'armée d'Andalousie? Et ces députés, et ce Berton et consors, n'avaient-ils pas sans cesse la Charte à la bouche? Il est clair que l'opposition hostile que les autels et les trônes en général, mais particulièrement le Catholicisme et les Bourbons, ont à combattre, serait doublée par la connaissance qui existe entre les factieux d'Espagne et ceux de France, si l'on donnait aux premiers le moyen d'annulter les attentats, et de prendre place dans un gouvernement fondé sur une transaction avec la révolte.

Comment supposer d'ailleurs que l'Europe *pût souffrir* une telle transaction, qui serait un encouragement publiquement donné aux mécontents et aux ambitieux de toutes les nations, qui se révolteraient dans l'espoir fondé d'obtenir une Charte, c'est à dire, l'impunité des emplois et des honneurs. Voilà, Monseigneur, la manière de voir des Cabinets avec lesquels vous avez à traiter. Votre présence ici est faite pour dissiper des défiances, pour détruire les préventions. Néanmoins, je ne puis me dispenser de vous faire remarquer quelques circonstances qui affaiblissent l'impression favorable que votre mission a produite ici.

Rien dans les actes du Ministère actuel n'a encore prouvé à l'Europe que ce Ministère ait abandonné le système si déplorablement suivi par ses prédécesseurs, qui, dans la vue de prouver à la France une sorte de patronage constitutionnel, favorisaient les révoltes dans les pays voisins, et offraient aux novateurs l'appui de la France, sous condition d'accepter la Charte. Ce système a échoué complètement; il *échouera toujours*. Il serait à désirer que V.E. pût convaincre ses collègues de cette vérité dont l'évidence lui sera démontrée pendant son séjour ici.

Hormis l'arrivée de V.E. au Congrès, rien n'a rassuré jusqu'ici les craintes de l'Europe; au contraire, certains discours ministériels, certaines réticences sans sujet, des articles ministériels insérés aux 'Débats,' et d'ailleurs, qui ont consterné les hommes monarchiques de tous les pays, et dont V.E. sait que les Cabinets se sont plaints officiellement—enfin, et surtout, la conservation et le choix de certains agens diplomatiques dont les opinions sont trop connues—

semblent indiquer que la politique de MM. Pasquier et consors l'emporte encore dans le conseil du Roi.

J'ai déjà eu l'occasion de communiquer à V.E. les renseignements qui m'étaient parvenus sur la position équivoque où M. de Châteaubriand s'était placé à Londres, et sur l'impression défavorable que son nom seul produisait sur les Cours Alliées. Le temps n'est plus où le diplomate particulière pût l'emporter sur l'union générale. L'idée de former une ligne défensive, ou plutôt offensive, entre les gouvernemens *constitutionnels* contre les monarchies n'est pas de saison, et le grand apôtre des Chartes est trop bien connu ici. L'arrivée de M. de Ch. à Verone est donc peu opportune. C'est, il faut le dire, un contresens diplomatique, à moins que le ministère de Louis XVIII. ne veuille fonder ses rapports avec ses Alliés sur une défiance réciproque. Croire que M. de C. sera admis à connaître les résolutions intimes des Cabinets, c'est se faire une illusion plus grande que toutes celles que le célèbre écrivain a consignées dans la Prose poétique.

Je dois dire aussi à V.E. que cette légion de diplomates que la France a envoyée au Congrès actuel, ressemble plus aux yeux des puissances à une armée d'observation qu'à une légation d'amitié et de confiance.

D'après les communications qui m'ont été faites, je dois certifier à V.E. que les Cabinets d'Autriche, de Russie, et de Prusse, pendant les dix jours qui viennent de s'écouler, se sont mis parfaitement d'accord par écrit sur toutes les questions qui vont s'agiter au Congrès. Ils répondront à tout d'une voix unanime. V.E. sentira combien cette circonstance est grave : qu'est qu'une union entre cinq Puissances, dans laquelle trois d'entre elles se présentent d'abord avec une opinion unique toute fermée ? Que peut faire la France dans ce cas ? Rompre, ou se trouver à la suite, ainsi qu'elle l'a fait jusqu'ici ; il importe à sa dignité de paraître en même temps que les autres, de discuter avec égalité. V.E. comprendra mieux que je ne pourrais le dire, combien ce fait que je viens de lui soumettre est digne de sa plus profonde attention : il touche aux bases fondamentales de l'alliance, qui ne peut subsister que lorsque la dignité de chaque partie contractante est conservée. C'est à V.E. à réparer le tort que les ministres précédens ont fait à notre diplomatie.

Ce fait du moins prouvera à V.E. que l'alliance monarchique est devenue aussi simple dans sa marche que formidable dans les ressources qu'elle présente. La France, peut-elle s'isoler d'un tel système quand elle peut y occuper un des premiers rangs ? Il est impossible de prévoir au juste les dispositions que le Duc de Wellington apportera au Congrès. La mort de Lord Londonderry fait craindre quelque changement défavorable dans les dispositions du Cabinet de Londres ; en définitive, s'il ne veut rien faire pour l'Espagne, on est sûr qu'il laissera tout faire. Dans tous les cas, c'est à vous, Monseigneur, d'enrayer ce point important, si la restauration de l'Espagne ne se fait pas à l'aide de la France, elle se fera tôt ou tard sans elle. Déjà un Roi Bourbon a été rétabli sur le trône de Naples par des étrangers, sans que nous ayons pu lui porter aucune assistance que l'offre inutile d'une charte de transaction avec ses sujets rebelles. Continuerons-nous de jouer ce rôle peu convenable et peu digne d'une grande monarchie ? Laisserons-nous toujours à l'Europe le soin de venger l'autorité royale chez nos voisins, chez nos parents, et le gouvernement du chef de la dynastie de Louis XVI. ne sera-t-il occupé qu'à proposer sans cesse des garanties en faveur des sujets révoltés contre les Rois de cette auguste famille ?

Dans la circonstance présente je crois que la Providence offre à V.E. une occasion de faire un grand bien, et d'acquiescer une grande gloire. Quelle que soit la nature des instructions que V.E. a reçues du Conseil des Ministres, il est impossible que ces instructions soient assez précises pour l'empêcher de profiter de cette occasion.

La restauration Française a été imparfaite, parce que la Révolution avait duré un quart de siècle, et parce que l'expérience des restaurations n'était pas encore acquise. La restauration d'Espagne doit être complète.

Les principes religieux et monarchiques doivent être rétablis dans toute leur pureté et dans tout leur éclat. Les Cabinets professent unanimement cette opinion, et elle sera manifestée à V.E. Eh bien ! Monseigneur, ce que l'Europe désire et projette, c'est à la France à l'exécuter. La France a dans ce moment les yeux fixés sur l'importante mission que vous êtes venu remplir. Il n'y a rien à gagner en opposant des délais aux vœux de l'Europe, il n'y a rien à perdre en s'empressant de les accomplir, vu que plus tôt ou plus tard l'Espagne sera délivrée et restaurée. Que ce soit vous, Monseigneur, qui remportiez l'honneur d'y avoir contribué le premier. La mémoire de vos aïeux vous sollicite à cette entreprise ; ce n'est pas pour rien que la Providence a placé un Montmorency au timon des affaires, lorsqu'un Roi Bourbon est dans les malheurs ; il est peut-être réservé à un descendant du premier Baron Chrétien d'attacher son nom au raffermissement des autels de la foi Catholique en Espagne, et au rétablissement du sceptre que Louis-le-Grand déposa dans les mains de son petit-fils.

Si je ne savais pas que des considérations purement humaines ont pesé de poids auprès de V.E., j'ajouterais que l'existence du ministère actuel ne peut être attachée à la résolution qu'il prendra relativement à l'Espagne. V.E. sait combien est précaire et divisée la majorité ministérielle. Un grand nombre de députés du Côté Droit pensent à l'égard de l'Espagne tout ce que j'ai exposé ci-dessus ; une autre partie, sans professer tout-à-fait les mêmes opinions, ne manquera pas cependant de reprocher au ministère de n'avoir pas pris une part active aux délibérations du Congrès. Les Libéraux qui tremblent sur le sort de la révolution d'Espagne ne s'en réuniront pas moins à leurs adversaires pour faire changer le ministère, car les changemens fréquens de ministère sont un des moyens les plus utiles pour désorganiser l'état au gré des Libéraux, et d'empêcher nos institutions de prendre racine. Le ministère se trouverait réduit à quelques voix du Centre à l'ouverture de la session ; et je connais telle ambition particulière, qui calcule déjà pour cette époque sur la réélection imposante des deux tiers de la Chambre, dans le cas où le ministère aurait persisté dans une politique de neutralité, au milieu des grands intérêts qui s'agitent, et n'aurait pris aucune part aux grandes questions qui vont se résoudre. Aussi, Monseigneur, si V.E. ne prend pas l'initiative dans les discussions qui doivent amener le salut de l'Espagne, on peut prédire avec quelque incertitude que le ministère actuel sera attaqué de toute part, et qu'il pourrait bien tomber dans l'oubli où gissent les ministères qui l'ont précédé.

En terminant cette trop longue note, il me reste à supplier V.E. de pardonner la liberté que j'ai prise de lui exposer sans aucune voile ma manière de voir. La précipitation avec laquelle j'ai rédigé cet écrit pourra faire excuser quelques phrases hardies.

Les bontés que V.E. m'a témoignées, le vif intérêt et la profonde reconnaissance que je professe pour sa personne, m'ont fait passer sur toute autre considération. C'est ici l'expression d'un Français initié dans la politique de l'Europe par la confiance que les différens ministres ont bien voulu lui témoigner, qui dépose dans vos mains toutes les connaissances qu'il a acquises dans la seule vue de prouver son zèle pour l'utilité de son pays, et pour la gloire de V.E. La franchise avec laquelle j'ai parlé de quelques opinions et de quelques personnes me force à supplier V.E. de ne faire aucune usage de cette note auprès de ceux qui l'entourent, bien qu'elles soient admises au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Cette note est confiée sous le sceau du secret à M. le Vicomte de Montmorency.



*Politique de l'Europe.*À Vérone, le 24<sup>me</sup> Oct., 1822.

M. de Montmorency a présenté Dimanche dernier une note verbale au Congrès, pour demander ce que l'Europe demande faire dans le cas où la France ferait à l'Espagne soit une guerre défensive, soit une guerre offensive. Les ministres sont à discuter cette note, et n'en donnent pas. MM. Pozzo di Borgo, de Tatischeff, voudraient que la guerre fût faite par l'Europe. Le Cabinet Français veut, comme sa dignité le réclame, la faire seul, et n'être qu'appuyé par l'Europe. Le Cabinet Autrichien penche pour cet avis. L'Empereur Alexandre veut que de quelque manière que ce soit, la chose se fasse. Wellington met des bâtons à la roue de tout côté; il dénigre notre gouvernement, notre armée; il prétend qu'à son passage à Paris il a surpris le secret du Roi et de M. de Villèle, qu'on ne fera rien, qu'on ne doit rien faire. Wellington se montre ici l'adversaire déclaré non seulement de la France, et surtout du parti Royaliste, mais encore de toutes les mesures monarchiques: il est encore plus mauvais que son gouvernement. Au milieu des dissensions prolongées et fort embrouillées auxquelles l'affaire d'Espagne donne lieu, on espère aussi que les sottises des nouveaux Cortès forceront la France à rappeler son ministre, et à tirer le canon. Tel est aussi, selon moi, le seul moyen que la Providence puisse employer pour résoudre une question aussi difficile que celle qui s'agit ici depuis quatre jours.

Les autres questions sont suspendues et même non entamées. Sous deux ou trois jours la cause des Espagnols sera peut-être jugée par un protocole du moins provisoirement.

Dans tous les cas si la France fait la guerre, elle est assurée d'avance de tout l'appui du continent.

[ 218. ]

À S. A. le Prince de Metternich.

MON CHER PRINCE,

Verone, ce 25<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

J'ai reçu par le courier de hier les instructions que je désirais sur l'affaire Turque, et je me trouve dans le cas de pouvoir continuer les conférences quand vous le jugera à propos. Je préférerais ce matin, ou demain matin, pour la conférence.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*Vérone, ce 25<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

Je m'empresse, mon cher Duc, de vous proposer l'heure de deux dans la matinée de demain, pour la conférence que vous désirez tenir dans les affaires du Levant.

Je me flatte pouvoir vous adresser, avant le départ de votre courier pour Londres, l'office relatif à l'*Austrian Loan*. Je viens de supplier S.M.I. de m'autoriser à cet effet.

Veuillez agréer, mon cher Duc, tous mes hommages.

METTERNICH.

To Prince Metternich.

Verona, 25th Nov., 1822.

The undersigned Minister Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty has the honour of transmitting to his Highness Prince Metternich, Chancellor of State, &c., &c., minutes of what he stated verbally to the conference of the Cabinet ministers on the 19th inst., on declining to sign the *procès verbal* defining the *casus fœderis* among the Allies, and on the 20th inst., upon the confidential communication made to the undersigned by his Highness and their Excellencies the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Prussia, and the Secretary of State of Russia, of the drafts of the despatches proposed to be written by his Highness and by those ministers respectively to the ministers representing the several courts at Madrid, which minutes the undersigned read to the conference of the same Cabinet ministers on the 21st inst.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[The same to Viscount Montmorency, Count Bernstorff, and Count Nesselrode.]

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To the Right Hon. George Canning.

[ 220. ]

SIR,

Verona, 26th Nov., 1822.

I enclose my Memorandum on the Slave Trade,\* which was read at the General Conference of the Allied ministers on the 24th inst., and is to be taken into consideration to-morrow. I believe that all will concur in a general declaration, and I enclose a draft of what will be proposed. France will take the other propositions *ad referendum*. The ministers of the other three Powers will agree to all the propositions; but I have reason to believe that the Russian ministers will propose that after communication with Portugal, and giving time to Portugal to abolish, all commerce with Portugal should be discontinued, as well as with the Brazils, if the Portuguese government and the government of the Brazils should refuse to abolish the slave trade.

I think the proposition is intended as a blow to us.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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\* See page 550.

[ 221. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 26th Nov., 1822.

I enclose the Memorandum upon the Spanish colonies, which I delivered to the Conference on the 24th inst., and which will be taken into consideration to-morrow. I have no reason to believe that any objection will be stated to our course of proceeding, although I understand that the language of the Corps Diplomatique upon this subject is regret that Great Britain should be the protector of Jacobins and insurgents in all parts of the world. As the piracies in the West Indies rendered necessary a departure from the principle laid down in the first instructions which I received upon this subject, viz., the recognition of the governments of those colonies in which all contest had ceased as governments *de facto*, I considered it best to state generally the necessity of some further recognition, without specifying of what colonies nor on what grounds, excepting on the general ground of the existing piracies. If the subject should be discussed in the Conference of to-morrow I will make use of the arguments and principles laid down in the original instructions; but I have reason to believe that my Memorandum will be received, as information of our proceedings and intentions, upon which no remark will be made, and that it will remain with his Majesty's government to adopt such measures upon this subject as they may think proper.

I have, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 222. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 26th Nov., 1822.

I am concerned that it is not in my power to give you an encouraging or satisfactory account of my proceedings respecting the settlement of the arrangement with the Austrian government on the Austrian loan.

Upon my arrival at Vienna I found the utmost unwillingness in the Austrian government to communicate at all upon this subject, and the apprehension of my acting upon it has, in point of fact, been the cause of much of the unusual constraint which I have observed upon others.

It has been necessary, therefore, that I should in general communicate in writing; and I cannot give you a better or more authentic account of a part of what has passed than by transmitting to you the copy of a letter which I wrote to Prince Metternich on the 9th inst., in answer to one which he wrote to me on the 7th, in which you will find detailed all that had passed up to that period.

I enclose besides copies of all the letters which I have written to him on this subject since my arrival at Vienna, and a copy of the only one I have received from him.

On the 9th inst. I saw Prince Metternich, and he asked me whether I adhered to the proposition contained in my private letter to him of the 19th of October, viz., three millions sterling in money, and one million in quicksilver, &c., as he said he had understood from the late Lord Londonderry that the affair might be arranged on better terms.

I answered that I had no objection to state confidentially that we would settle the affair upon the payment of a smaller sum in money, but that if the sum was reduced the terms of payment must be shortened. He then said he hoped shortly to be able to make me a farther and satisfactory communication upon this subject.

On the 24th inst. I spoke to him upon it, and stated that above a fortnight had elapsed since he had given me reason to expect a further communication, that I expected to be able to set out in a few days, and that my government would expect that I should settle this affair before I should quit Vienna. He then said that he had communicated with Count Stadion, and had taken the orders of the Emperor; and that he should in a day or two send me an official note, recognising on the part of the Emperor the principle of an arrangement, and of the payment of a sum of money. He then said that plenipotentiaries might be named to treat for the settlement of the affair at Vienna.

I did not conceal from Prince Metternich my surprise at this communication after all that had passed, and I begged him to observe that the affair was placed exactly as it had been left by the late Lord Londonderry, in the communications with his Highness at Hanover. This Prince Metternich positively denied. He declared that he had never in conversation with Lord Londonderry either admitted the existence of the debt, or the prin-

ciple of a payment in money. I told him that the understanding of the late Lord Londonderry was quite different—that he had repeatedly in my presence stated that he had assured Prince Metternich that the affair could not be settled without the payment of money, and that the Prince had admitted that a payment of some money was necessary, and that Lord Londonderry's instructions to Mr. Gordon had been founded upon this principle, as well as those of the government there. The Prince still insisted upon it that we could produce no document to prove the admission by the Emperor of the principle of a money payment, and that he was now prepared to admit this principle by an official note.

I then took the opportunity of urging him, for the sake of the credit of his government, to make arrangements for settling this business, if possible, before the meeting of Parliament. I stated that if the King's ministers should be under the necessity of going down to Parliament to state how this matter stood, it was not at all improbable that they would be called upon to sell the securities, or to take some other steps to recover the debt which would be equally disagreeable to the British government, as they would be to that of his Majesty the Emperor.

To this the Prince replied that if any measures of that kind were adopted they should be under the necessity of taking some measures to cry down the value of the securities, as, although they admitted the necessity of some arrangement to put an end to this question between the two countries, they did not acknowledge the existence of the debt.

We were then interrupted, and I wrote to him my note, No. 8, to which he wrote the answer No. 9, both enclosed above, and although more than ten days have since elapsed, and I have seen him twice, I have had no further communication from him. In the conversation which I had with Prince Metternich on the 18th of October, referred to in my letter of the 19th, No. 3, he stated positively that the Austrian government did not admit the existence of the debt, and that he conceived that the British government ought not to desire such acknowledgment, as, in point of fact, if the debt existed it ought to be paid; and the government could have no right to demand less than the whole sum. He then contended that the silence of the British government upon the existence of this debt on the different

occasions on which arrangements had been made between the two governments for the payment of money, tended to prove that the British as well as the Austrian government considered the whole transaction as cancelled. In answer, I begged to refer him to the treaties and the securities in our hands, and to the facts that the Austrian government had paid two years' interest on one of the debts, and that the intercourse between the two governments had been suspended for nearly two years during a most interesting period of the first revolutionary war, because the Austrian government had refused to ratify the treaty for the second loan, which had, however, at last been ratified. I then asked him whether he could produce any document to show that the debt had ever been cancelled, or the claim to it given up. I observed that our silence upon the debt when we were advancing money to enable the Austrian government to make further exertions could be easily accounted for. I then asked him whether he had ever held this language to the late Lord Londonderry, which he declared he had.

I beg leave, in justice to the memory of Lord Londonderry, to refer you to his Lordship's letter of the 19th of January, 1822, to Prince Metternich, in which you will see in what manner Lord Londonderry treated such notions when they came, not from Prince Metternich, but from Count Stadion, which letter would certainly prove that that was the first time that such notions had been broached to Lord Londonderry. Having referred you to that letter from Lord Londonderry, I now beg to draw your attention to a letter written by Prince Metternich to Mr. Gordon on the 8th of September last, in answer to two notes from Mr. Gordon, one of the 7th of April, the other of the 20th of August, the latter of which I also annex in copy. His Highness's letter was written after the receipt of the accounts from Vienna of the death of Lord Londonderry; and for the first time Prince Metternich brought forward in it the principles which it contains, and which formed the subject of his conversation with me on the 8th of October.

I did not see this letter till Sunday last.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—I also add, for more easy reference, copy of a letter addressed to the late Lord Londonderry, in December, 1822,

the tone of which you will not fail to remark, contrasted with that assumed in the note of the 8th of September to Mr. Gordon, and at present, on the subject of the Austrian loan.

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[ 223 ]    DECLARATION OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON ANNEXED TO  
                  THE PROTOCOL OF THE 26TH NOVEMBER, 1822.

The plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty has already, since his arrival at the Congress, taken an opportunity of declaring the sense which the King, his master, entertains of the magnanimity of his august ally, the Emperor of Russia, and of his moderation in the recent discussions with the Ottoman Porte; and he is happy to avail himself of this opportunity of repeating those sentiments, and the sincere desire of the King that those discussions which have had for their object to bring the Ottoman Porte to a just sense of what was due to his Imperial Majesty, may terminate in the re-establishment of all the amicable relations between the two Powers.

The object of the Allied courts, up to the present moment, has been to induce the Porte, by their representations, to perform the stipulations of its treaties with his Imperial Majesty, and, considering that Hospodars have been named and installed in the government of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, that the Turkish troops have been withdrawn from these provinces, that the Porte has declared, and in several instances manifested its determination to protect the performance of the rites of the Christian religion within its dominions, and the rebuilding of the churches destroyed at the commencement of the existing disturbances, and in general to prevent all persecution of Christians on account of their religion, and to extend its protection to those who may have submitted, or may submit themselves, in consequence of the recent proclamations of pardon and amnesty,—it may be hoped that the time is not far distant at which his Imperial Majesty may consider that the Porte has entitled itself to the expression of his Imperial Majesty's satisfaction, as held out in one of the alternatives of the note of his Imperial Majesty's Plenipotentiary.

The first of the other points referred to in the said note, viz., the official communication to be made to his Imperial Majesty's government by the government of the Ottoman Porte, of the

re-establishment in the Principalities of the government of the Hospodars, as required by the treaties between his Imperial Majesty and the Ottoman Porte, is, although not matter of treaty, so obviously a proper manifestation of the desire of the Ottoman Porte to see the relations of amity and good neighbourhood between the two Powers restored, that his Britannic Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople will readily suggest and use his good offices for its early adoption by the Porte.

The commerce of the Black Sea, as affected by the custom-house regulations of the Porte, must be a subject of solicitude to his Imperial Majesty, and in this view it will always excite the interest of his Britannic Majesty.

His Majesty's plenipotentiary is accordingly authorised to declare that his Majesty's ambassador will be instructed to use his good offices, and to exert the influence which his Majesty may possess at the Porte, in concert with his Allies, to forward the arrangements which the Sovereigns, his Allies, who have not yet obtained the privilege, may be desirous of making with the Porte for the passage of the Bosphorus by vessels bearing their flags respectively, in the same manner as the King's ambassador is already employed by his Majesty's command in favour of the flag of the King of Sardinia.

His Majesty's plenipotentiary trusts that these measures when completed will place the commerce of the Black Sea upon a better footing than that on which it stood previous to the recent disturbances, and that his Imperial Majesty will be convinced of the sincere desire of his Britannic Majesty to promote any arrangements which can tend to the prosperity of any part of his Imperial Majesty's dominions.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 224. ]

SIR,

Verona, 26th Nov., 1822.

I did not send off the messenger on Friday, as I told you I should in my despatch, as the Cabinet ministers of the three contracting Powers announced an intention of answering the minutes which I read to them in the conference of the 21st, of what I had stated to them in the conferences of the 19th and



20th. These answers have, however, not yet appeared, and I think it proper to send off the despatches which I wrote to you on the 22nd.

I beg you to express my most respectful and grateful acknowledgments to his Majesty for his most gracious approbation of my conduct in these transactions, as far as his Majesty had any knowledge of them at the date of your despatch, No. 1. I wish that I could feel confident that I deserved his Majesty's approbation for having been successful in preserving the general peace. I have certainly done everything in my power, and according to the instructions I received, with that object in view; and I cannot but be apprehensive that if the task had fallen into abler hands the success would have been more satisfactory. In the conferences of the 20th and 21st, I explained to the Allied ministers the circumstances in which his Majesty stood in relation to the Spanish government; that, in point of fact, the British government had much more ground of quarrel with Spain than that of France, and the small chance that existed that his Majesty's government could have any influence over the decisions of the Spanish government, when the despatches which had been communicated to me should be communicated *in extenso* to the Spanish government. The ministers, however, all, and particularly the French minister, requested that his Majesty's plenipotentiary should be apprised of the steps to be adopted, and that he should be directed to endeavour to allay the ferment, and to do everything in his power to preserve peace. I stated that I should report this wish, and that I did not doubt that his Majesty's government would feel it their duty to endeavour to preserve peace by making an exertion at Madrid to calm the irritation of the Spanish government, although we had not been successful at Verona in preventing the use of irritating language. At the same time, I begged it might be understood clearly that nothing could be said to the Spanish government on the subject of its differences with France, as we did not understand them, and could not interfere in them.

I hope to be able to leave this place on Thursday, or at latest on Friday. I shall pass by Lyons and Paris, at which last place I will delay only to pay my respects to the King, and proceed immediately to London.

I will despatch another messenger to-morrow night, or Thursday, with the result of the conference on the slave trade, the Spanish colonies, the navigation of the Rhine, and the Turkish question.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Vérone, le 26<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

Le soussigné, Chancelier de Cour et d'Etat de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, en recevant les différentes communications que S.E. M. le Duc de Wellington, Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté Britannique, lui a faites à diverses reprises sur l'*Austrian Loan*, a eu l'honneur de renouveler à son Excellence l'assurance positive, donnée antérieurement à M. Gordon, que sa Majesté l'Empereur est disposée à se prêter aux arrangements qui pourraient faciliter la conclusion de cette affaire sur des bases qui se concilieraient avec les intérêts des deux gouvernemens; et que le ministère Autrichien était prêt à entrer en négociation avec le ministère de S.M.B., sur des moyens et des termes d'acquittement modérés et d'une convenance réciproque.

Pressé par les instances de M. le Duc de Wellington d'entrer sur-le-champ en négociation, à Vérone, sur un objet qui est plus particulièrement de la compétence du Ministère des Finances, le soussigné s'est vu dans le cas de prendre à cet égard les ordres de l'Empereur, et sa Majesté vient de lui donner celui de déclarer à M. le Duc de Wellington qu'elle désire vivement elle-même de voir mettre un terme à cette affaire, et de faire disparaître un objet de discussion pénible entre deux gouvernemens, dont l'ancienne et constante union a été si utile à leurs intérêts réciproques, et si précieuse pour le rétablissement de la paix en Europe; que dans une affaire toutefois d'une aussi haute importance pour les finances de sa monarchie, il était impossible à sa Majesté de prendre une décision définitive dans un moment où elle se trouvait éloignée de son Ministre des Finances et de son Conseil d'Etat; que cette affaire ne pouvant se traiter convenablement et utilement qu'à Vienne, elle était prête à nommer un plénipotentiaire, qui serait chargé de discuter et d'arrêter les bases d'un arrangement à l'amiable entre les deux gouvernemens avec le plénipotentiaire que sa Majesté Britannique a déjà nommé à cet effet; que pour en faciliter la conclusion, elle consentirait même à un sacrifice pécuniaire, auquel elle s'était refusée jusqu'ici, mais que la quotité et le mode de ce sacrifice ne pourraient être déterminés qu'à Vienne, de concert et d'accord avec le Ministère des Finances. Sur ces bases l'Empereur est prêt à donner l'ordre d'ouvrir à Vienne les négociations avec le Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté Britannique; et sa Majesté Impériale désire sincèrement qu'elles puissent être terminées avant l'ouverture de la prochaine session parlementaire.

Le soussigné, en informant M. le Duc de Wellington de cette décision de sa Majesté l'Empereur, son auguste maître, saisit, &c.

METTERNICH.

225.] MEMORANDUM TO PRINCE METTERNICH ON THE EVACUATION  
OF PIEDMONT.

27th Nov., 1822.

J'ai vu ce soir le Roi de Sardaigne, ayant vu ce matin le Général de la Tour. Il paraît que le Général avait soumis au Roi un travail, portant que les troupes Autrichiennes devraient évacuer le pays par tiers; c'est-à-dire, 4000 en quatre mois, à commencer de 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre; 4000 en quatre mois après; et 4000 au 30<sup>me</sup> Septembre, 1823.

Il me paraît qu'ils seraient disposés à adopter cette proposition; c'est-à-dire, 4000 à partir dans un mois après le Congrès; 3000 au 31<sup>me</sup> Mars, 1823; et 5000 au 30<sup>me</sup> Septembre, 1823.

De cette manière vous auriez 5000 pour les derniers six mois. Je vous prie de me dire si cela vous convient. Je désire le savoir pour finir mes instructions pour Lord Londonderry.

WELLINGTON.

[ 226. ]

*To his Highness Prince Metternich.*

Verona, 27th Nov., 1822.

The undersigned Minister Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty has the honour of acknowledging the receipt of the note of his Highness Prince Metternich, dated the 26th inst., regarding the Austrian loan.

The undersigned does not apologise to his Highness for, during his residence at Verona, pressing him to take some measures to bring to a conclusion an arrangement upon that subject which has been in discussion between the two governments for more than a year, and the conclusion of which is admitted to be essential to the honour and interests of both countries.

The confidential verbal communication which took place in October, 1821, between the late Marquess of Londonderry and his Highness, and what has passed since in writing in the same form; the instructions of his Majesty, signed by the late Marquess of Londonderry, to his plenipotentiary at Vienna; and the wish and confident expectation of the Marquess of Londonderry, frequently expressed, that he should find the negotiation upon this subject concluded, and that he should not be embarrassed with the necessary attention to it when he should arrive to

take part in the deliberations of the Congress on other subjects, will, together with the sense of the undersigned of the importance of the arrangement to the home government of both countries, sufficiently account for the earnestness with which the undersigned has pressed this subject on the attention of his Highness, and for the expression of his surprise that on one side it should have been clearly understood that a payment in money by his Majesty the Emperor was the basis of the arrangement, and that that understanding is invariably so expressed, while on the other there was no such understanding.

The undersigned has certainly no official document in his possession admitting that principle on the part of his Majesty the Emperor, excepting that which his Highness Prince Metternich transmitted to him last night, and he only regrets that he was not aware at an earlier period since his arrival at Vienna on the 29th of September last, that that was the point at which the negotiation stood.

WELLINGTON.

*Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Vérone, le 27<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance la lettre que je viens d'adresser à Lord Strangford. Votre Excellence y recevra les témoignages de confiance dont leurs Majestés Impériales ont honoré cet Ambassadeur, et qu'il vœura assurément tous ses efforts à justifier.

C'est à vous, Monsieur le Duc, à contribuer efficacement au succès de la négociation dont Lord Strangford se trouve principalement chargé, moyennant les instructions les plus aptes à seconder ses démarches pour arriver au terme d'un complication dont les amis du bien ne sauraient assez déplorer la durée. Les nobles vues et les sentimens que votre Excellence a manifesté dans toute cette affaire me sont un garant certain qu'elle ne laissera pas échapper cette occasion nouvelle de rendre des services essentiels à une cause qui intéresse aussi éminemment les Cours Alliées et le maintien du repos général.

Veuillez recevoir, Monsieur le Duc, les assurances de ma haute considération.

METTERNICH.

[ ENCLOSURES. ]

1.

*Le Comte de Nesselrode to Prince Metternich.*

Vérone, ce 1<sup>er</sup>me Nov., 1822.

Je me suis empressé, mon Prince, de porter à la connaissance de l'Empereur la proposition que vous avez faite, au nom de votre auguste Souverain, d'en-

voyer à Constantinople un négociateur, avec la mission spéciale d'user de tous les moyens possibles pour engager la Porte à faire droit aux demandes de la Russie.

S.M.I. a reçu cette proposition comme un nouveau gage de l'amitié dont S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche lui donne tant de preuves.

Toutefois et bien que S.M.I. ait abandonné à la sagesse de ses Alliés la marche ultérieure des négociations, elle est d'avis qu'une expérience locale acquise par un long séjour et des rapports de confiance intime et personnelle déjà établis avec les ministres de la Porte, offrent, dans une conjoncture semblable, les premières garanties de succès. Ces garanties le Vicomte de Strangford les possède à un haut degré, et l'Empereur pense que s'il est possible que des négociations amènent sous peu un résultat satisfaisant, c'est le zèle et l'habileté de cet Ambassadeur qui peuvent le plus facilement l'obtenir.

Je vous renouvelle, mon Prince, les remerciemens de S.M.I. pour votre proposition, et je saisis avec plaisir cette occasion, &c.,

NESSELRODE.

## II.

### *Le Prince de Metternich to Lord Strangford.*

MILORD,

Vérone, le 26<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

Vous êtes informé que S.M.I. de Toutes les Russies avait manifesté le désir que les déterminations auxquelles elle s'arrêterait fussent transmises à Constantinople par un envoyé particulier. L'Empereur, mon auguste maître, toujours prêt à servir la cause du maintien de la paix et les vœux d'un Allié, a mis à cet effet à la disposition de l'Empereur Alexandre tel individu de ses propres employés que ce monarque croirait le plus apte à remplir un objet d'une importance aussi majeure. S.M.I. et R.A. n'a pas moins cru devoir m'ordonner de représenter au Cabinet de Russie que plus elle était disposée à se prêter à ses desirs, plus elle se reconnaissait le droit de lui avouer que la personne qu'elle regardait comme la plus apte à atteindre le but uniformément désiré par elle, par l'Empereur de Russie, et par les augustes Alliés, lui semblait être votre Excellence. L'opinion de S.M.I. s'est trouvée fondée sur la connaissance parfaite que vous avez du Divan et sur l'ensemble des qualités qui vous distinguent.

Ces raisons n'ont point échappé à l'esprit éclairé de l'Empereur Alexandre, et S.M. Impériale vient de nous fournir une preuve nouvelle de son désir sincère d'arriver avec la Porte à des termes d'accommodement, que l'Empereur mon maître regarde, pour sa part, comme renfermant le gage le plus patent et le plus honorable de la modération, de la sagesse, et de la loyauté qui distinguent si éminemment son auguste ami et Allié.

Je m'empresse d'avoir l'honneur de transmettre ci-jointe à votre Excellence la copie d'une lettre que je viens de recevoir de Monsieur le Comte de Nesselrode. Elle vous prouvera que l'Empereur de Russie dépose entre vos mains la conduite de l'affaire dans les termes dans lesquels elle se trouve placée aujourd'hui.

Votre Excellence est ainsi chargée d'une hante et importante commission ; de son succès dépendra la fin d'une complication qui a été aussi déplorable dans son origine que dangereuse dans son développement, et qu'il est de l'intérêt de l'Europe entière de voir se terminer le plus promptement possible. Les preuves de confiance que vous avez reçues, Milord, depuis longtems de la part du Cabinet dont la direction m'est confiée, ne sauraient vous laisser un doute que c'est avec un sentiment de tranquillité véritable que nous voyons un dépôt aussi précieux confié à vos soins directs. Vous ne pouvez nourrir un doute que

l'Empereur mon maître n'ait identifié dans cette affaire sa pensée entière avec celle de S.M.I. de Toutes les Russies. Votre succès sera regardé ainsi par S.M.I. et R.A. comme devant exciter à un haut degré sa reconnaissance personnelle.

L'internence va recevoir l'ordre de seconder les efforts de V.E. par tous les moyens en son pouvoir. Il ne recevra pas moins celui de s'entendre avec elle sur tous les points, et j'ose espérer que vos soins réunis arriveront à couronner l'œuvre salubre dans laquelle se concentrent tant de vœux.

Recevez, &c.

*To Count de la Tour.*

[ 227. ]

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

28<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

J'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à V.E. qu'après que j'ai eu l'honneur d'une audience de sa Majesté hier au soir j'ai vu S.A.I. le Prince de Metternich, et je lui ai proposé l'arrangement qui suit, auquel il a consenti et l'a adopté.

Que l'évacuation totale du Piedmont par les troupes Autrichiennes se fera au 30<sup>me</sup> Septembre, 1823.

Que 4000 hommes se retireront en un mois après que le Congrès sera fini.

Que 3000 hommes se retireront au 30<sup>me</sup> Mars, 1823; et que les 5000 hommes qui resteront se retireront au 30<sup>me</sup> Septembre, 1823.

Je suis vraiment d'opinion qu'on ne peut pas demander à S.M. l'Empereur de Russie pendant les derniers six mois moins que 5000 hommes; et que cette arrangement est à tout considérer le meilleur qu'on ait pu adopter.

Je prie V.E. de le faire agréer à S.M., et d'être assuré de la considération très distinguée avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 228. ]

SIR,

Verona, 28th Nov., 1822.

Referring to my despatch (No. 25) of the 19th, in which I enclosed the despatch from Count Bernstorff to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid on Spanish affairs, I now enclose a note from Count Bernstorff, with a minute of the alterations in that despatch which had been made at my suggestion.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

## [ENCLOSURE.]

*Le Comte de Bernstorff to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

[Extract.]

Vérone, le 27<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

“ Le soussigné, Ministre d’État et des Affaires Étrangères de sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, a reçu avec bien de la reconnaissance la communication que sa Grâce Monsieur le Duc de Wellington a eu la bonté de lui faire des précis et mémoires, dont lecture a été faite aux conférences du 20, 21, et 24 du courant. L’indisposition du soussigné ne lui ayant pas permis d’assister aux conférences des trois derniers jours, il n’en vouera que plus d’attention au contenu des pièces qui vient de lui être soumises.

“ Il saisit cette occasion pour mettre sous les yeux de Monsieur le Duc de Wellington l’aperyu des changemens qui, à la demande de sa Grâce, ont été faits dans la dépêche ostensible adressée au chargé d’affaires de Prusse en Espagne.

“ Il prie sa Grâce d’agréer le nouvel hommage de sa plus haute considération.”

BERNSTORFF.

CHANGEMENTS faits, à la demande de S. G. M. le Duc de WELLINGTON, dans l’instruction ostensible adressée au Chargé des Affaires de S.M. le Roi de Prusse à Madrid.

## ANCIENNE RÉDACTION.

*Premier Passage.*

Les choses en sont venues au point que les Puissances de l’Europe doivent enfin se demander quels sont aujourd’hui et quels seront désormais leurs rapports avec l’Espagne.

*Second Passage.*

Cette considération suffirait pour déterminer les Puissances Alliées à rompre le silence sur un état de choses qui d’un jour à l’autre peut compromettre la tranquillité de l’Europe.

## NOUVELLE RÉDACTION.

*Premier Passage.*

Les choses en sont venues au point que les Souverains réunis à Vérone ont enfin dû se demander quels sont aujourd’hui et quels seront désormais leurs rapports avec l’Espagne.

*Second Passage.*

Cette considération suffirait pour déterminer les Souverains réunis à rompre le silence sur un état de choses qui d’un jour à l’autre peut compromettre la tranquillité de l’Europe.

[ 22<sup>e</sup>. ]*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 28th Nov., 1822.

I enclose the protocols on the Turkish affair, with my note and those of the French and Prussian ministers, and the answer of Monsieur de Tatistcheff annexed to the protocol of the sixth meeting. I altered the latter part of my note in consequence of the receipt of your despatch No. 17, and of the earnest

request of the Emperor of Russia's ministers that I should express on the part of my government some interest in the prosperity of the Russian commerce in the Black Sea. I likewise enclose a letter to me from Prince Metternich, enclosing one which he had received from Count Nesselrode and one which the Prince addressed to Lord Strangford. I don't send you the two latter documents, as Lord Strangford has already transmitted them to you. The negotiations of the Porte being thus, by desire of his Majesty the Emperor, placed under the direction of Lord Strangford, and the censure of his past conduct being thus removed, his Lordship has set out on his return to his station.

I enclose you the copies of the Memorandum which I have given him for his guidance till you shall send him the instructions; likewise of the covering letter.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

L

PROCÈS-VERBAL de la Conférence du 26<sup>me</sup> Novembre, 1822. AFFAIRES D'ORIENT.

A la suite des déclarations consignées au Procès-Verbal de la Conférence du 9<sup>me</sup> Novembre, M. le Marquis de Caraman, M. le Prince de Hatzfeldt, et M. le Duc de Wellington, ont lu et déposé celles qui se trouvent ci-annexées sub A, B, C.

M. le Conseiller intime actuel de Tatistcheff, prévoyant qu'il recevrait de sa Majesté Impériale de toutes les Russies des instructions qui le mettraient dans le cas de répondre aux déclarations de Messieurs les Plénipotentiaires des autres Cours, a demandé pour cet effet une autre conférence, laquelle a été arrêtée pour le lendemain.

DÉCLARATION de Monsieur le Duc de Wellington au Protocole de la Conférence du 26<sup>me</sup> Novembre, 1822.

Le Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté Britannique a déjà, depuis son arrivée au congrès, saisi une occasion pour déclarer combien le Roi, son maître, reconnaît la magnanimité et la modération de son auguste allié l'Empereur de Russie dans les discussions récentes avec la Porte Ottomane; et c'est avec le plus grand plaisir qu'il profite de l'occasion présente pour exprimer les mêmes sentimens et le désir sincère du Roi, que les discussions qui ont eu pour objet d'inspirer à la Porte Ottomane des vœux justes sur ce qui est dû à sa Majesté Impériale, réussissent à rétablir les relations amicales entre les deux Puissances.

Le but des Cours Alliées a été constamment celui d'engager la Porte par



leurs représentations à remplir les stipulations de ses traités avec sa Majesté Impériale. Et maintenant que des Hospodars ont été nommés et investis du gouvernement des Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie; que les troupes Ottomanes ont été retirées de ces provinces; que la Porte a proclamé et dans plusieurs cas manifesté sa détermination de protéger l'exercice de la religion Chrétienne dans ses Etats, de rétablir les églises démolies au commencement des troubles actuels, et en général de prévenir toute persécution de Chrétiens par rapport à leur religion, et d'étendre sa protection à ceux qui se seraient soumis, ou se soumettraient encore en conséquence des actes de pardon et d'amnistie: il est à espérer que le terme ne sera pas éloigné, où sa Majesté Impériale jugera à propos d'accorder à la Porte ce témoignage de sa haute satisfaction, qui lui est offert dans une des alternatives de la note du Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté.

Le second objet touché dans la dite note est la notification officielle à faire au gouvernement de sa Majesté Impériale par la Porte, relativement au rétablissement dans les Principautés du gouvernement des Hospodars, tel que les traités le réclament. Quoique cette notification ne soit pas exigée par les Traités, elle serait cependant une démarche si évidemment propre à manifester le désir de la Porte de voir les relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage rétablies entre les deux Puissances, que l'Ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople proposera et emploiera avec empressement ses bons offices, pour que la Porte s'y décide le plus tôt possible.

Le commerce de la Mer Noire, et la manière dont il pourra être affecté par les réglemens de douane de la Porte, doit nécessairement offrir un sujet de sollicitude à sa Majesté Impériale; et sous ce point de vue réclamera toujours l'intérêt de sa Majesté Britannique. Le Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté est en conséquence autorisé à déclarer que son Ambassadeur sera instruit de faire valoir ses bons offices, et l'influence que sa Majesté pourra se promettre auprès de la Porte, afin de faciliter, de concert avec ses Alliés, les arrangemens que tels Souverains ses Alliés qui ne jouissent pas encore de ce privilège pourront désirer de faire avec la Porte, pour passer le Bosphore sous leurs pavillons, ainsi que l'Ambassadeur de sa Majesté s'est employé déjà, par ordre de sa Majesté, en faveur du pavillon du Roi de Sardaigne.

Le Plénipotentiaire Britannique se flatte que ces mesures, lorsqu'elles seront complétées, placeront le commerce de la Mer Noire sur un meilleur pied, que celui où il se trouvait avant les derniers troubles, et que sa Majesté Impériale sera convaincue du sincère désir de sa Majesté Britannique, de faciliter tout arrangement tendant à la prospérité d'une partie quelconque des états de sa Majesté Impériale.

#### DÉCLARATION du Plénipotentiaire de France au Protocole de la Conférence du 26<sup>me</sup> Novembre, 1822.

Le soussigné, en répondant à la déclaration qui lui a été communiquée par M. le Plénipotentiaire Russe dans la conférence du 9<sup>me</sup> Novembre, est chargé de déposer au protocole de la conférence de ce jour l'adhésion la plus complète de son gouvernement aux conditions auxquelles la Cour de Russie attache le rétablissement de ses relations diplomatiques ordinaires avec la Porte, et le renvoi de ses agens dans les Principautés du Danube.

Les sentimens nobles et généreux qui caractérisent depuis si longtemps

toutes les déterminations de sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, n'ont jamais permis à sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne d'élever le moindre doute sur ce qu'elle avait droit d'attendre de son auguste Allié, dans une circonstance où le repos de l'Europe se trouvait dépendant de ses hautes résolutions.

La modération dont sa Majesté Impériale a donné des preuves si marquantes depuis les malheureux événemens qui ont troublé la paix de l'Orient, vient encore de recevoir un nouvel éclat de la déclaration communiquée par M. le Plénipotentiaire Russe.

Le soussigné s'empresse d'assurer Monsieur le Plénipotentiaire de Russie que son gouvernement ne négligera aucun des moyens qui sont en son pouvoir pour engager le Divan à satisfaire au plus tôt la Cour de Russie sur les conditions auxquelles elle a réduit ses prétentions envers la Porte.

En unissant ses efforts à ceux de ses augustes Alliés pour hâter autant que possible le retour de la bonne intelligence entre les deux empires, sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne se félicite de pouvoir donner à sa Majesté Impériale une nouvelle preuve de ses sentimens pour son auguste personne, et du vif intérêt qu'elle ne cessera de prendre à tout ce qui peut toucher l'honneur et la dignité de sa couronne. Elle croit en même temps remplir un véritable devoir en saisissant une nouvelle occasion de montrer à l'Europe ce que l'on peut attendre de son fidèle attachement au principe d'union, qui fait la force de la grande alliance.

**DÉCLARATION du Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse au  
Protocole du 26<sup>me</sup> Novembre, 1822.**

Le Plénipotentiaire de Prusse pour les Affaires de l'Orient est autorisé à déclarer au Protocole de ce jour :

Que sa Majesté le Roi, son auguste maître, reconnaissant toute l'étendue des sacrifices nombreux que sa Majesté Impériale de toutes les Russies a portés à l'intérêt de ses augustes Alliés et au repos de l'Europe, partage dans toute leur étendue les principes et les sentimens exprimés dans la déclaration que le Cabinet d'Autriche a fait insérer en réponse à celle du Plénipotentiaire de Russie au Protocole du 9<sup>me</sup> Novembre, et que le chargé d'affaires de Prusse à Constantinople recevra les ordres les plus précis de joindre ses efforts à ceux des Ambassadeurs des Cours Alliées pour obtenir enfin l'accomplissement des justes demandes du Cabinet de Russie, et pour écarter par là les griefs qui s'opposent encore au rétablissement des relations diplomatiques et amicales des deux gouvernemens.

**II.**

**PROCES-VERBAL de la Conférence du 27 Novembre, 1822. AFFAIRES  
D'ORIENT.**

M. le Conseiller intime actuel de Tatistcheff, ayant annoncé hier qu'il se réservait de remettre à la Conférence de ce jour la déclaration dont il serait chargé par sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, a lu et déposé au Protocole la pièce ci-annexée, par laquelle sa Majesté Impériale a bien voulu exprimer aux Cours Alliées sa satisfaction de l'empressement qu'elles ont mis à recommander à leurs ministres accrédités à Constantinople de redoubler de soins et d'efforts pour le succès de la négociation importante qui leur est confiée.

**DÉCLARATION du Plénipotentiaire de Russie au Protocole de la Conférence  
du 27<sup>me</sup> Novembre, 1822.**

L'Empereur a pris connaissance des réponses communiquées au nom des Cours Alliées, à la Déclaration faite par le Plénipotentiaire de Russie, dans la conférence du 9<sup>me</sup> Novembre.

Sa Majesté a vu avec une satisfaction véritable ses Alliés apprécier les motifs de ses déterminations, reconnaître itérativement combien sont justes et modérées les conditions qu'elle propose à la Porte, et y joindre la promesse de redoubler de soins et d'efforts, pour engager cette Puissance à les accepter et à les exécuter dans toute leur étendue.

Il semble permis de croire que ces démarches ne seront pas infructueuses. Les injustes préventions du Divan devraient céder enfin à l'évidence des preuves réitérées, qui placent dans tout son jour la politique de la Russie ; et sa Majesté Impériale ne doute pas que fortes des nouveaux témoignages de ses vues pacifiques, les Cours d'Autriche, de France, d'Angleterre, et de Prusse, n'insistent à la Porte avec autant de franchise que d'énergie, sur l'adoption immédiate des seules mesures qui puissent annoncer le rétablissement des relations diplomatiques entre les deux empires.

En confiant à ses Alliés ses vœux et ses espérances l'Empereur se serait empressé de leur faciliter le succès à l'aide de plus amples concessions, s'il eût été en son pouvoir d'étendre celles qu'il a déjà accordées, et si les droits et les intérêts de la Russie eussent admis d'autres sacrifices.

Pour donner en revanche aux Cours Alliées un témoignage éclatant de la sécurité que lui inspire leur intervention amicale, sa Majesté Impériale a laissé uniquement à leur sagesse le soin de diriger la marche ultérieure des négociations à Constantinople, et le Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté Impériale est chargé d'offrir aux ministres qui prennent part aux conférences établies sur les affaires de l'Orient, les remerciemens sincères de son auguste Souverain, pour le zèle et les intentions bienveillantes qu'ils ont fait présider à des travaux, dont on ne saurait méconnaître ni la haute importance ni les utiles résultats.

[ 230. ]

**MEMORANDUM FOR LORD STRANGFORD.**

Verona, 28th Nov., 1822.

The enclosed protocols and the different notes annexed to them will show Lord Strangford upon what terms the Emperor of Russia is disposed to resume his diplomatical relations with the Porte, and the measures which the different Powers are disposed to adopt with a view to induce the Porte so to conduct itself as that the Emperor may have it in his power to resume these relations.

By this time it is probable that the Porte will feel that they will derive a certain advantage in their contest with the Greeks from the resumption of those relations ; and the prospect of this advantage, and the favourable disposition of the British govern-

ment towards the Porte, and the probable alteration of this disposition, must be held out as inducements to them to conduct themselves with moderation and justice towards the Greeks.

Such conduct must be represented to them as the only chance either of continued peace or of their retaining the countenance of the British government. In respect to the second point, viz. the letter to be written to the Emperor of Russia, it is very desirable to make the Ottoman Ministers feel that to write such a letter to his Imperial Majesty will be a dignified proceeding on the part of the Sultan, particularly if it contains only expressions of civility, and there should be no reference to past transactions or subjects of discussion. The state of these transactions and subjects cannot be altered by such a letter, and it will lead to peace without in any manner compromising the dignity or the interests of the Sultan's government. In respect to the commercial question, it is fully discussed in Lord Strangford's late despatches to Mr. Canning, to which it is unnecessary, and, indeed, I have not the means of adding anything. He will urge the Turkish government to perform every stipulation of the treaty in favour of the Russian commerce. I recommend that he should proceed with the Sardinian arrangement till it is brought to a conclusion. None other is to be undertaken by the British government till that is concluded.

The government will give him further orders respecting the use of his good offices in favour of any other Sovereign, his Majesty's ally, to obtain from the Porte the privilege of passing the Bosphorus for vessels bearing his flag. I need not point out how honourable it is to Lord Strangford's character, and to that of his country, that he should be charged with so important a concern as the completing the pacification between the Emperor of Russia and the Ottoman Porte, nor how anxious the government are that he should be successful in his endeavours to preserve peace.

I earnestly request his attention to the subject, and that he will continue to do everything in his power to attain the object with which he is charged.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 231. ]

## SEPARATE MEMORANDUM.

Lord Strangford will, in every case, act in concert with the Allied ministers at the Ottoman Porte, particularly with the Internuocio; but he will understand that it is he who is charged with the negotiation, and will be responsible, in character at least, for its failure; and therefore, although he will act in full confidence and concert with the others, he must take upon himself the lead, and must fix for the others the part which they are to take severally in the negotiation.

WELLINGTON.

[ 232. ]

*To Lord Strangford.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Verona, 28th Nov., 1822.

With this you will receive all the protocols, annexes, &c., on the Turkish question, and the copy of a letter from Prince Metternich to me; its enclosures I do not send, as you have them already.

But I send you with this a Memorandum of the points to which I think his Majesty's government will wish you to attend upon your arrival at your post, till you shall receive your instructions from the Secretary of State, founded upon his knowledge of what has occurred here. Wishing you every success,

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S. Count Nesselrode has desired me to tell you that he cannot send you the paper which he promised you last night on some question on the Georgian frontier.

[ 233. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 28th Nov., 1822.

Referring to my despatch to you of the 22nd instant, No. 29, I have to inform you that, upon reconsideration, I did not think it quite fair towards the Russian government to have considered that their despatch to their minister at Madrid contained a

reflection upon his Majesty's government, and not in some manner to draw the attention of the Russian Cabinet to the paragraph containing the reflection; and I therefore availed myself of the opportunity which a discussion with Count Lieven upon the terms of my note on the Turkish question gave me to point out to him the objectionable passage.

I told him that I considered our conduct in any transaction the free subject of discussion in any despatch, even though it was to be laid before our government, and that I did not feel myself entitled to make any remark or observation upon it; and that I should not have done so even to him, if it were not certain that this despatch would eventually be published in every newspaper in Europe. That being the case, I wished the Russian Cabinet would now consider whether such a reflection upon the course pursued by his Majesty's government could produce a good effect in the world, and particularly in England.

The Count denied stoutly that there was any intention to reflect upon us in any part of the despatch. I replied, that all those who had seen the paragraph were of opinion that it did reflect upon the British government; and I said that, although I considered it were beneath the dignity of the government to complain or even to inquire from others what they thought of it, I recommended him to ask Prince Metternich what his opinion was both of the meaning of the paragraph and of its consequences when published.

I there left the subject, and I have heard no more of it.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 234. ]

SIR,

Verona, 28th Nov., 1822.

I enclose the copy of a confidential Memorandum which I gave to Count Nesselrode on the 17th of October, regarding the Russian ukase, and the copy of his answer.

I have had one or two discussions with Count Lieven upon this paper, to which I object, as not enabling his Majesty's

government to found upon it any negotiation to settle the questions arising out of the ukase, which have not got the better of these difficulties; and I enclose you the copy of a letter which I have written to Count Lieven, which explains my objections to the Russian *Mémoire Confidentiel*. This question, then, stands exactly where it did. I have not been able to do anything upon it.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 235. ]

*To Count Lieven.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

Verona, 28th Nov., 1822.

Having considered the paper which your Excellency gave me last night, on the part of his Excellency Count Nesselrode, on the subject of our discussions on the Russian ukase, I must inform you that I cannot consent, on the part of my government, to found on that paper the negotiation for the settlement of the question which has arisen between the two governments on this subject.

We object to the ukase on two grounds: 1st, That his Imperial Majesty assumes thereby an exclusive sovereignty in North America, of which we are not prepared to acknowledge the existence or the extent: upon this point, however, the Memoir of Count Nesselrode does afford the means of negotiation; and my government will be ready to discuss it, either in London or St. Petersburg, whenever the state of the discussions on the other question arising out of the ukase will allow of the discussion.

The second ground on which we object to the ukase is, that his Imperial Majesty thereby excludes from a certain considerable extent of the open sea vessels of other nations. We contend that the assumption of this power is contrary to the law of nations; and we cannot found a negotiation upon a paper in which it is again broadly asserted. We contend that no Power whatever can exclude another from the use of the open sea; a Power can exclude itself from the navigation of a certain coast, sea, &c., by its own act or engagement, but it cannot by right be excluded by another. This we consider as the law of

nations; and we cannot negotiate upon a paper in which a right is asserted inconsistent with this principle.

I think, therefore, that the best mode of proceeding would be, that you should state your readiness to negotiate upon the whole subject, without restating the objectionable principle of the ukase which we cannot admit.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 236. ]

SIR,

Verona, 29th Nov., 1822.

I saw Prince Metternich on the 26th, after I had written my despatch, No. 32, which I now transmit to you, and I told him that I was very apprehensive that his Majesty's government would think that he had *manœuvred* a little in the transaction of the Austrian loan; and I wished that he would consider whether any delay to be gained was worth his consideration in comparison with the injury that he would do to himself by giving ground for such a belief. I thought I made some impression upon him, but we were interrupted, and he made me no answer; but he sent me a message in the evening, and I saw him at night; and upon both occasions he requested that I would not send home his note, or write upon the Austrian loan by the courier who was going off, as he was in hopes that he should be authorised by the Emperor to say something more satisfactory. I received his note, of which I enclose the original, on the night of the 26th, and I sent my answer, of which I enclose the copy, on the 27th, and I have heard no more from Prince Metternich on the subject.

On the evening of the 27th I waited upon the Emperor of Austria to take leave of him, and as I was going away his Imperial Majesty said that he wished to say a few words to me about the Austrian loan. His Imperial Majesty then said that, as a man of honour and conscience he must admit that he owed the money, and that, sitting in judgment upon the question in any court in his own country, considering what documents and securities we had in our possession he must decide against himself. But that, on the other hand, he had considered the debt as cancelled by the services he had rendered to the cause, by the sacrifices which he had made, and the misfortunes



which he had suffered, for which there could be no compensation. He then asked me whether I did not think that he had persevered in the good cause as long as it was in his power, and whether such conduct was not to be considered.

He was aware, he said, that it was necessary to come to some arrangement on this subject, but he hoped that we would consider his services and his present situation, and not bear hard upon him. I answered that he might rely upon it that the demand upon him would be moderate, and that everything would be done to make the payment easy to his finances; and that, as the debt which his Imperial Majesty had so handsomely acknowledged really existed, and had become the subject of discussion in England, it was not consistent with his Imperial Majesty's dignity that some arrangement should not be made to extinguish it of a nature and magnitude, in point of amount, to satisfy reasonable men that it was fair, and one that a great Power such as his Imperial Majesty ought to make.

I then paid him a compliment on his services to the common cause, and his perseverance, and assured him that there was no sovereign in Europe for whom his Majesty entertained such a regard, and the country such an interest as for his Imperial Majesty, and that neither his Majesty nor his government nor the country would wish to press him to make an arrangement which was unreasonable or would distress him.

His Imperial Majesty expressed his satisfaction at what I had said to him, but still I have heard no more upon the subject from Prince Metternich.

I enclose the Memorandum which I propose to give Mr. Gordon, directing him to carry on the negotiation under the instructions which he had received from the late Lord Londonderry, and to press it to a conclusion, if possible, before the meeting of Parliament.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 237. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 29th Nov., 1822.

When the King of Sardinia arrived at Verona, I availed myself of the opportunity which my introduction to his Majesty gave me of ascertaining his own wishes respecting the continued occupation of Piedmont by the Austrian troops.

His Majesty at first said that he thought their presence in Piedmont was no longer necessary, more particularly as he had them so near him. I took the liberty of observing to his Majesty that justice to his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria should induce him to declare himself positively whether he wished to detain the troops, as his Imperial Majesty must in honour wish to withdraw them as soon as their presence in Piedmont should be no longer necessary, and that it would not be quite reasonable to expect that his Imperial Majesty should keep an additional force at Lombardy at all times ready to attend his Majesty in Piedmont. His Majesty readily admitted the truth of this reasoning, and said that, provided the period of the troops being withdrawn was fixed, he had no objection to their remaining for some time longer.

After some discussion with Prince Metternich and with the Comte de la Tour upon this subject, I waited upon his Majesty on the 27th, and proposed to him the arrangement stated in the enclosed letter to the Comte de la Tour. His Majesty said he should agree to it, and I think it probable will propose it, as it is more advantageous to him than that which he intended to propose himself; viz., reckoning from the 1st of October last, that 4000 men should retire at the end of every four months, the whole to retire at the end of September, 1823.

The arrangement proposed by me is a better military arrangement, inasmuch as it leaves 5000 men for the last six months, and is at the same time less expensive to the King.

The Comte de la Tour wished me to speak to the King respecting the Prince de Carignan, but as his Majesty did not mention the subject to me, and I had no instructions from his Majesty to advert to the subject, I did not think it proper to commence upon it myself.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received the letter of which the enclosed is a copy from the Comte de la Tour, to which I have returned the accompanying answer.

*Le Comte de la Tour to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Vérone, le 29<sup>me</sup> Nov., 1822.

Je me suis empressé, Monsieur le Duc, de mettre sous les yeux du Roi, mon auguste maître, la lettre que votre Grâce m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 28 du courant.

Sa Majesté a éprouvé un vif plaisir en voyant se terminer, par la médiation de son plus ancien et fidèle Allié, une affaire aussi intéressante pour le bien de ses états, et se renouveler par là ces preuves d'intérêt et de bonne amitié qui depuis des siècles ont lié si étroitement les cours d'Angleterre et de Sardaigne.

Elle s'estime heureuse de pouvoir donner à votre Grâce une marque particulière de sa confiance en acceptant les bases de l'arrangement que vous avez bien voulu me communiquer dans la lettre précitée, et à l'Europe entière une preuve positive de la reconnaissance qu'elle professe pour les secours généreux qu'elle a reçus de S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, et de l'ardent désir qu'elle nourrit de conserver et de resserrer avec cet auguste Souverain les liens de l'amitié et de la confiance.

Sa Majesté désirerait seulement que, sans altérer essentiellement les dispositions contenues dans les trois paragraphes de la lettre de Votre Altesse, on voulut bien substituer la date fixée du 31<sup>me</sup> Décembre, 1822, pour la sortie des premiers 4000 hommes, à celle incertaine d'un mois après la fin du Congrès.

Le besoin urgent de donner dès à présent des dispositions militaires et financières aussi précises que possible, a seul influé sur ce désir du Roi. S.M. aime à se flatter, Monsieur le Duc, que cette légère variation ne saurait être l'objet d'une discussion, mais qu'elle devra encore à l'intervention de votre Grâce cette nouvelle preuve des intentions bienveillantes de ses augustes Alliés.

Je saisis avec empressement cette occasion pour offrir à votre Grâce l'hommage de tous mes sentimens personnels joint à celui de la plus haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Duc,

De votre Grâce le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

DE LA TOUR.

[ 238. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 29th Nov., 1822.

The military occupation of Piedmont, upon which I have written you in my despatch of this day, is the only Italian question into which I have entered with Prince Metternich.

He has informed me that he proposes to reduce the force in Naples; to what amount is not yet settled; but I have urged him to reduce it from 50,000 to 25,000 men.

In respect to the Prince de Carignan, Prince Metternich has a scheme of proposing that the King should restore him to his

favour, which is certainly a matter in the King's power to grant or not, on the condition that the Prince should promise when he comes to the throne to govern according to the laws, and not to make any alteration without the consent of constituted authorities in Piedmont, Savoy, and Genoa. I pointed out to Prince Metternich the fatality of such an arrangement, and the false notions and reports which it would occasion; but I don't think I made any impression upon him.

There is nothing else of importance that I know of to occupy the Italian Congress. I enclose the copy of the letter which I have written to Lord Londonderry, and the copy of my circular letter to the foreign ministers here upon my departure.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 239. ]

SIR,

Verona, 29th Nov., 1822.

I waited upon the Emperor of Russia to take leave of him on the 27th, and I enclose a Memorandum which I made immediately after my return home of the conversation I had with his Imperial Majesty.

His Imperial Majesty, both upon my entering the room and retiring from it, desired me to express to his Majesty his sincere regard for his person, and his desire to continue united in counsels with his Majesty. I waited upon the Emperor of Austria in the evening, and it was extraordinary, that although the Emperor of Russia told me in the morning that he neither believed nor wished that the peace between France and Spain would last, the Emperor of Austria should have told me in the evening that he hoped it would last; and was very much surprised, and even alarmed, when I stated to his Imperial Majesty my reasons for thinking it at least doubtful.

His Imperial Majesty likewise desired me to express to his Majesty his sincere regard, his hope that he should soon have the honour of seeing him, and his wish to continue united in counsels with his Majesty.

Nothing new has occurred here since I wrote to you on Tuesday, excepting that Monsieur Ouvrard has arrived with

an extravagant scheme for a loan of twenty millions sterling of capital for the Spanish Royalists.

Although I am well acquainted with Monsieur Ouvrard, having lived in his house for three years at Paris, he has kept entirely out of my way, and I cannot say that I know exactly what brought him here.

I believe it was some scheme to prevail upon the Allies to guarantee this loan; but in that object I don't think he will succeed.

I hear that the immediate proposition was that they should name the person, or a commission, to transact the business between the creditors and the Regency of Urgel; but I don't believe that this proposition has been acceded to. The secrecy, however, in which this transaction has been kept will show you how we stand here.

Indeed, I understand that it is now reported that if France should interfere actively in Spain, it is probable that we shall take up the cause of Spain against her; and something that dropped from the Emperor of Russia in his conversation with me shows that he is not far from the same opinion.

Since writing the above I have seen M. Ouvrard: I find that the scheme on which he came here was to obtain some kind of guarantee to the loan of the Spanish Royalists.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 240. ] MEMORANDUM ON CONVERSATION WITH EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

Verona, 27th Nov., 1822.

I waited upon the Emperor of Russia, and his Imperial Majesty, immediately upon my entering the room, after complimenting me upon appearing in his uniform, stated that he was not at all surprised at the course and termination of our negotiations respecting Spain; that he had foreseen what our conduct would be from the time I had spoken to him at Vienna, and even before; and that he had constantly stated this conviction to Prince Metternich, in answer to the expression of his hopes that he should carry us with him. His Imperial Majesty said that we had taken our line in the Neapolitan affair; but that he did not think that we were more disposed than others

to protect Jacobins and revolutionists; that having taken our line, we could not be expected to alter it, nor could the continental Sovereigns be expected to alter theirs; but that at all events he desired that I would assure the King, my master, that nothing should alter his Majesty's sentiments of friendship for him, or his sense of the benefit to be derived from this alliance.

I expressed my gratitude for this assurance, and the certainty that I had that it would be most agreeable to the King; and I stated to his Imperial Majesty that however the British government might take a different view from that taken by his Imperial Majesty, upon the Spanish or any other question, he might rely upon finding us at all times true to the principles on which we had invariably acted, and feeling the same desire to co-operate with his Imperial Majesty for the preservation of the peace of the world, and of the great settlement of Europe, in which his Imperial Majesty had acted so conspicuous a part. In respect to the protection of Jacobins and revolutionists, I told his Imperial Majesty I believed he would find in England less of their principles than in any other country, for that, in truth, there never was a revolution founded on Jacobin principles in any country in Europe. The Jacobins did not become immediately the arbiters of England, for this simple reason, that our system was founded on the preservation of property and rights of all descriptions, and theirs on the plunder of all property and the destruction of all private rights.

I did not wish to advert to topics which had gone by, as I then said that a decision had been taken; but I could not but be apprehensive that the peace of the world was not provided for by what had been passing lately. His Imperial Majesty to this answered that he did not think that the peace between France and Spain could last, nor, to say the truth, did he wish it, as he was convinced that the war must overturn the Spanish revolution, which nothing else could.

He then went into some details respecting a correspondence found on Mr. Bowring at Calais, and another one on M. Olivciros, which his Majesty said proved the conspiracy existing against the civilised world; and he contended that, even upon our own principles, the conduct of these revolutionary fools was such as to require repression.

I answered that there was one ally of which his Imperial Majesty had more than once availed himself, and that he appeared

to me to have left entirely out of his calculation upon this occasion. He answered, Which is it? I replied, Time! Time would remedy many of the evils complained of as resulting from the Spanish and other revolutions. Time would strengthen France, and place her in a situation to be more able to act her part in Europe; because, in fact, it was to France that we were all to look for the danger by which we were likely to be affected, in consequence of the existence of the revolutionary principle. I then observed that I believed I considered things in France in a more favourable light than his Imperial Majesty, or than any of the Ministers here; but that I could not see France go to war at present, and upon a revolutionary principle, without feeling that the world was in danger, and that I would prefer to trust to time for a remedy to the mischief to be apprehended from these revolutions rather than to incur such a risk.

The Emperor replied, that while we were waiting for the remedy of time much mischief would be done, and the *bons gens*, the Royalists in Spain, would be lost.

I asked him, then, why he did not support the Royalists, after having withdrawn his minister from Madrid, keeping the French government out of the quarrel. I told him that I did not approve of such a measure; but that there was this to be said in its favour, viz., that it avoided to place the government of France in a state of riot; and that it brought forward those Powers which conceived that they had an interest in the overthrow of the Spanish revolution.

We had then some conversation upon the details of this civil war, in which I told his Imperial Majesty that I had heard that the same individuals fought on both sides, according as there was money to pay them; and, after some observations on this fact, he said that by far the best thing to do was to interfere by means of a good army, which should at once extinguish the revolution.

He then talked about the French army, and repeated his conviction that it was neither in a state of discipline or of efficiency to effect any purpose; and he did not think less ill of the government! I asked him then, "To what will all this come? Does your Majesty expect that if there should be a war the French government can stand it?" "No; but if it should not, we have the means of setting all to rights!"

He then said, "Let us go into the Turkish question;" and

he stated that he was much obliged to me for the manner in which I had expressed myself on his interests; and that he hoped I was satisfied with what he had done respecting Lord Strangford. I told him that Lord S. was perfectly satisfied, and that I was much obliged to him for having done him justice; and that I was convinced that he had adopted the measure most likely to bring his affairs at Constantinople to a satisfactory termination.

I then took leave; and he again desired that I would state to the King what he felt for him, and his continued desire to remain united in counsels with his Majesty.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 241. ]

SIR,

Verona, 29th Nov., 1822.

Upon consultation with the ministers of France and Prussia, it appeared to us upon the whole most desirable that we should bring under the consideration of the conference of the ministers of the five Powers the state of the commerce and navigation of the Rhine, as affected by the internal regulations of the government of the Netherlands, and that I should propose to the conference that the ministers of the five Powers at Bruxelles should make a representation to the King of the Netherlands to induce his Majesty to enter into discussions with the other Sovereigns bordering upon the Rhine, with a view to carry into execution the treaty of Vienna, upon the commerce and navigation of that river.

This was done accordingly in the conference of the 27th, of which I enclose the protocol.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 242. ]

SIR,

Verona, 29th Nov., 1822.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have had another conversation with the Russian Minister regarding the ukase. It is now settled that both the Memorandums which I enclosed to you should



be considered as *non avenues*, and the Russian ambassador in London is to address you a note in answer to that of the late Lord Londonderry, assuring you of the desire of the Emperor to negotiate with you upon the whole question of the Emperor's claims in North America, reserving them all if the result of the negotiation should not be satisfactory to both parties.

This note will then put this matter in a train of negotiation, which is what was wished.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 243. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Verona, 29th Nov., 1822.

I enclose the protocols and notes on the Spanish colonies, from which you will see that the government is at full liberty to take the steps which may be thought proper on this subject. In the state in which this congress is at present it would have been quite hopeless to endeavour to bring these ministers to a common opinion in relation to the Spanish colonies. All that I could do was to converse with each, and I was in hopes their answers would have been more favourable than they are. But you will see that none of them positively object to what we are doing.

The Russian note positively admits the principle on which we have been acting; and in discussion it came out that the Emperor of Austria still maintained a minister in the Brazils, of both of which circumstances I availed myself; and I think that upon the whole they are better satisfied with us upon this subject than they were at first.

We had another discussion this day upon the Brazils, a gentleman having arrived from thence with a message from the Prince Regent, desiring that an envoy might be received from his Britannic Majesty. The Austrians took the lead upon this subject, and proposed that the demand should be referred to a conference to be formed in London. I recommended that they should consider this question well before they should entertain it, and said that in respect to the formation of a conference in London, I would take the question *ad referendum*. But

this proposal, which, although given up, was not unsupported, shows that these Powers are not very far from an acknowledgment of the new governments in America, if it should suit their interest.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 244. ]

SIR,

Verona, 29th Nov., 1822.

I enclose you the protocols of the conferences and the several notes annexed on the slave trade. I am, I confess, disappointed in the notes of the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries.

In my despatch to you, No. 27, of the 19th inst., I stated my expectation that the Emperor of Russia would support all the propositions contained in my Memorandum in the exact form in which they were made. I was informed, however, on Tuesday night, the 26th, that this would not be the case; and having called upon Count Nesselrode on Wednesday morning, before the conference, to see his note, I found that it went, in fact, to nothing, excepting to the general declaration and to the Portuguese trade, the rest being to depend upon negotiations to be opened at Paris, which his Imperial Majesty's minister was to support. I was aware of the sort of support which our negotiations would receive, and I told Count Nesselrode very frankly, that if the Emperor did not give a better support to my propositions, I should either withdraw them, and state that I should not have made them if I had not had the promise of his Imperial Majesty's support to them all after he had had my minute in his possession for a considerable time, or I should insert upon the protocol something of the same kind to follow his note. This remonstrance had the effect of producing the alteration of the note to what you see it is, and it is stated, both by Count Nesselrode and Count Lieven, that they declare to support our negotiations at Paris. But I doubt our having any effectual support from the Emperor of Russia. I would have inserted upon the protocol his abandonment of me, if his note had not contained a distinct admission that the trade ought to be made piracy.

Monsieur de Bernstorff has been very unwell, and the King of Prussia is absent, and that is the reason for which the Prussian

note is so weak. But I will endeavour to prevail upon Monsieur de Bernstorff to declare himself in more positive terms.

You will observe that what I intended should be a general declaration is a resolution, and that there is no separate declaration upon any of the points by the several Powers who agree to them.

There is a great objection to make a declaration from this Congress on the subject of negroes alone, and none is to be made on any other subject.

The general resolution will answer all the purpose of a declaration, and can be made the same use of.

I think we may turn to some use the declarations of each Power, but I delay to give any opinion upon this subject till I go to London.

After I had written thus far the Emperor of Russia came to take leave of me. Before he came he had particularly desired that we might have no conversation upon business. After much kindness to me personally, I told his Imperial Majesty that I must venture to disobey him, and to talk to him on a point of business on which my government, and I believed his Imperial Majesty, were both much interested. I then told him that I was not at all satisfied with the support which his ministers had given me in the affair of the slave trade, reminding him that I had laid my papers before his Majesty, and had informed him that I would not bring forward my propositions unless they should be supported by his Imperial Majesty.

The Emperor instructed me to tell him what I wished, and assured me that the note of his minister should be amended as I desired. Accordingly I have had added to it an engagement to support our negotiations on this subject in France; and as it would have renewed all our discussions if the remainder had been altered I have entered upon the protocol of yesterday an agreement to concert, in a conference to be formed in London, the measures to be adopted under the different notes on the protocol of yesterday.

The case then now stands as I could wish it, and you will have it entirely in your hands.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 245. ]

SIR,

Verona, 29th Nov., 1822.

I write you one line to tell you that Prince Metternich has just been with me, to tell me that the Emperor of Austria will consent to pay two millions in money, and one million in timber or quicksilver; but he wishes that before anything further passes on the subject I should make an effort with the cabinet to make some reduction of this sum if possible, that nothing should be mentioned of money to be paid till the negotiation should be concluded, and that every facility should be given in the negotiation for the payment of the money by Austria. I beg you to delay to send any instructions to Mr. Gordon on this subject till I shall arrive in England.

I still send home my despatch, No. 32 \* [26th Nov., 1822], but as it does not show off Prince Metternich in his best colours, I should wish it to be considered as private and confidential.

I have, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Prince Metternich.*

[ 246. ]

29th Nov., 1822.

The undersigned, Minister Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty, has the honour to inform Prince Metternich that the affairs being terminated for the discussion of which he was directed by the King, his master, to attend the conferences of Verona, he proposes to depart for England to-morrow.

His Excellency the Marquess of Londonderry, his Britannic Majesty's ambassador with his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, has been appointed by his Majesty to attend the conferences on the affairs of Italy on the part of his Majesty. It is the wish of his Majesty's government that any question which may arise on any other subject during the stay at Verona of their Majesties, or their plenipotentiaries, on which it may be wished to know his Majesty's sentiments, may be referred to his Majesty's government through the usual diplomatic channels.

\* See page 586.

The undersigned renews to his Highness Prince Metternich the assurances of his high consideration.

WELLINGTON.

[The same to Count Nesselrode, Count Bernstorff, leurs Excellences MM. les Plenipotentiaires de S. M. T. C.]

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[ 247. ]

*To Lord Londonderry.*

MY LORD,

Verona, 29th Nov., 1822.

The affairs for the discussion of which I was directed to attend the conferences at Verona being now terminated, I propose to set out on my return to England to-morrow.

I enclose the copy of a note which I have addressed to the ministers of the several courts.

There is only one subject upon which I have to give you any information, and that relates to the evacuation of Piedmont.

I enclose you the copy of a letter which I have written to the Comte de la Tour upon that subject, stating the arrangement which I had made with Prince Metternich. I have reason to know that this arrangement will be equally satisfactory to his Imperial Majesty, but as I don't think that the Emperor of Austria can be required to leave less than 5000 men for the last six months, and his Imperial Majesty originally wished that he should leave only 4000, it is possible that his Imperial Majesty may not like to propose the arrangement which I have settled.

I beg you to endeavour to prevail upon Count de la Tour to propose it.

On all other Italian questions his Majesty's policy is the same, and it is his Majesty's wish that the line to be followed by his Majesty's plenipotentiaries on these questions should be the same as in the year 1820-21, under the instructions sent for your guidance and that of Mr. Gordon by the late Secretary of State.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Comte de la Tour since writing the above, and of my

answer. I beg you to make him feel that the 31st of January—that is, four months from the 1st of October—is the period fixed by the King of Sardinia himself for the commencement of the evacuation. It is best to adhere to that day.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 29th Nov., 1822.

I have received and laid before the King your Grace's despatches Nos. 25, 26, and 27.

The King commands me to repeat the assurances of his Majesty's highest approbation of your Grace's unabated exertions to avert the calamity of a Spanish war.

I am also to express the satisfaction which his Majesty derives from the prospect of your Grace's obtaining from the Allied Powers such measures and declarations respecting the slave trade as may strengthen the hands of the British government in their endeavours to restrain, if not finally to extinguish, that disgraceful and abominable traffic.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,

my Lord Duke, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Gloucester Lodge, 29th Nov., 1822.

Your Spanish despatch of yesterday was a great disappointment, both because it brought no conclusion, and because it seems to prepare us for a conclusion not to be desired.

I confess I thought your letter to M. Villèle would have reacted upon Verona with more decisive effect.

I postpone till the next messenger (whom, however, I mean to dispatch on Tuesday) the full Spanish and Spanish-American budget with which I threatened you, as we are in the midst of a series of Cabinets, whose decision must be taken upon two or three points before we can proceed further than we have done in the instructions for the Admiralty enclosed in my despatch of this day. Cuba, and the supposed designs of the United States upon that colony, present a difficulty of no small amount.

You have done, in respect to that question (of Spanish-America), all that could be desired; and upon the slave trade, more than could have been expected.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

I will do nothing about Lord Strangford till your return.

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[ 248. ]

*To Prince Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

Milan, 1st Dec., 1822.

I wish you would turn over in your mind this idea which has occurred to me, and which I suggest to you, that your Ambassador in England should be authorised to grant licences for the importation into Vienna or Trieste of one million and a half of colonial produce annually, taking 15 or 20 per cent. on the value of each cargo for which the licence is granted, on the delivery of the licence. You would thus be certain of your revenue even before the goods should be exported from England.

This measure must succeed, even though your custom-house officers should be worse than they are, as they will have nothing to say to the execution of it.

It is not necessary that you should take the whole quantity from England. Take it from different countries, or from any country you please; the principle and the advantage to Austria will still be the same.

Turn this proposition over in your mind. It will convince you, at all events, that my mind is turned to get the Emperor out of this financial difficulty if in my power.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 249. ]

*To Prince Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

Milan, 1st Dec., 1822.

I received your letter of the 30th this day from General Bubna, and although I feel provoked and hurt that, notwithstanding the daily proofs which my government gives of its frankness and fairness, there is not a report which any agent of any foreign power can pick up and vend against us that is not believed, cherished, and immediately acted upon, I feel much obliged to you for giving me an immediate opportunity of justifying the British government, which I can do most fully.

I informed the ministers, in the conference at Verona, more than once, that we were upon the very worst terms with the Spanish government. Among the causes of complaint that we had were many infractions of treaties of commerce, some as old

as the dominion in Spain of the house of Austria ; and offers had been repeatedly made in late years to revise and new model these treaties according to the mutual convenience and mutual benefit of the parties.

I likewise informed the conference that the British government had complained to the Spanish government recently of the piracies committed on the commerce of his Majesty's subjects, and had explained themselves fully on the measures which they intended to adopt as a remedy.

I have two reports from Sir William A'Court, of the 9th November, both stating to his government the measures which the Spanish government had proposed, and were about to submit to the Cortes, with a view to be cordially reconciled to the British government, but not a word of a treaty of commerce. As far as I have any information therefore, I should say that it is not true that a treaty of commerce has been at all in discussion, and certainly not with Sir William A'Court, and, above all, not proposed by him. I insist upon the last, because I have by me the only instructions from Mr. Canning to Sir William A'Court, and in them there is no mention of a treaty of commerce. If, then, it be true that a treaty of commerce has been proposed in the Cortes since Sir William A'Court wrote on the 9th ultimo, it is with the same general view in which other measures have been proposed, viz., that of endeavouring to reconcile Great Britain to Spain in the existing crisis of the affairs of the latter.

This is my explanation upon this subject, which I authorise you to state to whomsoever you please.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I beg you will observe that there does not appear in Sir William A'Court's despatches that he at all encouraged these propositions and offers from the Spanish Cortes ; and certainly he was not directed in the instructions of Mr. Canning to encourage them.

Sir William A'Court's two reports above mentioned only reached me this morning, having been transmitted from Paris by Sir Charles Stuart.

WELLINGTON.



[ 250. ]

*To Prince Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

Milan, 1st Dec., 1822.

If I had been at Verona I would have communicated to you the despatches and instructions I had received, upon which I have written to you in the other letter ; but not being with you, and as Prince Esterhazy is here, I have shown them to him, and he will tell you their contents, and that they fully prove the case which I have stated in my other letter.

There is no secret in all this ; there can be none ; but still I don't wish that the contents of these despatches and instructions should be shown. He will let you know them, but I should not wish them to go any further.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 3rd Dec., 1822.

Your *Friday's* messenger has not arrived, and we have instead of him rumours from Verona and newspapers from Paris, all breathing war ; and the latter announcing your departure from Verona for the 24th ultimo.

In this state of uncertainty, and being on the other hand sure of hearing from you the day after to-morrow, I think it best to suspend the departure of the messenger whom I intended to dispatch to-day ; sending directions, however, to Sir Charles Stuart to forward to you, if you are still at Verona, copies of three despatches which I address to him to-day, in answer to three inquiries of M. de Villèle, touching—

1st. Our armament for the West Indies and the report of our intention to occupy Cuba ;

2nd. The proposition to the Cortes for a commercial treaty with Spain ; and

3rd. Our pretended guarantee of Portugal.

If I were to write to you myself, I could only send to you more in detail the matters of which the despatches that Sir Charles Stuart will have to forward to you, contain the substance.

One word only on the other hypothesis of your having (as the French intelligence affirms) left Verona, and of this letter finding you at or near Paris. In that case, and in the case (which it would imply) of the question of peace and war being left in the hands of the French government, may I implore you to remain at Paris so long as to be able to hear *once* from me there after we *know* the event, which is now surmised ?

The temper in which M. de Villèle professes to be, affords one more chance of preserving peace, if you should be at hand to encourage him,

during the first conflict of the two parties in the French government. Without such aid I fear he may be overborne.

I would much rather (speaking herein my own individual opinion only as yet, without having had an opportunity to compare it with that of Lord Liverpool) accept the mediation between France and Spain, now, from France singly and directly, than have been involved in it by delegation from the Congress, and responsible for the conduct and issue of it not to the parties concerned but to the Alliance: I mean, of course, *if* our mediation were the only chance of peace; for otherwise it is not in any case a trust to be courted. But peace is undoubtedly by any means (if possible) to be preserved.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S. I have shown this letter to Lord Liverpool, who entirely concurs in it.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 6th Dec., 1822.

My despatch of to-day realises the intimation of my private letter of Tuesday.

We all feel that every effort must have been made by this government to avert the war before we can say that we have done our duty. If M. de Villèle values either his power or his reputation, surely he will work strenuously to that end.

I shall be grieved if it is inconvenient to you to remain at Paris; but without you neither Villèle nor we have a fair chance of success.

I intend to send a messenger to Sir William A'Court to-morrow, who will pass through Paris. Perhaps you will write to A'Court by him. I shall not promise to A'Court that you will do so. But I shall enjoin him to write to you by return of the messenger.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 6th Dec., 1822.

The latest date of your Grace's despatches from Verona is still the 19th ultimo.

The French mail due yesterday, has from some unaccountable accident failed to arrive; and we are left in an uncertainty as to everything that has passed at Verona for more than a fortnight, so much the more painful, as all the unauthenticated reports from Paris concur in representing the breaking out of hostilities as but too probable.

In this state of things, however difficult and embarrassing it may be to

shape instructions to a case not ascertained, it has nevertheless been felt by his Majesty's advisers, on a review of your Grace's correspondence compared with that of Sir Charles Stuart, that we should be wanting to our duty if we did not submit to his Majesty the course which it would be expedient to pursue, in that which is understood to be the present situation of the question of peace or war between France and Spain.

It is understood that the three Continental Powers have delegated exclusively to the court of France the decision of that question; binding themselves to support her in what she may decide. It is understood further that the preponderating influence in the French councils is for the alternative of war. This prevailing impression coincides but too nearly with that which appeared to be upon your Grace's mind at the date of your last despatches. Meantime M. de Villèle has taken several opportunities of expressing to Sir Charles Stuart, in terms too plain to be mistaken, both his own earnest desire for the preservation of peace (a desire in which the King, his master, is represented by him as warmly participating), and his wish to receive not only the support but the advice of the British government in his endeavours to preserve it.

I enclose to your Grace extracts of two of Sir Charles Stuart's despatches, in which these sentiments of M. de Villèle are particularly reported; so particularly indeed as to render it incumbent upon this government to take some notice of so direct an appeal to their friendly disposition. Hitherto I have not thought it right to do so; because, while your Grace was communicating with M. de Villèle from Verona, with so much more perfect a view of the circumstances on which any council was to be founded, it would have been inexpedient, and might have been mischievous to hazard any opinion from hence which might by possibility come in conflict with your Grace's, on a view necessarily imperfect and liable to be changed by subsequent information. That objection exists no longer, if this despatch shall find your Grace at Paris. And I have, therefore, received the King's commands to signify to your Grace his Majesty's pleasure, that in the event of the situation of affairs being such as is supposed in this despatch, that is, of the decision of war or peace being entirely with the French government, your Grace should seek a conversation with M. de Villèle, and after referring to his Excellency's communications through Sir Charles Stuart, should offer frankly to that minister the mediation of his Majesty between their Most Christian and Catholic Majesties, as the last hope of avoiding a rupture; the consequences of which no human foresight can calculate: but in which his Majesty verily believes that France, if the aggressor, risks far more than Spain.

When in a former despatch I was commanded rather to deprecate than to encourage the acceptance by your Grace of a similar duty of intervention for his Majesty, the circumstances were altogether different.

The question was not then simply between France and Spain: nor had the three great Continental Powers then assumed that secondary and subsidiary position towards France which they have now consented to occupy.

The notions which induced Russia to push France forward to war might be very different from those on which France herself might be willing to engage in it; and an earnest and *bonâ fide* endeavour on the part of his Majesty to save the interest and honour of France by such an intervention

might, even if satisfactory to France herself, by no means have answered the wishes of her partners in the negotiation. Every step of ours in a negotiation so undertaken would have been the subject of joint criticism, and we should have gone into the negotiation, either apparently acquiescing in principles which we could not but disapprove, or disavowing them at the very moment when we engaged to act on behalf of those who professed them. The grounds of our intervention, if it take place in the case now supposed, is altogether cleared of those difficulties.

If war with Spain be justifiable at all, on the principles avowed by the Alliance, it is clearly on the part of France that that justification must be found. It must be found in immediate, not in constructive provocation; in stateable offence, or in manifest and intelligible danger.

France, when weighing singly for herself the motives and possible consequences of her own decision, when stating her own case, and still more when enabling us to state it for her, must sift and prove her causes of war with a much more scrupulous nicety; with a much more quickened consciousness of the responsibility of a false decision, than when surrounded by associates, sympathising with her in her resentments against Spain, but comparatively removed from the danger to which the indulgence of those resentments must expose her.

It is impossible that M. de Villèle, or any other French statesman, should not feel how deeply the new institutions of France will be embarked in the fearful peril of a Spanish war. It is impossible that they should not ask themselves whether any imaginable success in that war can tend to the confirmation of those institutions; and whether any failure in it, however inconsiderable, may not shake them and the French monarchy itself to their foundations?

It is in reliance upon this more sober and awakened view of the interests of France herself, that your Grace is now authorised to tender that intervention which it was not thought desirable to court, nor, if it could be avoided, to accept, while France was only a sharer in combined counsels and less at liberty to act upon considerations purely her own.

But it will not escape your Grace's observation that in order to afford a reasonable prospect of success to our mediation, if France should be willing to employ it, there should be some reasonable hope of a similar acceptance on the part of Spain.

I enclose to your Grace an extract of a despatch from the Spanish government to its chargé d'affaires in London, which was read and delivered to me by M. de Colomb in a conference the day before yesterday.

The remaining part of this despatch (with which I do not trouble your Grace on this occasion), relates to the questions pending between the two governments in respect to commercial grievances and to the piracies in the West Indian seas. The whole is in a tone of subdued remonstrance and amicable profession. The language with which M. de Colomb accompanied the delivery of his paper was even more supplicatory than the paper itself; and such as, coupled with that paper (if M. de Colomb's language may be taken as that of his government), could leave no doubt of the desire of Spain to avail herself of the mediation of this country.

My despatch No. 16, to which I have already referred, stated the tendency of those questions respecting commerce and piracy, as likely to create em-

barrassment in any mediation which we might undertake between France and Spain. Undoubtedly those questions, and the measures (of which your Grace is aware) arising out of them, would create such embarrassment. But, on the other hand, it is to be considered that our embarrassment would be scarcely less, perhaps more, in the case of a war between France and Spain. The coincidence in that case, of our naval operations in the West Indies, with any French attack upon Spain by land, would exhibit an appearance of concert, and of a common cause between France and this country, the very reverse of the truth; but likely to produce a conviction difficult to be removed, on the irritated minds of the Spanish government and people.

The former embarrassment was worth avoiding while there was a chance of peace between France and Spain; but with the prospect of war there is only a choice of embarrassments, and of the two, that would be the most inconvenient which should add to our existing causes of difference with Spain the aggravation of a supposed cooperation with her enemies.

On the other hand, it is not altogether to be overlooked that the very offer of our interference to avert hostilities with France, will be such a proof of the absence of all unfriendly feeling towards Spain, as may perhaps operate more efficaciously than either prolonged discussions or the demonstration or employment of force, to bring to a settlement all the questions which we have now pending with the Spanish government.

I am, with great truth and respect,  
my Lord Duke, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 8th Dec., 1822.

Your Grace's despatches, from No. 28 to No. 34 inclusive (with the exception of No 32), were delivered to me in the night of Friday last, some hours after I had sent off to your Grace my despatch No. 24 of that day. I have laid them before the King.

The Paris mail which arrived yesterday in due course has not brought me anything from your Grace.

The reports contained in your last despatches, and those which I receive from Sir Charles Stuart, all tend to confirm the view, hypothetically taken in my despatch of Friday, of the present state of the question of peace or war between France and Spain; and of the conduct which it is the duty, as well as the interest, of the British government to observe, in a crisis of such extreme delicacy and importance.

It appears that the question of peace or war is left to the decision of France. It appears that the government of his Most Christian Majesty has not finally made up its mind on that decision. It appears that M. de Villèle still holds the language, and still professes to entertain the expectation, of peace. It appears, on the other hand, that the influence of Russia is likely to be exerted to the utmost to stimulate the French cabinet to war.

The zeal with which Monsieur Pozzo di Borgo will, no doubt, carry into effect the instructions of his Imperial Master, can perhaps only be counteracted, with any probability of success, by your Grace's interposition with the French minister; and with the King of France himself, on behalf of that more forbearing and more safe policy, to which your government is, for the sake of France herself, desirous of giving the preponderance.

While such is the situation of things in France, and while there is yet a pause in the councils of his Most Christian Majesty, which (if we do not flatter ourselves too much) looks like hesitation, the enclosed extracts from despatches received (since Friday) from Sir William A'Court will show your Grace that the temper of the Spanish government is assuming a somewhat milder tone; and that the discussions, which your Grace appeared naturally enough to apprehend might altogether disincline the Spanish ministry from listening to, much less from soliciting, any offer of interposition on the part of Great Britain, are now proceeding at least with courtesy, and perhaps not entirely without the chance of an amicable, if not in all respects a satisfactory, termination.

The shock first felt at the communication of the instructions respecting Cuba has gradually subsided; and has given place, first with the public and latterly even with the ministers, to a more just estimate of the provocations which we had sustained in the unchecked depredations on our commerce in the West Indies, and of our right to obtain that redress for ourselves, which Spain or her local authorities could not or would not afford to us.

Sir William A'Court so far from anticipating with dread the further measures to which a continued denial of justice on the part of the Spanish government must lead, though at this time not particularly instructed as to the nature and extent of those measures, considers "reprisal" as the natural alternative for the restitution of the *Lord Collingwood* if his endeavours to procure that restitution should fail. The case of this ship (your Grace is aware) is that which, from its clearness, its publicity, and from the consequent necessity under which the British government will be, of accounting for the result of it to Parliament, has been selected to be the test both of the disposition and of the power of the Spanish government to do us justice.

I cannot help therefore entertaining a sanguine belief that on the side of Spain our mediation would be anything but unacceptable; on that of France there would, no doubt, be less inclination to resort to it.

There is indeed a preliminary difficulty, to which your Grace justly attaches great weight, in one of your late despatches: that is, the utter ignorance in which we are as to the causes of war which France may have against Spain. What appears to the eye is the fact of the adoption of a too popular Constitution in Spain, and the moral danger of its vicinage to France; a ground perhaps for precaution, and, where precaution may have grown intolerably inconvenient and manifestly inefficient—but then only—for more decisive measures.

What France has openly alleged is the peril to which the person of the King of Spain is exposed, and the restraint to which his liberty is subjected. Upon these points, besides that the peril, if it existed, is clearly lessened, and that the restraint (as appears by Sir William A'Court's despatch) is

otherwise accounted for by the Spanish minister; there seems reason to hope that to the King our master, as a mediating Power, tranquillizing assurances on these points might be given unsolicited; which Spain would undoubtedly refuse to the menacing requisition of France.

The other points put forward in the French complaints are speeches in the Cortes, and publications in the newspapers of Madrid. The real, though unavowed cause, is perhaps the passion which is now felt in France for something of *éclat* and of national exertion; a sort of false appetite for glory, which they disguise to others and perhaps to themselves under the pretence of a genuine necessity for vindicating the national honour and national safety by war. To combat this sentiment directly may perhaps be more difficult, than to strip it of the pretexts with which it is disguised, and to point out the dangers with which the indulgence of it must be accompanied. The pretexts are in truth so small compared with the magnitude of the responsibility which would attend the stirring up a war which must sooner or later spread over all Europe (for in the occupation of Spain by French arms no other nation could long acquiesce); the contingent dangers are so far beyond all calculation, and those which are more immediate press so awfully upon France herself, upon her internal tranquillity, and upon the stability of her political institutions, that it is hoped that France may still be made to feel the immense risk which she is about to incur for advantages so trivial and so problematical, so unlikely to be achieved, and so impossible to be permanent.

The King commands me to signify to your Grace his Majesty's pleasure that you should press these and other considerations, which will occur to your Grace's mind more powerfully than I can suggest them, upon the French ministers and upon his Most Christian Majesty himself; and it is the earnest wish and hope of the King that your Grace may yet have the satisfaction of preventing the interruption of that peace which your Grace had so large a share in procuring for the world.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 8th Dec., 1822.

UPON receipt of your Grace's despatch No. 28, I have looked over my correspondence with M. Sarmiento, on the subject of the supposed guarantee, and find, as I expected, nothing that could warrant the apprehensions, and misapprehensions, to which that correspondence has given rise.

The assurances given to M. Sarmiento in my note of October 1st are founded, distinctly and exclusively, upon the "ancient engagements and obligations" of Great Britain towards Portugal; and its sense is of course limited by them. Those "engagements and obligations" are before the world; and there is nothing in them that extends to a guarantee, even of territorial integrity and independence, much less of political institutions; with respect to which latter, no word could have found its way into the

treaties of former times; and with respect to which, a guarantee was asked of this country in the time of my predecessor, and was distinctly refused.

However, as it is clear that the Portuguese government has created a false impression as to the character and effect of my correspondence with its chargé d'affaires, and as the last official note of that gentleman held out an intimation of further communication, which has never been fulfilled, and the non-fulfilment of which *may* have been expressly designed to leave to him the last word in the correspondence, I have felt it right to put upon record the true meaning and extent of his Majesty's assurances to Portugal, in an official note to M. Sarmento, which I shall deliver to that gentleman at a conference to-morrow; a copy of which I enclose for your Grace's use, and for the satisfaction of the French government, if the subject should be renewed at Paris.

I suspect, however, that M. de Villèle will not recur to the subject, as he has already expressed to Sir Charles Stuart his regret that he had too hastily given so much credit to the report of what was said by M. Pinheiro to the French chargé d'affaires at Lisbon, as to transmit it to Verona for enquiry; and has intimated a belief, which is, no doubt, well founded, that the Portuguese government had been deceiving both France and England, and playing the two governments against each other.

It may not be amiss to learn of M. de Villèle (if he should, contrary to my expectation, revert to this matter of Portugal at all) whereabouts the French government now is in its commercial arrangements with that government.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
GEORGE CANNING.

*To Prince Metternich.*

[ 251. ]

MON CHER PRINCE,

Paris, 9th Dec., 1822.

As you and I had some conversation on the subject of Portugal besides what passed in conference upon this subject, I think it proper to inform you, that on my road here I received the copy of a communication from Mr. Canning to the Portuguese government on the subject of its relations with Brazil, in which he declares the intention of his Majesty to maintain a strict neutrality in the contest about to take place between the mother country and its colony. This document will be conveyed to you in the usual diplomatic course; but as we had some conversation upon the subject, I think it proper to let you know what has passed by the earliest opportunity.

I am afraid that there is no doubt that the Prince Regent has allowed himself to be proclaimed Emperor of the Brazils,



and has thereby thrown off the mask of allegiance to the King, his father. They say that these proceedings are all very much against the inclination of the Princess.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 252. ]

*To Prince Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

Milan, 9<sup>me</sup> Déc., 1822.

Depuis que je vous ai écrit de Milan, j'ai reçu une dépêche du Chevalier A'Court du 10<sup>me</sup> Novembre, où il annonce que le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères venait de lui proposer un traité de commerce entre les deux gouvernemens. Il paraît par cette dépêche, non seulement que la proposition est venue du gouvernement Espagnol, mais que le Chevalier A'Court s'est abstenu d'en parler le premier malgré beaucoup d'insinuations qu'il avait reçues, que la proposition de sa part serait bien reçue. Il est probable que les mêmes causes qui l'ont fait résister à toutes ces insinuations, ont aussi occasionné la réserve vis-à-vis du ministre de France à Madrid dont se plaint son Excellence.

Je vous envoie la copie d'une note qu'a écrit M. Canning en réponse à celle que lui a présenté à ce sujet le chargé d'affaires de France. Vous y verrez que malgré que lui et moi avons écrit sur le même sujet, lui à Londres et moi à Milan, nous en avons dit la même chose.

Au reste, il paraît que le gouvernement Espagnol n'est pas du tout satisfait des mesures que le gouvernement de sa Majesté juge à propos de prendre, pour mettre fin aux pirateries dont se plaignent ses sujets aux Antilles.

Toujours à vous, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 253. ]

*To General Gordon.*

MY DEAR GORDON,

Paris, 9th Dec., 1822.

I did not answer your letter on the subject of the office of Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance when I received it as I had at that time offered the office to Lord Beresford, and I

wished to have his answer before I should write to you. I have now received it, and he will accept the offer; but I should wish the subject not to be mentioned till I shall have had an opportunity of taking the King's pleasure upon it.

I need not assure you how very happy I should be to have it in my power to promote any arrangement which should be agreeable to you; but I will not deceive you by telling you that if Beresford had not accepted it I could have recommended you for this office. You are aware how I stand in respect to claims upon me; and if Beresford had not accepted the offer which I made to recommend him, I must have offered the office to others in succession of the general officers who have served with me.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 254. ]

SIR,

Paris, 9th Dec., 1822.

I arrived here this afternoon, and received your despatch, No. 24, of the 6th instant, and I beg you to be assured that I am ready to stay here as long as his Majesty's government may think proper, or to go wherever they may conceive that I can render any service to his Majesty.

Since my arrival I have had an interview with Mons. de Villèle, which lasted for two hours; and I have the pleasure to inform you that that minister still entertains the same peaceful views that he did when I was here in September; and he has assured me that I shall find the King, Monsieur, and all the Royal Family and the Cabinet of the same opinion.

With these views he sent a messenger on Thursday to Verona, with orders to the French ministers at that place to inform the ministers of the three Continental Sovereigns that circumstances in Spain had altered materially since they had determined to address despatches to the ministers representing their several Sovereigns at Madrid, to represent to them that those despatches, in their present form, might now do the utmost mischief to the cause of France, and the greatest benefit to the cause of the revolution; and to express the desire of the French government that the transmission of these despatches

should be suspended till an opportunity (*le moment opportun*) should occur. This *moment opportun* Mons. de Villèle described as the occurrence of one of the cases of the *procès verbal*; and the conference at Paris will be judges of it equally with the French government.

I congratulated Mons. de Villèle upon this step, which, I entertain but little doubt, will have the desired effect. The Emperor of Russia may make some difficulty on the subject, but, in my opinion, the other Powers will make none; and Prince Metternich will exert all his influence over his Imperial Majesty to induce him to consent to the proposition of the French government.

Finding this to be the case, I did not think proper to offer Mons. de Villèle the mediation of his Majesty. I told him, however, that I was authorised to assure him of the sincere desire of his Majesty to endeavour to remove the difficulties of the relative situation of France and Spain; and he entered much at length into a description of their relations, and of their recent communications. The details of this discussion are interesting, and I propose to report them to you by a messenger whom I will send to England to-morrow. I will not detain the messenger now about the despatches any longer, or his bag will be too late for the packet of Wednesday; and I think it very desirable that you should receive as soon as possible the intelligence which this despatch contains.

I think I ought to wait here at least till the return of the messenger from Verona, who is expected by the 18th, as Mons. de Villèle did not tell me what line the French government would take in case the Allied ministers at Verona should not comply with their request; and I think I may at that period, or between this and the return of the courier, concert some measure with Mons. de Villèle which may insure the general tranquillity, even in that case. At all events, it will give ample time for my receiving an answer to this despatch.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 9th Dec., 1822.

I leave the despatches to Sir William A'Court open for your information. You will have the goodness to add to them any intelligence or observation that you may think useful for his guidance.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 255.]

SIR,

Paris, 10th Dec., 1822.

In the conversation which I had last night with Mons. de Villèle, he began by inquiring whether I was satisfied with what had taken place at Verona. I answered that it depended upon the question of peace or war; that if France could remain at peace, I had every reason to be satisfied; but if, as I apprehended, war was to be the consequence of what had been done at Verona, I could not be satisfied, nor could anybody.

Mons. de Villèle then informed me of the instructions sent to the French ministers at Verona, which I mentioned to you in my despatch of last night. The particular alterations in the circumstances of the case to which he referred, and on which he had directed them to rely, were first, the total defeat of the Royalists, and the loss of the Royalist cause in Spain; secondly, the greater degree of moderation of the government.

There are other facts connected with these which he stated to me, but which I am not so certain that he has ordered the French ministers to bring forward at Verona. One of these is the influence which it appeared by late transactions that the foreign ministers had over the safety of the royal family; the other was, that the King of Spain appeared to be less anxious than he had been for the invasion of Spain by French troops.

I think likewise that there is a motive for the conduct of Mons. de Villèle which he has not stated to the ministers at Verona, nor to me; and that is, that the defeat of the Royalists, and total retreat from Spain of the Royalist government, has put an end to all engagements between France and them.

Mons. de Villèle reasons upon the despatches written at Verona to the ministers of the several Courts residing at Madrid

very much in the same manner that these despatches are considered in my answer, given to the Allied ministers, when I declined, on the part of his Majesty's government, to make any similar communication to the Spanish government. He said they must create irritation, and increase that which exists; that the ministers must be withdrawn, which is the last blow which the Continental Powers can strike; that France must withdraw her minister, if the other Powers should adopt that measure, and that war must follow. He observes that it is useless to examine by what course war will follow the withdrawing of the ministers, as the fact must be considered certain, and measures must be adopted accordingly.

He considers likewise that the writing of these despatches had been founded upon an erroneous notion that there might be three different proceedings, or rather three stages in the same proceeding, viz. the communication of the despatches; withdrawing the ministers; and war. Whereas there would be but one. War must follow the communication of the despatches.

He then inquired whether I thought the Powers at Verona would consent to allow the question to remain in suspense for some time. I encouraged him to hope that they would, for the reasons stated in my despatch of last night. The conversation then turned upon the opinions of the different Sovereigns and their ministers at Verona, and upon the transactions and discussions of the conference; in the course of which Mons. de Villèle declared, that although he was aware that I had thought otherwise, he could assure me that he and Mons. de Montmorency were entirely of the same opinion, and that the King had in consequence created Mons. de Montmorency a duke.

He admitted that he had not been acquainted with all that had passed till my Memorandum had been communicated to him, and that he could not approve all, but that he did of the result, which had left France at liberty to take her own measures, with the promised support of the other Continental Powers; and that he should think his position complete, and as good as it could be after a Congress, if he could prevail upon the Continental Powers to withhold their despatches. The expression which he used when talking of their possible refusal to suspend the transmission of their despatches was this: "*Je ne vous dis pas ce que nous ferons;*" but from the whole of the

conversation, I judge that, if they should persist, he will not send a similar despatch on the part of the French government.

This impression, however, is not confirmed by what I learnt this morning from General Pozzo di Borgo and Mons. de Montmorency.

After we had gone through this part of the subject, I stated to Mons. de Villèle that I was happy to find from Sir Charles Stuart that he was satisfied with the explanations which his Majesty's government had sent him on different points on which he had desired to have explanations, when he interrupted me, and said that there was still a point on which it was wished that we should explain ourselves, as, in fact, everything we did, and every measure we adopted which might alter our situation, either in respect to commerce or territory, excited the utmost jealousy in France, and occasioned the utmost embarrassment to the French government. He then said that he wished that we could have refrained from touching the island of Cuba, excepting in concert with the government of the Havannah; and that he had heard that a very harsh instruction had been issued to the commanders of the fleets in the West Indies to resist the usual operations and search of the *guarda costas* employed by the commanding officers and other Spanish authorities to protect the monopoly by the mother country of the commerce of the Spanish colonies.

I explained to Mons. de Villèle in what manner the operations upon the island of Cuba were necessary, in order to complete our measure against the pirates, which everybody must admit was necessary for ourselves, and desirable to others; and I showed him that they were to be carried on upon a part of the coast of the island which could have no more influence on the possession or commerce of the Havannah than it appeared the government of that port had upon the operations of the pirates upon the coast. With this explanation Mons. de Villèle appeared to be satisfied.

I then adverted to the other complaint, and stated that, in point of fact, we had enjoyed a commerce with the Spanish colonies, recognised by the mother country both in the time of the Cortes and of the King, from the year 1810 to the present period; that the King had particularly recognised this commerce, and had promised that if it should ever become necessary to interrupt it, it should be after sufficient notice to

those concerned, in order that they might not be losers; that, notwithstanding these circumstances, the governors of Puerto Cabello and of Porto Rico, and, I believed, of the Havannah, had fitted out vessels purposely to prey upon this innocent and recognised commerce; and that his Majesty's government having frequently applied to Spain for redress, and no redress having been given, and the evil having lately increased, had been under the necessity of taking measures to obtain redress, and to protect the commerce of his Majesty's subjects.

Mons. de Villèle admitted that our case was better than it had been represented; and he only regretted that these measures of rigour had been found necessary at the very moment of the report that there was a negotiation in progress for a treaty of commerce between the two nations, as the two facts, unexplained, occurring at the same time afforded ground for the reports of the occupation of the Spanish West India islands by Great Britain, and of other concessions by Spain to Great Britain, as compensation for the line which the British government had taken in the recent discussions at Verona.

I replied, that a reference to dates, and Mr. Canning's ignorance of the proposition of the treaty till informed of it by despatches from Paris, must convince any reasonable man of the total want of foundation for those reports. I then told him that he would do well to put this matter in the usual diplomatical channel, and that I did not doubt that he would find the result to be satisfactory.

I then informed Mons. de Villèle that I was authorised to tell him that his Majesty's government were disposed and ready to adopt any measure which should be thought advisable to remove the difficulties existing between the French and Spanish governments; but before I report what passed on that subject, I will state the reasons for thinking that the best use of the discretion reposed in me was not to offer the mediation of Great Britain. If, however, I have mistaken the wishes of government, it is easy to set the matter right by a direct offer of the mediation.

First, I know that the mediation of Great Britain in any Spanish question is particularly disagreeable to the King, and to all who surround him. They think that we have supplanted them in Spain; and they would prefer anything to an acknowledgment of the influence of the British government in that

country, and to measures which would probably tend to augment that influence.

Secondly, they have in reality no cause of quarrel with Spain, excepting the existence of the Spanish constitution; and a mediation on the part of the British government, if accepted, which is very improbable, as they would probably answer as they did at Verona to the proposition of Prince Metternich, that there is nothing upon which to mediate, would tend only to bring to light, I am afraid, a series of miserable intrigues. I thought it better to offer our services in general terms than a mediation; and as the answer might easily and naturally have led to something more specific, if a mediation had been wished for or thought of, that which was given tends to prove that it was not thought of, and, if offered, would not have been accepted.

Mons. de Villele said that he was really apprehensive that there was no remedy to the existing evils but time; that he had lately had a conversation with the Due de San Lorenzo, the Spanish minister here, and Mons. de Torreno, and had endeavoured to impress upon their minds the necessity of making some change, and of reconciling the King of Spain to their system; but he said that the answer which they gave him, and the accounts which he had received from Mons. de la Garde regarding the state of affairs in Spain, and the choice of men which still remained, and of the small proportion of influence or of public confidence which any individual possessed, induced him to despair of producing any change.

He said that he had offered the Duc de San Lorenzo and Mons. de Torreno to mediate between Spain and any of her colonies, of which the Spanish government might be disposed to recognise the independence, and to engage to stipulate for every commercial advantage for Spain, but for none for France which Great Britain should not already enjoy either under treaty with Spain or with the colony in question. That if the Spanish government wished to send an Infant to Mexico or Peru, or to any other part of Spanish America, attended by troops, with a view to make an endeavour to renew the connection between those colonies and Spain, the expedition now fitting in the ports of France should be at the orders of the Spanish government to convey the Infant and the troops wherever they pleased. That they were ready to review, in



concert with the Spanish government, their commercial system with Spain, in order to see if something might not grow out of this review favourable to Spain; and, in short, to do everything which could tend to the benefit and honour of Spain, provided only they would endeavour to reconcile the King to their system; and that France should in all commercial advantages be upon the same footing with Great Britain. Upon this last part of the subject he was excessively warm; and said that, as he had spoken out to them, he thought it as well to let me know what he had said, as he could assure me that France could not submit to an extension of our advantages and our territory.

In answer, I told him that he might rely upon it that he would never find us requiring any exclusive advantage. That nobody could dispute the right which we had to cultivate those advantages which a good understanding with other Powers might give us, and to place our relations with such powers upon the best foundation for the advantage of both countries; but we disclaimed all desire to enjoy any exclusive advantage in the commerce of any country.

Mons. de Villèle made a civil reply; and I begged him to turn over in his mind what I had said to him. He expressed a wish that I should remain here till the return of the courier from Verona, and hoped, in the mean time, we should have frequent opportunities of conversing.

In the course of the conversation, as well as when we were upon the point of separating, Mons. de Villèle particularly desired me to request you to pay no attention to their newspapers, however nearly their several editors may be supposed to be connected with different ministers and leading characters in France. He said that he was quite certain that the public opinion, as well as that of the government and the King and royal family, was in favour of peace, but that he had allowed the newspapers for a considerable time to take their course. He said, however, that he had thought it proper to sound the public opinion by a paragraph in the '*Journal des Débats*' on the preceding day, and he found it to be everything he could wish.

Since I wrote you last night I have seen General Pozzo di Borgo and Mons. de Montmorency. I can't tell whether the former was well acquainted with what had passed, or the object

of the French government in their communication with Verona. He told me that they had desired that the transmission of the despatches might be delayed till the French government should have an opportunity of communicating with Verona, with which desire the ministers of the three Powers at Paris had complied, as there was no wish to hurry them into any measure of which they could disapprove. Mons. de Montmorency did not tell me that any reference had been made to Verona; but he said that material alterations had been made in the French despatch which I had seen at Verona, and that he thought I should now be satisfied with it. On other points I found him still more violent and prejudiced against all our proceedings in relation to Spain and her colonies than Mons. de Villèle.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 256. ]

SIR,

Paris, 10th Dec., 1822.

When I was at Milan on the 1st inst., I received from Prince Metternich a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy, upon the subject of the Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Spain. I don't send the copy of the note enclosed in that letter, as it is an exact copy of that presented to you by Mons. de Marcellus on the 26th November. In answer to that letter I wrote the enclosed,\* and having on my road to Paris received the copy of Sir W. A'Court's despatch to you of the 10th of November, and of your note to Mons. de Marcellus, I thought it proper to write Prince Metternich the enclosed.†

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 257. ]

SIR,

Paris, 10th Dec., 1822.

Your despatch, No. 19, of the 22nd of November, which I received on the road to Paris, induces me to state in more

\* No. 2. See page 622.

† No. 3. See page 624.

detail than I did in mine of the 29th November (No. 45) what passed in conference at Verona on that day regarding the relations between Portugal and the Brazils.

The discussions commenced by the production by Prince Metternich of a letter which had been sent to him by a Brazilian gentleman who had arrived at Verona, who stated in it first that he had credentials from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to the Emperor of Austria; secondly, that the object of his mission was to obtain the recognition of the independence of the Brazils by the Allies, and a mediation on the part of the Allies between Portugal and the Brazils. Prince Metternich, after reading this letter to the conference, expressed the wish of the Emperor that it should be considered by his Allies, and stated that the Emperor had an agent at the Brazils, but that he kept him there only on account of the family connexion. Prince Metternich expressed a disposition to consider of the requests made in this letter, and proposed that they should be considered in a conference to be assembled in London.

The French ministers stated that they must take the question *ad referendum*.

The Russian ministers were at first disposed to acquiesce in the proposition of the Austrian minister, as was the Prussian.

I said that in respect to the conference in London, I must take the proposition *ad referendum* if persisted in, as, although a discussion upon any point of interest to any of the parties to the treaties is a matter of right, the discussion in a conference, and the choice of the seat of that conference, were matters for consideration, and that I could not take upon me to determine those points. I thought that London might be considered by some the most inconvenient of all positions for a conference on the affairs of Portugal and the Brazils.

Then, in respect to the proposition itself, I said that it would be impossible for the Allies to consent to a mediation, and to form a conference to carry it on, upon the demand of one party only; and that in respect to the recognition of the independence of the Brazils, and the reception of a minister from thence, although I did not doubt that my government would not be indisposed to such a measure upon certain conditions, and probably would not be the last to recognise such independence *de facto*, the question was so little foreseen that I had no instructions upon it, and it was so important that I could not decide

it without reference to his Majesty. I then pointed out how inconsistent it would be with all that had passed in this Congress if the independence of Brazil was in any manner recognised; and I recommended to the ministers to reflect a little upon the subject, and to take the orders of their Sovereigns before they proceeded any further. They unanimously adopted this recommendation, and there the subject has dropped.

I took an opportunity, however, of speaking to Prince Metternich upon it, and requested him to recollect the inconvenience which had been felt, and the immense evils which had been the consequence of throwing the mediation between Spain and Portugal on Monte Video into the conference at Paris. I begged him to observe that Great Britain was the only Power which could have any natural influence upon the questions between Portugal and the Brazils, and that if the parties chose to act on our mediation, it was much better for their sakes to leave the management to the British government than to mix up in it other Powers, whose governments could neither feel the same interest in its success, nor so well understand the bearing of all the questions to be settled.

Here the conversation dropped; but the knowledge of what has passed upon this subject at Verona may induce you to communicate to the Allied governments the contents of your notes to the Portuguese and Brazilian governments.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 10th Dec., 1822.

The French newspapers, received to day, exhibit symptoms of a milder character. I earnestly hope that you will be able to improve them into a settled disposition to peace.

The more one considers the possible—the *probable*—consequences of war, even of a successful war on the side of France, the more one is appalled at them, not for Spain only, nor only for France herself; but for ourselves.

Our neutrality between Spain and her colonies, difficult as it was to maintain and enforce, was a task comparatively easy with that which we should have upon our hands, in endeavouring to maintain and enforce neutrality between France and Spain. And if France get possession of the Peninsula, and if the Emperor of Russia put his army in motion towards the south, no government, however cool and firm, would be able to master the call for armament here.

At all events we feel that we have not done all that we ought to do until we have remonstrated with France against the intemperate use of that discretionary power, which we have endeavoured in vain to prevent from being put into her hands.

To succeed in this remonstrance is the most desirable object; but the next is to have made it strenuously and *bonâ fide*, though we fail.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S. You will see by my despatch to Sir W. A'Court to-day that we take a very temperate course as to the Spanish colonies.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 10th Dec., 1822.

Since my despatches of the 8th instant were written, I have had the honour to receive your Grace's final despatches from Verona to No. 46 (including No. 32), which at the above date had not reached me.

These despatches have been laid before the King.

I have the honour to transmit herewith two despatches *in cypher* for Sir William A'Court, together with a copy of those despatches for your Grace's information.

Should the messenger for Madrid be still at Paris, your Grace will have the goodness to forward the cyphered despatches to Sir William A'Court by that conveyance; but should he have already left Paris, your Grace will in that case be so good as to forward them by the common post.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,

my Lord Duke, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

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[ 258. ] MEMORANDUM ON M. TORRENO'S ACCOUNT OF HIS CONVERSATION  
WITH M. VILLÈLE.

SIR,

Paris, 12th Dec., 1822.

Since I addressed you on the 10th instant, I have seen Mons. de Torreno, who related to me the conversation which he had had with Mons. de Villèle, nearly in the same terms in which Mons. de Villèle had reported it, with this remarkable difference, however, that Mons. de Torreno reports that Mons. de Villèle stated that the continuance of peace depended upon the security of the life of the King, and upon the consent of the Spanish government to the mediation of France in the affairs of the colonies, and upon their acceptance of the offer of France, to convey an Infant

to Mexico or Peru, and not upon any change of constitution, or upon their endeavour to reconcile the King to their system. I particularly inquired from Mons. de Torreno whether Mons. de Villèle had not made use of these expressions to him. He said, certainly not; that so far from it, the impression upon his mind was, that Mons. de Villèle had declared that he did not care what their system of government was, provided the King was secure, and provided they applied to France to mediate for them with their colonies.

I am inclined to believe that up to last night none of the foreign ministers here knew the object of the communication to Verona. General Pozzo di Borgo knew that the transmission of the despatches to Madrid had been suspended, and that a communication had been made to Verona, but of what nature he did not mention to me, and from what I heard last night I am inclined to believe he did not know. General Vincent and the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires certainly did not.

I have seen the King this morning, and what he said to me was to the same purport as what Mons. de Villèle had said to me on the day I arrived here. I stated to his Majesty that I was authorised by my government to offer its services to relieve the difficulties of his situation in relation to Spain. The King said, in very positive terms, that the best thing the British government could do would be to endeavour to prevail upon the Spaniards to modify their system in such a manner as to give to the King of Spain some security for the safety of his person, and more authority, and to the system itself more stability. I stated, in reply, that if the Spanish government requested the King's mediation to prevent hostilities, or to reconcile them to his Most Catholic Majesty, and to the other Powers, we might have it in our power to give them some counsel which might be of service, and which might not offend or irritate if such an opportunity were offered by their own act; but that I was very apprehensive that to give such counsel, our mediation with his Majesty being unasked, would be quite useless, would tend to irritate, and would deprive us of the means of being serviceable to preserve peace if a critical moment should occur.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 259. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 12th Dec., 1822.

Before I went to the King I had heard that his Majesty was of late much altered, but I am much concerned to have to inform you that I found him more altered than I had expected. From his appearance I should suppose that he had had a paralytic attack. One of his Majesty's eyes was more closed than the other, and his head, which was in a great degree sunk upon his chest, inclined to that side.

Although his Majesty was very attentive to what I said, and answered with his usual precision and intelligence, he appeared much less interested than usual in the subject of conversation, which embraced all that had passed at Verona, and he talked much less.

I am really very apprehensive that we shall soon lose him, notwithstanding that the several ministers declare that he is better than he has been.

I have, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 260. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 12th Dec., 1822.

I enclose the copy of the letter which I have written to Sir W. A'Court in consequence of the wish expressed in your letter of the 6th inst.

I have, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 261. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Paris, 12th Dec., 1822.

I have nothing to tell you that is not in my despatches. General Vincent has just now been with me, and it appears that M. de Montmorency has been as close with him as with me. He certainly does not know with what view the French government desire the suspension of the transmission of the despatches.

He tells me that M. de Montmorency says it is on account of the necessity of communicating with England, and he agrees to the delay with reluctance.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Sir W. A'Court.*

[ 262. ]

SIR,

Paris, 12th Dec., 1822.

I send with this despatches for you from Mr. Canning, and as he has desired me to make you acquainted with the state of affairs here, I cannot do better than send you the copy and extract of two despatches which I have addressed to him since my arrival, begging you to consider the communication as quite confidential. I consider that the knowledge of the Spanish government that the desire of peace is so strong here as it is, would effectually prevent the attainment of all our objects, and that first of all objects amongst others.

In order that you may understand my despatches to Mr. Canning, I send you the extract of a Memorandum upon the proceedings at Verona, which I sent to Sir Charles Stuart on the 12th November, and notes upon it explaining what was done, and the copy of the *procès-verbal* among the four Continental Powers defining the *casus fœderis*, the occurrence of any of which you will observe now, according to the new French proposition, will occasion the transmission of the despatches to the several ministers at Madrid. The great object now is that the Spanish government should request the mediation of his Majesty; and I hope that if they should not be relieved from their apprehensions at too early a period, they will make that application.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

NOTES UPON MEMORANDUM \* TO SIR CHARLES STUART OF THE  
12TH NOVEMBER, 1822.

These despatches were written, and were communicated to me, and I declined, on the part of my government, to write in similar

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\* See page 519.



terms to the British minister at Madrid, or to send him instructions to hold any language on the part of his Majesty to the Spanish government on the quarrel between France and Spain.

His efforts were to be confined to endeavour to allay the ferment at Madrid which these despatches were calculated to excite, and to do all the good in his power.

These despatches were intended to be sent, whether the Spanish government sent similar despatches or not.

This treaty has been signed in the form of a *procès-verbal*, and a copy of it is sent herewith.

[ENCLOSURE.]

PROCÈS-VERBAL

Signé par Messieurs les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie.

Vérone, le \* Novembre, 1822.

Les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, ayant jugé nécessaire de déterminer les cas dans lesquels les engagements éventuels pris avec la Cour de France par les Cours d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, dans la supposition d'une guerre déclarée ou provoquée par le gouvernement actuel de l'Espagne, deviendraient obligatoires pour les Puissances qui y ont pris part, sont convenus de préciser l'application desdits engagements dans les termes suivans :—

ARTICLE I.

Les trois cas dans lesquels les engagements éventuels entre les quatre Puissances signataires du présent procès-verbal deviendront immédiatement obligatoires sont—

1. Celui d'une attaque à main armée de la part de l'Espagne contre le territoire Français, ou d'un acte officiel du gouvernement Espagnol provoquant directement à la rebellion les sujets de l'une ou de l'autre des Puissances.

2. Celui de la déchéance prononcée contre sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne d'un procès intenté à son auguste personne, ou d'un attentat de même nature contre les membres de sa famille.

3. Celui d'un acte formel du gouvernement Espagnol portant atteinte aux droits de succession légitime de la famille Royale.

ARTICLE II.

Attendu qu'indépendamment des cas ci-dessus spécifiés et définis, il peut s'en présenter que l'une ou l'autre des Cours signataires du présent acte regarderait comme étant de la même valeur, et devant emporter les mêmes effets, que ceux qui se trouvent désignés à l'Article I., il est arrêté que tel

\* Blank in manuscript.

cas non spécifié ou tout autre cas analogue venant à se réaliser, les Ministres des Hautes Cours Alliées accrédités près de sa Majesté Très Chrétienne se réuniront avec le Cabinet de France pour examiner et déterminer si le cas en question doit être considéré comme rentrant dans la classe des *casus fœderis* prévus et définis, et exigeant comme tel l'application directe des engagements pris par les Hautes Puissances.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 13th Dec., 1822.

Your Grace's despatches of Tuesday have been received and laid before the King.

The step taken by M. de Villèle, in referring back to Verona the consideration of the despatches proposed to be sent, in support of the demands of France, by the three continental Courts to their several ministers at Madrid, with a view of inducing the three Courts to suspend the transmission, and to modify the contents of those despatches, undoubtedly constituted a case (wholly unforeseen when the last instructions of your government were framed) which made it expedient to suspend on your Grace's part the offer to the French government of his Majesty's mediation with Spain.

Upon a full review, however, of the situation in which we stand towards both those Powers, and towards the other members of the Alliance, and upon an anxious consideration of the several issues to which the question of peace or war may come, and of the possibility that we may not be accurately and immediately apprised of the occurrence of the opportunity ("*le moment opportun*" of M. de Villèle) at which a decision for war might be taken, all those of his Majesty's servants whom I have been able to get together in town are of opinion that it is highly material, for the clear and perfect discharge of the duty of the British government, in a question so deeply affecting the interests not only of the Powers immediately concerned but of the world, that your Grace should not leave Paris without having placed in the hands of the French government the eventual offer of his Majesty's mediation.

They are further of opinion, that this should rather be done before the answer to M. de Villèle's reference to Verona shall have been received at Paris, than that your Grace should wait there, to be informed of the purport of that answer. They think indeed that it would be inexpedient that your Grace should be in any degree party (as M. de Villèle seems to desire) to the deliberations of the French government upon that answer whatever it may be. If it shall be of a nature to lead to war, it is obviously useless that we should be called into council again, upon a point upon which his Majesty's opinion has been recorded and cannot be changed. In any other case, there is at least no advantage (and there might be some danger of misunderstanding or misrepresentation hereafter) from our being consulted by the French government upon the details of a communication, upon the whole course or character of which we have differed from France, and which could hardly be modified now so as to meet our views, and obtain our concurrence.

It is so essential that your Grace should be present here to take your share in advising his Majesty upon a state of affairs growing every day more difficult and anxious, that no explanation can be wanting to the French government for your Grace's return to England. It is therefore his Majesty's pleasure that, after delivering a note eventually tendering his Majesty's mediation, your Grace should not protract your stay in Paris for a longer period than may be necessary for your Grace's convenience, and for the purpose of avoiding the appearance of an abrupt departure.

I have thought that it might save your Grace trouble if I enclosed to you a draft of the note to be presented to the French government.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,  
my Lord Duke, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 13th Dec., 1822,  
6 P.M.

Your despatches reached me only this morning. The exceeding importance, as it appears to us, of not leaving our offer of mediation unmade or unrecorded, induces me to send off this one despatch, upon that subject only, without waiting to add any commentary upon M. de Villèle's singular conversation. Otherwise, I do think that for the French government to have taken upon themselves to catechise us upon our proceedings towards Spain and in the West Indies, while *they* were fitting out larger armaments, planning invasions for Spain of the Spanish American colonies, and proposing commercial treaties with Spain on no other basis than that of equality with us in all commercial advantages, and then to tell us gravely that France will not "submit" to our gaining any advantages in commerce and territory, is a strain of (what shall I say—insolence? or only) coolness which shows that the success of their demand upon the three continental Powers at Verona has turned even M. de Villèle's head.

I confess I long to tell M. de Villèle (if it were worth while, and if this were the moment) that we *will* trade with the late Spanish American colonies, whether France likes it or not; that we will *not* respect the Spanish Guarda Costas, which attempt to interdict that trade to us; and that if France sends a large fleet to help the Guarda Costas, we will send a larger to watch (at least) *their* operations.

The truth seems to be, that having got the three continental Powers at their back, the use which M. de Villèle intends to make of them with Spain is not against Spain, but against us. He will say (or probably has said) to Spain, "See, we have all Europe ready to fall upon you. We can crush you in a moment; but give up all connexion with England, and we will spare you; nay more, we will help you to do her and her commerce all manner of harm."

But all this will keep. The business of the day is to get a clear case for ourselves, whatever may be the issue of the present loose and per-

plexed negotiations between Paris, Verona, and Madrid; and that case all who are here agree in thinking is only to be made by putting the offer of mediation into the hands of the French government, and leaving them to deal with it as they may. The ministers in town are, besides Lord Liverpool and myself, the Lord Chancellor, Robinson, Melville, and Vansittart. Peel and Lord Bathurst were both here when the first instructions as to mediation were written.

I trust it will not be long before we have you among us.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I enclose a paper which I was just going to destroy, but I will send it to you instead. It contains the heads of the note in L.'s handwriting.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The undersigned has already explained the sentiments of his government at Verona respecting the state of affairs between France and Spain; had instructions to offer the mediation of his King at Paris, before the French government took their decisive step of sending to Madrid; rejoices at the suspension in the proceeding of sending the despatches and the reference to Verona, but is now ready to declare, upon the part of the King his master, that he will be prepared to offer his mediation in the event of the answer from Verona being of such a nature as to lead to a course likely to be productive of hostilities, or under any circumstances under which the governments of France and Spain may be ready to accept it for the purpose of preserving peace.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 263.]

SIR,

Paris, 16th Dec., 1822.

I had an interview yesterday with Monsieur de Villèle, in which he expressed the greatest anxiety respecting the result of the course of measures which he was pursuing. He doubted the consent of the Emperor of Russia to the proposed delay in the transmission of the instructions to his minister at Madrid; but, in that case, he stated that it was not his intention to transmit any corresponding instruction to the French minister; and although he said that the French minister would be withdrawn in case the ministers of the other Courts should be withdrawn, I think it probable that he will endeavour to avoid to take even that step; but if he does withdraw the French minister, he declares that he sees no chance of avoiding war, and that he intends to be prepared to take the field as soon as the season shall permit. Then if the three continental Courts should consent to leave the case in the hands of France and of

the conference at Paris, Monsieur de Villèle felt that this government could not remain long in the position in which it stood. It was absolutely necessary that something should be done to enable the French government to withdraw the Army of Observation, or to put the French government in a situation to be able to state that they saw their way to a favourable conclusion of their discussions with Spain. I informed him of the object of your recent communications to Spain, and the probability that they would place his Majesty's government in a situation to be able to bring the Spanish government to some explanation which might be communicated to them previous to the session of the legislature. This will commence on the 28th of January. He endeavoured to convince me that the best thing we could do to bring the Spanish government to reason was to declare our adhesion to the *procès-verbal*, which, I told him, was quite out of the question, for the reasons which I had already stated at Verona; but upon the whole I think I left him better satisfied with his situation than when I found him. There is doubtless a large party here in favour of war. They think that war in which there should be any success would tend more to the establishment of the House of Bourbon than the most successful government of years of peace; they consider military success in a war in Spain as certain, and they don't look to political results. This party, then, will certainly endeavour to drive the government to war, and Monsieur de Villèle's apprehensions respecting the difficulties of his position with the Chambers, if he should not be able to show some clear road out of the embarrassments between the French and Spanish governments, are not unfounded. He expressed great anxiety that I should remain here till the arrival of the answer from Verona, and that I should return, if not inconvenient to me, when the answer of the Spanish government to your recent communication should be received.

Since I wrote to you on Thursday I have endeavoured to discover the meaning of the difference between Monsieur de Villèle's account and Monsieur de Torreno's account of what passed between them in respect to the Spanish constitution. It appears to me that when Monsieur de Villèle talked of the safety of the King, and said that he did not care what the constitution was, he meant provided it was what is called here *légitime*, that is, a constitution proceeding from the King by a grant or

charter, and not forced upon him. The Duc de San Lorenzo, who was present at the conversation, is quite certain that some change of the Spanish constitution is in Monsieur de Villele's contemplation.

Monsieur, in a conversation I had with him, expressed this same notion, viz., that he did not care so much about the substance of the constitution as its *légitimité*, that is, its proceeding from the King.

There are accounts from Verona that the Sovereigns were to leave that place on the 17th instant.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 264. ]

SIR,

Paris, 16th Dec., 1822.

I have had the honour of receiving your despatch, No. 28, of the 13th instant, and the instruction which it contains will be carried into execution this day. As you no longer entertain the wish that I should remain here, I will quit Paris as soon as I shall have taken leave of the King.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 265. ]

SIR,

Paris, 16th Dec., 1822.

As I have, in fact, no official information of the existence or nature of the reference to Verona, and Monsieur de Montmorency had never mentioned the subject to me, it was necessary that I should communicate with Monsieur de Villele before I should present the note enclosed in your despatch, No. 28, of the 13th instant. Accordingly, I waited upon him this day, and read the note to him, and he stated that he had no objection to my presenting it to Monsieur de Montmorency, as he had informed that minister that he had spoken to me respecting the reference to Verona. He then said that he wished that this note were not presented, and that, as an individual, he would

advise me not to present it, as he could not see the utility of presenting it at present; that he was perfectly satisfied with what I had said to him, and he was quite convinced that we would do everything in our power to settle their difficulties with Spain, and the French government were disposed to confide in his Majesty's government, and to make every use of them for that purpose; but that they would feel great difficulty in either asking for or accepting the mediation of a Power suspected by the public opinion of France of being favourably inclined to Spain upon questions so little defined, or capable of being defined, as those which were the real grounds of their difference with Spain.

I explained to him the reasons of his Majesty's government for wishing to present this note, as stated in your despatch, and it was settled that I should present it to-morrow to Monsieur de Montmorency. A conversation then followed upon the real question with Spain, which is what I stated in my despatch, No. 56; but as I am likely to see you so soon, I will not detain the messenger to trouble you with a report of what passed.

Monsieur de Villèle suggested only one alteration in the note, which I propose to make, viz., the substitution of the words French and Spanish governments for the words his Most Christian Majesty and his Catholic Majesty in the last page.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 266. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

Paris, 16th Dec., 1822.

I have received your despatch and letter of the 13th, and my despatches contain the reports of the state of affairs and that your orders will be carried into execution this day.

I think the government have mistaken this case, and that the mediation will be rejected on the ground on which it was rejected at Verona, and it will be very difficult for you afterwards to take your station between France and Spain without taking the part of the latter to a greater degree than would be

desirable. The offer of the mediation would never have been too late, and might at some time or other prevent a war, which is of more importance to us than to make out a case.

I enclose you a confidential paper which I have received from Monsieur de Torreno. I don't think it holds out much prospect of success in any attempt to obtain an alteration of the Spanish constitution. I don't think I shall be able to take leave of the King till Monday, and I shall, in that case, leave this on Friday. The answer from Verona will probably arrive on that day or Saturday, as the Sovereigns were not to go away till the 17th, and it is probable that the answer would not be despatched till the eve of their departure.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Duc de Montmorency.*

[ 267. ]

Paris, 17th Dec., 1822.

The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's plenipotentiary, has explained and recorded in the conferences of Verona the sentiments of his government upon the present critical state of affairs between France and Spain, and the earnest solicitude of the King, his master, to avert a war of which no human foresight can calculate the consequences.

Upon his arrival at Paris the undersigned found instructions from his government to offer to his Most Christian Majesty the mediation of the King, his master, before the decisive step should have been taken of transmitting to Madrid the despatches written at Verona.

The undersigned rejoiced at the delay which had been interposed to the transmission of those despatches to Madrid by the reference to Verona; and his government have learnt, with the liveliest satisfaction, the determination of the French government to reconsider a measure which the undersigned had so anxiously deprecated.

It is the sincere hope of his Majesty that this salutary reconsideration may prevent recourse to arms. But as the issue of the reference to Verona may still be doubtful, the undersigned is instructed to declare that if the answer to that reference



should not be such as to preclude all danger of hostilities, his Majesty will be ready to accept the office of mediator between the French and Spanish governments, and to employ his most strenuous endeavours for the adjustment of their differences and for the preservation of the peace of the world.

WELLINGTON.

[ 268. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 17th Dec., 1822.

I waited upon Monsieur de Montmorency this day, and, after explaining the reasons for my omitting to present a note to offer the mediation of his Majesty between France and Spain, on my arrival at Paris, the reasons for which his Majesty's government wished that a note to the same purport should be presented with it, and the situation in which his Majesty stood at present in relation to Spain, particularly on the points on which he had expressed so much anxiety some time before, viz., the proposed new treaty of commerce and the Spanish colonies, I presented to him the note of which I enclose the copy.

You will observe that I have omitted a few words in two parts of the note. The despatches written at Verona were not agreed upon, as far as relates to their contents, by France with the three continental members of the Alliance; on the contrary, I believe that the French minister objected particularly to the contents of the Russian despatch; nor was the reference to Verona on the despatches so much as on the period of their being transmitted. A later period of transmission might have occasioned a necessity for alteration, but that was not the object of the reference.

I thought it best, therefore, to omit words which would have tended to create an impression that I had misunderstood what had passed at Verona as well as what had been stated to me here, and would certainly have drawn forth a reply.

He perused the note, and said that he should lay it before the King.

He then adverted to the communications made to me by Monsieur de Villèle regarding the reference to Verona on the transmission to Madrid of the despatches from the several

cabinets, and he told me that a messenger had arrived this morning with the accounts of the first impression made by the communication of this demand from France.

He said that both the Emperor of Russia and Prince Metternich had stated that they were desirous of pursuing a course in this affair which should be convenient to the French government, but that they were very unwilling to appear to give way (*se rendre*) to the Spanish revolution; that they had no objection to a delay in the transmission of the despatches, which should, however, not exceed the period at which the Spanish government, when they should receive them, might believe that they were written at Verona, and the results of the conferences in that town. Monsieur de Montmorency added that this was only the first *aperçu*, and that Monsieur de Chateaubriand was to be despatched with the final answer.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 17th Dec., 1822.

In the uncertainty where this messenger will find you, I might spare you and myself the trouble of a despatch: but that I think M. de Villèle's conversation with you, and with Torreno, ought not to be left without observation. There is something in the tone of them both, that really stirs one's blood—not in the way in which the atrocities and violences of revolutionary France have stirred it, for the last quarter of a century—but in the good old constitutional way in which France and England used to hate and provoke each other in times before revolutions were so plenty. Villèle seems to be a minister of those times; and, I suspect, must be watched, and perhaps checked, accordingly.

If you should be on your road to Paris, pray take the trouble to send on a copy of the despatch to Sir Charles Stuart: not that he should seek an opportunity of acting upon it, and commencing anew any discussion with M. de Villèle, but that he may be aware, when the occasion arises, as no doubt it will again, of the impression which M. de Villèle's tone has made here, and of the tone in which it ought to be met, if he repeats it.

I have nothing from A'Court since I last wrote to you.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 17th Dec., 1822.

Your Grace's despatches of Friday have been received and laid before the King.

The report made to your Grace by M. de Torreno of M. de Villèle's conversation with him, even if it is not to be assumed as accurate and unexaggerated in every particular, tallies too well with the same minister's extraordinary disclosures to your Grace, to leave much doubt of the disposition of the French government to turn to another account than that for which it was ostensibly given to them, the authority which they have obtained from the concurrence of the three continental Powers at Verona; and to indemnify themselves for a forbearance towards Spain by the alienation of Spain from Great Britain.

Whether the three Powers will have consented to this diversion of the authority so entrusted to France, and whether Spain will be eager to accept the offers of maritime aid now tendered to her from the quarter from which she has been so many months expecting a blow to be struck at her national security and independence, are points upon which it is not easy to pronounce a confident opinion. But it is at least advantageous for this government to know the mind of France as fully as it has been expressed by M. de Villèle, and to learn that the jealousies of our armaments, and the suspicions expressed of their destination, have their origin in a consciousness on the part of the French government, that they were themselves engaged in plans of which the moving principle was hostility to British influence and aggrandizement.

We do not repent of having disclaimed in terms too plain to be misinterpreted all views of aggrandizement. We have given sufficient proof that our influence, whatever it might be, was intended to be exerted only for an object in which we believe France herself to be as much interested as any other nation, or more—the preservation of peace: and we admit a frank declaration of any accidental jealousies and suspicions which may be conceived by a friendly government, to be the best and surest indication of a general disposition to confidence. But M. de Villèle might have spared the intimation that France will not "submit" to see any advantages, commercial or territorial, acquired by Great Britain. Such language is not a very courteous return for the delicacy with which we have forborne to intimate to France, that Great Britain could not "submit" to see the French force established in military occupation of Spain.

We trust that peace may be preserved without reconse being had by us to such an argument; but M. de Villèle might be made to feel (if any occasion for recurring to the topics of his late conversation should arise), that the readiness with which we have explained to him the preparations in our ports, and the unreserve with which we have opened ourselves upon all points in our intercourse with other countries on which he has applied for information, are not to be construed into an admission that we had either done anything that justified suspicion, or that the public opinion of

France is to control our conduct in the vindication of our rights, or in the fair pursuit of our interests.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 269. ]

SIR,

Paris, 19th Dec., 1822.

As I am upon the point of returning to England, I beg leave to mention to you how much reason I have to be satisfied with the assistance rendered to me, and the services to the public, of the Earl Clanwilliam, Lord Marcus Hill, and Mr. Seymour, who were appointed to accompany me on my mission; and I beg leave to recommend them through you to his Majesty's gracious protection.

Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the Secretary of the Master of the Ordnance, likewise accompanied me, and I have every reason to be satisfied with the assistance I received from him.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 270. ]

SIR,

Paris, 19th Dec., 1822.

As the messenger who will leave this to-night will arrive in London before I shall, and it may be convenient to you to receive in writing rather than verbally, and as soon as possible, a statement of Monsieur de Villèle's objects in relation to Spain, I think it best to write by this occasion, although I set out for London to-morrow morning. Monsieur de Villèle says that all he wishes is to be able to withdraw the French Army of Observation without the loss of credit.

He thinks that the only mode in which this can be done is for the Spanish government to make some reform of their constitution, which shall proceed from the King himself, thus making it, what is called here, *légitime*. He is very indifferent as to the nature or degree of the alteration, but only that it

should be made in a mode which shall imply the consent and approbation of the Sovereign to the whole system.

He then wishes that when the session here commences, which will be on the 28th of January, the King should be enabled to announce to the Chambers that he has well-founded reason to hope that he will be enabled to withdraw the Army of Observation and to preserve his relations of peace and good neighbourhood with Spain. Before I leave this I propose to see him again, and to endeavour to prevail upon him to define exactly what will induce him to make such a communication to the Chambers.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 271.]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

SIR,

Paris, 19th Dec., 1822.

I have seen the King, Monsieur de Villèle, and Monsieur de Montmorency this day, and I understood from all three that it is not intended to ask for or to accept of his Majesty's mediation on the question between France and Spain. The King and his two ministers gave nearly the same reasons for this determination, which are stated in my despatch of the 9th instant. I urged upon Monsieur de Villèle and Monsieur de Montmorency the expediency of their giving an answer which may enable his Majesty's government to continue their good offices in Spain; and the latter said that the answer would be calculated to induce his Majesty's government to continue their *efforts officieux pour maintenir la paix*, although decisive on the subject of the mediation.

Monsieur de Villèle informed me that as soon as Monsieur de Chateaubriand will arrive with the final answer to the reference made to Verona, the Council will deliberate upon the measures which this government will adopt, whether to write a despatch to their ambassador at Madrid to the same purport as those written by the other three Courts, or to withdraw their minister without writing a despatch in case the other Courts should come to that determination. He then asked me whether it was not possible to induce his Majesty's government to sign

the *procès-verbal* of Verona, in case they should find the Spanish government unable or unwilling to make such reasonable arrangement of their affairs as to satisfy moderate men of the safety of continuing at peace with them. He said that he entertained no doubt that this measure on the part of his Majesty would bring the Spaniards to reason; and, at all events, would enable him to separate the French government from the three Continental Powers in as far as regarded the transmission of these despatches, on which subject he declared himself much displeased with them.

I answered that I thought it very improbable that his Majesty's government would ever become a party to the *procès-verbal*. I then asked him whether he considered that instrument as merely defensive?—whether, supposing the state of things in Spain remaining the same he would or could keep his Army of Observation on the frontier, or could disperse it? and whether he would order all Spaniards who were in France, or who should hereafter cross the frontier, to proceed to the right of the Garonne? And I pointed out to him that if he could not answer these questions in a satisfactory manner he could not expect that his Majesty's government could agree to the *procès-verbal*, even if there were not other reasons, some referable to antecedent circumstances, others to the contents of that instrument itself, which must prevent his Majesty from becoming a party to it.

Monsieur de Villele then went into a long discussion on the questions I had put to him, the result of which was that he considered the *procès-verbal* as merely defensive, although the despatches by which it was accompanied gave it an offensive appearance; that if his Majesty's government should consent to sign the *procès-verbal* he would willingly wait for the result of events in Spain; and would either leave his army on the frontier or withdraw it according as might be found best for the general interests. In respect to the last point I could not bring him to a positive declaration. He said that if Spain made any reasonable concession, there could be no doubt upon the subject; but that till some concession was made, he did not think the public opinion in this country would bear such a shock as the ordering the Spanish royalists to retire behind the Garonne.

I then begged him to observe that we must consider the encouragement given to the Spanish royalists as offensive (and

he admitted it was *provocante*); and that we would not become parties to a defensive treaty with a Power who thought proper or found it necessary to adopt such a measure.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 272. ]

*To the Earl of Clancarty.*

MY DEAR CLANCARTY,

Paris, 19th Dec., 1822.

We have always been in the habit of communicating confidentially to the King what passed in the conferences with other Powers, and I enclose you a Memorandum which I sent in November to Sir Charles Stuart, and a note which I sent with the Memorandum to Sir W. A'Court lately for his information.

The French government have since I left Verona desired that the transmission of the despatches mentioned in the above documents, and which were not written in a very conciliatory tone, should be suspended till a moment should arrive which they should consider *un moment opportun*. The answer is not arrived from Verona; but we know what the answer will be, viz., that the French government may delay for a short period to transmit these despatches, but that they must be sent so as to arrive at Madrid in such time as that the Spanish government may be certain that they were sent from, and the consequences of, the Congress at Verona.

In the mean time our minister at Madrid is doing everything in his power to calm matters at Madrid; and as there is a real wish for peace here, I should not be surprised if we succeeded in preserving it, notwithstanding all that our Allies have done for war.

I conclude that Mr. Canning has written to you respecting the directions he sent to me on the navigation of the Rhine.

Ever, my dear Clancarty, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*To Sir Charles Stuart.*

[ 273. ]

MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,

Culais, 21st Dec., 1822.

I enclose you the copy of a despatch, and the extract of a private letter, which I received by the last messenger from England, which contain instructions for your guidance.

I likewise enclose extracts from my despatches to Mr. Canning, containing the reports to which these despatches relate, in order that you may see exactly when it is intended you should apply these instructions in case such an opportunity ever should offer. I don't believe that such an opportunity will offer.

The fashion and habit of the diplomatic world has been lately to suspect us of selfish policy, and in pursuit of objects of this description, to imagine that we stick at nothing. I had but too much reason to complain of this mistrust of our government at Verona, and upon my arrival at Paris I found that it was generally believed that we had protected the Spanish government and cause at Verona, in consequence of some secret engagement, and that an advantageous treaty of commerce was to be the payment of such protection, and that we were to take possession of Cuba, Porto Rico, and what else we could get in the scramble, in case the French government should invade Spain.

Even the ministers were not free from these absurd notions, of which I observed more than one trace in their conversations with me, and most particularly M. de Montmorency; and even when they do not entertain these notions themselves, they feel the inconvenience of their circulation among the French public, because they have to combat these notions before they can venture to embark on any line of policy in concert with us. This is the view which I think the King always took of these reports, particularly when he mentioned to me his regret that our government could not settle its affair at Cuba without landing a force.

As M. de Villèle's conversation with Torreno, referred to in the enclosed papers, took place some days before I arrived at Paris, and that with me on the day of my arrival, it is not surprising that they should both have the colour of the notions prevalent at the time, however erroneous those notions, and that in a free and confidential conversation with me he should have



expressed what he felt. I had, however, another conversation with him upon the subject of our policy in relation to the Spanish colonies on the day before I left Paris, in which he stated distinctly the desire of the French government to act in concert with that of his Majesty on this subject; and he made a very remarkable avowal, which shows what their real intention is in these questions. He admitted that there was not capital in France to carry on the commerce which was most advantageous to the country, and which they had it in their power to carry on; but he said that whenever the agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers heard that our government had made any arrangement calculated to benefit British commerce, which arrangement the French government did not likewise adopt, they began immediately to complain, not of their own want of capital and enterprise, not of the antecedent circumstances which had deprived France of all maritime commerce and capital, but of the neglect of the French government, and of the superior foresight of that of his Majesty.

I mention this subject in confidence, just to show you in what state of mind I left M. de Villèle on these questions, and as the foundation for my hope that you will bear no more of these jealousies. If you do, you will know to what to attribute them.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Coombe Wood,  
Monday, 23rd Dec., 1822. 11 A.M.

I receive your despatches and private letter of the 19th here, on my way to Brighton, where I am commanded to dine to day. If I had learnt that you were actually arrived, I could hardly have refrained from returning to town to see you, though at the risk of being too late for dinner at the Pavilion. But I think I could not properly do so in the uncertainty as to the time of your arrival.

Would you not think it right (if not too much fatigued) to resume your journey, and pay your respects to the King?

You would find Lord Liverpool here (at Coombe) in your way, any time to-day.

It is not worth while, as we are to meet so soon, to enter into any discussion about the mediation. If there was any hazard in the course which we proposed, you have so executed our proposal as to achieve all the good

which we promised ourselves, and to avoid all the evil which you apprehended.

We have our "case"; and We still hope that we shall not miss our "object".

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

most sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I probably shall not be able to leave Brighton to-morrow before one or two o'clock. After that time I will be guided by what I may hear from you.

P.P.S.—Arbuthnot, who is here, desires me to say that he will call at Apsley House as soon as he gets to town to day.

*Sir W. A'Court to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Madrid, 24th Dec., 1822.

Your Grace's interesting packet was delivered to me two days ago, together with Mr. Canning's despatches of the 9th instant, by Mr. Jackson.

I refer you to the despatches which accompany this letter (which will of course be communicated to you by Sir Charles Stuart, if your Grace should still be at Paris, and which, if in London, will reach you officially), for every information respecting our position here, and the feelings of the government with respect to the proposed mediation.

The Paris papers of the 17th making some mention of such an arrangement, the thing has been very publicly canvassed, and as far as I can judge very ill received even by those who may be considered the most friendly to Great Britain. No transaction! No modifications! is the general cry; and the idea that England wishes to force her mediation upon Spain has excited a violence of feeling which I have never before observed in this country. Of course it will be my business to contradict these idle reports, which are eagerly propagated by our enemies.

Your Grace's efforts in favour of Spain have been the theme of great commendation here. The exaltados are pleased to allow that you have "done the State some service" upon this occasion!

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient, humble servant,

WILLIAM A'COURT.

*Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON CHER DUC,

Venise, ce 24<sup>me</sup> Déc., 1822.

J'ai reçu à Vérone peu avant mon départ les deux lettres que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser de Paris. Je vous remercie pour l'une comme pour

l'autre. La réponse de Mr. Canning à la note de M. de Marcellus m'avait déjà été communiquée de Londres, et je n'y ai trouvé que ce à quoi je m'étais attendu de tous tems. Vous me connaissez trop pour ne pas savoir que je ne suis pas du nombre des hommes qui s'alarment facilement, et cela bien moins encore quand il s'agit de positions Anglaises.

Les deux Empereurs sont partis d'ici le 22<sup>me</sup> et le 23<sup>me</sup> Déc. Je les rejoindrai à Innsbruck le 28<sup>me</sup>. L'Empereur de Russie prendra le 29<sup>me</sup> la route par la Bohême, pour retourner chez lui.

Je suis encore sans connaître la décision du gouvernement Français relativement au rappel de son Ambassadeur de Madrid. C'est avec beaucoup de calme que j'attends la décision sur le parti qu'il aura pris. Les facilités et les difficultés que la révolution d'Espagne offre à un plan quelconque que pourrait nourrir la France, ne se trouveront ni dans le rappel ni dans le maintien de son représentant à Madrid. Le fond des choses est trop fort pour que des nuances puissent influer grandement sur les positions. Le mal se nomme *la révolution*, et les calculs s'arrêtent bien vite dès qu'il s'agit d'un mal pareil. Ce que j'attends avec impatience c'est d'apprendre que notre Ministre ait quitté Madrid. Nous n'avons que faire dans cette galère, et nous serons bien plus forts le jour où nous serons en scission ouverte et franche avec un corps politique empesté. Tout est et reste faux dans *notre* position aussi longtems que nous devons user de ménagement envers un corps pareil. Vous savez combien nous sommes peu prosélitaires et combien peu nous cherchons ainsi à vouloir que tout le monde fasse ce que nous trouvons bon de faire pour nous.

Veuillez, mon cher Duc, me continuer vos bontés et votre confiance. Si vous voulez me faire comprendre quelque chose, contribuez à ce que l'on me parle clair; faites le vous-même aussi souvent que vous le jugerez à propos, et ne doutez jamais de la haute valeur que je vouerai à vos paroles comme à vos pensées.

Demandez compte à Madame de Lieven de ce que je lui mande par le présent courier relativement à l'invention d'un nouveau *piano forte* qu'un Vénitien vient de faire. Vous qui aimez la musique, et surtout le chant avec accompagnement de piano, vous ne pourrez faire mieux qu'en vous faisant faire l'un de ces instrumens; il suffit pour accompagner un chœur de chanteurs quelconque, et il remplace surtout *la basse*, que vous placez à côté de votre piano. Un piano *double* coûte 100 louis, et un piano *simple* (c'est-à-dire le *piano basso* seul) en coûte 50. Ce dernier sert pour accompagner un piano quelconque. Madame de Lieven vous expliquera tout cela, car je lui en ai fait une ample description. Si vous désirez l'un de ces instrumens je me charge de la commander. Je n'oublierai pas celle de la machine organisée de laquelle je vous ai parlé à Vérone.

Adieu, mon cher Duc. Agréez l'hommage des sentimens d'amitié et de haute considération que vous me connaissez depuis longtems pour vous.

METTERNICH.

*Le Duc de Montmorency to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*Paris, le 24<sup>me</sup> Déc., 1822.

Le soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a reçu et mis sous les yeux du Roi la note que Son Excellence Monsieur le Duc de Wellington lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser le 17<sup>me</sup> de ce mois.\*

Sa Majesté a apprécié les sentimens qui ont porté le Roi d'Angleterre à lui offrir sa médiation pour prévenir une rupture entre elle et le gouvernement Espagnol ; mais elle a dû reconnaître que la situation de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne n'était pas telle qu'il y eut lieu d'établir une médiation entre ces deux Cours. En effet, il n'existe entr'elles aucun différend, aucun point particulier de discussion, dont l'accommodement pût rétablir leurs relations sur le pied où elles devraient être. L'Espagne, par la nature de sa révolution, par les circonstances qui l'ont suivie, a excité l'inquiétude de plusieurs grandes Puissances. *L'Angleterre l'a partagée, cette inquiétude ; car dès 1820 elle prévoyait des cas où l'on ne pourrait conserver avec l'Espagne des rapports de bonne intelligence et de paix.* La France est plus intéressée que toute autre Puissance aux événemens qui peuvent résulter de la situation actuelle de cette monarchie. Mais ce ne sont point ses intérêts seuls qui sont compromis, et qu'elle peut avoir en vue dans la circonstance présente : ce sont ceux du repos de l'Europe et du maintien des principes qui le garantissent. *Monsieur le Duc de Wellington sait que tel a été le sentiment qui a dicté la conduite de la France à Vérone, et que les Cours qui y ont donné leur adhésion ont regardé les conséquences de la Révolution et de l'état actuel de l'Espagne comme leur étant communes ; qu'elles n'ont pas eu l'idée que ce fût entre la France et l'Espagne seulement qu'il y eût à régler les difficultés présentes ; qu'elles ont pensé qu'il s'agissait d'une question toute Européenne, et que c'est en conséquence de cette opinion qu'ont été conçues et proposées les démarches qui devaient avoir pour but d'amener, s'il est possible, une amélioration dans l'état d'un pays si digne de l'intérêt de l'Europe ; démarches dont le succès eût été complètement assuré, si l'Angleterre eût cru pouvoir y concourir.*

Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne, qui a dû peser mûrement ces considérations, a donc pensé qu'elle ne pouvait accepter la médiation que sa Majesté Britannique a bien voulu lui proposer. Elle trouve toutefois avec plaisir, dans cette proposition, un gage nouveau des dispositions conciliantes du Gouvernement Anglais ; et elle pense que dans ces dispositions il peut rendre d'éminens services à l'Europe, en faisant aussi passer au Gouvernement Espagnol des conseils qui, le ramenant à des idées plus calmes, pourraient influer heureusement sur sa position intérieure. Sa Majesté apprendrait avec la plus vive satisfaction le succès de ses efforts. Elle y verrait un gage d'espérance pour la conservation d'une paix dont les gouvernemens et les peuples de l'Europe doivent sentir vivement tout le prix.

Le soussigné saisit avec empressement l'occasion de renouveller à Son Excellence Monsieur le Duc de Wellington l'assurance de sa haute considération.

MATHIEU DE MONTMORENCY.

\* See page 655.

[ 274. ]

*To Prince Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

London, 25th Dec., 1822.

The more I consider the advantages which his Imperial Majesty would derive from an arrangement of commerce by licenses, to be paid for to his ambassador here, as proposed to you in my letter from Milan of the 1st instant, the more convinced I am that you ought to adopt it.

I beg you to look at this subject in this view. We will suppose that these licenses would produce only 50,000*l.* sterling per annum. Why should you not give your creditors in England a lien upon this money? When a certain time will have elapsed after the term *Austrian Loan* will have been effaced from our finance, and that it should be known that you possessed this revenue here, there is no doubt that you would be able to borrow money upon it at five per cent., instead of seven and eight which you now pay; and you will do this not only without the risks attending any alteration of your system of customs, but with a certainty of improving both that branch of your revenue and your system of commerce in Italy.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 275. ]

*To Prince Metternich.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

London, 26th Dec., 1822.

Since I returned to England I have conversed with the ministers on the communications which I had had with your Highness respecting the Austrian loan immediately previous to my departure from Verona, and I have been desired to assure you that they consider two millions sterling in money, and one million in quicksilver or timber as the lowest sum which can satisfy reasonable men in this country for the sacrifice made of all claims on the part of the public on his Majesty the Emperor, on account of loans raised here for his Imperial Majesty's service. A diminution of this sum would only tend to defeat the object of both governments in coming to any arrangement on this subject. Your Highness will recollect that in the letter which I wrote you on the 19th of October I stated three millions in money and one million in quicksilver and timber as the

amount which would satisfy the British government, and the payment to be made in two years; and in a conversation which I had with your Highness afterwards, I stated that if there was any diminution of the sum which I had demanded, there must be a proportionate diminution of the term fixed in which the payments should be made.

I have great pleasure in informing your Highness, however, that there will be no occasion to accelerate the time fixed for the payment, as proposed in my letter of the 19th of October, although the sum to be paid in money is reduced from three millions sterling to two. The British government will be satisfied to receive it in equal payments within the years 1823 and 1824.

There remains, however, one point upon which I have been desired to press your Highness as urgently as may be in my power; and that is the period of the conclusion of the convention upon this subject, and that at which it may be practicable for his Majesty's government to make this arrangement public without inconvenience to that of his Imperial Majesty. It is felt here that nearly all the benefit which we can derive from this arrangement will depend upon our being able to state it to Parliament on the first day of the session, viz., on the 4th of February. It is useless that I should enter into all the circumstances of our situation, but I will only tell you that the finance of the year will depend very materially upon this arrangement, and that it is most important to us to know and to be able to state that it is concluded before the meeting of Parliament on the 4th of February.

I hope, therefore, that you will lose no time in negotiating the convention with Mr. Gordon, and that at all events you will release me from the promise I made you of secrecy upon this subject in the last interview which I had with you.

In addition to the importance to our finance of this year of an immediate settlement of this question, I assure you that we consider it of the utmost importance to his Majesty the Emperor, towards whom we wish to encourage the good opinion and good will and confidence of the Parliament and country.

I have been desired, however, to tell you that if we are not enabled to announce the settlement of the arrangement at the commencement of the session his Majesty's government must consider themselves at liberty to revise their terms, and to insist

upon others more nearly equal in amount to the losses which this country has sustained, and the expenses it has incurred in consequence of these loans for his Imperial Majesty's service.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 26th Dec., 1822.

I have received your letter of the 21st enclosing the despatch of Mr. Canning of the 19th, together with the extracts of the preceding despatches to which it has referred.

I much fear that these instructions will lie by me for some time before any opportunity of adverting to the subject will be afforded me.

Though M. de Villèle's former habits have necessarily caused him to imbibe most of the prejudices which prevail in France against our government upon colonial and commercial subjects, his good sense does not allow him to contest the justice of a fair explanation; and I attribute therefore solely to your efforts the very favourable change in his opinions upon these questions which is visible since your departure, and which renders it quite unnecessary for me to go over the same ground again unless it shall be called for by what passes in conversation with his colleagues.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours very faithfully,

CHARLES STUART.

*Lord Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Bruxelles, 27th Dec., 1822.

Your letter of the 19th instant, with its most interesting enclosures by M. le Baron Fagel, reached me only last night. To-day I have communicated the two papers to Nagell, and shall probably to-morrow make a similar communication to the King. Mr. Canning has had the goodness to keep us well informed of the outline and general results of your proceedings at Verona on Spanish affairs, and these have, from time to time, as they arrived, been imparted to the King and to Nagell; we have however had few original pieces. The copy of your most excellent note of the 12th of November, full of sound sense and of sound doctrine, has afforded much satisfaction, because it has afforded increased hope to Nagell and to me, that peace may yet be maintained. Against such reasoning it would seem almost madness for the Cabinet of the Tuilleries to embark in war. It seems indeed to have had its effect upon them; but the fear is, that they have already been urged too far forward to be enabled to retract; more especially as you seem to think that, though suspended for a moment, the despatches from Verona to the several Ministers at Madrid, must still be expedited.

This Court is quite with ours in favour of maintaining a strict neutrality in the event of war, and I firmly believe are quite prepared to resist every

effort which may be made by Russia or by any other power to wean her from this system. An additional argument, which will scarcely fail to present itself to the French Ministry in favour of their continuing in a state of peace, will be drawn from the neutral policy even of this small kingdom. For, with Prussia lukewarm, and the Netherlands identified with Great Britain in policy, would it be quite prudent for France to expose a large portion of her frontier to the chances of such events as may result from a state of war with Spain?

I was aware of the instruction sent out to you to Verona relative to the prohibition by this country of certain articles in transit through its rivers, and I find the Austrian Envoy at this Court has already been directed to co-operate with me in remonstrance on this subject. My instructions have not yet reached me, they are probably on their way hither, but the weather has prevented the arrival here of any mails from England for the last week; two are now due.

Yours, my dear Duke, most sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

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*Lord Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Coombe Wood, 27th Dec., 1822.

You will see Sir C. Stuart's despatches. The ministers of the three Powers are to be withdrawn. If Villèle continues to think that he must ultimately adopt the same course unless the Spaniards agree to modify their Constitution, war, I fear, is inevitable. No one detests their Constitution more than I do; but nothing would induce me, if I were a Spaniard, to alter an Article in it at the *dictum* of any foreign Powers, or until it was evident it had been done exclusively upon national considerations, and from national feelings.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

[ 276. ]

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

London, 31st Dec., 1822.

I enclose M. le Duc de Montmorency's note,\* which appears to be a parting blow at us.

I don't exactly recollect Lord Londonderry's Memorandum, but if I remember right, we have never gone further than to say that there might be cases in which it would not be possible to preserve the relations of amity and peace; which is very different from *foreseeing cases*.

In respect to the second and third part of the note marked,

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\* See page 667.



I should say that from the commencement to the end of the proceedings at Verona, the case of Spain under consideration was a French case, and nothing else. It was brought forward as a French case; the answers given were as to a French case; the replies were from French ministers; and the *procès-verbal* is founded upon French cases.

The Allies thought proper, in addition, to give certain orders to their ministers at Madrid; but it must be observed that one of my principal objections to this measure was that it aggravated the evil of the French case, and that M<sup>ons.</sup> de Villele's late effort to have the transmission of these despatches suspended is founded upon the very reasoning in my answer to the proposition that his Majesty's government should transmit a similar despatch to his minister at Madrid.

I don't know whether it is worth while to make these observations, but I have thought it is as well to state them to you.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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